Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “ALARM SYSTEMS”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 109 records · Page 6

Scale 6.1 Enhancements for Nuclear Criticality Safety

The Scale code system developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory provides a comprehensive, verified and validated, user-friendly tool set for criticality safety, reactor physics, radiation shielding, and sensitivity and uncertainty analysis. For more than 30 years, regulators, licensees, and research institutions around the world have used Scale for safety analysis and design. Scale provides a 'plug-and-play' framework with 89 computational modules, including three deterministic and three Monte Carlo radiation transport solvers that are selected based on the desired solution. Scale's graphical user interfaces assist with accurate system modeling and convenient access to desired results. Scale 6.1 builds on the existing capabilities and ease-of-use of Scale and provides several new features such as improved options and capabilities for sensitivity and uncertainty analysis calculations, improved flexibility in shielding and criticality accident alarm system calculations with automated variance reduction, and new options for the definition of group structures for depletion calculations. The Scale 6.1 development team has focused on improved robustness via substantial additional regression testing and verification for new and existing features, providing improved performance relative to Scale 6.0, especially in reactor physics calculations and in the nuclear data used for source term characterization and shielding calculations.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Development of Shielding Benchmarks Using the Godiva IV Assembly

The Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) is developing a shielding benchmark using the Godiva IV assembly as a source. Its present status is reviewed herein. Even eight decades into the nuclear era, substantial work remains to develop a database of shielding benchmarks to support future nuclear development. A nuclear simulation is only as good as its supporting data, inputs, and validation basis. Uncertainty in these areas is addressed using conservatism, which adds margin and, occasionally, cost. In many shielding situations, high accuracy is not necessary because additional material is not particularly expensive. After all, 1–2 cm of lead often reduces the gamma ray dose substantially. However, in certain areas, conservatism can add unnecessary cost. These areas include mobile shielding applications such as casks, ships, microreactors, and spacecraft, where weight and, thus, margin is expensive. Although these characteristics are side benefits for NCSP shielding benchmark development, the main driver is enabling more reliable placement of criticality accident alarm systems (CAASs) in nuclear material facilities, such as those dedicated to the production of advanced reactor fuels. CAAS placement relies on more than accurate data and code validation. It also relies on sufficiently accurate materials specifications, geometry specifications, and a well-defined, alarm-producing baseline accident. All these things require tacit knowledge and understanding of the problem being evaluated. Benchmarks can help ensure this understanding.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

SCALE 6: Comprehensive Nuclear Safety Analysis Code System

Version 6 of the Standardized Computer Analyses for Licensing Evaluation (SCALE) computer software system developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, released in February 2009, contains significant new capabilities and data for nuclear safety analysis and marks an important update for this software package, which is used worldwide. This paper highlights the capabilities of the SCALE system, including continuous-energy flux calculations for processing multigroup problem-dependent cross sections, ENDF/B-VII continuous-energy and multigroup nuclear cross-section data, continuous-energy Monte Carlo criticality safety calculations, Monte Carlo radiation shielding analyses with automated three-dimensional variance reduction techniques, one- and three-dimensional sensitivity and uncertainty analyses for criticality safety evaluations, two- and three-dimensional lattice physics depletion analyses, fast and accurate source terms and decay heat calculations, automated burnup credit analyses with loading curve search, and integrated three-dimensional criticality accident alarm system analyses using coupled Monte Carlo criticality and shielding calculations.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Enhancements in SCALE 6.1

The SCALE code system developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory provides a comprehensive, verified and validated, user-friendly tool set for criticality safety, reactor physics, radiation shielding, and sensitivity and uncertainty analysis. For more than 30 years, regulators, licensees, and research institutions around the world have used SCALE for nuclear safety analysis and design. SCALE provides a 'plug-and-play' framework with 89 computational modules, including three deterministic and three Monte Carlo radiation transport solvers that are selected based on the desired solution. SCALE's graphical user interfaces assist with accurate system modeling, visualization, and convenient access to desired results. SCALE 6.1 builds on the existing capabilities and ease-of-use of SCALE and provides several new features such as enhanced lattice physics capabilities and multigroup Monte Carlo depletion, improved options and capabilities for sensitivity and uncertainty analysis calculations, improved flexibility in shielding and criticality accident alarm system calculations with automated variance reduction, and new options for the definition of group structures for depletion calculations. The SCALE 6.1 development team has focused on improved robustness via substantial additional regression testing and verification for new and existing features, providing improved performance relative to SCALE 6.0, especially in reactor physics calculations and in the nuclear data used for source term characterization and shielding calculations.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

CAS Operator Training Simulator

SAND2022-1525 O The Central Alarm System (CAS) training simulator is a standalone application that will work on any Alarm Control and Display (AC&D) System. Designed to be used by an instructor in a classroom environment, this software plays back scenario alarms and videos usually exported out of Scribe3D or any software that can produce scenario-based videos. Users can select from an array of different scenarios to play. The alarms are sent to an AC&D controller and the videos are sent to a Video Management Server (VMS). Both alarms and associated videos displayed by the intended AC&D system. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525.

Le, Tam↗

Criticality Calculations with MCNP6 - Practical Lectures

These slides are used to teach MCNP (Monte Carlo N-Particle) usage to nuclear criticality safety analysts. The following are the lecture topics: course information, introduction, MCNP basics, criticality calculations, advanced geometry, tallies, adjoint-weighted tallies and sensitivities, physics and nuclear data, parameter studies, NCS validation I, NCS validation II, NCS validation III, case study 1 - solution tanks, case study 2 - fuel vault, case study 3 - B&W core, case study 4 - simple TRIGA, case study 5 - fissile mat. vault, criticality accident alarm systems. After completion of this course, you should be able to: Develop an input model for MCNP; Describe how cross section data impact Monte Carlo and deterministic codes; Describe the importance of validation of computer codes and how it is accomplished; Describe the methodology supporting Monte Carlo codes and deterministic codes; Describe pitfalls of Monte Carlo calculations; Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of Monte Carlo and Discrete Ordinants codes; The diffusion theory model is not strictly valid for treating fissile systems in which neutron absorption, voids, and/or material boundaries are present. In the context of these limitations, identify a fissile system for which a diffusion theory solution would be adequate.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

D-Zero Silicon Cooling System Moisture Injection System Control System

This engineering note describes the Monitoring, Controls, Interlock, and Alarm systems used to operate the Dzero Silicon Moisture Injection System that injects moisture into the Silicon Dry Air Purge System. The actual software programming is not included in this document, but the programming actions and interactions are included.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

Audit Report, "Fire Protection Deficiencies at Los Alamos National Laboratory"

The Department of Energy's Los Alamos National Laboratory (Los Alamos) maintains some of the Nation's most important national security assets, including nuclear materials. Many of Los Alamos' facilities are located in close proximity to one another, are occupied by large numbers of contract and Federal employees, and support activities ranging from nuclear weapons design to science-related activities. Safeguarding against fires, regardless of origin, is essential to protecting employees, surrounding communities, and national security assets. On June 1, 2006, Los Alamos National Security, LLC (LANS), became the managing and operating contractor for Los Alamos, under contract with the Department's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). In preparation for assuming its management responsibilities at Los Alamos, LANS conducted walk-downs of the Laboratory's facilities to identify pre-existing deficiencies that could give rise to liability, obligation, loss or damage. The walk-downs, which identified 812 pre-existing fire protection deficiencies, were conducted by subject matter professionals, including fire protection experts. While the Los Alamos Site Office has overall responsibility for the effectiveness of the fire protection program, LANS, as the Laboratory's operating contractor, has a major, day-to-day role in minimizing fire-related risks. The issue of fire protection at Los Alamos is more than theoretical. In May 2000, the 'Cerro Grande' fire burned about 43,000 acres, including 7,700 acres of Laboratory property. Due to the risk posed by fire to the Laboratory's facilities, workforce, and surrounding communities, we initiated this audit to determine whether pre-existing fire protection deficiencies had been addressed. Our review disclosed that LANS had not resolved many of the fire protection deficiencies that had been identified in early 2006: (1) Of the 296 pre-existing deficiencies we selected for audit, 174 (59 percent) had not been corrected; and, (2) A substantial portion of the uncorrected deficiencies, 86 (49 percent) were considered by the walk-down teams to be significant enough to warrant compensatory actions until the deficiency was corrected or was tracked to closure through implementation of corrective actions. Further, we found that 32 of the significant deficiencies had been closed by the previous Los Alamos contractor, prior to LANS assuming responsibility for operation of the Laboratory, even though the deficiencies had not been corrected. A fire protection expert provided technical support during the audit. As an example of uncorrected problems, LANS had not resolved, by performing periodic tests, a deficiency identified in 2006 regarding a kitchen hood fire suppression system in a facility located within the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center. Such systems are required to be tested twice a year by the National Fire Protection Association standard, a standard that had been adopted by Department of Energy under DOE Order 420.1B. Yet, in 2006, the LANS walk-down team recognized that this system had not been inspected since May 2004 and noted that deficient suppression systems could result in significantly high levels of property damage and loss. After we brought this issue to management's attention on February 6, 2009, LANS officials stated that the Laboratory would correct this deficiency. As with the problems involving the fire suppression system, we observed that LANS had not always corrected life safety deficiencies involving building exits at one of its primary facilities. This included providing a secondary emergency exit for a building with occupants on multiple floor levels. LANS had removed personnel from the third floor and improved the sprinkler system of the facility, but it had still not provided a secondary exit for personnel on the second floor by the time we completed our review. NNSA has since stated that this fire protection issue will be completely addressed by relocating personnel from the second floor. Perhaps most serious, our testing revealed that a number of deficiencies were formally closed even though actual corrective action had not been completed. Notably, we observed that action had not been taken to resolve a recommendation to replace a fire alarm panel found to be unreliable. After the walk-down was conducted but prior to contract transition, the former contractor closed the recommendation in its action tracking database even though the panel had not been replaced. The walk-down team had categorized the fire alarm system as requiring replacement since it had been modified many times, was old and obsolete, and had very limited available spare parts. In fact, the walk-down team concluded that the panel 'must be considered to be unreliable and should have a very high priority for replacement'.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Neutron Activation Foil and Thermoluminescent Dosimeter Responses to a Polyethylene Reflected Pulse of the CEA Valduc SILENE Critical Assembly

This benchmark experiment was conducted as a joint venture between the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the French Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique (CEA). Staff at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in the US and the Centre de Valduc in France planned this experiment. The experiment was conducted on October 19, 2010 in the SILENE critical assembly facility at Valduc. Several other organizations contributed to this experiment and the subsequent evaluation, including CEA Saclay, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), the Y-12 National Security Complex (NSC), Babcock International Group in the United Kingdom, and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The goal of this experiment was to measure neutron activation and thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD) doses from a source similar to a fissile solution critical excursion. The resulting benchmark can be used for validation of computer codes and nuclear data libraries as required when performing analysis of criticality accident alarm systems (CAASs). A secondary goal of this experiment was to qualitatively test performance of two CAAS detectors similar to those currently and formerly in use in some US DOE facilities. The detectors tested were the CIDAS MkX and the Rocky Flats NCD-91. The CIDAS detects gammas with a Geiger-Muller tube and the Rocky Flats detects neutrons via charged particles produced in a thin 6 LiF disc depositing energy in a Si solid state detector. These detectors were being evaluated to determine whether they would alarm, so they were not expected to generate benchmark quality data.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Neutron Activation Foil and Thermoluminescent Dosimeter Responses to a Lead Reflected Pulse of the CEA Valduc SILENE Critical Assembly

This benchmark experiment was conducted as a joint venture between the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the French Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique (CEA). Staff at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in the US and the Centre de Valduc in France planned this experiment. The experiment was conducted on October 13, 2010 in the SILENE critical assembly facility at Valduc. Several other organizations contributed to this experiment and the subsequent evaluation, including CEA Saclay, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), the Y-12 National Security Complex (NSC), Babcock International Group in the United Kingdom, and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The goal of this experiment was to measure neutron activation and thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD) doses from a source similar to a fissile solution critical excursion. The resulting benchmark can be used for validation of computer codes and nuclear data libraries as required when performing analysis of criticality accident alarm systems (CAASs). A secondary goal of this experiment was to qualitatively test performance of two CAAS detectors similar to those currently and formerly in use in some US DOE facilities. The detectors tested were the CIDAS MkX and the Rocky Flats NCD-91. The CIDAS detects gammas with a Geiger-Muller tube, and the Rocky Flats detects neutrons via charged particles produced in a thin 6 LiF disc, depositing energy in a Si solid-state detector. These detectors were being evaluated to determine whether they would alarm, so they were not expected to generate benchmark quality data.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

A business case for nuclear plant control room modernization - 352

This paper presents a generic business case for implementation of technology that supports Control Room Modernization (CRM) in existing nuclear power plants (NPPs). The business case is based on advanced digital instrumentation and control (I and C), human-system interface (HSI), and work process technologies that allow NPP operators to conduct control room operations with improved human factors and efficiency, and therefore operate with fewer operational events. Labor savings can be harvested in terms of reduced overtime and redistribution of work. Significant savings are also demonstrated as reduced time to bring the plant back on line after completion of outages. The benefits are quantified to a rough order of magnitude, providing directional guidance to NPPs that are interested in developing similar business cases. The technologies employed in CRM include large overview displays, task-based operator displays, computer-based procedures, advanced alarm systems, computerized operator support systems, and wireless networks, among others. The CRM business case is founded on the following categories of cost savings: - Integrated Computer-Based Procedures for Operators; - Reduction in Corrective Action Program Work Due to Operator Error; - Reduction in Outage Critical Path Time; - Operation of Local Control Panels; - Reduction in Control Room Support; - Reduction in Plant Events Resulting in Generation Loss; - Paperless Control Room Processes. In addition to cost savings, these technologies also offer improvements to indirect ways that have impact on key performance indicators of the plant. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Analysis Capability and Data Needs Identified During the Evaluation of the SILENE CAAS Benchmarks

In October 2010, a series of benchmark experiments was conducted at the Commissariat à l’Énergie Atomique et aux Énergies Alternatives (CEA) Valduc SILENE facility. These experiments were a joint effort between the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the French CEA to create three benchmarks for verification and validation of radiation transport codes, as well as evaluated nuclear data, used to analyze criticality accident alarm systems (CAASs). Many preliminary details of these experiments and their evaluation have been discussed in previous publications. The first benchmark evaluation was published in 2015, and the second and third evaluations will be published at the end of 2016.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

NDCS Group Meeting Work overview: NCSP Task ORNL IP&D-5 [Slides]

The presentation discusses the primary goal of the NCSP Task IP&D-5 which is to use available data from HPRR operation to create a benchmark report for inclusion in the ICSBEP, as a Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) shielding benchmark. The presentation elaborates on the HPRR operation and how it relates to the KENO VI model, sulfur pellets measurements, and calculation methodology between KENO and MAVRIC FW-CADIS. The presentation concludes by stating that some work is still needed to evaluate uncertainties and to explain the discrepancy computation/experiment.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Computer-based human-machine interfaces for emergency operation - 233

The Halden Reactor Project (HRP) has many years of experience in developing and evaluating principles for computer-based human-machine interfaces (HMIs). We have synthesized the lessons learned in an integrated design concept that is implemented on a boiling water reactor (BWR) simulator in the Halden Man Machine Laboratory (HAMMLAB). The design concept is intended to alert and support the operators in monitoring and controlling the plant during normal operation, emergency situations and outages. The computer-based HMIs include an alarm system, operating displays, operating procedures and large screen displays. The design concept has been tested in a simulator study in HAMMLAB. This paper describes the design and initial testing of the computer-based emergency operating procedures (EOPs) and other displays to support the operators when using the EOPs. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Emergency Response Capability 2009 Baseline Needs Assessment Performance Assessment

This document was prepared by John A. Sharry, LLNL Fire Marshal and Division Leader for Fire Protection and was reviewed by Sandia/CA Fire Marshal, Martin Gresho. This document is the second of a two-part analysis of Emergency Response Capabilities of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The first part, 2009 Baseline Needs Assessment Requirements Document established the minimum performance criteria necessary to meet mandatory requirements. This second part analyses the performance of Lawrence Livermore Laboratory Emergency Management Department to the contents of the Requirements Document. The document was prepared based on an extensive review of information contained in the 2004 BNA, a review of Emergency Planning Hazards Assessments, a review of building construction, occupancy, fire protection features, dispatch records, LLNL alarm system records, fire department training records, and fire department policies and procedures. On October 1, 2007, LLNL contracted with the Alameda County Fire Department to provide emergency response services. The level of service called for in that contract is the same level of service as was provided by the LLNL Fire Department prior to that date. This Compliance Assessment will evaluate fire department services beginning October 1, 2008 as provided by the Alameda County Fire Department.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

A smart alarm for particle accelerator beamline operations

We present the initial results of a proof-of-concept 'smart alarm' for the Continuous Electron Beam Accelerator Facility injector beamline at Jefferson Lab. To minimize machine downtime and improve operational efficiency, an autonomous alarm system able to identify and diagnose unusual machine states is needed. Our approach leverages a trained neural network capable of alerting operators (a) when an anomalous condition exists in the beamline and (b) identifying the element setting that is the root cause. The tool is based on an inverse model that maps beamline readings (diagnostic readbacks) to settings (beamline attributes operators can modify). The model takes as input readings from the machine and computes machine settings which are compared to control setpoints. Instances where predictions differ from setpoints by a user-defined threshold are flagged as anomalous. Given data corresponding to 354 anomalous injector configurations, the model can narrow the root cause of an anomalous condition to three potential candidates with 94.6% accuracy. Furthermore, compared to the current method of identifying anomalous conditions which raises an alarm when machine parameters drift outside their normal tolerances, the data-driven model can identify 83% more anomalous conditions.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

C-400 and C-409 Criticality Incredible Road Map

Many guides and standards describe a process for evaluating process operations with known quantities of fissile material. The accepted industry guides and standards for performing criticality evaluations for fissile material operations are not well suited for operating systems that may contain residual fissile material. The Paducah Site deactivation activities includes large process components that have unfavorable geometries for the {sup 235}U enrichment levels present. The fissile material holdup in these components can range from negligible residual quantities to significant deposits weighing several hundred pounds. The purpose of this white paper is to outline a methodology that can be used to declare a facility as criticality incredible (CI). For the purpose of this paper, criticality incredible means that the inventory and its form and distribution within the facility does not need Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation (NCSE) type (e.g., administrative or engineered) controls. This assumes of course that certain project assumptions are maintained. For example in the facilities that will be discussed within this paper, wet decontamination is not part of the planned demolition and disposal operations. The proposed methodology for deactivation of a facility to the point that criticality incredible can be declared will be applied to the C-400 Chemical Cleaning Building and to the C-409 Decontamination Facility at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP). The purpose and intent of the CI declaration is to release a facility from Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) requirements and simplify the demolition of the facility. In practical terms, this means the facility can be re-categorized as < a Hazard Category 3 facility per DOE-STD-1027-92 Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, NCS controls are not needed, and the Criticality Accident Alarm Systems (CAAS) can be removed from service. The only involvement from the site NCS program following the declaration would be to ensure that the underlying assumptions are not violated through discovered conditions or project changes. This includes the institutional control of preventing new fissile material from being introduced into the facility. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

A novel approach to criticality accident detection for a legacy facility

For operations on the Sellafield site involving fissile material a Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) has traditionally been installed unless an omission case can be made. An omission case would examine if, in the absence of all controls, a criticality could reasonably be expected or whether the potential dose to an operator would remain below a maximum acceptable dose. It is a UK legal requirement for adequate emergency arrangements to be in place for hazards on a nuclear licensed site. For facilities where criticality is credible there is a regulatory expectation that a -Criticality Warning System- should be in place. A -Criticality Warning System- is not necessarily a full CAAS and alternative means of criticality detection may be part of an adequate emergency plan. The Sellafield site has a Magnox fuel reprocessing facility which has been operated since the 1960's. Evaporation of the Medium Active (MA) liquid waste from this process is undertaken in an associated building. Following extensive review of the plant and process a number of maloperations which can route fissile material to the MA evaporator were identified. Adequate controls to prevent these scenarios were shown to be in place. In the unlikely event of a failure of controls leading to sustained loss of fissile material a criticality incident may occur and hence an emergency plan was determined to be necessary. The novel emergency arrangements which were developed utilized the existing gamma monitor network located across multiple building floors. These gamma monitors are present for radiological safety. This emergency arrangement would require rapid interpretation of the gamma alarms by an operator and the manual triggering of a criticality evacuation alarm. The gamma monitors were demonstrated to be able to detect the minimum incident of concern (10{sup 15} fissions) as well as being able to alarm during the ramp up in power of a large criticality incident (10{sup 18} fissions). It was shown that a criticality accident could readily be distinguished from a radiological event (e.g. loss of containment). To support this work, criticality excursion analysis was used to examine the likely characteristics of a criticality in the MA evaporator. This novel arrangement was justified due to a number of factors including: the limited remaining operational lifetime of this facility (<5 years), the low frequency of maloperation coupled with a failure of controls and the crucial risk reduction provided by the continued reprocessing of Magnox fuel. Furthermore, the time and cost involved with design and installation of a standard CAAS would be substantially greater than a plan based upon existing instrumentation. These arguments were accepted by the UK regulator the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR). (author)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗