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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Computationally Guided Development of Components for High Energy Density Solid-State Lithium-Sulfur Batteries

All electric vertical take-off and landing vehicles (eVTOL) for urban air mobility (UAM) concepts face numerous challenging technical barriers before their introduction into the consumer marketplace. The most challenging of these technical barriers to overcome is developing an energy storage system capable of meeting the rigorous aerospace safety and performance criteria1. The performance metrics for eVTOL craft, such as specific energy, specific power, and safety, exceed those of electric automobiles by a factor of two to four. Current state-of-the-art (SOA) lithium-ion batteries are incapable of meeting the key performance criteria of energy and safety for eVTOL. Therefore, next generation advanced chemistries and designs must be developed to meet required performance metrics for electric aviation2. Beyond lithium-ion chemistries, such as lithium-sulfur, show promise in their high energy, while limitations exist in their power and cyclability due to low electrical conductivity and high intermediate solubility in organic liquid electrolytes. Several strategies to overcome the low electrical conductivity involve the use of selenium as a dopant in the active sulfur material, along with the incorporation of 2-dimensional electron-conducting holey-graphene to improve the composite cathodes electronic conductivity. Furthermore, combining this chemistry with a solid-electrolyte avoids the components’ dissolution issues3. However, the development of composite solid-state cathodes is non-trivial as several components must be intimately mixed so that the active component has sufficient access to both electrons and lithium ions to undergo full electrochemical conversion. Mathematical modeling of battery components can assist experimental design through a robust and rigorous combination of computational modeling techniques covering multiple length scales. The objective is to leverage modern computational materials methods combined with battery multiphysics tools to develop radically advanced compatible cathode and electrolyte materials, build and test solid state lithium-sulfur cells and packs. A NASA-based cross-organizational team of high-powered experts combined integrated computational predictive modeling, fundamental chemistry analysis, advanced material science, and battery cell development to tackle this very challenging, multidisciplinary problem. This presentation will show a multiscale computational modeling approach that has produced a novel particle dynamics method called Solid Electrolyte Sphere Approximation Model (SESAM). SESAM modeling targets the 1-10 µm scale structures and provides electromechanical and grain interactions for predictive design guidelines for the manufacturing of solid-state components. Parameters such as particle size and volume fraction of the constituent materials were modeled and experimentally fabricated to optimize electrochemical performance through improved microstructure design. Experimental feedback was provided through ionic and electronic conductivity assessment and structural analysis of developed materials and cell components.

battery↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Characterization of Radiation Exposure at Aviation Flight Altitudes Using the Nowcast of Aerospace Ionizing Radiation System (NAIRAS)

Exposure to ionizing radiation from galactic cosmic rays (GCRs) and solar energetic particles (SEPs) at aircraft flight altitudes can have an adverse effect on human health. Although airline crews are classified as radiation workers by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), in most countries, their level of exposure is unquantified and undocumented throughout the duration of their career. As such, there is a need to assess pilot ionizing radiation exposure. The Nowcast of Aerospace Ionizing Radiation System (NAIRAS), a real-time global, physics-based model is used to assess such exposure. The Automated Radiation Measurements for Aerospace Safety (ARMAS) measurement dataset consists of high latitude, high altitude, and long-duration aircraft flights between 2013-2021. Here, we characterize radiation exposure at aviation flight altitudes using the NAIRAS model and compare with over 800 flight trajectories from the ARMAS flight measurement inventory.

Daniel B Phoenix↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Characterization of Radiation Exposure at Aviation Flight Altitudes Using the Nowcast of Aerospace Ionizing Radiation System (NAIRAS)

Exposure to ionizing radiation from galactic cosmic rays (GCR) and solar energetic particles (SEP) at aircraft flight altitudes can have an adverse effect on human health. Although airline crews are classified as radiation workers by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), in most countries, their level of exposure is unquantified and undocumented throughout the duration of their career. As such, there is a need to assess pilot ionizing radiation exposure. The Nowcast of Aerospace Ionizing Radiation System (NAIRAS), a real-time, global, physics-based model is used to assess such exposure. The Automated Radiation Measurements for Aerospace Safety (ARMAS) measurement dataset consists of high latitude, high altitude, and long-duration aircraft flights between 2013-2023. Here, we characterize radiation exposure at aviation flight altitudes using the NAIRAS model and compare with over 1000 flight trajectories from the ARMAS flight measurement inventory.

Daniel B Phoenix↗
NASA NTRS1969

The NASA System Safety Program

NASA aerospace system safety program implementation and supporting organization with emphasis on background, concepts, constraints, methods and results

Harris, R. E.↗
NASA NTRS2007

NASA Engineering Safety Center NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Working Group 2007 Proactive Task Status

In 2007, the NASA Engineering Safety Center (NESC) chartered the NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Working Group to bring forth and address critical battery-related performance/manufacturing issues for NASA and the aerospace community. A suite of tasks identifying and addressing issues related to Ni-H2 and Li-ion battery chemistries was submitted and selected for implementation. The current NESC funded are: (1) Wet Life of Ni-H2 Batteries (2) Binding Procurement (3) NASA Lithium-Ion Battery Guidelines (3a) Li-Ion Performance Assessment (3b) Li-Ion Guidelines Document (3b-i) Assessment of Applicability of Pouch Cells for Aerospace Missions (3b-ii) High Voltage Risk Assessment (3b-iii) Safe Charge Rates for Li-Ion Cells (4) Availability of Source Material for Li-Ion Cells (5) NASA Aerospace Battery Workshop This presentation provides a brief overview of the tasks in the 2007 plan and serves as an introduction to more detailed discussions on each of the specific tasks.

Manzo, Michelle A.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Online Dectection and Modeling of Safety Boundaries for Aerospace Application Using Bayesian Statistics

The behavior of complex aerospace systems is governed by numerous parameters. For safety analysis it is important to understand how the system behaves with respect to these parameter values. In particular, understanding the boundaries between safe and unsafe regions is of major importance. In this paper, we describe a hierarchical Bayesian statistical modeling approach for the online detection and characterization of such boundaries. Our method for classification with active learning uses a particle filter-based model and a boundary-aware metric for best performance. From a library of candidate shapes incorporated with domain expert knowledge, the location and parameters of the boundaries are estimated using advanced Bayesian modeling techniques. The results of our boundary analysis are then provided in a form understandable by the domain expert. We illustrate our approach using a simulation model of a NASA neuro-adaptive flight control system, as well as a system for the detection of separation violations in the terminal airspace.

Statistics↗
NASA NTRS2005

Formal Safety Certification of Aerospace Software

In principle, formal methods offer many advantages for aerospace software development: they can help to achieve ultra-high reliability, and they can be used to provide evidence of the reliability claims which can then be subjected to external scrutiny. However, despite years of research and many advances in the underlying formalisms of specification, semantics, and logic, formal methods are not much used in practice. In our opinion this is related to three major shortcomings. First, the application of formal methods is still expensive because they are labor- and knowledge-intensive. Second, they are difficult to scale up to complex systems because they are based on deep mathematical insights about the behavior of the systems (t.e., they rely on the "heroic proof"). Third, the proofs can be difficult to interpret, and typically stand in isolation from the original code. In this paper, we describe a tool for formally demonstrating safety-relevant aspects of aerospace software, which largely circumvents these problems. We focus on safely properties because it has been observed that safety violations such as out-of-bounds memory accesses or use of uninitialized variables constitute the majority of the errors found in the aerospace domain. In our approach, safety means that the program will not violate a set of rules that can range for the simple memory access rules to high-level flight rules. These different safety properties are formalized as different safety policies in Hoare logic, which are then used by a verification condition generator along with the code and logical annotations in order to derive formal safety conditions; these are then proven using an automated theorem prover. Our certification system is currently integrated into a model-based code generation toolset that generates the annotations together with the code. However, this automated formal certification technology is not exclusively constrained to our code generator and could, in principle, also be integrated with other code generators such as RealTime Workshop or even applied to legacy code. Our approach circumvents the historical problems with formal methods by increasing the degree of automation on all levels. The restriction to safety policies (as opposed to arbitrary functional behavior) results in simpler proof problems that can generally be solved by fully automatic theorem proves. An automated linking mechanism between the safety conditions and the code provides some of the traceability mandated by process standards such as DO-178B. An automated explanation mechanism uses semantic markup added by the verification condition generator to produce natural-language explanations of the safety conditions and thus supports their interpretation in relation to the code. It shows an automatically generated certification browser that lets users inspect the (generated) code along with the safety conditions (including textual explanations), and uses hyperlinks to automate tracing between the two levels. Here, the explanations reflect the logical structure of the safety obligation but the mechanism can in principle be customized using different sets of domain concepts. The interface also provides some limited control over the certification process itself. Our long-term goal is a seamless integration of certification, code generation, and manual coding that results in a "certified pipeline" in which specifications are automatically transformed into executable code, together with the supporting artifacts necessary for achieving and demonstrating the high level of assurance needed in the aerospace domain.

Denney, Ewen↗
NASA NTRS2004

Formal Verification of Safety Properties for Aerospace Systems Through Algorithms Based on Exhaustive State-Space Exploration

The Runway Safety Monitor (RSM) designed by Lockheed Martin is part of NASA's effort to reduce aviation accidents. We developed a Petri net model of the RSM protocol and used the model checking functions of our tool SMART to investigate a number of safety properties in RSM. To mitigate the impact of state-space explosion, we built a highly discretized model of the system, obtained by partitioning the monitored runway zone into a grid of smaller volumes and by considering scenarios involving only two aircraft. The model also assumes that there are no communication failures, such as bad input from radar or lack of incoming data, thus it relies on a consistent view of reality by all participants. In spite of these simplifications, we were able to expose potential problems in the RSM conceptual design. Our findings were forwarded to the design engineers, who undertook corrective action. Additionally, the results stress the efficiency attained by the new model checking algorithms implemented in SMART, and demonstrate their applicability to real-world systems. Attempts to verify RSM with NuSMV and SPIN have failed due to excessive memory consumption.

Ciardo, Gianfranco↗
NASA NTRS2002

Simulation of the National Aerospace System for Safety Analysis

Work started on this project on January 1, 1999, the first year of the grant. Following the outline of the grant proposal, a simulator architecture has been established which can incorporate the variety of types of models needed to accurately simulate national airspace dynamics. For the sake of efficiency, this architecture was based on an established single-aircraft flight simulator, the Reconfigurable Flight Simulator (RFS), already developed at Georgia Tech. Likewise, in the first year substantive changes and additions were made to the RFS to convert it into a simulation of the National Airspace System, with the flexibility to incorporate many types of models: aircraft models; controller models; airspace configuration generators; discrete event generators; embedded statistical functions; and display and data outputs. The architecture has been developed with the capability to accept any models of these types; due to its object-oriented structure, individual simulator components can be added and removed during run-time, and can be compiled separately. Simulation objects from other projects should be easy to convert to meet architecture requirements, with the intent that both this project may now be able to incorporate established simulation components from other projects, and that other projects may easily use this simulation without significant time investment.

Pritchett, Amy↗
NASA NTRS2003

Certification Processes for Safety-Critical and Mission-Critical Aerospace Software

This document is a quick reference guide with an overview of the processes required to certify safety-critical and mission-critical flight software at selected NASA centers and the FAA. Researchers and software developers can use this guide to jumpstart their understanding of how to get new or enhanced software onboard an aircraft or spacecraft. The introduction contains aerospace industry definitions of safety and safety-critical software, as well as, the current rationale for certification of safety-critical software. The Standards for Safety-Critical Aerospace Software section lists and describes current standards including NASA standards and RTCA DO-178B. The Mission-Critical versus Safety-Critical software section explains the difference between two important classes of software: safety-critical software involving the potential for loss of life due to software failure and mission-critical software involving the potential for aborting a mission due to software failure. The DO-178B Safety-critical Certification Requirements section describes special processes and methods required to obtain a safety-critical certification for aerospace software flying on vehicles under auspices of the FAA. The final two sections give an overview of the certification process used at Dryden Flight Research Center and the approval process at the Jet Propulsion Lab (JPL).

Nelson, Stacy↗
NASA NTRS2003

Certification Processes for Safety-Critical and Mission-Critical Aerospace Software

This document is a quick reference guide with an overview of the processes required to certify safety-critical and mission-critical flight software at selected NASA centers and the FAA. Researchers and software developers can use this guide to jumpstart their understanding of how to get new or enhanced software onboard an aircraft or spacecraft. The introduction contains aerospace industry definitions of safety and safety-critical software, as well as, the current rationale for certification of safety-critical software. The Standards for Safety-Critical Aerospace Software section lists and describes current standards including NASA standards and RTCA DO-178B. The Mission-Critical versus Safety-Critical software section explains the difference between two important classes of software: safety-critical software involving the potential for loss of life due to software failure and mission-critical software involving the potential for aborting a mission due to software failure. The DO-178B Safety-critical Certification Requirements section describes special processes and methods required to obtain a safety-critical certification for aerospace software flying on vehicles under auspices of the FAA. The final two sections give an overview of the certification process used at Dryden Flight Research Center and the approval process at the Jet Propulsion Lab (JPL).

Nelson, Stacy↗
NASA NTRS2010

NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Program: Generic Safety, Handling and Qualification Guidelines for Lithium-Ion (Li-Ion) Batteries; Availability of Source Materials for Lithium-Ion (Li-Ion) Batteries; Maintaining Technical Communications Related to Aerospace Batteries (NASA Aerospace Battery Workshop)

This NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Working Group was chartered within the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC). The Battery Working Group was tasked to complete tasks and to propose proactive work to address battery related, agency-wide issues on an annual basis. In its first year of operation, this proactive program addressed various aspects of the validation and verification of aerospace battery systems for NASA missions. Studies were performed, issues were discussed and in many cases, test programs were executed to generate recommendations and guidelines to reduce risk associated with various aspects of implementing battery technology in the aerospace industry. This document contains Part 1 - Volume I: Generic Safety, Handling and Qualification Guidelines for Lithium-Ion (Li-Ion) Batteries, Availability of Source Materials for Lithium-Ion (Li-Ion) Batteries, and Maintaining Technical Communications Related to Aerospace Batteries (NASA Aerospace Battery Workshop).

Manzo, Michelle A.↗
NASA NTRS2010

NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Program: Generic Safety, Handling and Qualification Guidelines for Lithium-Ion (Li-Ion) Batteries; Availability of Source Materials for Lithium-Ion (Li-Ion) Batteries; Maintaining Technical Communications Related to Aerospace Batteries (NASA Aerospace Battery Workshop)

This NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Working Group was chartered within the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC). The Battery Working Group was tasked to complete tasks and to propose proactive work to address battery related, agency-wide issues on an annual basis. In its first year of operation, this proactive program addressed various aspects of the validation and verification of aerospace battery systems for NASA missions. Studies were performed, issues were discussed and in many cases, test programs were executed to generate recommendations and guidelines to reduce risk associated with various aspects of implementing battery technology in the aerospace industry. This report contains the Appendices to the findings from the first year of the program's operations.

Manzo, Michelle A.↗
NASA NTRS1984

NASA's approach to flight confidence

NASA's confidence in the flight readiness of aerospace hardware and software is achieved by a thorough integration of safety activities into every program facet, from concept through the mission. This involves technical and administrative personnel, organizations that specify requirements, design, manufacturing, test and the operators. Reviews by inhouse and external specialists form an integral part of the assurance process. Examples of safety issues and their resolution for some power and propulsion functions are given (lithium cells, autoignition/fretting in high pressure oxygen environments, ignition sources from auxiliary power unit, and low thrust rocket engines). Finally, some comments on NASA's integrated safety activities and the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel's role in the NASA review and assessment process all of which provides added confidence in achieving a high level of mission safety and success.

Roth, G. L.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Defining Collaborative Control Interactions Using Systems Theory

Human teams collaborate by establishing roles, changing functional authorities, maintaining team cognition, coordinating, and mutually helping one another close control loops. These complex inter-actions are inspiring novel concepts to improve human-machine and multi-machine collaboration. However, these new systems face engineering gaps in modeling, analysis, design, and assurance. As such, few have been fielded in safety-critical domains like aerospace. To analyze safety, this paper introduces a system-theoretic framework to describe interactions that are—or are planned to be—used in multi-controller systems. It outlines a taxonomy of seven structural dimensions that influence controller interactions and nine dynamics observed in collaborative control that are defined using Systems Theory. An analyzed set of 101 controller interactions in aerospace systems demonstrates how to apply the framework and that designers are trying to create more sophisticated systems. This framework provides the foundation to extend system-theoretic hazard analysis techniques to systematically find collabora-tive-control causal factors.

Human machine teaming↗
NASA NTRS1992

Update to the safety program for the general-purpose heat source radioisotope thermoelectric generators for the Galileo and Ulysses missions

With the rescheduling of the Galileo and Ulysses launches and the use of new upper stages following the Challenger accident, the aerospace nuclear safety program for the general-purpose heat source radioisotope thermoelectric generators (GPHS-RTGs) was extended to accommodate the new mission scenarios. As in the original safety program, the objectives were to determine the response of the GPHS-RTG to the various postulated accident environments and to determine the risk (if any) associated with these postulated accidents. The extended GPHS-RTG safety program was successfully completed in sufficient time to prepare an updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) with revisions for the October 1989 launch of the Galileo spacecraft.

Bennett, Gary L.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Evolution of NASA’s Nuclear Flight Safety Program to Meet Changing Needs

Over the past 4 years, the United States (U.S.) Government has issued several new National policies that fundamentally change the approach to nuclear flight safety for aerospace applications, including the complete revision of the Federal policy for handling launch of spacecraft containing space nuclear systems. In response, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is updating its nuclear flight safety program while still maintaining consistency with other Federal policies, international conventions, and NASA’s own policies. To achieve this evolution, NASA is factoring in an objectives-driven and assurance case mindset to develop a risk-informed and performance-based program. NASA and others have successfully applied this mindset in other disciplines and contexts and it is being pursued here via broad cooperation within NASA and with external stakeholders. This paper will briefly describe how the NASA nuclear flight safety program is evolving to meet these changing needs.

NASA↗