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Homeostatic regulation of meiotic DSB formation by ATM/ATR

Ataxia–telangiectasia mutated (ATM) and RAD3-related (ATR) are widely known as being central players in the mitotic DNA damage response (DDR), mounting responses to DNA double-strand breaks (DSBs) and single-stranded DNA (ssDNA) respectively. The DDR signalling cascade couples cell cycle control to damage-sensing and repair processes in order to prevent untimely cell cycle progression while damage still persists [1]. Both ATM/ATR are, however, also emerging as essential factors in the process of meiosis; a specialised cell cycle programme responsible for the formation of haploid gametes via two sequential nuclear divisions. Central to achieving accurate meiotic chromosome segregation is the introduction of numerous DSBs spread across the genome by the evolutionarily conserved enzyme, Spo11. This review seeks to explore and address how cells utilise ATM/ATR pathways to regulate Spo11-DSB formation, establish DSB homeostasis and ensure meiosis is completed unperturbed.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Comparison of sugar content for ionic liquid pretreated Douglas-fir woodchips and forestry residues

The development of affordable woody biomass feedstocks represents a significant opportunity in the development of cellulosic biofuels. Primary woodchips produced by forest mills are considered an ideal feedstock, but the prices they command on the market are currently too expensive for biorefineries. In comparison, forestry residues represent a potential low-cost input but are considered a more challenging feedstock for sugar production due to complexities in composition and potential contamination arising from soil that may be present. We compare the sugar yields, changes in composition in Douglas-fir woodchips and forestry residues after pretreatment using ionic liquids and enzymatic saccharification in order to determine if this approach can efficiently liberate fermentable sugars. : These samples were either mechanically milled through a 2 mm mesh or pretreated as received with the ionic liquid (IL) 1-ethyl-3-methylimidazolium acetate [C 2 mim][OAc] at 120°C and 160°C. IL pretreatment of Douglas-fir woodchips and forestry residues resulted in approximately 71-92% glucose yields after enzymatic saccharification. X-ray diffraction (XRD) showed that the pretreated cellulose was less crystalline after IL pretreatment as compared to untreated control samples. Two-dimensional nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy (2D-NMR) revealed changes in lignin and hemicellulose structure and composition as a function of pretreatment. Mass balances of sugar and lignin streams for both the Douglas-fir woodchips and forestry residues throughout the pretreatment and enzymatic saccharification processes are presented. While the highest sugar yields were observed with the Douglas-fir woodchips, reasonably high sugar yields were obtained from forestry residues after ionic liquid pretreatment. Structural changes to lignin, cellulose and hemicellulose in the woodchips and forestry residues of Douglas-fir after [C 2 mim][OAc] pretreatment are analyzed by XRD and 2D-NMR, and indicate that significant changes occurred. Irrespective of the particle sizes used in this study, ionic liquid pretreatment successfully allowed high glucose yields after enzymatic saccharification. These results indicate that forestry residues may be a more viable feedstock than previously thought for the production of biofuels.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Deep Bed Iodine Sorbent Testing FY 2011 Report

Nuclear fission results in the production of fission products (FPs) and activation products that increasingly interfere with the fission process as their concentrations increase. Some of these fission and activation products tend to evolve in gaseous species during used nuclear fuel reprocessing. Analyses have shown that I129, due to its radioactivity, high potential mobility in the environment, and high longevity (half life of 15.7 million years), can require control efficiencies of up to 1,000x or higher to meet regulatory emission limits. Deep-bed iodine sorption testing has been done to evaluate the performance of solid sorbents for capturing iodine in off-gas streams from nuclear fuel reprocessing plants. The objectives of the FY 2011 deep bed iodine sorbent testing are: (1) Evaluate sorbents for iodine capture under various conditions of gas compositions and operating temperature (determine sorption efficiencies, capacities, and mass transfer zone depths); and (2) Generate data for dynamic iodine sorption modeling. Three tests performed this fiscal year on silver zeolite light phase (AgZ-LP) sorbent are reported here. Additional tests are still in progress and can be reported in a revision of this report or a future report. Testing was somewhat delayed and limited this year due to initial activities to address some questions of prior testing, and due to a period of maintenance for the on-line GC. Each test consisted of (a) flowing a synthetic blend of gases designed to be similar to an aqueous dissolver off-gas stream over the sorbent contained in three separate bed segments in series, (b) measuring each bed inlet and outlet gas concentrations of iodine and methyl iodide (the two surrogates of iodine gas species considered most representative of iodine species expected in dissolver off-gas), (c) operating for a long enough time to achieve breakthrough of the iodine species from at least one (preferably the first two) bed segments, and (d) post-test purging with pure N 2 to drive loosely or physisorbed iodine species off of the sorbent. Post-test calculations determine the control efficiencies for each bed, iodine loadings on the sorbent, and mass transfer zone depths. Portions of the iodine-laden sorbent from the first bed of two of the tests have been shipped to SNL for waste form studies. Over the past three years, we have explored a full range of inlet iodine and methyl iodide concentrations ranging from ~100 ppb to ~100 ppm levels, and shown adequate control efficiencies within a bed depth as shallow as 2 inches for lower concentrations and 4 inches for higher concentrations, for the AgZ-type sorbents. We are now performing a limited number of tests in the NC-77 sorbent from SNL. Then we plan to continue to (a) fill in data gaps needed for isotherms and dynamic sorbent modeling, and (b) test the performance of additional sorbents under development.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Automated Work Package: Initial Wireless Communication Platform Design, Development, and Evaluation

The Department of Energy’s Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program is developing the scientific basis to ensure long-term reliability, productivity, safety, and security of the nuclear power industry in the United States. The Instrumentation, Information, and Control (II&C) pathway of the program aims to increase the role of advanced II&C technologies to achieve this objective. One of the pathway efforts at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is to improve the work packages execution process by replacing the expensive, inefficient, bulky, complex, and error-prone paper-based work orders with automated work packages (AWPs). An AWP is an automated and dynamic presentation of the work package designed to guide the user through the work process. It is loaded on a mobile device, such as a tablet, and is capable of communicating with plant equipment and systems to acquire plant and procedure states. The AWP replaces those functions where a computer is more efficient and reliable than a human. To enable the automatic acquisition of plant data, it is necessary to design and develop a prototype platform for data exchange between the field instruments and the AWP mobile devices. The development of the platform aims to reveal issues and solutions generalizable to large-scale implementation of a similar system. Topics such as bandwidth, robustness, response time, interference, and security are usually associated with wireless communication. These concerns, along with other requirements, are listed in an earlier INL report. Specifically, the targeted issues and performance aspects in this work are relevant to the communication infrastructure from the perspective of promptness, robustness, expandability, and interoperability with different technologies.

Automated Work Packages↗

Assessment of the mechanical performance of the Westinghouse BWR control rod CR 99 at high depletion levels

A long-term program assessing the mechanical performance of the Westinghouse BWR control rod CR 99 at high depletion levels has been performed. The scope of the program has mainly been based on the operation of four CR 99 Generation 2 control rods in demanding positions during 6 and 7 cycles in the Leibstadt Nuclear Power Plant (KKL) and on the detailed visual inspections and blade wing thickness measurements that were performed after the rods were discharged. By correlating statistically the blade wing thickness measurements to the appearance of irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking (IASCC), the probability of IASCC appearance as function of the blade wing swelling was estimated. In order to correlate the IASCC probability of a CR 99 to its depletion, the {sup 10}B depletion of the studied rods was calculated in detail on a local level with the stochastic Monte Carlo code MCNP in combination with the Westinghouse nodal code system PHOENIX4/POLCA7. Using this information coupled to the blade wing measurement data, a finite element model describing the blade wing swelling of an arbitrary CR 99 design as function of {sup 10}B depletion could then be generated. In the final step, these relationships were used to quantify the probability of IASCC appearance as function of the {sup 10}B depletion of the CR 99 Generations 2 and 3. Applying this detailed mapping of the CR 99 behavior at high depletion levels and using an on-line core monitoring system with explicit {sup 10}B depletion tracking capabilities will enable a reliable prediction of the probability for IASCC appearance, thus enhancing the optimized design and the sound operation of the CR 99 control rod. Another important outcome of the program was that it was clearly shown that no significant amount of boron leakage did occur through any of the detected IASCC cracks, despite the very high depletion levels achieved. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

The Effect of the Presence of Ozone on the Lower Flammability Limit (LFL) of Hydrogen in Vessels Containing Savannah River Site High Level Waste - 12387

The Enhanced Chemical Cleaning (ECC) process uses ozone to effect the oxidation of metal oxalates produced during the dissolution of sludge in the Savannah River Site (SRS) waste tanks. The ozone reacts with the metal oxalates to form metal oxide and hydroxide precipitants, and the CO{sub 2}, O{sub 2}, H{sub 2}O and any unreacted O{sub 3} gases are discharged into the vapor space. In addition to the non-radioactive metals in the waste, however, the SRS radioactive waste also contains a variety of radionuclides, hence, hydrogen gas is also present in the vapor space of the ECC system. Because hydrogen is flammable, the impact of this resultant gas stream on the Lower Flammability Limit (LFL) of hydrogen must be understood for all possible operating scenarios of both normal and off-normal situations, with particular emphasis at the elevated temperatures and pressures of the typical ECC operating conditions. Oxygen is a known accelerant in combustion reactions, but while there are data associated with the behavior of hydrogen/oxygen environments, recent, relevant studies addressing the effect of ozone on the flammability limit of hydrogen proved scarce. Further, discussions with industry experts verified the absence of data in this area and indicated that laboratory testing, specific to defined operating parameters, was needed to comprehensively address the issue. Testing was thus designed and commissioned to provide the data necessary to support safety related considerations for the ECC process. A test matrix was developed to envelope the bounding conditions considered credible during ECC processing. Each test consists of combining a gas stream of high purity hydrogen with a gas stream comprised of a specified mixture of ozone and oxygen in a temperature and pressure regulated chamber such that the relative compositions of the two streams are controlled. The gases are then stirred to obtain a homogeneous mixture and ignition attempted by applying 10J of energy to a fuse wire. A gas combination is considered flammable when a pressure rise of 7% of the initial absolute pressure is observed. The specified testing methodology is consistent with guidelines established in ASTM E-918-83 (2005) 'Standard Practices for Determining Limits of Flammability of Chemicals at Elevated Temperature and Pressure'. The LFL of hydrogen in air was determined and is in good agreement with the literature data. Ozone-oxygen mixtures were found to be flammable at concentrations above 8.3 vol.% based on the ASTM E918 7% pressure rise criteria for flame propagation. This result is lower than previously reported values which can be explained through the variations in the test setup and procedure. It is believed that the lower values obtained in this work are a result of improvements of the test methodology. Tests performed with hydrogen in various concentrations of ozone in oxygen have shown that the LFL of hydrogen decreases as the concentration of ozone in the mixture increases. This testing was designed to provide data under the conditions considered most optimal to produce deflagration. The geometry and materials of construction of the testing vessel; the location of the fuse wire; the magnitude of the supplied energy; the careful minimization of diluents and other contaminants; and meticulous procedural detail to maintain integrity of the ozone to the maximum extent practical, result in data that reflect not the expected process conditions, but those that enhance the possibility of flame propagation. For this reason, there is believed to be considerable conservatism in the indicated results. Per the vendor, the maximum possible ozone concentration producible by the planned ECC Ozone generator is 8 volume percent (the typical maximum operating setpoint concentration is 6.8 vol%), less than the 8.3 minimum volume % concentration shown to be flammable in a 99.999% pure O{sub 2} environment at the optimally conservative conditions established in this testing. Further, the feed to the ECC ozone generator is only 87% oxygen, the remainder, water vapor and nitrogen, both powerful diluents. It is, thus, believed not credible that deflagration can occur at this maximum feed concentration condition. In addition, once the ozone stream contacts the waste stream, the many simultaneous oxidizing reactions will rapidly decompose available ozone to well below flammable levels. Further, because the radiolytically generated hydrogen quantity is negligible compared to the supplied ozone/oxygen stream (0.0004 moles per minute H{sub 2} vs 76 moles per minute ozone/oxygen), even the total H{sub 2}/O{sub 3} mixture, without crediting decomposition reactions, does not approach flammable concentrations. Finally, even at the 'end' of the ECC batch cycle, when most of the metal oxalates have been decomposed, testing has indicated that the ozone concentration in the vapor space of the ECC process vessel reaches a concentration of no more than 3 vol%, remaining well below concentrations of concern. The major issue for the ECC operation established by this testing is the impact of the data when applied to off normal conditions. While it is possible to discontinue ozone addition to the reaction vessel at any time, the radiolytic hydrogen generation rate continues, varying slightly as ambient pressures and temperatures change. Relative to the data generated and analyzed in this testing, the ECC hazards analysis team will re-evaluate off normal conditions (e.g. those during which process exhaust ventilation is lost) such that issues involving mixtures of hydrogen and ozone in the vapor space can be appropriately controlled. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

ROV used in Sludge Retrieval and Treatment Project - 18575

The Orano-operated waste treatment site at La Hague, France, has treated large quantities of nuclear waste through-out its many decades of operation. During a period of over twenty years, a significant amount of the radioactive sludge resulting from the liquid waste treatment processes was placed into a set of adjoining tanks, called the STE2 silos. Now that those tanks are reaching capacity, a project has begun to retrieve this waste, transfer it to another location for homogenisation and characterization, and to then send it to another facility for conditioning and long-term storage. Because of the conditions inside and around these tanks, the waste retrieval process has many limitations. For example, the high radiation levels require that the retrieval be done efficiently, with a high removal rate and that operation be done remotely. The sludge retrieval tool will be operated and navigated while hidden inside the tank, under a significant amount of supernatant liquid, but needs to be accessible for maintenance and modifications and able to be transferred from one tank to the next. Additionally, the highly viscous consistency of the sludge requires special suction capabilities. All of these conditions need to be met, by a system that fits into the tanks' 900 mm (<3 ft) access ports. After almost three years of profound engineering, construction and testing efforts, a final design has been approved. The tool consists of a 250 kg (∼550 lb), remotely-operated vehicle (ROV) with an Archimedes-type screw attachment. It is delivered into and retrieved from the tank through a shielded glovebox that allows for maintenance and exchange of attachments. Sludge is sucked through a rotating screw and out a second tank opening with a consideration for limiting external water usage. To locate and navigate the tool, cameras detect LEDs attached to the ROV's buoys, and then calculate the ROV's position and orientation. With preliminary design and testing of the prototype complete, the project is preparing to award the ROV manufacturing contract and finalize the design of auxiliary systems, such as the rinsing and maintenance processes and localization instrumentation. After extensive final testing, the gloveboxes will be placed over the tanks in mid-2020, with entry into the first tank expected in April 2024. The ideas and experiences Orano is currently gathering during this effort will be of interest to laboratories and facilities that will soon be retrieving waste sludge from their aging storage tanks. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Lessons Learned in the Update of a Safety Limit for the High Flux Isotope Reactor

A recent unreviewed safety question (USQ) regarding a portion of the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) transient decay heat removal analysis focused on applicability of a heat transfer correlation at the low flow end of reactor operations. During resolution of this issue, review of the correlations used to establish the safety limit (SL) on reactor flux-to-flow ratio revealed the need to change the magnitude of the SL at the low flow end of reactor operations and the need to update the hot spot fuel damage criteria to incorporate current knowledge involving parallel channel flow stability. Because of the original safety design strategy for the reactor, resolution of the issues for the flux-to-flow ratio involved reevaluation of all key process variable SLs and limiting control settings (LCSs) using the current version of the heat transfer analysis code for the reactor. Goals of the work involved updating and upgrading the SL analysis where necessary, while preserving the safety design strategy for the reactor. Changes made include revisions to the safety design criteria at low flows to address the USQ, update of the process- and analysis input-variable uncertainty considerations, and upgrade of the safety design criteria at high flow. The challenges faced during update/upgrade of this SL and LCS are typical of the problems found in the integration of safety into the design process for a complex facility. In particular, the problems addressed in the area of instrument uncertainties provide valuable lessons learned for establishment and configuration control of SLs for large facilities.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Coupling TRACE with nodal neutronics code Ants using the Exterior Communications Interface and VTT's multi-physics driver Cerberus

In this paper a recently developed coupling between system code TRACE and nodal neutronics code Ants is presented. The TRAC/RELAP Advanced Computational Engine (TRACE) is a reactor system code developed by U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The code has been designed to analyse loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCAs), operational transients and other accident scenarios in light water reactors. Ants is the reduced order nodal neutronics code of the Kraken framework. The diffusion solution method in Ants is based on the Analytic Function Expansion Nodal method (AFEN) and Flux Expansion Nodal Method (FENM). Rectangular, hexagonal and triangular geometries are supported. Both steady state and burnup problems including micro-depletion can be simulated. The coupling is implemented using VTT's multi-physics driver Cerberus and the Exterior Communications Interface (ECI) which is supplied with TRACE and enables the coupling of TRACE without source code modifications. The main focus in the paper is on describing the TRACE-Ants coupling in detail in order to share to other code developers what we have learned from the ECI based coupling process. The coupled code system is briefly tested by simulating a simple transient in a SMR core initiated by control rod movement. The results of the test calculation look reasonable and more complicated test cases will be modelled in the near future.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Glass formulation and lab-scale testing of glasses designed for in-can Melter and in-container Vitrification of high-assay low-enriched uranium aqueous polishing Raffinate waste

Glasses were designed for processing a nuclear waste from aqueous polishing of high-assay low-enriched uranium using either In-Can Melter (ICM) or GeoMelt® In-Container Vitrification™ (ICV) technologies, which operate at temperatures of T p ≤ 1100 °C and T p ≤ 1450 °C, respectively. Due to the different operating conditions, the melt and glass properties were optimized differently for each technology. Each glass was designed to optimize for maximum waste loading while simultaneously satisfying processing (e.g., crystallization, viscosity, and conductivity) and product quality (e.g., durability, hazard characteristic, and crystal content) constraints. Here, the raffinate waste contains high nitric acid (4 M) and low total solids (9 g·L -1 ) concentrations. Feed preparation processes were tested to facilitate concentration and nitrate destruction/removal while controlling redox of the melter feed. A successful feed process including sugar addition and spray-drying was performed to generate an adequate melter feed for ICV processing.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Interfractional Prostate Shifts: Review of 1870 Computed Tomography (CT) Scans Obtained During Image-Guided Radiotherapy Using CT-on-Rails for the Treatment of Prostate Cancer

Purpose: To review 1870 CT scans of interfractional prostate shift obtained during image-guided radiotherapy. Methods and Materials: A total of 1870 pretreatment CT scans were acquired with CT-on-rails, and the corresponding shift data for 329 patients with prostate cancer were analyzed. Results: Of the 1870 scans reviewed, 44% required no setup adjustments in the anterior-posterior (AP) direction, 14% had shifts of 3-5 mm, 29% had shifts of 6-10 mm, and 13% had shifts of >10 mm. In the superior-inferior direction, 81% had no adjustments, 2% had shifts of 3-5 mm, 15% had shifts of 6-10 mm, and 2% had shifts of >10 mm. In the left-right direction, 65% had no adjustment, 13% had shifts of 3-5 mm, 17% had shifts of 6-10 mm, and 5% had shifts of >10 mm. Further analysis of the first 66 consecutive patients divided into three groups according to body mass index indicates that the shift in the AP direction for the overweight subgroup was statistically larger than those for the control and obese subgroups (p < 0.05). The interfractional shift in the lateral direction for the obese group (1 SD, 5.5 mm) was significantly larger than those for the overweight and control groups (4.1 and 2.9 mm, respectively) (p < 0.001). Conclusions: These data demonstrate that there is a significantly greater shift in the AP direction than in the lateral and superior-inferior directions for the entire patient group. Overweight and obese patient groups show a significant difference from the control group in terms of prostate shift.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

Resolution of Technical Issues at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant Pretreatment Facility - 17281

The U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) Pretreatment (PT) Facility has a number of first-of-a-kind technical challenges that have required additional expert analysis and testing activities to resolve. In 2006, an External Flowsheet Review Team identified 28 technical vulnerabilities with the plant design or future operability. Over a period of three months starting in September 2012, a number of top scientists and engineers conducted a review of the major technical issues associated with the design and operability of the WTP. These experts also provided independent advice on some of the broader challenges associated with completing the Hanford tank waste mission - highlighting the linkage between the physical and chemical properties of the tank waste and the PT Facility technical issues. In 2012 and early 2013, DOE's Office of River Protection (ORP) directed the WTP contractor to suspend production work on the PT Facility until the outstanding technical issues could be resolved and the nuclear safety basis could be updated and brought into alignment with any updates to the facility design and/or process flowsheet. By late 2016, DOE and the WTP contractor resolved three of the eight outstanding technical issues: - (T1) Hydrogen Gas in Vessels; - (T2) Criticality in PT Facility Vessels; - (T3) Hydrogen in Piping and Ancillary Vessels (HPAV). Resolving all three of these issues required a combination of engineering studies and updates to foundational PT Facility safety basis documents to ensure both the design features and safety control strategies were adequately developed and fully supportable. The five remaining unresolved technical issues are Pulse-Jet Mixing (PJM) of Vessels (T4), Erosion and Corrosion in WTP Vessels and Piping (T5), PT Facility Optimization (T6), Black Cell Vessel Structural Integrity (T7), and Facility Ventilation (T8). Specific plans for resolving each of the five remaining technical issues have been developed by the WTP contractor. This paper provides a synopsis of the status of PT Facility technical issue resolution, and how resolution of the issues will enable DOE to make an informed decision to establish a new performance baseline for the PT Facility at a future date. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Demonstration of Integrated Hazard Analysis for Digital Reactor Trip Systems

Digital instrumentation and control (I&C) upgrades are a vital research area for nuclear industry. Despite their performance benefits, deployment of digital I&C in nuclear power plants (NPPs) has been limited. Digital I&C systems exhibit complex failure modes including common cause failures (CCFs) which can be difficult to identify. This paper describes the development of a redundancy-guided application of the Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) for the hazard analysis of digital I&C in advanced NPPs. The resulting Redundancy-guided System-theoretic Hazard Analysis (RESHA) is applied for the case study of a representative state-of-the-art digital reactor trip system. The analysis qualitatively and systematically identifies the most critical CCFs and other hazards of digital I&C systems. Ultimately, RESHA can help researchers make informed decisions for how, and to what degree, defensive measures such as redundancy, diversity, and defense-in-depth can be used to mitigate or eliminate the potential hazards of digital I&C systems.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

The German product quality control of the compacted metallic nuclear waste - 15311

The treatment and safe disposal of spent nuclear fuel is a key challenge of nuclear energy utilization and has to be accomplished regardless the future nuclear of electricity production or phase-out policies. Until June 2005 approx. 6662 tons of spent fuel from German nuclear power plants was sent to the La Hague (France) and Sellafield (UK) plants for reprocessing. An equivalent amount of nuclear waste compounds has contractually to be returned to Germany, which is currently in progress. The returnable waste streams comprise mainly highly-active vitrified waste containing a major part of fission products and actinides, and intermediate-active super-compacted metallic waste containing reprocessed fuel element's structural materials and some technological waste from the reprocessing process itself. Shearing and dissolution of spent fuel leaves scraps of fuel metal cladding, the end-pieces and spacers which are contaminated, activated and irradiating from their life in a reactor core. In fact, this metallic intermediate level radioactive waste makes up a bit more than half of the total volume of the reprocessed waste. At La Hague the metallic waste is super-compacted. Several, typically eight, compacted discs are stacked in a stainless steel container, named CSD-C as for 'Colis Standard de Dechets Compactes'. 4104 containers of such CSD-Cs in 152 transport/storages casks have to be returned to Germany. Each one of them has to be checked and quality certified for its conformity with German national product specifications and acceptance criteria by independent national product quality control inspectors (PKS). The residue package documentation has to be complete and the characterization methods have to be comprehensive. Due to the heterogeneity of metallic waste the characterization and control of its properties is very complex. The nuclear characterization is performed by means of non-destructive measurements, where only a few key nuclides are measured directly. In fact, the proper calculation of the whole nuclear inventory relies on numerous supplementary simulations. The measurement and calculation methodology is scrutinized by PKS in detail and key points are benchmarked with our own simulations for the sake of an independent nuclear inventory declaration check. With respect to the vast amount of documentation and parameters, which have to be checked and verified, PKS had to optimize their checking procedures. For this purpose dedicated proof tools have been developed that shall be applied for selected indicative cross-checks of the relevant parameters. This contribution is dedicated to the procedure of quality control by PKS and examples of actually performed computational verifications of declared nuclear inventory. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

NMIS with Imaging and Gamma Ray Spectrometry for Pu, HEU, HE and Other Materials

The Nuclear Material Identification System (NMIS) has been under development at ORNL and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Y-12 National Security Complex since 1984. In the mid-1990s, what is now the US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Verification (ONV) realized that it was a useful technology for future arms control treaty applications and supported further development of the system. In 2004, fast-neutron imaging was incorporated into the system. In 2007, the ONV decided to develop a fieldable version of the system, designated as FNMIS, for potential use in future treaties. The FNMIS is being developed to be compatible with the eventual incorporation of gamma-ray spectrometry and an information barrier. This report addresses how and what attributes could be determined by the FNMIS system with gamma-ray spectrometry. The NMIS is a time-dependent coincidence system that incorporates tomographic imaging (including mapping of the fission sites) and gamma-ray spectrometry. It utilizes a small, lightweight (30 lb), portable deuterium-tritium (DT) neutron (14.1 MeV) generator (4 x 10 7 neutrons/second) for active interrogation and can also perform passive interrogation. A high-purity germanium (HPGe) gamma-ray detector with multichannel analysis can be utilized in conjunction with the source for active interrogation or passively. The system uses proton recoil scintillators: 32 small 2.5 x 2.5 x 10.2-cm-thick plastic scintillators for imaging and at least two 2 x 2 arrays of 27 x 27 x 10-cm-thick plastic scintillators that detect induced fission radiation. The DT generator contains an alpha detector that time and directionally tags a fan beam of some of the neutrons emitted and subdivides it into pixels. A fast (1 GHz) time correlation processor measures the time-dependent coincidence among all detectors in the system. A computer-controlled scanner moves the small detectors and the source appropriately for scanning a target object for imaging. The system is based on detection of transmitted 14.1 MeV neutrons, fission neutrons, and gamma rays from spontaneous, inherent source fission of the target, fission neutrons and gamma rays induced by the external DT source, gamma rays from natural emissions of uranium and plutonium, and induced gamma-ray emission by the interaction of the 14.1 MeV neutrons from the DT source. The NMIS can and has been used with a time-tagged californium spontaneous fission source. It has also been used with pulsed interrogation sources such as LINACs, DT, and deuterium-deuterium (DD) sources. This system is uniquely suited for detection of shielded highly enriched uranium (HEU), plutonium, and other special nuclear materials and detection of high explosives (HE) and chemical agents. The NMIS will be adapted to utilize a trusted processor that incorporates information barrier and authentication techniques using open software and then be useful in some international applications for materials whose characteristics may be classified. The proposed information barrier version of the NMIS system would consist of detectors and cables, the red (classified side) computer system, which processes the data, and the black (unclassified side) computer, which handles the computer interface. The system could use the 'IB wrapper' concept proposed by Los Alamos National Laboratory and the software integrity (digital signatures) system proposed by Sandia. Since it is based entirely on commercially available components, the entire system, including NMIS data acquisition boards, can be built with commercial off-the-shelf components. This system is being developed into a fieldable system (FNMIS) for potential arms control treaties by the ONV. The system will be modularly constructed with the RF shielded modules connected to the processor by appropriate control and signal cable in metal conduit. The FNMIS is presently being designed for eventual incorporation of gamma-ray spectrometry and an information barrier to protect classified information. The system hardware and software can be configured to obtain the following: plutonium presence, plutonium mass, Pu-240/239 ratio, plutonium geometry, plutonium metal vs non-metallic (absence of metal), time (age) since processing for plutonium (or last purification), uranium presence, uranium mass, uranium enrichment, uranium geometry, uranium metal vs non-metallic compound (absence of metal), beryllium presence and mass, tritium and deuterium gas bottle presence, HE, and chemical weapons. A matrix of the quantities determined, the method of determination, whether active (external neutron source) or passive, and the measurement equipment involved is given in the Tables 1-4. Some of these attributes can be obtained by multiple data analysis methods. The gamma-ray spectrometry methods for HEU, plutonium, and HE have been developed by other laboratories, are well known, and will be incorporated.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Integration of the Kromek D3S Detector and Spot Robot For Secondary Inspections

Inspecting vehicles and containers for the presence of nuclear material is a challenging task for border control and security. When performed manually by inspectors, this task also has an associated risk of exposing the inspectors to unknown radiation. With the advent of agile, easy-to-program, quadruped robots like the Boston Dynamics Spot, automation of secondary inspection can improve the efficiency of the inspection process and alleviates the radiation risks to inspectors. In this project, Brookhaven National Laboratory and the University of Massachussetts at Lowell explored how to automate a simple secondary inspection mission. The Spot robot comes with its own software development kit (SDK) that allows clients/users to write custom code in the Python programming language to control the robot. Spot also has a payload computer called Spot-CORE, which runs the Ubuntu Linux operating system and allows users to integrate external sensors, such as a radiation detector, with Spot. In this study, the Kromek D3S detector has been integrated with Spot via the Spot-CORE, allowing Spot to capture gamma spectra and neutron counts for a specified acquisition period. Two custom routines, search and confirmation, have been developed and executed in this specified order. The search routine directs Spot to go around the nearest obstacle, e.g., vehicle and container, in a preset distance and step to collect gamma and neutron gross counts with the D3S detector. The radiation data and the robot location corresponding to each step are stored and fed to the confirmation routine at the end of the search. The confirmation routine then navigates Spot to the locations of the highest gamma or neutron counts to perform a long, e.g., one minute, measurement, and gives the operators the signature gamma spectra and neutron counts at the hotspots. This paper presents a detailed description of this automated system along with results of the preliminary tests in identifying the location and signature of a 137Cs radiation source in a vehicle.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

URANIUM ACCUMULATIONS IN CASTING OPERATIONS

In December 2017, unexpected accumulations of uranium were discovered in several locations throughout the casting process area at the Y-12 National Security Complex that subsequently placed casting operations on hold. The Y-12 uranium casting process takes place in enclosures and hoods, many of which are open to a large floor surface area that has limited visibility and access. At the time of discovery, there were no Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) analyses or limits for material accumulations in the casting processing areas. Due to changes in the operation of the casting process and invalid assumptions in the criticality safety evaluation, significant material accumulations were occurring inside the enclosures. The material accumulations were identified as a result of an extent of condition review from another process, and an occurrence report was filed. The NCS organization worked with Production and Operations personnel to identify additional areas of uranium accumulation in the casting area, which resulted in several iterations of cleaning and material collection. Following material recovery, a causal analysis was performed that identified several contributing factors that allowed the accumulations to go unnoticed. In order to resume operations, the criticality safety evaluation was revised to analyze and control uranium accumulations in the casting area. Additionally, improvements in nuclear material control and accountability (NMC&A) controls were required. Casting operations have since resumed with frequently required material collections, which have limited the amount of uranium material accumulation.

42 ENGINEERING↗