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DOE OSTI2022

2021 Prototype Installation and Testing Awardee: XFlow Energy Company

XFlow Energy Company (XFlow Energy) aims to reduce the cost of wind energy by designing vertical-axis wind turbines (VAWTs), which have a cheaper blade manufacturing process and a mechanically simpler design than traditional wind turbines, among other cost-saving advantages. However, a lack of modeling or simulation tools that can predict the coupling between aerodynamic and structural forces poses a significant challenge to developers of VAWTs. Known as aeroelastic models, these are not just important design tools - they're critical for certifying VAWTs of 25 kilowatts (kW), which is the size of XFlow Energy's prototype wind turbine. Without certification, XFlow Energy will not be able to deliver an independently validated product to its customers, and those customers will not be eligible for state and federal incentives. An accurate aeroelastic model could provide less-conservative structural optimization tactics than are currently used, resulting in a wind turbine with lower capital costs.

CIP↗
DOE OSTI2023

Meeting Building Energy Performance Standards at The Westory

The Westory office building used Washington, DC's Building Energy Performance Standard as an impetus for energy efficiency improvements and certification with the assistance of Cushman & Wakefield's Energy & Sustainability Services.

Energy Performance Standards, Energy Audit, ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2015

Assessing and improving regulatory communication processes: the case of the WIPP CRA - 15151

This paper will focus on how and why effective communication is useful and meaningful for a multi-organizational project team and the concrete practices through which this team assessed and intervened in its communication. First, the effort generated five recommendations that may be useful in other similar projects. The five primary areas of improvement include the use of an electronic platform for collaboration and document sharing, the continued use of an in-house technical editor, improved direction for authors and technical editors, improved comment resolution process (development of Communication Guidelines) and improved management of the project schedule. These areas for improvement were translated into process changes that were identified and agreed upon by the team. Specific actions were assigned to members of the team with the intent to streamline the complex regulatory process. Second, and more importantly, we demonstrate how the assessment of communication, thinking about our communication practices together (reflexive engagement), and the implementation of insights about communication fit into a larger continuous improvement framework. Third, the experience of the interdisciplinary team provided preliminary evidence about the efficacy of the approach and the need for continuous engagement with communication. The intensified participation in the second assessment encouraged greater ownership and satisfaction with corrective actions. The substance of the recommendations was made more robust as well, focusing on improving communication within the project team. Early anecdotal evidence suggests that improvements in communications continue to enhance the project team's efficiency and efficacy of the planning phase through submittal of the Compliance Re-certification Application. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2015

Impacts of an additional exhaust shaft on WIPP performance - 15170

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), located in southeastern New Mexico, has been developed by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for the geologic (deep underground) disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste. WIPP performance assessment (PA) demonstrates repository performance from facility closure to 10,000 years after closure. The recent radiological release event at the WIPP site has temporarily halted waste emplacement activities at the facility. A modified ventilation system is envisioned that will provide sufficient airflow necessary for the resumption of full-rate disposal operations in the future. A primary component of the modified ventilation system is an additional exhaust shaft in the north end of the repository. There are four shafts currently in the repository north end, namely a salt handling shaft, an exhaust shaft, a waste shaft, and an air intake shaft. These shafts are combined into a single composite shaft in WIPP PA that captures the combined impacts of all of them. The proposed additional exhaust shaft is combined with the four existing shafts in the repository model to determine its impacts on long-term repository performance. Moreover, mined volume in the repository north end is modified in the repository representation so as to include additional drifts created to access the new shaft. Computed gas and brine flow behaviors corresponding to the repository with the additional exhaust shaft are compared to those obtained in the PA executed for the 2014 Compliance Re-certification Application (the CRA-2014 PA). Results show that the repository with an additional exhaust shaft and drifts yields brine and gas flow behaviors similar to the current repository configuration. It is concluded that WIPP continues to satisfy regulatory compliance limits with the addition of an exhaust shaft and its access drifts, with compliance curves like those found in the CRA-2014 PA for total normalized releases. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2015

Risk considerations for WIPP passive institutional controls - 15173

The regulatory assurance measures for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) include such things as active and passive institutional controls, monitoring, waste retrieval/removal capabilities and engineered barriers. Passive Institutional Controls (PICs) are an assurance measure intended to reduce the likelihood of humans unintentionally intruding the WIPP geologic radioactive waste disposal system for thousands of years after it is closed. The waste repository is designed such that it should not pose a significant risk to future populations if it is left undisturbed. The design has also been demonstrated through a performance assessment (PA) analysis to not pose a significant risk to future generations even if it is intruded upon by an inadvertent drilling intrusion [1, Appendix PA]. Through PA, it has been determined that the overall risk of the disposal system to people and the environment is small. The intent of the regulatory Assurance Requirements and PICs is to provide additional confidence that the repository will perform as expected after closure. However, the actual implementation of the proposed PICs design may pose a greater risk to the current population than they would potentially reduce for future generations. Specifically, the risks due to industrial accidents, construction and transportation risks incurred during the fabrication and construction of the permanent markers system may be greater than the overall reduction in risk to future generations due to the existence of the permanent markers. If this were true, implementation of the current PICs design may be counter to the intention of the regulatory requirement to include such assurance measures. As such, provisions for assurance measures used in geologic radioactive waste disposal facilities, such as PICs, should consider risk impacts. A provision of any disposal program's Regulatory Assurance Requirements should address the impacts of the known risks from all the components of the assurance-related systems. The initial WIPP PICs design was developed as part of the regulatory certification process in 1996 with the intent of being revised when the WIPP closes several decades from now [2, Appendix PIC]. The revised design that will be developed at closure should address the design's potential reduction to long-term risks from the repository and the risks due to the implementation of the final design. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2015

Influencing future exploratory drilling rates-a potential approach for the waste isolation pilot plant - 15307

The Department of Energy/Carlsbad Field Office (DOE/CBFO) is responsible for managing activities related to the disposal of TRU and TRU-mixed waste in the geologic repository at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), near Carlsbad, New Mexico. The WIPP Compliance Certification Application had a reference concerning natural resources at the site of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. This reference suggested that resources could be withdrawn from under the repository area from a distance and not affect the integrity of the repository. This would not eliminate, but would certainly diminish, the rate of exploratory drilling in the distant future. Currently the only scenarios that result in releases from the repository are human intrusion scenarios, without human intrusion radioactive releases to the accessible environment are essentially zero for the very long term future. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2015

Laboratory testing options for FUSRAP projects - 15462

Remediation projects within the Formerly Used Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) have many options to consider when evaluating their analytical testing needs. Factors that should be considered in determination of a project's analytical testing needs include which parameter results are considered time-critical, the potential savings in reduction of construction-related delays when time-critical samples are analyzed onsite (including screening) instead of offsite, control of data quality for onsite versus offsite data, and the value of additional knowledge gained by programs such as FUSRAP by employing onsite laboratories. The most important factor turned out to be reduction in construction-related delays. We considered development of an optimum combination of onsite lab/offsite lab capability. This depends on: i. Time critical parameters and the methods required; ii. Estimated Cost for onsite lab construction or facility rental, maintenance, labor, chemicals (reagents and standards), and certification (if desired and deemed necessary) iii. Ability, flexibility, and cost of offsite lab sample testing using project-desired TATs and methods that will meet project action levels iv. Willingness of stakeholders, in particular regulators, in accepting some combination of onsite and offsite testing (for example, onsite screening followed by offsite confirmatory testing for certain parameters) Due to the significant costs in construction of an onsite lab and development of sample testing capability and all which that entails, the recommendations made in this paper will aid other FUSRAP projects in finding an acceptable combination of onsite and offsite testing that is acceptable to all stakeholders. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2015

Managing TRU waste processing and storage issues/challenges - 15487

Operational events at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) facility resulted in suspension of disposal operations and waste shipments to WIPP creating significant challenges for the Department of Energy (DOE) complex. The Oak Ridge Transuranic (TRU) Waste Program which was poised to re-start shipping after a 2.5 year suspension of the Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) certification activities which resulted in on-site accumulation of the highest activity contact handled (CH) TRU waste containers. As a result, Transuranic Waste Processing Center (TWPC) is nearing its physical storage capacity for CH waste and has already reached storage capacity limits for remote handled (RH) TRU waste. The TWPC storage capacity for RH-TRU waste is very limited and dependent on real time shipping support to continue RH waste processing activities in the facilities Hot Cell. Additionally, changes in dispersion modeling (i.e., dry deposition factor changes) used in the TWPC Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) present Material at Risk (MAR) management challenges to effectively manage off-site dose consequences. These facts necessitated the identification of alternative waste storage options for both CH and RH waste to continue waste processing operations at TWPC. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2015

Achievements and process improvements in processing transuranic waste at the TRU Waste Processing Center - 15488

Wastren Advantage, Inc., (WAI) is the DOE Prime contractor for the TRU Waste Processing Center (TWPC) located in Oak Ridge, TN. This paper highlights the TWPCs specific achievements and process improvements associated with both Contact (CH) and Remote Handled (RH), Transuranic (TRU) waste receipt processing and repackaging for disposal. The five key improvement areas and achievements include: - The TWPC installed, tested and operated successfully the Drum Venting System (DVS) to vent over-packed CH-TRU waste drums in several configurations including 55-gallon drums over-packed in 79 or 85-gallon drums. - A new Remote Drum Opener (RDO) system was designed, tested and placed in service to vent drums discovered in overpack boxes in the Box Breakdown Area and to vent overpack configurations that could not be handled in the standard DVS (e.g., 110 gallon overpacks and multiple drum configurations). - The Cask Processing Enclosure (CPE) approach to repackaging RH-TRU waste contained in concrete casks was developed and implemented - Hot Cell outage to incorporate planned equipment modifications and improvements to maintain processing rates. - To improve certification and segregation of CH-TRU from drums that meet Low Level Waste criteria for disposal at Nevada the TWPC added additional equipment/facilities for Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) and Real Time Radiography (RTR). (authors)

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DOE OSTI2015

Environmental cleanup of the East Tennessee Technology Park - Year three - A status report - 15522

On August 1, 2011, URS - CH2M Oak Ridge LLC (UCOR) began its five-year, $1.4 billion cleanup of the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP), the former Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant, located on the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Oak Ridge Reservation (Reservation) in Tennessee. Under the contract, the base period scope of work to be completed by 2016 includes demolition of both the K-25 and K-31 gaseous diffusion buildings and all demolition waste dispositioned, initiation of demolition on the remaining K-27 gaseous diffusion building, safe storage of transuranic (TRU) waste for eventual transfer to the Transuranic Waste Processing Center, previously designated -No-Path-To-Disposition Waste- dispositioned to the extent possible, and completion of design and engineering of a mercury treatment system to be installed at the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12). UCOR will have also managed DOE Oak Ridge Office of Environmental Management (OREM)-owned facilities at ETTP, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), and Y-12 in a safe and cost-effective manner. Since assuming responsibilities as the ETTP and Oak Ridge Reservation cleanup contractor, UCOR has completed its life-cycle Performance Measurement Baseline; received its Earned Value Management System (EVMS) certification; completed the deactivation and demolition (D and D) of the 44-acre K-25 gaseous diffusion building; removed and disposed of a contaminated underground storage tank (Tank W-1A) at ORNL; dispositioned mercury-contaminated storage tanks at Y-12; completed closure of the Toxic Substances Control Act Incinerator; disposed of more than 158,000 cubic yards of cleanup waste while managing the on-site Environmental Management Waste Management Facility (EMWMF); and conducted operations, surveillance, and maintenance activities at 180 DOE EM facilities at ETTP, ORNL, and Y-12 in a safe and cost-effective manner. In 2014, UCOR completed the removal and disposal of all of the K-25 demolition debris; completed the removal of asbestos-laden transite siding on the K-31 gaseous diffusion building and began demolition of that 17-acre building; advanced the characterization and deactivation of the K-27 gaseous diffusion building, readying the building for the start of demolition in 2015; advanced the design and engineering of a Mercury Treatment Facility to be located at Y-12; continued the cost-effective and safe disposition of all cleanup wastes; and readied ETTP for Voluntary Protection Program Star Status Assessment in 2015. Project performance as of December 31, 2014, continued to be excellent: - Cost Performance Index - 1.12 - Schedule Performance Index - 1.02 At the same time, since safety is the foundation of all cleanup work, UCOR's safety record goes hand-in-hand with its excellent project performance. Through calendar year 2014, UCOR's recordable injury rate was 1.04 occurrences per 200,000 work hours, and the lost workday case rate was 0.52. This performance continues to be due, in large part, to the people and processes URS and CH2M HILL, the parent companies of UCOR, brought to the project. Key enablers included: - Selected and deployed experienced staff in key leadership positions throughout the organization, continually re-energizing the organization with new leaders - Implemented previously successful safety programs and initiatives from other DOE sites, such as DOE's Voluntary Protection Program - Brought fresh thinking and innovation to tackling tough project issues, such as the deactivation of the Technetium-99-contaminated areas of K-27, applying lessons learned from the D and D of K-25; and implementing a -waste factory- approach to cleanup - Maintained continuing alignment between UCOR's contract with DOE and its Performance Measurement Baseline - rapidly addressing contract changes when they arose - Maintained a readiness both from a process as well as experienced personnel perspective to support DOE OREM in performing other significant Oak Ridge Reservation cleanup activities. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2015

An underground laboratory in the context of salt disposal research - 15549

Evaluating the basis of need for an underground research laboratory for salt science and engineering is imperative because of the significant commitment of time and money involved. Decades of salt repository studies, numerous experiments, and sophisticated modeling capabilities underpin the scientific database that supports safe disposal of nuclear waste in salt. The safety case for disposal of non-heat-generating waste such as transuranic waste interred at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant is robust, with the only long-term releases to the environment projected to be by way of human intrusion. The scientific evidence also favors safe disposal of heat-generating waste. Technical evaluations for disposal of heat-generating waste in salt experienced a rather long hiatus in the United States subsequent to certification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant and issuance of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act Amendment that ended salt disposal research for the civilian program. Similar salt repository research in Germany was delayed by a ten-year moratorium that ended in 2010. In collaboration with German peers, the United States Department of Energy has reviewed and evaluated thermally driven processes in salt disposal and identified key technical areas in which to prioritize resources. The goal for disposal research in salt is to provide sufficient technical information to license a repository successfully. The necessity or utility of a salt underground laboratory is to be evaluated in the context of an overall research agenda that supports a license application. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2015

Support of SRS salt-stone regulatory compliance - 15586

The SRS salt-stone Facility is designed and permitted to immobilize and dispose of low-level radioactive and hazardous liquid waste (salt solution) remaining from the processing of radioactive material at the Savannah River Site. The salt-stone Processing Facility (SPF) is permitted as a wastewater treatment facility per the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control Regulations (SCDHEC) South Carolina Hazardous Waste Management Regulations (SCHWMR) R.61-67. The salt-stone Disposal Facility is permitted as a solid waste landfill site, as defined by SCDHEC Regulations R61-107.19. The salt-stone Sampling and Analysis Plan provides the SCDHEC with the chemical and physical characterization strategy for the salt solution and salt-stone waste form. During operation, samples are collected from Tank 50H on a quarterly basis and are analyzed by the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) for over chemical and radioactive components. The analytical results are compared to the salt-stone waste acceptance criteria in a technical report. SRNL also prepares salt-stone samples from the quarterly sample and premix binder materials provided by the SPF to determine the non-hazardous nature of the grout to meet the requirements of the SCDHEC regulation for the 'Characteristic of Toxicity', R.61-79.261.24(b) and the 'Universal Treatment Standards', R.61-79.268.48.4. salt-stone samples are collected, size reduced, packaged, and shipped to an independent United States EPA certified laboratory, or a laboratory that holds an equivalent certification such as one from the National Environmental Laboratory Accreditation Program to perform the EPA Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP) extraction of the salt-stone sample. SRNL reviews the results of the TCLP analysis and prepares a report detailing the sample preparation and analysis that is used by the salt-stone Facility to demonstrate the nonhazardous nature of the salt-stone waste form. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2015

Shortage of Type B LLRW Casks in the US to Serve Nuclear Plants and National Labs - 15663

In early 2012, the industry experienced sudden shortage of Type B Low Level Radioactive Waste (LLRW) transport casks available for transportation of nuclear waste and sealed sources within the United States (US) of America. Some of the events which created this situation include, but not limited to, opening of a new LLRW Disposal facility (Andrews County, TX) managed by Waste Control Specialists (WCS) for Class A, B and C LLRW, retirement of vast majority of previously certified Type B LLRW transport packages, more stringent regulatory certification requirements and increased demand for LLRW transportation casks to support decommissioning of nuclear power plant and transportation of sealed sources. Cask designers are still in the process of responding to the emerging needs of the industry. This paper will provide a detailed background and discuss the events that have occurred in recent years that have led to a shortage of Type B LLRW transport casks available to service the industry with transportation of resins, used filters, irradiated hardware and sealed sources. In addition, this paper will provide an overview of currently available, being fabricated Type B packages as well as information about the tentative designs of Type B LLRW transport casks to be designed and certified in the US by cask design/manufacturing firms in the near future. In conclusion section, this paper will summarize whether the LLRW Type B transport cask supply market for discussed payloads will be able to adequately respond to the industry demand. Potential ways for long term resolution of this issue will be discussed. (author)

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DOE OSTI2015

Nuclear waste management approach for new build nuclear power plants in the people's republic of China - 15687

EnergySolutions continues to provide waste treatment solutions in the People's Republic of China (PRC). Currently two projects are in the installation phase at different sites (Haiyang, an AP-1000TM site and Yangjiang, a CPR-1000 site). EnergySolutions is also working closely with PRC nuclear regulatory officials for certification of High Integrity Containers (HIC). This paper discusses progress on these two projects, and new information regarding current and future PRC waste management plans. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2016

Importance Ranking of Software Dependability Attributes in the Nuclear Industry

With the current transition from analog to digital instrumentation and control systems in nuclear power plants, the number and variety of software-based systems has significantly increased. Due to the sophisticated nature and the increasing complexity of software, a significant challenge faced by the nuclear industry is the trust one can place in software-based systems once they have been developed. The trust placed in software is typically termed software dependability, a qualifier which encompasses different attributes such as software reliability, safety, security, availability and maintainability. It is recognized that these attributes relate to each other in different ways under various scenarios. The detailed dependencies between software dependability attributes can be found in a previous study. With limited time and budget resources, which dependability attribute should be given the highest priority when certifying software-based systems in the nuclear industry is a fundamental question that needs to be answered. This paper addresses this problem using stakeholders' opinion elicitation. A comprehensive questionnaire was designed to elicit the goals that should be fulfilled by the nuclear industry and to collect the relative importance of the various dependability attributes for each goal. We then used the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) to analyze the data and obtained the relative importance ranking of software dependability attributes in the context of a reactor protection system. The results will provide guidance to resource allocation for the certification of software dependability in the nuclear industry. (authors)

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2019

Future Transition of WIPP from EM to Another DOE Office - 19256

The U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) has a primary mission to assist federal government entities disposition transuranic (TRU) radioactive waste. The main resource for disposition is the deep geologic repository known as the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Other resources include a complete transportation system and a program that assists in the certification and shipment of TRU waste to WIPP known as the National TRU Program (NTP). All of these resources are managed by CBFO, which currently is part of the DOE Environmental Management (EM) program. EM's primary mission for DOE is to clean up the legacy remaining from many years of nuclear weapons research and production. But, CBFO estimates the need for WIPP and NTP will continue beyond the mission of EM and will assist other entities such as the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the Office of Science (OS) and the Navy. As the inventory of legacy TRU waste is reduced, the inventory of new TRU waste will continue from ongoing missions. So, over the life span of WIPP the primary customers of CBFO will shift from legacy EM sites to newly-generated TRU waste sites. And, somewhere along the way CBFO estimates that it will transition, primarily from an EM support (legacy waste) entity to a primarily a NNSA support (newly-generated waste) entity to facilitate ongoing DOE missions. This paper will address the need for that change at a programmatic level and will include some ideas for conceptual planning for such a transition. (author)

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DOE OSTI2019

Panel Session 13: TRU Waste Generator Sites - Implementation of the New US DOE WIPP WAC

This panel focused on the next phase of the US National Transuranic (TRU) Program (NTP) to support shipments to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP: located in Carlsbad, New Mexico, USA). Topics include program changes to increase waste stream approval efficiency, Documented Safety Analysis (DSA)/Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC), TRUPACT-III and Remote Handled (RH) shipments, lessons learned from NTP waste certification and transportation, and NTP transportation stakeholder engagement and support programs. Presentations proposed include: 1 - National TRU Program Update (Kenneth Princen, US DOE (USA)); 2 - WIPP WAC (Rev 9) Implementation (Mark Pearcy, Nuclear Waste Partnership, LLC (USA)); 3 - Remote-Handled (RH) TRU Waste Update (J.R. Stroble, US DOE (USA)); 4 - National TRU Program Transportation Stakeholder Engagement and Support (James Mason, US DOE (USA))

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DOE OSTI2019

Panel Session 51: Idaho Transuranic Waste Challenges, Solutions and Implications for the Future (3/5)

This panel focused on the retrieval, characterization, treatment, certification, and shipping of transuranic (TRU) waste at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Site, Idaho, USA. The INL began receiving TRU waste from offsite generators (primarily the Rocky Flats Plant in Colorado, USA) beginning in 1954. Until 1970, the INL Site disposed of barrels, boxes, and other debris in a shallow, unlined landfill. Beginning in 1970, the INL Site began storing TRU waste on an asphalt pad, which was then covered with several feet of soil. This practice continued until the late 1980's at which time a large air support building was erected over the waste. In the mid-to-late 1990's, the air support building was removed and a massive building was constructed over the entire dirt mound. Contractors retrieved the waste from the early 2000's through February 2017 to support an Idaho Settlement Agreement milestone that required the retrieval of 65,000 cubic meters of TRU waste and removal from Idaho. This panel focused on the Idaho Transuranic Waste Challenges, Solutions and Implications for the Future. The Idaho Transuranic Waste Program includes buried and stored waste retrieval and processing of contact- and remote-handled transuranic waste. Over the duration of the program, the Idaho site has conducted targeted retrieval of buried waste from the 1950's and 1960's; designed, permitted, built, operated, and completed the mission of a facility to process 65,000 cubic meters of waste; and shipped more than 57,000 cubic meters of waste to WIPP. Presentation proposed: Transuranic Waste Challenges and Solutions (Hoss Brown, Fluor Idaho, LLC (USA), John McCoy, Fluor Idaho, LLC (USA), James Malmo, US DOE (USA), Doug Pruitt, Department of Energy Idaho Field Office (USA), Kenneth Princen, US DOE (USA))

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