Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Plant Protection System”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 1,009 records · Page 56

Investigation of instrumentation containing an embedded digital device - 257

The U.S. nuclear power industry primarily relies on mature, well-proven analog technology as the basis for most instrumentation and control (I and C) equipment employed in its nuclear power plants (NPPs). However, the market for this legacy instrumentation is very small and availability of such equipment for spare parts or replacement is increasingly limited. Frequently, modern I and C equipment contains embedded digital devices (EDDs), such as microprocessors and programmable logic devices. While the enhanced functional capabilities provided by the digital components offer improved performance, reliability, and maintainability, the corresponding complexity of sophisticated digital implementations also exacerbate concerns about an increased potential for undetected systematic faults, which can lead to common-cause failure (CCF). As part of a research project sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy, an investigation has been conducted of commercially available instrumentation marketed for nuclear or industrial application. The objective was to identify the usage of EDDs and to determine the types of functional roles allocated to the devices. Examples of the equipment surveyed include smart sensors, sequencers for emergency diesel generators, pumps, valve actuators, motor control centers, breakers, priority logic modules, and uninterruptible power sources. Where sufficient detail was found, an evaluation was performed to ascertain the nature and role of the digital technology implemented in the instrumentation. The information gained through this investigation serves as technical input for defining a classification approach for EDDs based on the functional impact of the device. For example, the role of an EDD can involve any of the following functions: performance monitoring and diagnostics, information extraction and communication, instrument condition monitoring and protection, or execution of core instrument functions. Classifying digital devices according to their role in the operation of the instrumentation in which they are embedded can enable determination of the potential functional impact of failure of that device and contribute to determination of the potential safety significance of a CCF event disabling all instances of that device. This paper will report on the findings of the investigation of instrumentation with EDDs and indicate considerations for the emerging classification approach. The higher-level goal of this effort is to determine whether a graded approach to qualification testing may be possible based on classification. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Survey of Cyber Risk Analysis Techniques for Use in the Nuclear Industry

Using traditional probabilistic risk analysis methods for severe accident safety risk management on non-digital systems, structures, and components at nuclear power plants is well-established. In contrast, cyber risk analysis of digital assets is still an immature field with unproven techniques due, in part, to the continuously changing threat environment and the challenge of digital assets failing in unexpected ways. As the nuclear fleet continues to adopt digital instrumentation and control systems, it is increasingly important to have effective and efficient cyber risk analysis techniques to support risk management decisions, such as risk elimination by system redesign or risk mitigation by implementation of prioritized security controls. To understand the state of the art in cyber risk analysis for future research, we surveyed 36 publications across ten application domains. We describe our survey methodology and rate each technique based upon scope, adoptability, and repeatability. In this work, we examine the unique constraints of the nuclear industry and outline the strengths and weaknesses of using the cyber risk analysis techniques in the industry, highlighting gaps with current techniques. We also discuss challenges and potential research directions for advancing the science for both existing and new advanced reactors.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Final Report for the Testing of the Y-12 Criticality Accident Alarm System Detectors at the Godiva IV Burst Reactor (IER-443)

This report documents the experimental conditions and final results for the performance testing of the Y-12 Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) detectors at the Godiva IV Burst Reactor at the National Criticality Experimental Research Center (NCERC) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The testing followed a previously issued test plan and was conducted during the week of July 17, 2017, with completion on Thursday July 20. The test subjected CAAS detectors supplied by Y-12 to very intense and short duration mixed neutron and gamma radiation fields to establish compliance to maximum radiation and minimum pulse width requirements. ANSI/ANS- 8.3.1997 states that the “system shall be sufficiently robust as to actuate an alarm signal when exposed to the maximum radiation expected”, which has been defined at Y-12, in Documented Safety Analyses (DSAs), to be a dose rate of 10 Rad/s. ANSI/ANS-8.3.1997 further states that “alarm actuation shall occur as a result of a minimum duration transient” which may be assumed to be 1 msec. The pulse widths and dose rates provided by each burst during the test exceeded those requirements. The CAAS detectors all provided an immediate alarm signal and remained operable after the bursts establishing compliance to the requirements and fitness for re-deployment at Y-12.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

NPP Structure, System, Component and Decommissioning Activity based Radiological Environmental Impact Evaluation - 18254

Nuclear power plant consists of Structures, Systems and Components (SSCs), and decommissioning activity and radiological environmental impact evaluation item are identified and may be tracked to SSC. The breakdown structures for SCCs, decommissioning activities, and radiological environmental impact evaluation items are illustrated, respectively. A matrix is provided possibly to identify and manage the radioactive environmental impact evaluation items corresponding to the decommissioning activities in SCCs. This matching relation and breakdown structures are expected to help not only to identify radiological environmental impact with its cause, but also to establish countermeasure to the lowest manageable level, focusing on SSCs and decommissioning activities. This approach is also applicable to decommissioning other nuclear facilities. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

MAN-004 Design Standards Manual

At Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico (SNL/NM), the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of facilities is guided by industry standards, a graded approach, and the systematic analysis of life cycle benefits received for costs incurred. The design of the physical plant must ensure that the facilities are "fit for use," and provide conditions that effectively, efficiently, and safely support current and future mission needs. In addition, SNL/NM applies sustainable design principles, using an integrated whole-building design approach, from site planning to facility design, construction, and operation to ensure building resource efficiency and the health and productivity of occupants. The safety and health of the workforce and the public, any possible effects on the environment, and compliance with building codes take precedence over project issues, such as performance, cost, and schedule. These design standards generally apply to all disciplines on all SNL/NM projects. Architectural and engineering design must be both functional and cost-effective. Facility design must be tailored to fit its intended function, while emphasizing low-maintenance, energy-efficient, and energy-conscious design. Design facilities that can be maintained easily, with readily accessible equipment areas, low maintenance, and quality systems. To promote an orderly and efficient appearance, architectural features of new facilities must complement and enhance the existing architecture at the site. As an Architectural and Engineering (A/E) professional, you must advise the Project Manager when this approach is prohibitively expensive. You are encouraged to use professional judgment and ingenuity to produce a coordinated interdisciplinary design that is cost-effective, easily contractible or buildable, high-performing, aesthetically pleasing, and compliant with applicable building codes. Close coordination and development of civil, landscape, structural, architectural, fire protection, mechanical, electrical, telecommunications, and security features is expected to ensure compatibility with planned functional equipment and to facilitate constructability. If portions of the design are subcontracted to specialists, delivery of the finished design documents must not be considered complete until the subcontracted portions are also submitted for review. You must, along with support consultants, perform functional analyses and programming in developing design solutions. These solutions must reflect coordination of the competing functional, budgetary, and physical requirements for the project. During design phases, meetings between you and the SNL/NM Project Team to discuss and resolve design issues are required. These meetings are a normal part of the design process. For specific design-review requirements, see the project-specific Design Criteria. In addition to the design requirements described in this manual, instructive information is provided to explain the sustainable building practice goals for design, construction, operation, and maintenance of SNL/NM facilities. Please notify SNL/NM personnel of design best practices not included in this manual, so they can be incorporated in future updates.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Sandia National Laboratories Facilities Management and Operations Center Design Standards Manual

At Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico (SNL/NM), the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of facilities is guided by industry standards, a graded approach, and the systematic analysis of life cycle benefits received for costs incurred. The design of the physical plant must ensure that the facilities are "fit for use," and provide conditions that effectively, efficiently, and safely support current and future mission needs. In addition, SNL/NM applies sustainable design principles, using an integrated whole-building design approach, from site planning to facility design, construction, and operation to ensure building resource efficiency and the health and productivity of occupants. The safety and health of the workforce and the public, any possible effects on the environment, and compliance with building codes take precedence over project issues, such as performance, cost, and schedule. These design standards generally apply to all disciplines on all SNL/NM projects. Architectural and engineering design must be both functional and cost-effective. Facility design must be tailored to fit its intended function, while emphasizing low-maintenance, energy-efficient, and energy-conscious design. Design facilities that can be maintained easily, with readily accessible equipment areas, low maintenance, and quality systems. To promote an orderly and efficient appearance, architectural features of new facilities must complement and enhance the existing architecture at the site. As an Architectural and Engineering (A/E) professional, you must advise the Project Manager when this approach is prohibitively expensive. You are encouraged to use professional judgment and ingenuity to produce a coordinated interdisciplinary design that is cost-effective, easily contractible or buildable, high-performing, aesthetically pleasing, and compliant with applicable building codes. Close coordination and development of civil, landscape, structural, architectural, fire protection, mechanical, electrical, telecommunications, and security features is expected to ensure compatibility with planned functional equipment and to facilitate constructability. If portions of the design are subcontracted to specialists, delivery of the finished design documents must not be considered complete until the subcontracted portions are also submitted for review. You must, along with support consultants, perform functional analyses and programming in developing design solutions. These solutions must reflect coordination of the competing functional, budgetary, and physical requirements for the project. During design phases, meetings between you and the SNL/NM Project Team to discuss and resolve design issues are required. These meetings are a normal part of the design process. For specific design-review requirements, see the project-specific Design Criteria. In addition to the design requirements described in this manual, instructive information is provided to explain the sustainable building practice goals for design, construction, operation, and maintenance of SNL/NM facilities. Please notify SNL/NM personnel of design best practices not included in this manual, so they can be incorporated in future updates. You must convey all documents describing work to the SNL/NM Project Manager in both hard copy and in an electronic format compatible with the SNL/NM-prescribed CADD and other software packages, and in accordance with a SNL/NM approved standard format. Print all hard copy versions of submitted documents (excluding drawings and renderings) double-sided when practical.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Surface-modified microchannel-type process heat exchanger (PHE) for hydrogen production using sulfur-iodine cycle - 18481

For massive production of hydrogen using a very high temperature gas-cooled reactor (VHTR) system, a small-scale process heat exchanger (PHE) for feasibility testing of a sulfur-iodine (S-I) cycle is designed at KAERI. Printed circuit type heat exchanger (PCHE), which is suitable for a helium/decomposed sulfuric acid (SO{sub 3}/SO{sub 2}) heat transfer system, is employed with surface modification to protect the substrate alloy from the corrosive sulfuric acid environment. Experiments on diffusion bonding, which is a key technology in compact-type heat exchangers, are conducted to achieve considerable strength and ductility at both room and high temperature. Metallographic examination reveals the migrated grain boundary across the interface. Tensile ductility over 35 % is achieved and dimples are observed on the fracture surface in all testing temperatures. For surface modification, β-SiC having high corrosion resistance is deposited on the surface of the microchannels using electron beam physical vapor deposition (EB-PVD) followed by ion-beam irradiation to enhance the adherence at the interface of β-SiC/alloy. Through corrosion testing in aqueous sulfuric acid (60 vol.%), the weight loss of the surface-modified specimens is decreased by one order of magnitude, implying the relevance of coating for this application. (authors)

08 HYDROGEN↗

Radionuclide Inventory Calculations for the Calcined Solid Storage Facility Performance Assessment - 19292

Originally named the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant when it was constructed in the early 1950's, the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center reprocessed SNF to recover highly enriched uranium and other nuclear-related products for the U.S. DOE. Reprocessing SNF generated millions of gallons of aqueous radioactive waste. Calcination was a process developed at the INL Site to convert liquid waste into a solid, granular form from 1963 to 2000. The calcination process produced a safer product for storage while reducing the volume of stored liquid waste by an average factor of seven. Calcine is currently stored in the Calcined Solids Storage Facility (CSSF). The CSSFs are often called 'bin sets' because each CSSF (CSSFs 1 through 6) contains several stainless-steel storage bins housed in a concrete vault. The CSSF is an interim waste storage facility. In the future, calcine will be retrieved, treated (if necessary), and sent to an off-Site facility for storage or disposal. To close the CSSF, the bulk of the calcine will be removed and stored or disposed of elsewhere. The bins and vaults will then be placed in a configuration that is protective of human health and the environment. For purposes of the performance assessment, the depth of the residual calcine at closure was assumed to be 5-cm in each bin. The 5-cm of residual calcine in each bin is assumed to be mixed in grout during closure. The activities of the residual radionuclides are the inventory used for the dose assessment calculations for the CSSF performance assessment. The objective of this analysis was to calculate the radionuclide activity in the residual calcine remaining in the CSSF after closure. The purpose of this paper is to present the approach used to calculate the radionuclide inventory of the calcine currently stored in CSSF and the residual calcine in the CSSF after closure using data from the calcined waste Historical Processing Model (HPM). Limited sampling and analysis of the calcine in the CSSF bins was conducted in the past. Future similar calcine sampling and analysis efforts would be costly, generate additional mixed waste, and may not provide the desired detailed calcine composition data. However, during the later years of calcining, an alternative to calcine sampling and analysis was developed and the information was captured in the HPM. The HPM uses multiple sources to provide definitive calcine volume, mass, and composition, including: compositions and volumes of the liquid wastes that were calcined, ORIGEN2 - and ORIGEN-ARP-based radioactivity calculations, calciner and CSSF operating data, and process knowledge of INTEC fuel and waste-processing systems. HPM calcine composition was used to develop an inventory of radionuclides for use in the performance assessment evaluation for closure of CSSF. There are 43 bins that contain calcine, with six to twelve segments in each bin for a total of 337 bin segments for which the HPM calculates the average calcine composition. The HPM calculates the composition of each of the nearly 7,000 batches of material (startup bed, nonradioactive material, and radioactive waste) charged to the calciners. The calculations use the CSSF dimensions, including the CSSF number of bins, heights, outside diameters, annular air space diameter (if necessary), and volume of calcine currently in the bins. For each of the CSSFs, for a 5-cm residual, the percent of total calcine was calculated along with the residual activity for the radionuclides. Residual activity was estimated for 148 different radionuclides. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Development of solid materials for UF 6 sampling: FY16 Annual Report

A handheld implementation of the ABACC-developed Cristallini method, which captures uranium hexafluoride samples as an inert salt, was organized in FY17 and succeeded in demonstrating the handheld sampler concept with reactive hexafluoride gases. The Cristallini method relies on the use of a hydrated substrate to react the incoming hexafluoride resulting in the formation of a stable uranyl fluoride salt. The Cristallini method has been demonstrated as a facility modification installed near the sampling tap of a gas centrifuge enrichment plant. While very successful in reducing the hazards of uranium hexafluoride sample, the method still takes a considerable amount of time and can only be used in facilities where the apparatus has been installed; this arrangement generally prohibits the sampling of filled cylinders that have already exited the facility and have been deposited in the on-site tank storage yard. The handheld unit under development will allow the use of the Cristallini method at facilities that have not been converted as well as tanks in the storage yard. The handheld system utilizes an active vacuum system, rather than a passive vacuum system in the facility setup, to drive the uranium hexafluoride onto the adsorbing media. The handheld unit will be battery operated for fully autonomous operation and will include onboard pressure sensing and flushing capability. To date, the system concept of operations was demonstrated with tungsten hexafluoride that showed the active vacuum pump with multiple cartridges of adsorbing media was viable. Concurrently, the hardened prototype system was developed and tested; removable sample cartridges were developed (the only non-COTS component to date); and preparations were made for uranium tests and a domestic field test.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

TECHNICAL BASIS FOR EVALUATING SURFACE BARRIERS TO PROTECT GROUNDWATER FROM DEEP VADOSE ZONE CONTAMINATION

The U.S. DOE and its predecessors released nearly 2 trillion liters (450 billion gallons) of contaminated liquid into the vadose zone at the Hanford Site. Some of the contaminants currently reside in the deeper parts of the vadose zone where they are much less accessible to characterization, monitoring, and typical remediation activities. The DOE Richland Operations Office (DOE-RL) prepared a treatability test plan in 2008 to examine remediation options for addressing contaminants in the deep vadose zone; one of the technologies identified was surface barriers (also known as engineered barriers, covers, and caps). In the typical configuration, the contaminants are located relatively close to the surface, generally within 15 m, and thus they are close to the base of the surface barrier. The proximity of the surface barrier under these conditions yielded few concerns about the effectiveness of the barrier at depth, particularly for cases in which the contaminants were in a lined facility. At Hanford, however, some unlined sites have contaminants located well below depths of 15 m. The issue raised about these sites is the degree of effectiveness of a surface barrier in isolating contaminants in the deep vadose zone. Previous studies by Hanford Site and PNNL researchers suggest that surface barriers have the potential to provide a significant degree of isolation of deep vadose zone contaminants. The studies show that the actual degree of isolation is site-specific and depends on many factors, including recharge rates, barrier size, depth of contaminants, geohydrologic properties ofthe sediments, and the geochemical interactions between the contaminants and the sediments. After the DOE-RL treatability test plan was published, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory was contracted to review the information available to support surface barrier evaluation for the deep vadose zone, identify gaps in the information and outcomes necessary to fill the data gaps, and outline tasks to achieve those outcomes. Full understanding of contaminant behavior in the deep vadose zone is constrained by four key data gaps: limited access; limited data; limited time; and the lack of an accepted predictive capability for determining whether surface barriers can effectively isolate deep vadose zone contaminants. Activities designed to fill these data gaps need to have these outcomes: (1) common evaluation methodology that provides a clear, consistent, and defensible basis for evaluating groundwater impacts caused by placement of a surface barrier above deep vadose zone contamination; (2) deep vadose zone data that characterize the lithology, the spatial distribution of moisture and contaminants, the physical, chemical, and biological process that affect the mobility of each contaminant, and the impacts to the contaminants following placement of a surface barrier; (3) subsurface monitoring to provide subsurface characterization of initial conditions and changes that occur during and following remediation activities; and (4) field observations that span years to decades to validate the evaluation methodology. A set of six proposed tasks was identified to provide information needed to address the above outcomes. The proposed tasks are: (1) Evaluation Methodology - Develop common evaluation methodology that will provide a clear, consistent, and defensible basis for evaluating groundwater impacts caused by placement of a surface barrier above deep vadose zone contamination. (2) Case Studies - Conduct case studies to demonstrate the applicability ofthe common evaluation methodology and provide templates for subsequent use elsewhere. Three sites expected to have conditions that would yield valuable information and experience pertinent to deep vadose zone contamination were chosen to cover a range of conditions. The sites are BC Cribs and Trenches, U Plant Cribs, and the T Farm Interim Cover. (3) Subsurface Monitoring Technologies - Evaluate minimally invasive geophysical approaches for delineating subsurface plumes and monitoring their migration in the deep vadose zone. (4) Controlled Field Test at Sisson and Lu Site - Evaluate the ability ofthe model to predict long-term liquid, vapor, and chemical transport processes at a well-characterized site containing a plume of subsurface water and tracer remaining from injections in the early 1980s and 2000s. (5) Deep Vadose Zone Monitoring at T Farm - Demonstrate the ability of the geophysical sensors and the model to detect and predict long-term migration of liquid and vapor between the vadose zone beneath the infiltration area and the vadose zone protected by the interim cover. (6) Deep Vadose Zone Monitoring at the Prototype Hanford Barrier - Demonstrate the ability of geophysical sensors and the model to detect and predict the hydrologic conditions in the vadose zone beneath the Prototype Hanford Barrier 15 years after construction.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 37, No. 2, April-June 1996]

Nuclear Safety is a journal that covers significant issues in the field of nuclear safety. Its primary scope is safety in the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear power reactors worldwide and the research and analysis activities that promote this goal, but it also encompasses the safety aspects of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing and handling, and nuclear waste disposal, the handling of fissionable materials and radioisotopes, and the environmental effects of all these activities. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 97 The Nuclear Community and the Public: Cognitive and Cultural Influences on Thinking About Nuclear Risk, M. A. Meyer; 109 Twenty-Third Water Reactor Safety Information Meeting, D. A. Copinger; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 126 Analysis of a PWR LBLOCA Without SCRAM, Trevor N. Tyler, Rafael Macian-Juan and John H. Mahaffy; DESIGN FEATURES: 139 Vulnerability of Multiple-Barrier Systems, N. C. Lind; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 149 A Study of Wet Catalytic Oxidation of Radioactive Spent Ion Exchange Resin by Hydrogen Peroxide, Xingchao Jian, Tianbao Wu, and Guichun Yun; 157 A Comparison Study and Resolution of Differences Between Emergency Response and Safety Analysis Codes Used at the Savannah River Site, A. A. Simpkins; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 164 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 167 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 172 Proposed Rule Changes as of Dec. 31,1995; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 178 American Nuclear Society 1997 Annual Meeting; 178 American Nuclear Society Nuclear Criticality and Safety Division Topical Meeting; 176 The Authors.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Dose coefficients and derived guidance and clinical decision levels for contaminated wounds

The NCRP Wound Model describing the retention of selected radionuclides at the site of a contaminated wound and their uptake into the transfer compartment has been combined with the ICRP element-specific systemic models for those radionuclides to derive dose coefficients for intakes via contaminated wounds. Those coefficients have been used to generate derived guidance levels (i.e., the activity in a wound that would result in an effective dose of 20 or 50 mSv, or in some cases, a committed organ equivalent dose of 500 mSv), and clinical decision levels (i.e., activity levels that would indicate the need for consideration of medical intervention to remove activity from the wound site or administration of decorporation therapy or both), typically set at 5 times the derived guidance levels. Data are provided for the radionuclides commonly encountered at nuclear power plants and nuclear weapons, fuel fabrication or recycling, waste disposal, medical and research facilities. These include: {sup 60}Co, {sup 90}Sr, {sup 99m}Tc, {sup 131}I, {sup 137}Cs, {sup 192}Ir, {sup 210}Po, {sup 226,228}Ra, {sup 228,232}Th, {sup 235,238}U, {sup 237}Np, {sup 238,239}Pu, {sup 241}Am, {sup 242,244}Cm, and {sup 252}Cf.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Assessment of Pump Coastdown and Reactor Protection Scram Delays during Station Blackout Conditions

This report presents an assessment of the impact of pump coastdown time and reactor protection scram delays for the Versatile Test Reactor (VTR) during Protected Station Blackout (PSBO) conditions. While previous simulations for the VTR assumed centrifugal pumps in the primary system, the current pre-conceptual design uses electromagnetic (EM) pumps. Because there is uncertainty as to what the parameters of the EM pump design will be, this report focuses on the impact of the flow coastdown and the reactor protection scram delay, not on the needs of the pump design. PSBO transient simulations were performed using the SAS4A/SASSYS-1 fast reactor safety analysis code (version 5.2.3). The model used in the simulations is based on the FY18 SAS4A/SASSYS-1 model. A change to the model was made to replace the centrifugal pump model with an electromagnetic pump model with a motor generator as a coastdown mechanism. The results of the PSBO transient simulations were assessed against the criteria used in Reference 2 with an additional 50°C for conservatism to account for uncertainties. The results show that as the delay before scramming the rods increases, the moment of inertia of the coastdown mechanism must increase to satisfy the criteria. By increasing the moment of inertia to extend the flow coastdown, temperatures can be kept below the desired limits with reactor protection scram delays between 3 and 10 seconds.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Comparison of REMIX vs. MOX fuel characteristics in multiple recycling in VVER reactor

Multiple recycling of regenerated uranium-plutonium fuel in thermal reactors of VVER-1000 type with high enriched uranium feeding (REMIX-fuel) gives a possibility to terminate the accumulation of spent nuclear fuels (SNF) and Pu and decrease the accumulation of irradiated uranium by an order of magnitude. Results of comparison of VVER-1000 nuclear fuel cycle characteristics vs different fuel types such as UOX, MOX and REMIX-fuel have been presented. REMIX fuel (Regenerated Mixture of U-, Pu oxides) is the mixture of plutonium and uranium extracted from SNF and refined from other actinides and fission products with the addition of enriched uranium to provide the power potential necessary. The savings in terms of uranium quantities and separation works in the nuclear energy system (NES) with reactors using REMIX-fuel compared to the NES with uranium-fuelled reactors are shown to be of about 30% and 8%, respectively. For the NES with thermal reactors partially loaded with MOX-fuel, the uranium and separation works saving of about 14% would be obtained. Production of neptunium and americium in reactors with REMIX-fuel in steady state increases by a factor 3, and production of curium - by 10 compared to the reactors with UOX-fuel. This increase of minor actinide buildup is owed to the multiple recycling of plutonium. It should be noted that in this case all fuel assemblies contain high-background plutonium, and their manufacturing involves an expensive technology. Besides, management of REMIX-fuel will require special protection measures even during the fresh fuel manufacturing phase. The above-said gives ground to state that the use of REMIX fuel would be questionable in economic aspect.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Adaptive Management Methods to Protect the California Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Water Resource

The California Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta is the hub for California's water supply, conveying water from Northern to Southern California agriculture and communities while supporting important ecosystem services, agriculture, and communities in the Delta. Changes in climate, long-term drought, water quality changes, and expansion of invasive aquatic plants threatens ecosystems, impedes ecosystem restoration, and is economically, environmentally, and sociologically detrimental to the San Francisco Bay/California Delta complex. NASA Ames Research Center and the USDA-ARS partnered with the State of California and local governments to develop science-based, adaptive-management strategies for the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. The project combines science, operations, and economics related to integrated management scenarios for aquatic weeds to help land and waterway managers make science-informed decisions regarding management and outcomes. The team provides a comprehensive understanding of agricultural and urban land use in the Delta and the major water sheds (San Joaquin/Sacramento) supplying the Delta and interaction with drought and climate impacts on the environment, water quality, and weed growth. The team recommends conservation and modified land-use practices and aids local Delta stakeholders in developing management strategies. New remote sensing tools have been developed to enhance ability to assess conditions, inform decision support tools, and monitor management practices. Science gaps in understanding how native and invasive plants respond to altered environmental conditions are being filled and provide critical biological response parameters for Delta-SWAT simulation modeling. Operational agencies such as the California Department of Boating and Waterways provide testing and act as initial adopter of decision support tools. Methods developed by the project can become routine land and water management tools in complex river delta systems.

Agriculture↗

PJM Controller Testing with Prototypic PJM Nozzle Configuration

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of River Protection’s Waste Treatment Plant (WTP) is being designed and built to pre-treat and then vitrify a large portion of the wastes in Hanford’s 177 underground waste storage tanks. The WTP consists of three primary facilities—pretreatment, low-activity waste (LAW) vitrification, and high-level waste (HLW) vitrification. The pretreatment facility will receive waste piped from the Hanford tank farms and separate it into a high-volume, low-activity liquid stream stripped of most solids and radionuclides and a much smaller volume of HLW slurry containing most of the solids and most of the radioactivity. Many of the vessels in the pretreatment facility will contain pulse jet mixers (PJM) that will provide some or all of the mixing in the vessels. Pulse jet mixer technology was selected for use in black cell regions of the WTP, where maintenance cannot be performed once hot testing and operations commence. The PJMs have no moving mechanical parts that require maintenance. The vessels with the most concentrated slurries will also be mixed with air spargers and/or steady jets in addition to the mixing provided by the PJMs. Pulse jet mixers are susceptible to overblows that can generate large hydrodynamic forces, forces that can damage mixing vessels or their internal parts. The probability of an overblow increases if a PJM does not fill completely. The purpose of the testing performed for this report was to determine how reliable and repeatable the primary and safety (or backup) PJM control systems are at detecting drive overblows (DOB) and charge vessel full (CVF) conditions. Testing was performed on the ABB 800xA and Triconex control systems. The controllers operated an array of four PJMs installed in an approximately 13 ft diameter × 15 ft tall tank located in the high bay of the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) 336 Building test facility. The PJMs were fitted with 4 inch diameter discharge nozzles representative of the nozzles to be used in the WTP. This work supplemented earlier controller tests done on PJMs with 2 inch nozzles (Bontha et al. 2007). Those earlier tests enabled the selection of appropriate pressure transmitters with associated piping and resulted in an alternate overblow detection algorithm that uses data from pressure transmitters mounted in a water flush line on the PJM airlines. Much of that earlier work was only qualitative, however, due to a data logger equipment failure that occurred during the 2007 testing. The objectives of the current work focused on providing quantitative determinations of the ability of the BNI controllers to detect DOB and CVF conditions. On both control systems, a DOB or CVF is indicated when the values of particular internal functions, called confidence values, cross predetermined thresholds. There are two types of confidence values; one based on a transformation of jet pump pair (JPP) drive and suction pressures, the other based on the pressure in the flush line. In the present testing, we collected confidence levels output from the ABB and Triconex controllers. These data were analyzed in terms of the true and noise confidence peaks generated during multiple cycles of DOB and CVF events. The distributions of peak and noise amplitudes were compared to see if thresholds could be set that would enable the detection of DOB and CVF events at high probabilities, while keeping false detections to low probabilities. Supporting data were also collected on PJM operation, including data on PJM pressures and levels, to provide direct experimental evidence of when PJMs were filling, full, driving, or overblowing.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Direct observation of pitting corrosion evolutions on carbon steel surfaces at the nano-to-micro- scales

The Cl¯-induced corrosion of metals and alloys is of relevance to a wide range of engineered materials, structures, and systems. Because of the challenges in studying pitting corrosion in a quantitative and statistically significant manner, its kinetics remain poorly understood. Herein, by direct, nano- to micro-scale observations using vertical scanning interferometry (VSI), we examine the temporal evolution of pitting corrosion on AISI 1045 carbon steel over large surface areas in Cl¯-free, and Cl¯-enriched solutions. Special focus is paid to examine the nucleation and growth of pits, and the associated formation of roughened regions on steel surfaces. By statistical analysis of hundreds of individual pits, three stages of pitting corrosion, namely, induction, propagation, and saturation, are quantitatively distinguished. By quantifying the kinetics of these processes, we contextualize our current understanding of electrochemical corrosion within a framework that considers spatial dynamics and morphology evolutions. In the presence of Cl¯ ions, corrosion is highly accelerated due to multiple autocatalytic factors including destabilization of protective surface oxide films and preservation of aggressive microenvironments within the pits, both of which promote continued pit nucleation and growth. Furthermore these findings offer new insights into predicting and modeling steel corrosion processes in mid-pH aqueous environments

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 37, No. 2, April-June 1996]

Nuclear Safety is a journal that covers significant issues in the field of nuclear safety. Its primary scope is safety in the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear power reactors worldwide and the research and analysis activities that promote this goal, but it also encompasses the safety aspects of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing and handling, and nuclear waste disposal, the handling of fissionable materials and radioisotopes, and the environmental effects of all these activities. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 97 The Nuclear Community and the Public: Cognitive and Cultural Influences on Thinking About Nuclear Risk, M. A. Meyer; 109 Twenty-Third Water Reactor Safety Information Meeting, D. A. Copinger; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 126 Analysis of a PWR LBLOCA Without SCRAM, Trevor N. Tyler, Rafael Macian-Juan and John H. Mahaffy; DESIGN FEATURES: 139 Vulnerability of Multiple-Barrier Systems, N. C. Lind; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 149 A Study of Wet Catalytic Oxidation of Radioactive Spent Ion Exchange Resin by Hydrogen Peroxide, Xingchao Jian, Tianbao Wu, and Guichun Yun; 157 A Comparison Study and Resolution of Differences Between Emergency Response and Safety Analysis Codes Used at the Savannah River Site, A. A. Simpkins; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 164 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 167 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 172 Proposed Rule Changes as of Dec. 31,1995; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 178 American Nuclear Society 1997 Annual Meeting; 178 American Nuclear Society Nuclear Criticality and Safety Division Topical Meeting; 176 The Authors.

05 NUCLEAR FUELS↗