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At least 109 records · Page 6

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the extravehicular mobility unit, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort performed an independent analysis of the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) hardware and system, generating draft failure modes criticalities and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were than compared to the most recent proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter EMU hardware.

Raffaelli, Gary G.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the extravehicular mobility unit, volume 2

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort performed an independent analysis of the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) hardware and system, generating draft failure modes criticalities and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the most recent proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter EMU hardware. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA analysis worksheets and contains the potential critical items list and NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross references and recommendations.

Raffaelli, Gary G.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the electrical power distribution and control subsystem, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter EPD and C hardware. The IOA product for the EPD and C analysis consisted of 1671 failure mode analysis worksheets that resulted in 468 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the proposed NASA Post 51-L baseline which consisted of FMEAs and 158 CIL items. Volume 1 contains the EPD and C subsystem description, analysis results, ground rules and assumptions, and some of the IOA worksheets.

Schmeckpeper, K. R.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control Subsystem, Volume 2

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter EPD and C hardware. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets.

Schmeckpeper, K. R.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the electrical power distribution and control subsystem, volume 3

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter EPD and C hardware. Volume 3 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets and contains the potential critical items list and the NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross reference and recommendations.

Schmeckpeper, K. R.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the electrical power generation/power reactant storage and distribution subsystem FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) is presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power Generation/Power Reactant Storage and Distribution (EPG/PRSD) subsystem hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baselines with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. The results of that comparison are documented for the Orbiter EPG/PRSD hardware. The comparison produced agreement on all but 27 FMEAs and 9 CIL items. The discrepancy between the number of IOA findings and NASA FMEAs can be partially explained by the different approaches used by IOA and NASA to group failure modes together to form one FMEA. Also, several IOA items represented inner tank components and ground operations failure modes which were not in the NASA baseline.

Ames, B. E.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the life support and airlock support systems, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Life Support and Airlock Support Systems (LSS and ALSS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. The discrepancies were flagged for potential future resolution. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter LSS and ALSS hardware. The IOA product for the LSS and ALSS analysis consisted of 511 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 140 potential critical items. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 456 FMEAs and 101 CIL items. The IOA analysis identified 39 failure modes, 6 of which were classified as CIL items, for components not covered by the NASA FMEAs. It was recommended that these failure modes be added to the NASA FMEA baseline. The overall assessment produced agreement on all but 301 FMEAs which caused differences in 111 CIL items.

Arbet, J. D.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the life support and airlock support systems, volume 2

The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL). The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Life Support and Airlock Support Systems (LSS and ALSS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. The discrepancies were flagged for potential future resolution. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter LSS and ALSS hardware. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets and contains the critical items list and NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross reference and recommendations.

Barickman, K.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control/Electrical Power Generation (EPD and C/EPG) FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control/Electrical Power Generation (EPD and C/EPG) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional analysis as required. The results of that comparison is documented for the Orbiter EPD and C/EPG hardware. The IOA product for the EPD and C/EPG analysis consisted of 263 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 42 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 211 FMEA and 47 CIL items.

Mccants, C. N.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the EPD and C/remote manipulator system FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C)/Remote Manipulator System (RMS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA analysis of the EPD and C/RMS hardware initially generated 345 failure mode worksheets and identified 117 Potential Critical Items (PCIs) before starting the assessment process. These analysis results were compared to the proposed NASA Post 51-L baseline of 132 FMEAs and 66 CIL items.

Robinson, W. W.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the electrical power distribution and control/remote manipulator system subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C)/Remote Manipulator System (RMS) hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained in the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the results of the independent analysis of the EPD and C/RMS (both port and starboard) hardware. The EPD and C/RMS subsystem hardware provides the electrical power and power control circuitry required to safely deploy, operate, control, and stow or guillotine and jettison two (one port and one starboard) RMSs. The EPD and C/RMS subsystem is subdivided into the four following functional divisions: Remote Manipulator Arm; Manipulator Deploy Control; Manipulator Latch Control; Manipulator Arm Shoulder Jettison; and Retention Arm Jettison. The IOA analysis process utilized available EPD and C/RMS hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based on the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Robinson, W. W.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the orbital maneuvering system FMEA/CIL, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) hardware and Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter OMS hardware. The IOA analysis defined the OMS as being comprised of the following subsystems: helium pressurization, propellant storage and distribution, Orbital Maneuvering Engine, and EPD and C. The IOA product for the OMS analysis consisted of 284 hardware and 667 EPD and C failure mode worksheets that resulted in 160 hardware and 216 EPD and C potential critical items (PCIs) being identified. A comparison was made of the IOA product to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline which consisted of 101 hardware and 142 EPD and C CIL items.

Prust, Chet D.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the orbital maneuvering subsystem, volume 2

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) hardware and electrical power distribution and control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter OMS hardware and EPD and C systems. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets and contains the critical items list and the NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross reference and recommendations.

Haufler, W. A.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the reaction control system, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the aft and forward Reaction Control System (RCS) hardware, and Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter RCS hardware and EPD and C systems. The IOA product for the RCS analysis consisted of 208 hardware and 2064 EPD and C failure mode worksheets that resulted in 141 hardware and 449 EPD and C potential critical items (PCIs) being identified. A comparison was made of the IOA product to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. After comparison and discussions with the NASA subsystem manager, 96 hardware issues, 83 of which concern CIL items or PCIs, and 280 EPD and C issues, 158 of which concern CIL items or PCIs, and 280 EPD and C issues, 158 of which concern CIL items or PCIs, remain unresolved. Volume 1 contains the subsystem description, assessment results, and some of the IOA worksheets.

Prust, Chet D.↗

Pilot Assessment of Immune Dysregulation, Stress and Latent Herpesvirus Reactivation at Palmer, Antarctica - Platform for validation of Immune Countermeasures?

Recent studieshave characterized adverse health events potentially relatedto immune system dysregulation, latent herpesvirus reactivation, and clinical incidence for crewmembers onboard ISS. Both areview article describing potential spaceflight countermeasures related to immunityand a specific countermeasures protocol for deep space missions were recently published. An appropriate ground analogto enable spaceflight countermeasures has yet to be validated, although winterover in Antarctica (AWO) seems a highly relevant mission parallel to spaceflight. AWO consists of prolonged deployment, extreme environment, circadian misalignment, personal isolation, station lifestyle (varies by base), and personal risk. Through several studies, AWO at several European bases has beencharacterized, and to date the data has revealed that (immunologically) deployment to interior bases at elevation and with persistent hypobaric hypoxia possesses certaindissimilarities to spaceflight. This proposal seeks to collect low cost pilot data assessing stress, immunity and viral reactivation during AWOat thecoastalU.S. Palmer Station. Even among coastal bases, lifestyle, available crew time/workload and logistical access can vary considerably. Considering all factors, if validated, Palmer may be the most feasible location to evaluate NASA countermeasures. The goal of this pilot study is to ascertain if Palmer may serve as a spaceflight analog option for ground validation of immune countermeasures.The study initiatedwith the crew deployed for winterover at Palmer in 2020.A second crew participated in the recently concluded WO2021 season.All participatingcrew havecollectedand preservedsaliva, plasma and hair samples. On location, the crewmembers alsoperformeda fingerstick blood collection for immediate analysis of basic peripheral leukocyte subsets. Preserved biosamples have beenreturned for analysis, with the WO2020 samples received, and the WO2021 samples currently en-route to Houston. It should be noted that COVID-19 had significant impacts on operations, including training and the collection of pre-mission baseline samples. Preliminary data from the 2020 crewmembers indicate that a relatively mild but detectable immune dysregulation persists at Palmer Station, including alterations in concentration of some plasma cytokines and consistent increases in the incidence of EBV reactivation. Final study data will be tabulated upon receipt of the 2021 crew samples.

Stephanie Krieger↗

Investigations of Methane Production in Hypersaline Environments

The recent reports of methane in the atmosphere of Mars, as well as the findings of hypersaline paleo-environments on that planet, have underscored the need to evaluate the importance of biological (as opposed to geological) trace gas production and consumption. Methane in the atmosphere of Mars may be an indication of life but might also be a consequence of geologic activity and/or the thermal alteration of ancient organic matter. Hypersaline environments have now been reported to be extremely likely in several locations in our solar system, including: Mars, Europa, and Enceladus. Modern hypersaline microbial mat communities, (thought to be analogous to those present on the early Earth at a period of time when Mars was experiencing very similar environmental conditions), have been shown to produce methane. However, very little is known about the physical and/or biological controls imposed upon the rates at which methane, and other important trace gases, are produced and consumed in these environments. We describe here the results of our investigations of methane production in hypersaline environments, including field sites in Chile, Baja California Mexico, California, USA and the United Arab Emirates. We have measured high concentrations of methane in bubbles of gas produced both in the sediments underlying microbial mats, as well as in areas not colonized by microbial mats in the Guerrero Negro hypersaline ecosystem, Baja California Mexico, in Chile, and in salt ponds on the San Francisco Bay. The carbon isotopic (δ13C) composition of the methane in the bubbles exhibited an extremely wide range of values, (ca. -75 per mille ca. -25 per mille). The hydrogen isotopic composition of the methane (δ2H) ranged from -60 to -30per mille and -450 to -350per mille. These isotopic values are outside of the range of values normally considered to be biogenic, however incubations of the sediments in contact with these gas bubbles reveals that the methane is indeed being produced by these sediments. Substrate limitation of methanogenesis in these environments, and not methane oxidation, would explain the isotopic values of the methane in these environments. Incubations with both isotopically labeled and unlabeled putative substrates for methanogenesis have shown that the substrates most important for methanogenesis in these environments are the so-called non-competitive substrates, e.g., methylamines, dimethylsulfide, and methanol. Acetate and bicarbonate appear not to be important substrates for methanogens in these environments. Extraction of DNA and analysis of a gene used for methane production (mcrA) has revealed that the community composition of methanogens is consistent with organisms known to use non-competitive substrates. Our work has shown that hypersaline environments have the potential to both produce and preserve methane for analysis, e.g., by capable rovers. Our work expends the range of methane isotopic values now known to be produced by active methanogenesis

hypersaline paleo-environments↗

Concrete Model Checking with Abstract Matching and Refinement

We propose an abstraction-based model checking method which relies on refinement of an under-approximation of the feasible behaviors of the system under analysis. The method preserves errors to safety properties, since all analyzed behaviors are feasible by definition. The method does not require an abstract transition relation to he generated, but instead executes the concrete transitions while storing abstract versions of the concrete states, as specified by a set of abstraction predicates. For each explored transition. the method checks, with the help of a theorem prover, whether there is any loss of precision introduced by abstraction. The results of these checks are used to decide termination or to refine the abstraction, by generating new abstraction predicates. If the (possibly infinite) concrete system under analysis has a finite bisimulation quotient, then the method is guaranteed to eventually explore an equivalent finite bisimilar structure. We illustrate the application of the approach for checking concurrent programs. We also show how a lightweight variant can be used for efficient software testing.

Pasareanu Corina S.↗

Prokaryotic and Fungal Characterization of the Facilities Used to Assemble, Test, and Launch the OSIRIS-REx Spacecraft

To characterize the ATLO (Assembly, Test, and Launch Operations) environment of the OSIRIS-REx spacecraft, we analyzed 17 aluminum witness foils and two blanks for bacterial, archaeal, fungal, and arthropod DNA. Under NASA’s Planetary Protection guidelines, OSIRIS-REx is a Category II outbound, Category V unrestricted sample return mission. As a result, it has no bioburden restrictions. However, the mission does have strict organic contamination requirements to achieve its primary objective of returning pristine carbonaceous asteroid regolith to Earth. Its target, near-Earth asteroid (101955) Bennu, is likely to contain organic compounds that are biologically available. Therefore, it is useful to understand what organisms were present during ATLO as part of the larger contamination knowledge effort—even though it is unlikely that any of the organisms will survive the multi-year deep space journey. Even though these samples of opportunity were not collected or preserved for DNA analysis, we successfully amplified bacterial and archaeal DNA (16S rRNA gene) from 16 of the 17 witness foils containing as few as 7 ± 3 cells per sample. Fungal DNA (ITS1) was detected in 12 of the 17 witness foils. Despite observing arthropods in some of the ATLO facilities, arthropod DNA (COI gene) was not detected. We observed 1,009 bacterial and archaeal sOTUs (sub-operational taxonomic units, 100% unique) and 167 fungal sOTUs across all of our samples (25–84 sOTUs per sample). The most abundant bacterial sOTU belonged to the genus Bacillus. This sOTU was present in blanks and may represent contamination during sample handling or storage. The sample collected from inside the fairing just prior to launch contained several unique bacterial and fungal sOTUs that describe previously uncharacterized potential for contamination during the final phase of ATLO. Additionally, fungal richness (number of sOTUs) negatively correlates with the number of carbon-bearing particles detected on samples. The total number of fungal sequences positively correlates with total amino acid concentration. These results demonstrate that it is possible to use samples of opportunity to characterize the microbiology of low-biomass environments while also revealing the limitations imposed by sample collection and preservation methods not specifically designed with biology in mind.

Aaron B. Regberg↗