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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS2005

Effect of Impact Location on the Response of Shuttle Wing Leading Edge Panel 9

The objective of this paper is to compare the results of several simulations performed to determine the worst-case location for a foam impact on the Space Shuttle wing leading edge. The simulations were performed using the commercial non-linear transient dynamic finite element code, LS-DYNA. These simulations represent the first in a series of parametric studies performed to support the selection of the worst-case impact scenario. Panel 9 was selected for this study to enable comparisons with previous simulations performed during the Columbia Accident Investigation. The projectile for this study is a 5.5-in cube of typical external tank foam weighing 0.23 lb. Seven locations spanning the panel surface were impacted with the foam cube. For each of these cases, the foam was traveling at 1000 ft/s directly aft, along the orbiter X-axis. Results compared from the parametric studies included strains, contact forces, and material energies for various simulations. The results show that the worst case impact location was on the top surface, near the apex.

Lyle, Karen H.↗
NASA NTRS2005

One More Time

NASA engineers on the Hubble Space Telescope program are actively preparing a shuttle mission to service the orbiting observatory, perhaps as early as 2007, pending a safe return to flight of the shuttle fleet. Administrator Michael D. Griffin must give final clearance to mount the mission, scuttled by former Administrator Sean O'Keefe on what he said were safety grounds in the wake of the Columbia accident. But Griffin, who has overturned much of O'Keefe's policy in his three months on the job, has already told the Hubble program to proceed as though the mission will take place. In that, he has at least the acquiescence of Harold Gehman, the retired admiral who headed the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). The CAIB never intended its recommendations to preclude a shuttle-borne Hubble servicing mission, Gehman says, and its members still believe the risk would be no greater than missions to the International Space Station (ISS).

Morring, Frank, Jr.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Return to Flight Task Group

It has been 29 months since Columbia was lost over East Texas in February 2003. Seven months after the accident, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) released the first volume of its final report, citing a variety of technical, managerial, and cultural issues within NASA and the Space Shuttle Program. To their credit, NASA offered few excuses, embraced the report, and set about correcting the deficiencies noted by the accident board. Of the 29 recommendations issued by the CAIB, 15 were deemed critical enough that the accident board believed they should be implemented prior to returning the Space Shuttle to flight. Some of these recommendations were relatively easy, most were straightforward, a few bordered on the impossible, and others were largely overcome by events, particularly the decision by the President to retire the Space Shuttle by 2010. The Return to Flight Task Group (RTF TG, or simply, the Task Group) was chartered by the NASA Administrator in July 2003 to provide an independent assessment of the implementation of the 15 CAIB return-to-flight recommendations. An important observation must be stated up-front: neither the CAIB nor the RTF TG believes that all risk can be eliminated from Space Shuttle operations; nor do we believe that the Space Shuttle is inherently unsafe. What the CAIB and RTF TG do believe, however, is that NASA and the American public need to understand the risks associated with space travel, and that NASA must make every reasonable effort to minimize such risk. Since the release of the CAIB report, NASA and the Space Shuttle Program expended enormous effort and resources toward correcting the causes of the accident and preparing to fly again. Relative to the 15 specific recommendations that the CAIB indicated should be implemented prior to returning to flight, NASA has met or exceeded most of them the Task Group believes that NASA met the intent of the CAIB for 12 of these recommendations. The remaining three recommendations were so challenging that NASA could not comply completely with the intent of the CAIB.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2004

Development of Non Destructive Evaluation Techniques for the In-Situ Inspection of the Orbiter's Thermal Protection System

One of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board's (CAB) recommendation is to develop and implement an inspection plan to determine the structural integrity of all Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) system components that make part of the Space Shuttle's thermal protection system. This presentation focuses on the efforts to leverage non-destructive evaluation (NDE) expertise from academia, private industry, and government agencies resulting in the design of a comprehensive health monitoring program for RCC components. The different NDE techniques that were considered are presented along with the chosen techniques and preliminary inspection results of RCC materials.

Hernandez, Jose M.↗
NASA NTRS2005

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration Nondestructive Evaluation Program for Safe and Reliable Operations

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Nondestructive Evaluation (NDE) Program is presented. As a result of the loss of seven astronauts and the Space Shuttle Columbia on February 1, 2003, NASA has undergone many changes in its organization. NDE is one of the key areas that are recognized by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) that needed to be strengthened by warranting NDE as a discipline with Independent Technical Authority (iTA). The current NASA NDE system and activities are presented including the latest developments in inspection technologies being applied to the Space Transportation System (STS). The unfolding trends and directions in NDE for the future are discussed as they apply to assuring safe and reliable operations.

Generazio, Ed↗
NASA NTRS2006

Utilizing HDTV as Data for Space Flight

In the aftermath of the Space Shuttle Columbia accident February 1, 2003, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board recognized the need for better video data from launch, on-orbit, and landing to assess the status and safety of the shuttle orbiter fleet. The board called on NASA to improve its imagery assets and update the Agency s methods for analyzing video. This paper will feature details of several projects implemented prior to the return to flight of the Space Shuttle, including an airborne HDTV imaging system called the WB-57 Ascent Video Experiment, use of true 60 Hz progressive scan HDTV for ground and airborne HDTV camera systems, and the decision to utilize a wavelet compression system for recording. This paper will include results of compression testing, imagery from the launch of STS-114, and details of how commercial components were utilized to image the shuttle launch from an aircraft flying at 400 knots at 60,000 feet altitude. The paper will conclude with a review of future plans to expand on the upgrades made prior to return to flight.

Grubbs, Rodney↗
NASA NTRS2006

Radio Frequency (RF) Attenuation Measurements of the Space Shuttle Vehicle

Following the loss of Columbia, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) provided recommendations to be addressed prior to Return To Flight (RTF). As a part of CAIB Recommendation 3.4.1 - Ground Based Imagery, new C-band and X-band radars were added to the array of ground-based radars and cameras already in-situ at Kennedy Space Center. Because of higher power density considerations and new operating frequencies, the team of Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) assembled to investigate the technical details of introducing the new radars recommended a series of radio frequency (RF) attenuation tests be performed on the Space Shuttle vehicle to establish the attenuation of the vehicle outer mold line structure with respect to its external RF environment. Because of time and complex logistical constraints, it was decided to split the test into two separate efforts. The first of these would be accomplished with the assistance of the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), performing RF attenuation measurements on the aft section of OV-103 (Discovery) while in-situ in Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF) 3, located at Kennedy Space Center. The second would be accomplished with the assistance of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the electromagnetic interference (EMI) laboratory out of the Naval Air Warfare Center, Patuxent River, Maryland (PAX River), performing RF attenuation measurements on OV-105 (Endeavour) in-situ inside the Space Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) hangar, also located at Kennedy Space Center. This paper provides a summary description of these efforts and their results.

Scully, R. C.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Effect of Clouds on Shuttle Imaging

This report describes the results of the AMU's task for determining the effect of clouds on optical imaging of the Space Shuttle launch vehicle during its ascent phase from lift-off to Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) Separation. This effort was motivated by Recommendation R3.4-1 from the Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report. The AMU developed a 3-dimensional (3D) model to forecast the probability that at any time from lift-off to SRB separation, at least three of the ascent imaging cameras would have a view of the Shuttle unobstructed by cloud. Because current observational and modeling capabilities do not permit accurate forecasts of cloud morphology and location, the AMU simulated obscuration of the lines-of-sight (LOS) from a network of cameras to the Shuttle by idealized cloud-fields placed randomly within the 3D domain. For each random realization of numerous cloud-field scenarios the number of simultaneous views of the Shuttle was computed from the LOS data between lift-off and SRB separation. The percent of time with 3 simultaneous views was averaged from 100 random realizations of each scenario. Analyses of the percent of time viewable were made to determine its sensitivity to cloud amount, cloud base height, cloud thickness, cloud horizontal dimensions, and an upgrade of the camera network.

Short, David A.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Software Certification and Software Certificate Management Systems

Incremental certification and re-certification of code as it is developed and modified is a prerequisite for applying modem, evolutionary development processes, which are especially relevant for NASA. For example, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) report 121 concluded there is "the need for improved and uniform statistical sampling, audit, and certification processes". Also, re-certification time has been a limiting factor in making changes to Space Shuttle code close to launch time. This is likely to be an even bigger problem with the rapid turnaround required in developing NASA s replacement for the Space Shuttle, the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV). Hence, intelligent development processes are needed which place certification at the center of development. If certification tools provide useful information, such as estimated time and effort, they are more likely to be adopted. The ultimate impact of such a tool will be reduced effort and increased reliability.

Denney, Ewen↗
NASA NTRS2005

Micro-Flying Robotics in Space Missions

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board issued a major recommendation to NASA. Prior to return to flight, NASA should develop and implement a comprehensive inspection plan to determine the structural integrity of all Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) system components. This inspection plan should take advantage of advanced non-destructive inspection technology. This paper describes a non-intrusive technology with a micro-flying robot to continuously monitor inside a space vehicle for any stress related fissures, cracks and foreign material embedded in walls, tubes etc.

Bardina, Jorge↗
NASA NTRS2005

Using Perilog to Explore "Decision Making at NASA"

Perilog, a context intensive text mining system, is used as a discovery tool to explore topics and concerns in "Decision Making at NASA," chapter 6 of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) Report, Volume I. Two examples illustrate how Perilog can be used to discover highly significant safety-related information in the text without prior knowledge of the contents of the document. A third example illustrates how "if-then" statements found by Perilog can be used in logical analysis of decision making. In addition, in order to serve as a guide for future work, the technical details of preparing a PDF document for input to Perilog are included in an appendix.

McGreevy, Michael W.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Impact Testing of Orbiter Thermal Protection System Materials

This viewgraph presentation reviews the impact testing of the materials used in designing the shuttle orbiter thermal protection system (TPS). Pursuant to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommendations a testing program of the TPS system was instituted. This involved using various types of impactors in different sizes shot from various sizes and strengths guns to impact the TPS tiles and the Leading Edge Structural Subsystem (LESS). The observed damage is shown, and the resultant lessons learned are reviewed.

Kerr, Justin↗
NASA NTRS2006

NASA Engineering Excellence: A Case Study on Strengthening an Engineering Organization

NASA implemented a system of technical authority following the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAE) report calling for independent technical authority to be exercised on the Space Shuttle Program activities via a virtual organization of personnel exercising specific technical authority responsibilities. After the current NASA Administrator reported for duty, and following the first of two planned "Shuttle Return to Flight" missions, the NASA Chief Engineer and the Administrator redirected the Independent Technical Authority to a program of Technical Excellence and Technical Authority exercised within the existing engineering organizations. This paper discusses the original implementation of technical authority and the transition to the new implementation of technical excellence, including specific measures aimed at improving safety of future Shuttle and space exploration flights.

Shivers, C. Herbert↗
NASA NTRS2005

Implementation of Programmatic Quality and the Impact on Safety

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the implementation of a programmatic quality assurance discipline within the International Space Station Program and the resulting impact on safety. NASA culture has continued to stress safety at the expense of quality when both are extremely important and both can equally influence the success or failure of a Program or Mission. Although safety was heavily criticized in the media after Col~imbiaa, strong case can be made that it was the failure of quality processes and quality assurance in all processes that eventually led to the Columbia accident. Consequently, it is possible to have good quality processes without safety, but it is impossible to have good safety processes without quality. The ISS Program quality assurance function was analyzed as representative of the long-term manned missions that are consistent with the President s Vision for Space Exploration. Background topics are as follows: The quality assurance organizational structure within the ISS Program and the interrelationships between various internal and external organizations. ISS Program quality roles and responsibilities with respect to internal Program Offices and other external organizations such as the Shuttle Program, JSC Directorates, NASA Headquarters, NASA Contractors, other NASA Centers, and International Partner/participants will be addressed. A detailed analysis of implemented quality assurance responsibilities and functions with respect to NASA Headquarters, the JSC S&MA Directorate, and the ISS Program will be presented. Discussions topics are as follows: A comparison of quality and safety resources in terms of staffing, training, experience, and certifications. A benchmark assessment of the lessons learned from the Columbia Accident Investigation (CAB) Report (and follow-up reports and assessments), NASA Benchmarking, and traditional quality assurance activities against ISS quality procedures and practices. The lack of a coherent operational and sustaining quality assurance strategy for long-term manned space flight. An analysis of the ISS waiver processes and the Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) process implemented as quality functions. Impact of current ISS Program procedures and practices with regards to operational safety and risk A discussion regarding a "defense-in-depth" approach to quality functions will be provided to address the issue of "integration vs independence" with respect to the roles of Programs, NASA Centers, and NASA Headquarters. Generic recommendations are offered to address the inadequacies identified in the implementation of ISS quality assurance. A reassessment by the NASA community regarding the importance of a "quality culture" as a component within a larger "safety culture" will generate a more effective and value-added functionality that will ultimately enhance safety.

Huls, Dale Thomas↗
NASA NTRS2007

Recovery of Space Shuttle Columbia and Return to Flight of Space Shuttle Discovery

NASA has come a long way in our journey to reduce the risks of operating the Spse Shuttle system. The External Tank bipod Thermal Protection System has been redesigned to eliminate the proximate cause of the Columbia accident. In all areas, we have applied the collective knowledge and capabilities of our Nation to comply with the Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommendations and to raise the bar beyond that. We have taken prudent technical action on potential threats to review and verify the material condition of all critical areas where failure could result in catastrophic loss of the crew and vehicle. We are satisfied that critical systems and elements should operate as intended-safely and reliably. While we will never eliminate all the risks from our human space flight programs, we have eliminated those we can and reduced, controlled, and/or mitigated others. The remaining identified risks will be evaluated for acceptance. Our risk reduction approach has its roots in the system safety engineering hierarchy for hazard abatement long employed in aerospace systems engineering. The components of the hierarchy are, in order of precedence, to: design/redesign; eliminate the hazard/risk; reduce the hazard/risk; and control the hazard/risk and/or mitigate the consequence of the remaining hazard/risk through warning devices, special procedures/capabilities, and/or training. This proven approach to risk reduction has been applied to potential hazards and risks in all critical areas of the Space Shuttle and has guided us through the technical challenges, failures, and successes present in return to flight endeavors. This approach provides the structured deliberation process required to verify and form the foundation for accepting any residual risk across the entire Space Shuttle Program by NASA leadership.

Rudolphi, Michael U.↗
NASA NTRS2007

From ESAS to Ares: A Chronology

Throughout my career, I have observed many launch vehicle efforts come and go. Although it may appear on the surface that those were dead-end streets, the knowledge we gained through them actually informs the work in progress. Following the tragic loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia's crew, the administration took the Columbia Accident Investigation Board's findings to heart and united the Agency behind the Vision for Space Exploration, with clear goals and objectives, including fielding a new generation of safe, reliable, and affordable space transportation. The genesis of the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle and Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle activities now under way by a nationwide Government and industry team was the confirmation of the current NASA Administrator in April 2005. Shortly thereafter, he commissioned a team of aerospace experts to conduct the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS), which gave shape to launch vehicles that will empower America's resurgence in scientific discovery through human and robotic space exploration. In October 2005, I was asked to lead this effort, building the team and forming the partnerships that will, in turn, build America's next human-rated space transportation system. In November 2006, the Ares I team began conducting the System Requirements Review milestone, just 1 year after its formation. We are gaining momentum toward the first test flight of the integrated vehicle system in 2009, just a few short years away. The Agency is now poised to deliver on the commitment this nation has made to advance our interests in space. In its inaugural year, the Ares team has conducted the first human-rated launch vehicle major milestone in over 30 years. Using the Exploration Systems Architecture Study recommendations as a starting point, the vehicle designs have been evolved to best meet customer and stakeholder requirements to fulfill the strategic goals outlined in the Vision for Space Exploration.

Cook, Stephen A.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Assuring Crew Health Protection

Amongst the recommendation of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) were the establishment of an independent technical authorities, one of which is the Health and Medical Technical Authority. This viewgraph presentation reviews the work of this Technical Authority in maintaining standards that are aimed at implementing health and medical policy, responding to medical events and emergencies consistent with acceptable levels defined by standards and providing expertise for program milestones.

Robinson, Judith L.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Probabilistic Modeling of Space Shuttle Debris Impact

On Feb 1, 2003, the Shuttle Columbia was lost during its return to Earth. As a result of the conclusion that debris impact caused the damage to the left wing of the Columbia Space Shuttle Vehicle (SSV) during ascent, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommended that an assessment be performed of the debris environment experienced by the SSV during ascent. A flight rationale based on probabilistic assessment is used for the SSV return-to-flight. The assessment entails identifying all potential debris sources, their probable geometric and aerodynamic characteristics, and their potential for impacting and damaging critical Shuttle components. A probabilistic analysis tool, based on the SwRI-developed NESSUS probabilistic analysis software, predicts the probability of impact and damage to the space shuttle wing leading edge and thermal protection system components. Among other parameters, the likelihood of unacceptable damage depends on the time of release (Mach number of the orbiter) and the divot mass as well as the impact velocity and impact angle. A typical result is visualized in the figures below. Probability of impact and damage, as well as the sensitivities thereof with respect to the distribution assumptions, can be computed and visualized at each point on the orbiter or summarized per wing panel or tile zone.

Huyse, Luc J.↗