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At least 109 records · Page 6

Investigation of Dynamic Flight Maneuvers With an Iced Tailplane

A detailed analysis of two of the dynamic maneuvers, the pushover and elevator doublet, from the NASA/FAA Tailplane Icing Program are discussed. For this series of flight tests, artificial ice shapes were attached to the leading edge of the horizontal stabilizer of the NASA Lewis Research Center icing aircraft, a DHC-6 Twin Otter. The purpose of these tests was to learn more about ice-contaminated tailplane stall (ICTS), the known cause of 16 accidents resulting in 139 fatalities. The pushover has been employed by the FAA, JAA and Transport Canada for tailplane icing certification. This research analyzes the pushover and reports on the maneuver performance degradation due to ice shape severity and flap deflection. A repeatability analysis suggests tolerances for meeting the required targets of the maneuver. A second maneuver, the elevator doublet, is also studied.

VanZante, Judith Foss↗

AWE: Aviation Weather Data Visualization Environment

Weather is one of the major causes of aviation accidents. General aviation (GA) flights account for 92% of all the aviation accidents, In spite of all the official and unofficial sources of weather visualization tools available to pilots, there is an urgent need for visualizing several weather related data tailored for general aviation pilots. Our system, Aviation Weather Data Visualization Environment AWE), presents graphical displays of meteorological observations, terminal area forecasts, and winds aloft forecasts onto a cartographic grid specific to the pilot's area of interest. Decisions regarding the graphical display and design are made based on careful consideration of user needs. Integral visual display of these elements of weather reports is designed for the use of GA pilots as a weather briefing and route selection tool. AWE provides linking of the weather information to the flight's path and schedule. The pilot can interact with the system to obtain aviation-specific weather for the entire area or for his specific route to explore what-if scenarios and make "go/no-go" decisions. The system, as evaluated by some pilots at NASA Ames Research Center, was found to be useful.

Spirkovska, Lilly↗

An Obstacle Alerting System for Agricultural Application

Wire strikes are a significant cause of helicopter accidents. The aircraft most at risk are aerial applicators. The present study examines the effectiveness of a wire alert delivered by way of the lightbar, a GPS-based guidance system for aerial application. The alert lead-time needed to avoid an invisible wire is compared with that to avoid a visible wire. A flight simulator was configured to simulate an agricultural application helicopter. Two pilots flew simulated spray runs in fields with visible wires, invisible wires, and no wires. The wire alert was effective in reducing wire strikes. A lead-time of 3.5 sec was required for the alert to be effective. The lead- time required was the same whether the pilot could see the wire or not.

DeMaio, Joe↗

An Obstacle Alerting System for Agricultural Application

Wire strikes are a significant cause of helicopter accidents. The aircraft most at risk are aerial applicators. The present study examines the effectiveness of a wire alert delivered by way of the lightbar, a GPS-based guidance system for aerial application. The alert lead-time needed to avoid an invisible wire is compared with that to avoid a visible wire. A flight simulator was configured to simulate an agricultural application helicopter. Two pilots flew simulated spray runs in fields with visible wires, invisible wires, and no wires. The wire alert was effective in reducing wire strikes. A lead-time of 3.5 sec was required for the alert to be effective. The lead-time required was the same whether the pilot could see the wire or not.

DeMaio, Joe↗

Symbology Development for General Aviation Synthetic Vision Primary Flight Displays for the Approach and Missed-Approach Modes of Flight

Spatial disorientation induced by inadvertent flight into instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) continues to be a leading cause of fatal accidents in general aviation. The Synthetic Vision Systems General Aviation (SVS-GA) research element, an integral part of NASA s Aviation Safety and Security Program (AvSSP), is investigating a revolutionary display technology designed to mitigate low visibility events such as controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) and low-visibility loss of control (LVLoC). The integrated SVS Primary Flight Display (SVS-PFD) utilizes computer generated 3-dimensional imagery of the surrounding terrain augmented with flight path guidance symbology. This unique combination will provide GA pilots with an accurate representation of their environment and projection of their flight path, regardless of time of day or out-the-window (OTW) visibility. The initial Symbology Development for Head-Down Displays (SD-HDD) simulation experiment examined 16 display configurations on a centrally located high-resolution PFD installed in NASA s General Aviation Work Station (GAWS) flight simulator. The results of the experiment indicate that situation awareness (SA) can be enhanced without having a negative impact on flight technical error (FTE), by providing a general aviation pilot with an integrated SVS display to use when OTW visibility is obscured.

Bartolone, Anthony P.↗

Providing a Turn for the Better

Engineers are tasked with designing new systems every day to meet changing or unexpected technical requirements. After the tragic explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger on January 28, 1986, NASA engineers embarked on a complete overhaul of many of their long-standing quality systems and procedures. When the official cause of the accident was determined to be an O-ring failure in the right Solid Rocket Booster, NASA's Shuttle Program initiated a thorough redesign of the rocket boosters' clevis ends, which are the O-ring's mating surfaces. One of the unique systems that NASA engineers developed as a result of this effort included a heating assembly that is coupled to the outside of the rocket boosters. When the assembly is affixed to the external surface of the boosters, the very nature of its design allows for the warming of the O-rings prior to launch. After the engineers completed the assembly's design, however, they found that it was nearly impossible to tighten the spanner nuts required for attaching the system, given the minimum amount of clearance they had in the limited and confined space. Under these circumstances, the standard wrenches typically used for tightening these types of nuts did not work, and there were no other existing devices to solve the problem. NASA engineers embraced the challenge, developing a torque wrench tool adapter that allowed for a full rotation of spanner nuts in confined spaces. The tool, which is similar to an open-ended crowfoot wrench and a fixed-face spanner wrench, contains two dowel pins that center and lock the wrench onto the nut.

Source record↗

Bolt Stress Monitor

In photo, an engineer is using a new Ultrasonic Bolt Stress Monitor developed by NASA's Langley Research Center to determine whether a bolt is properly tightened. A highly accurate device, the monitor is an important tool in construction of such structures as pressure vessels, bridges and power plants, wherein precise measurement of the stress on a tightened bolt is critical. Overtightened or undertightened bolts can fail and cause serious industrial accidents or costly equipment break-downs. There are a number of methods for measuring bolt stress. Most widely used and least costly is the torque wrench, which is inherently inaccurate; it does not take into account the friction between nut and bolt, which has an influence on stress. At the other end of the spectrum, there are accurate stress-measuring systems, but they are expensive and not portable. The battery-powered Langley monitor fills a need; it is inexpensive, lightweight, portable and extremely accurate because it is not subject to friction error. Sound waves are transmitted to the bolt and a return signal is received. As the bolt is tightened, it undergoes changes in resonance due to stress, in the manner that a violin string changes tone when it is tightened. The monitor measures the changes in resonance and provides a reading of real stress on the bolt. The device, patented by NASA, has aroused wide interest and a number of firms have applied for licenses to produce it for the commercial market.

Source record↗

Skid Resistance Research

Skidding causes many traffic accidents. Streets and highways with skid-resisting surfaces reduce the incidence of such accidents. In fact, resurfacing roads to improve skid resistance is now required by federal law. Skid resistance is measured by road testing with specially equipped skid trailers. A project underway at NASA-Langley may considerably reduce the cost of skid trailers, thus making them more widely available to highway departments. For testing the skid resistance of aircraft runways, Langley engineers developed a relatively inexpensive test vehicle and a "pulsed braking" technique that is now being applied experimentally to road testing. The vehicle is a standard automobile modified to incorporate instrumentation, special test tires and valves, and a trailing fifth wheel for monitoring distance and velocity. The instrumentation includes a low-cost meter, a set of accelerometers that sense motion changes, and a chart recorder.

Source record↗

Flight Simulator and Training Human Factors Validation

Loss of control has been identified as the leading cause of aircraft accidents in recent years. Efforts have been made to better equip pilots to deal with these types of events, commonly referred to as upsets. A major challenge in these endeavors has been recreating the motion environments found in flight as the majority of upsets take place well beyond the normal operating envelope of large aircraft. The Environmental Tectonics Corporation has developed a simulator motion base, called GYROLAB, that is capable of recreating the sustained accelerations, or G-forces, and motions of flight. A two part research study was accomplished that coupled NASA's Generic Transport Model with a GYROLAB device. The goal of the study was to characterize physiological effects of the upset environment and to demonstrate that a sustained motion based simulator can be an effective means for upset recovery training. Two groups of 25 Air Transport Pilots participated in the study. The results showed reliable signs of pilot arousal at specific stages of similar upsets. Further validation also demonstrated that sustained motion technology was successful in improving pilot performance during recovery following an extensive training program using GYROLAB technology.

Glaser, Scott T.↗

Hybrid Terrain Database

A prototype hybrid terrain database is being developed in conjunction with other databases and with hardware and software that constitute subsystems of aerospace cockpit display systems (known in the art as synthetic vision systems) that generate images to increase pilots' situation awareness and eliminate poor visibility as a cause of aviation accidents. The basic idea is to provide a clear view of the world around an aircraft by displaying computer-generated imagery derived from an onboard database of terrain, obstacle, and airport information.

Arthur, Trey↗

Materials Analysis: A Key to Unlocking the Mystery of the Columbia Tragedy

Materials analyses of key forensic evidence helped unlock the mystery of the loss of space shuttle Columbia that disintegrated February 1, 2003 while returning from a 16-day research mission. Following an intensive four-month recovery effort by federal, state, and local emergency management and law officials, Columbia debris was collected, catalogued, and reassembled at the Kennedy Space Center. Engineers and scientists from the Materials and Processes (M&P) team formed by NASA supported Columbia reconstruction efforts, provided factual data through analysis, and conducted experiments to validate the root cause of the accident. Fracture surfaces and thermal effects of selected airframe debris were assessed, and process flows for both nondestructive and destructive sampling and evaluation of debris were developed. The team also assessed left hand (LH) airframe components that were believed to be associated with a structural breach of Columbia. Analytical data collected by the M&P team showed that a significant thermal event occurred at the left wing leading edge in the proximity of LH reinforced carbon carbon (RCC) panels 8 and 9. The analysis also showed exposure to temperatures in excess of 1,649 C, which would severely degrade the support structure, tiles, and RCC panel materials. The integrated failure analysis of wing leading edge debris and deposits strongly supported the hypothesis that a breach occurred at LH RCC panel 8.

Mayeaux, Brian M.↗

Work Practice Simulation of Complex Human-Automation Systems in Safety Critical Situations: The Brahms Generalized berlingen Model

The transition from the current air traffic system to the next generation air traffic system will require the introduction of new automated systems, including transferring some functions from air traffic controllers to on­-board automation. This report describes a new design verification and validation (V&V) methodology for assessing aviation safety. The approach involves a detailed computer simulation of work practices that includes people interacting with flight-critical systems. The research is part of an effort to develop new modeling and verification methodologies that can assess the safety of flight-critical systems, system configurations, and operational concepts. The 2002 Ueberlingen mid-air collision was chosen for analysis and modeling because one of the main causes of the accident was one crew's response to a conflict between the instructions of the air traffic controller and the instructions of TCAS, an automated Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System on-board warning system. It thus furnishes an example of the problem of authority versus autonomy. It provides a starting point for exploring authority/autonomy conflict in the larger system of organization, tools, and practices in which the participants' moment-by-moment actions take place. We have developed a general air traffic system model (not a specific simulation of Überlingen events), called the Brahms Generalized Ueberlingen Model (Brahms-GUeM). Brahms is a multi-agent simulation system that models people, tools, facilities/vehicles, and geography to simulate the current air transportation system as a collection of distributed, interactive subsystems (e.g., airports, air-traffic control towers and personnel, aircraft, automated flight systems and air-traffic tools, instruments, crew). Brahms-GUeM can be configured in different ways, called scenarios, such that anomalous events that contributed to the Überlingen accident can be modeled as functioning according to requirements or in an anomalous condition, as occurred during the accident. Brahms-GUeM thus implicitly defines a class of scenarios, which include as an instance what occurred at Überlingen. Brahms-GUeM is a modeling framework enabling "what if" analysis of alternative work system configurations and thus facilitating design of alternative operations concepts. It enables subsequent adaption (reusing simulation components) for modeling and simulating NextGen scenarios. This project demonstrates that BRAHMS provides the capacity to model the complexity of air transportation systems, going beyond idealized and simple flights to include for example the interaction of pilots and ATCOs. The research shows clearly that verification and validation must include the entire work system, on the one hand to check that mechanisms exist to handle failures of communication and alerting subsystems and/or failures of people to notice, comprehend, or communicate problematic (unsafe) situations; but also to understand how people must use their own judgment in relating fallible systems like TCAS to other sources of information and thus to evaluate how the unreliability of automation affects system safety. The simulation shows in particular that distributed agents (people and automated systems) acting without knowledge of each others' actions can create a complex, dynamic system whose interactive behavior is unexpected and is changing too quickly to comprehend and control.

complex systems↗

Aircraft Loss of Control: Problem Analysis for the Development and Validation of Technology Solutions

Aircraft loss of control (LOC) is a leading cause of fatal accidents across all transport airplane and operational classes. LOC can result from a wide spectrum of precursors (or hazards), often occurring in combination. Technologies developed for LOC prevention and recovery must therefore be effective under a wide variety of conditions and uncertainties, including multiple hazards, and the validation process must provide a means of assessing system effectiveness and coverage of these hazards. This paper provides a detailed description of a methodology for analyzing LOC as a dynamics and control problem for the purpose of developing effective technology solutions. The paper includes a definition of LOC based on several recent publications, a detailed description of a refined LOC accident analysis process that is illustrated via selected example cases, and a description of planned follow-on activities for identifying future potential LOC risks and the development of LOC test scenarios. Some preliminary considerations for LOC of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) and for their safe integration into the National Airspace System (NAS) are also discussed.

Belcastro, Christine M.↗

TPSAS-NF1676L-18905-DND

Aircraft loss of control is a leading cause of fatal accidents across all transport airplane and operational classes. Aircraft loss-of-control (LOC) accidents are highly complex in that they can result from numerous causal and contributing factors acting alone or (more often) in combination. Hence, there is no single intervention strategy to prevent these accidents. This presentation will define LOC as a dynamics and control problem, summarize LOC accident analysis results, and discuss current NASA research that supports a holistic approach for significantly reducing aircraft LOC accidents for current and future aircraft. The approach includes onboard systems technologies for LOC prevention and recovery, as well as a parallel effort for their validation. The onboard systems technologies provide improved situational awareness, guidance, and control under realistic LOC hazards, and include: hazards effects detection and mitigation; upset detection, prevention and recovery; and multiple hazards mitigation. Validation technologies include analytical, simulation, and experimental methods, tools and testbeds as well as the development of a comprehensive set of realistic LOC test scenarios. Future research directions will also be discussed.

Christine Belcastro↗

An Analysis of U.S. Civil Rotorcraft Accidents by Cost and Injury (1990-1996)

A study of rotorcraft accidents was conducted to identify safety issues and research areas that might lead to a reduction in rotorcraft accidents and fatalities. The primary source of data was summaries of National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) accident reports. From 1990 to 1996, the NTSB documented 1396 civil rotorcraft accidents in the United States in which 491 people were killed. The rotorcraft data were compared to airline and general aviation data to determine the relative safety of rotorcraft compared to other segments of the aviation industry. In depth analysis of the rotorcraft data addressed demographics, mission, and operational factors. Rotorcraft were found to have an accident rate about ten times that of commercial airliners and about the same as that of general aviation. The likelihood that an accident would be fatal was about equal for all three classes of operation. The most dramatic division in rotorcraft accidents is between flights flown by private pilots versus professional pilots. Private pilots, flying low cost aircraft in benign environments, have accidents that are due, in large part, to their own errors. Professional pilots, in contrast, are more likely to have accidents that are a result of exacting missions or use of specialized equipment. For both groups judgement error is more likely to lead to a fatal accident than are other types of causes. Several approaches to improving the rotorcraft accident rate are recommended. These mostly address improvement in the training of new pilots and improving the safety awareness of private pilots.

Iseler, Laura↗

Theoretical study of the effect of wind velocity gradients on longitudinal stability and control in climbing and level flight

A change in the wind vector over a short distance along the flight path (wind gradient) has caused several severe airplane accidents during take-off and landing. Results of a previous study showed that, in descending flight, a positive wind gradient (decreasing head wind) caused severe divergent motion and a negative wind gradient (decreasing tail wind) caused oscillatory motion which should not create a control problem. The results obtained when the same method of analysis was applied to climbing and to straight and level flight are reported. In straight and level flight, a wind gradient was found to cause effects similar to those found in descending flight. In climbing flight, it was found that a negative wind gradient caused a slightly divergent oscillation that presented no control problems and a positive wind gradient caused oscillatory divergence. Results of motion studies indicated that adequate control of the airplane motions can be provided by automatic control systems.

Sherman, W. L.↗

What Happened, and Why: Toward an Understanding of Human Error Based on Automated Analyses of Incident Reports

The objective of the Aviation System Monitoring and Modeling (ASMM) project of NASA s Aviation Safety and Security Program was to develop technologies that will enable proactive management of safety risk, which entails identifying the precursor events and conditions that foreshadow most accidents. This presents a particular challenge in the aviation system where people are key components and human error is frequently cited as a major contributing factor or cause of incidents and accidents. In the aviation "world", information about what happened can be extracted from quantitative data sources, but the experiential account of the incident reporter is the best available source of information about why an incident happened. This report describes a conceptual model and an approach to automated analyses of textual data sources for the subjective perspective of the reporter of the incident to aid in understanding why an incident occurred. It explores a first-generation process for routinely searching large databases of textual reports of aviation incident or accidents, and reliably analyzing them for causal factors of human behavior (the why of an incident). We have defined a generic structure of information that is postulated to be a sound basis for defining similarities between aviation incidents. Based on this structure, we have introduced the simplifying structure, which we call the Scenario as a pragmatic guide for identifying similarities of what happened based on the objective parameters that define the Context and the Outcome of a Scenario. We believe that it will be possible to design an automated analysis process guided by the structure of the Scenario that will aid aviation-safety experts to understand the systemic issues that are conducive to human error.

Maille, Nicolas P.↗

Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Volume 1

The findings of the Commission regarding the circumstances surrounding the Challenger accident are reported and recommendations for corrective action are outlined. All available mission data, subsequent tests, and wreckage analyses were reviewed and specific failure scenarios were developed. The Commission concluded that the cause of the Mission 51-L accident was the failure of the pressure seal in the aft field joint of the right solid rocket motor. The failure was due to a faulty design unacceptably sensitive to a number of factors. These factors were the effects of temperature, physical dimensions, the character of materials, the effects of reuse, processing, and the reaction of the joint to dynamic loading. In addition to analyzing the material causes of the accident, the Commission examined the chain of decisions that culminated in approval of the launch. It concluded that the decision making process was flawed in several ways including (1) failure in communication resulting in a launch decision based on incomplete and misleading information, (2) a conflict between engineering data and management judgements, and (3) a NASA management structure that permitted flight safety problems to bypass key Shuttle managers.

Rogers, W. P.↗