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At least 109 records · Page 6

Orion Aerodynamics for Hypersonic Free Molecular to Continuum Conditions

Numerical simulations are performed for the Orion Crew Module, previously known as the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) Command Module, to characterize its aerodynamics during the high altitude portion of its reentry into the Earth's atmosphere, that is, from free molecular to continuum hypersonic conditions. The focus is on flow conditions similar to those that the Orion Crew Module would experience during a return from the International Space Station. The bulk of the calculations are performed with two direct simulation Monte Carlo (DSMC) codes, and these data are anchored with results from both free molecular and Navier-Stokes calculations. Results for aerodynamic forces and moments are presented that demonstrate their sensitivity to rarefaction, that is, for free molecular to continuum conditions (Knudsen numbers of 111 to 0.0003). Also included are aerodynamic data as a function of angle of attack for different levels of rarefaction and results that demonstrate the aerodynamic sensitivity of the Orion CM to a range of reentry velocities (7.6 to 15 km/s).

Moss, James N.

Photogrammetric Technique for Center of Gravity Determination

A new measurement technique for determination of the center of gravity (CG) for large scale objects has been demonstrated. The experimental method was conducted as part of an LS-DYNA model validation program for the Max Launch Abort System (MLAS) crew module. The test was conducted on the full scale crew module concept at NASA Langley Research Center. Multi-camera photogrammetry was used to measure the test article in several asymmetric configurations. The objective of these measurements was to provide validation of the CG as computed from the original mechanical design. The methodology, measurement technique, and measurement results are presented.

Jones, Thomas W.

Collaborative Systems Engineering in the Ascent Abort-2 Crew Module/Separation Ring Project

Generally speaking, systems engineering (SE) tool-sets face a dilemma balancing power and accessibility. High-powered SE tools (MagicDraw, Cradle, Core, etc.) tend to be specialized and are available only to highly trained Systems Engineers, and/or through the use of a 'back room' developer team making the output products available to the broader team. On the other hand, highly accessible tools (MS Word, Excel, etc.) do not have the power to implement SE in a rigorous manner. NASA has to test all aspects of the new human-rated Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle spacecraft prior to its first crewed mission. The test program includes uncrewed launch abort flight tests to demonstrate the capability to save the crew in the event that a launch failure occurs. Orion's second abort flight test will be a low-altitude flight test known as "Ascent Abort 2 (AA-2)." This test is currently scheduled to be carried out at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station's Space Launch Complex 46 (SLC-46) in Florida in 2019. NASA's in-house AA-2 Crew Module and Separation Ring (CSR) Team is producing the crew module and separation ring. Operating jointly as both an Advanced Exploration Systems (AES) Project and an Orion Project, the CSR project charter includes development of innovative, streamlined and generally more efficient practices for creation of flight hardware and software. One result of this tasking has been development of a collaborative and data-centric systems engineering environment within the team's shared web environment (Microsoft SharePoint). Through the use of built-in, 'out of the box capabilities' present in MS SharePoint, the CSR Systems Engineering team has created (with some limited developer support) a data-centric architecture for the project's SE implementation, including functional and interface analysis, requirements development and management, risk management, verification planning and management, test results, and end item management. Data elements are linked between data structures so as to define and control relationships between item types, link requirements to parents and children, and link tests to the requirements that they verify. The overall project team integration is increased by also linking SE content to project management content over the project life cycle, including team communication, action items, configuration management, decisional and meeting materials, and life cycle reviews. This presentation will provide an overview of the collaborative SE environment, showing how it provides the power for a number of SE tasks while still providing the accessibility and transparency to allow the full project team to collaborate and succeed. Given the project phase, we'll be able to present a nearly full lifecycle discussion, from concept through verification and approaching delivery.

Systems Engineering environments

First Stage Solid Propellant Multiply Debris Thermal Analysis

Destruction of a solid rocket stage of a launch vehicle can create a thermal radiation hazard for an aborting crew module. This hazard was assessed for the Constellation Program (Cx) crew and launch vehicle concept. For this concept, if an abort was initiated in first stage flight, the Crew Module (CM) will separate and be pulled away from the malfunctioning launch vehicle via a Launch Abort System (LAS). Having aborted the mission, the launch vehicle will likely be destroyed via a Flight Termination System (FTS) in order to prevent it from errantly traversing back over land and posing a risk to the public. The resulting launch vehicle debris field, composed primarily of first stage solid propellant, poses a threat to the CM. The harsh radiative thermal environment, caused by surrounding burning propellant debris, may lead to CM parachute failure. A methodology, detailed herein, has been developed to address this concern and to quantify the risk of first stage propellant debris leading to the thermal demise of the CM parachutes. Utilizing basic thermal radiation principles, a software program was developed to calculate parachute temperature as a function of time for a given abort trajectory and debris piece trajectory set. Two test cases, considered worst case aborts with regard to launch vehicle debris environments, were analyzed using the simulation: an abort declared at Mach 1 and an abort declared at maximum dynamic pressure (Max Q). For both cases, the resulting temperature profiles indicated that thermal limits for the parachutes were not exceeded. However, short duration close encounters by single debris pieces did have a significant effect on parachute temperature. Therefore while these two test cases did not indicate exceedance of thermal limits, in order to quantify the risk of parachute failure due to radiative effects from the abort environment, a more thorough probability-based analysis using the methodology demonstrated herein must be performed.

Toleman, Benjamin M.

Trajectory Reconstruction of Orion Ground Test Article Water Impact Tests

The Orion Crew Module is a component of NASA’s Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle that will be used for future missions to low Earth orbit and beyond. Ten water impact tests of the Orion Ground Test Article (GTA) were conducted at the Hydro Impact Basin at NASA Langley Research Center in 2016 and were designed to provide data for the validation of the LS-DYNA model used to determine the Crew Module structural loads during ocean splashdown, and the determination of an acceptable Model Uncertainty Factor to apply to simulation results used to drive the design. Post-test data obtained from the onboard sensors were used to reconstruct the GTA trajectories both before and after water impact. Results from one vertical test and two swing tests are presented and compared to videos taken for each test.

Lugo, Rafael A.

Development of Acoustic Mufflers for Cabin Noise Reduction in Orion Spacecraft

Controlling cabin acoustic noise levels in the Crew Module (CM) of the Orion spacecraft is critical to ensure adequate speech intelligibility, to avoid fatigue, and prevent any possibility of temporary and permanent hearing loss to the crew. The primary source of cabin noise for the on-orbit phase of the mission is from the Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) which recycles and conditions breathing air and maintains cabin pressurization through its duct network and components. Unfortunately, as a side effect, noise from the ECLSS fans propagates through theses ducts and emanate into the cabin habitable volume via the ECLSS inlet and outlets. To mitigate excessive duct-borne noise, two ECLSS mufflers have been designed to provide significant acoustic transmission loss (TL) so that the cabin noise requirements can be met. Each muffler is meant to be installed in the ducting of the ECLSS air inlet and outlet sides, respectively. Packaging constraints and tight volume requirements necessitated the mufflers to be of complex geometry and compatible with the bends of the ECLSS duct layout. To design and characterize the acoustic performance of the inlet and outlet mufflers, computational acoustic models were developed using the Finite Element Method (FEM) with 𝑤𝑎𝑣𝑒଺ vibroacoustic software. Characterization of the acoustic material and perforations in the mufflers were addressed with poroelastic theory. Once the mufflers were designed on paper and its TL predicted, prototypes of these mufflers were created using additive manufacturing. The muffler prototypes were subsequently tested for acoustic TL in the laboratory with various con-figurations of acoustic materials. Comparing the analytical predictions to the test performance yielded excellent correlation for acoustic TL and demonstrated significant broadband noise attenuation. The ECLSS mufflers are currently scheduled to be installed on the Artemis II Crew Module (CM) of the Orion spacecraft and will provide significant cabin comfort to crew during the mission.

Indranil Dandaroy

Extended duration lunar lander

Selenium Technologies has been conducting preliminary design work on a manned lunar lander for use in NASA's First Lunar Outpost (FLO) program. The resulting lander is designed to carry a crew of four astronauts to a prepositioned habitat on the lunar surface, remain on the lunar surface for up to 45 days while the crew is living in the habitat, then return the crew to earth via direct reentry and land recovery. Should the need arise, the crew can manually guide the lander to a safe lunar landing site, and live in the lander for up to ten days on the surface. Also, an abort to earth is available during any segment of the mission. The main propulsion system consists of a cluster of four modified Pratt and Whitney RL10 rocket engines that use liquid methane (LCH4) and liquid oxygen (LOX). Four engines are used to provide redundancy and a satisfactory engine out capability. Differences between the new propulsion system and the original system include slightly smaller engine size and lower thrust per engine, although specific impulse remains the same despite the smaller size. Concerns over nozzle ground clearance and engine reliability, as well as more information from Pratt and Whitney, brought about this change. The power system consists of a combination of regenerative fuel cells and solar arrays. While the lander is in flight to or from the moon, or during the lunar night, fuel cells provide all electrical power. During the lunar day, solar arrays are deployed to provide electrical power for the lander as well as electrolyzers, which separate some water back into hydrogen and oxygen for later use by the fuel cells. Total storage requirements for oxygen, hydrogen, and water are 61 kg, 551 kg, and 360 kg, respectively. The lander is a stage-and-a-half design with descent propellant, cargo, and landing gear contained in the descent stage, and the main propulsion system, ascent propellant, and crew module contained in the ascent stage. The primary structure for both stages is a truss, to which all tanks and components are attached. The crew module is a conical shape similar to that of the Apollo Command Module, but significantly larger with a height and maximum diameter of six meters.

Babic, Nikola

Orion MPCV Touchdown Detection Threshold Development and Testing

A robust method of detecting Orion Multi ]Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) splashdown is necessary to ensure crew and hardware safety during descent and after touchdown. The proposed method uses a triple redundant system to inhibit Reaction Control System (RCS) thruster firings, detach parachute risers from the vehicle, and transition to the post ]landing segment of the Flight Software (FSW). The vehicle crew is the prime input for touchdown detection, followed by an autonomous FSW algorithm, and finally a strictly time based backup timer. RCS thrusters must be inhibited before submersion in water to protect against possible damage due to firing these jets under water. In addition, neglecting to declare touchdown will not allow the vehicle to transition to post ]landing activities such as activating the Crew Module Up ]righting System (CMUS), resulting in possible loss of communication and difficult recovery. A previous AIAA paper gAssessment of an Automated Touchdown Detection Algorithm for the Orion Crew Module h concluded that a strictly Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) based detection method using an acceleration spike algorithm had the highest safety margins and shortest detection times of other methods considered. That study utilized finite element simulations of vehicle splashdown, generated by LS ]DYNA, which were expanded to a larger set of results using a Kriging surface fit. The study also used the Decelerator Systems Simulation (DSS) to generate flight dynamics during vehicle descent under parachutes. Proto ]type IMU and FSW MATLAB models provided the basis for initial algorithm development and testing. This paper documents an in ]depth trade study, using the same dynamics data and MATLAB simulations as the earlier work, to further develop the acceleration detection method. By studying the combined effects of data rate, filtering on the rotational acceleration correction, data persistence limits and values of acceleration thresholds, an optimal configuration was determined. The lever arm calculation, which removes the centripetal acceleration caused by vehicle rotation, requires that the vehicle angular acceleration be derived from vehicle body rates, necessitating the addition of a 2nd order filter to smooth the data. It was determined that using 200 Hz data directly from the vehicle IMU outperforms the 40 Hz FSW data rate. Data persistence counter values and acceleration thresholds were balanced in order to meet desired safety and performance. The algorithm proved to exhibit ample safety margin against early detection while under parachutes, and adequate performance upon vehicle splashdown. Fall times from algorithm initiation were also studied, and a backup timer length was chosen to provide a large safety margin, yet still trigger detection before CMUS inflation. This timer serves as a backup to the primary acceleration detection method. Additionally, these parameters were tested for safety on actual flight test data, demonstrating expected safety margins.

Daum, Jared

Contingency Operations of Americas Next Moon Rocket, Ares V

America has begun the development of a new space vehicle system which will enable humans to return to the moon and reach even farther destinations. The system is called Constellation: it has 2 earth-launch vehicles, Ares I and Ares V; a crew module, Orion; and a lander, Altair with descent and ascent stages. Ares V will launch an Earth Departure Stage (EDS) and Altair into low earth orbit. Ares I will launch the Orion crew module into low earth orbit where it will rendezvous and dock with the Altair and EDS "stack". After rendezvous, the stack will contain four complete rocket systems, each capable of independent operations. Of course this multiplicity of vehicles provides a multiplicity of opportunities for off-nominal behavior and multiple mitigation options for each. Contingency operations are complicated by the issues of crew safety and the possibility of debris from the very large components impacting the ground. This paper examines contingency operations of the EDS in low earth orbit, during the boost to translunar orbit, and after the translunar boost. Contingency operations under these conditions have not been a consideration since the Apollo era and analysis of the possible contingencies and mitigations will take some time to evolve. Since the vehicle has not been designed, much less built, it is not possible to evaluate contingencies from a root-cause basis or from a probability basis; rather they are discussed at an effects level (such as the reaction control system is consuming propellant at a high rate). Mitigations for the contingencies are based on the severity of the off-nominal condition, the time of occurrence, recovery options, options for alternate missions, crew safety, evaluation of the condition (forensics) and future prevention. Some proposed mitigations reflect innovation in thinking and make use of the multiplicity of on-orbit resources including the crew; example: Orion could do a "fly around" to allow the crew to determine the condition and cause of a partially separated payload shroud. Other mitigations are really alternate missions; example, an engine out on during ascent resulted in insufficient propellant for the lunar mission, but the on-orbit vehicle stack is otherwise perfect and can pursue an alternate mission, such as a high ballistic trajectory to test the high-speed atmospheric reentry of Orion. Evaluation and presentation of contingency operations at this early stage of the development of the Ares V rocket will improve the design of the vehicle and lay the groundwork for the exhaustive contingency planning which must be done after the vehicle is built as preparations for operations.

Jaap, John

Project Freebird: An orbital transfer vehicle

Freebird is a space-based orbital transfer vehicle designed to repair and deorbit orbital assets. Freebird is based at International Space Station Alpha (ISSA) at an inclination of 51.6 deg and is capable of three types of missions: crewed and teleoperated LEO missions, and extended robotic missions. In a crewed local configuration, the vehicle can visit inclinations between 30.8 deg and 72.4 deg at altitudes close to 390 km. Adding extra fuel tanks extends this range of inclination up to 84.9 deg and down to 18.3 deg. Furthermore, removing the crew module, using the vehicle in a teleoperated manner, and operating with extra fuel tanks allows missions to polar and geosynchronous orbits. To allow for mission flexibility, the vehicle was designed in a semimodular configuration. The major system components include a crew module, a 'smart box' (which contains command, communications, guidance, and navigation equipment), a propulsion pack, extra fuel tanks, and a vehicle storage facility (VSF) for storage purposes. To minimize risk as well as development time and cost, the vehicle was designed using only proven technology or technology which is expected to be flight-qualified in time for the intended launch date of 2002. And, because Freebird carries crew and operates near the space station, it must meet or exceed the NASA reliability standard of 0.994, as well as other standard requirements for such vehicles. The Freebird program was conceived and designed as a way to provide important and currently unavailable satellite repair and replacement services of a value equal to or exceeding operational costs.

Aneses, Carlos A.

Ares I-X: On the Threshold of Exploration

Ares I-X, the first flight of the Ares I crew launch vehicle, is less than a year from launch. Ares I-X will test the flight characteristics of Ares I from liftoff to first stage separation and recovery. The flight also will demonstrate the computer hardware and software (avionics) needed to control the vehicle; deploy the parachutes that allow the first stage booster to land in the ocean safely; measure and control how much the rocket rolls during flight; test and measure the effects of first stage separation; and develop and try out new ground handling and rocket stacking procedures in the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) and first stage recovery procedures at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) in Florida. All Ares I-X major elements have completed their critical design reviews, and are nearing final fabrication. The first stage--four-segment solid rocket booster from the Space Shuttle inventory--incorporates new simulated forward structures to match the Ares I five-segment booster. The upper stage, Orion crew module, and launch abort system will comprise simulator hardware that incorporates developmental flight instrumentation for essential data collection during the mission. The upper stage simulator consists of smaller cylindrical segments, which were transported to KSC in fall 2008. The crew module and launch abort system simulator were shipped in December 2008. The first stage hardware, active roll control system (RoCS), and avionics components will be delivered to KSC in 2009. This paper will provide detailed statuses of the Ares I-X hardware elements as NASA's Constellation Program prepares for this first flight of a new exploration era in the summer of 2009.

Davis, Stephan R.

Design and testing of an energy-absorbing crewseat for the F/FB-111 aircraft, volume 1

A program to determine if the injury potential could be reduced by replacing the existing crewseats with energy absorbing crewseats is explored. An energy-absorbing test seat was designed using much of the existing seat hardware. An extensive dynamic seat test series, designed to duplicate various crew module ground impact conditions, was conducted at a sled test facility. Comparative tests with operational F-111 crewseats were also conducted. After successful dynamic testing of the seat, more testing was conducted with the seats mounted in an F-111 crew module. Both swing tests and vertical drop tests were conducted. The vertical drop tests were used to obtain comparative data between the energy-absorbing and operational seats. Volume 1 describes the energy absorbing test seat and testing conducted, and evaluates the data from both test series.

Shane, S. J.

STS-114 Micrometeoroid/Orbital Debris (MMOD) Post-Flight Assessment

NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) personnel assisted Kennedy Space Center (KSC) inspection teams in the identification of 41 micrometeoroid/orbital debris (MMOD) impact sites on the OV-103 vehicle (Discovery) during STS-114 postflight inspections. There were 14 MMOD impacts reported on the crew module windows (Figure 1). The largest impact feature, a 6.6 mm x 5.8 mm crater on window #4, was caused by a particle with an estimated diameter of 0.22 mm (Figure 2). This impact was among the largest ever recorded on a crew module window. The window was removed and replaced. Scanning Electron Microscope/Energy Dispersive X-ray (SEM/EDX) analysis of dental mold samples from the impact site to determine particle origin was inconclusive, possibly due to contamination picked up on the ferry flight from Edwards Air Force Base to KSC. The radiators on the inside of the payload bay doors sustained 19 impacts (Figure 3) with one of the impacts causing a face sheet perforation. The 0.61 mm diameter hole was produced by a particle with an estimated diameter of 0.4 mm, which approaches the 0.5-mm critical particle diameter of the wing leading edge reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) panel high-temperature regions (Zone 3, Figure 4) that was established during Return to Flight testing of the RCC panels. An inspection of the payload bay door exterior insulation (FRSI) revealed a 5.8 mm x 4.5 mm defect that was caused by an MMOD particle with unknown composition, as the sample obtained was contaminated. Figure 5 provides a summary of the exterior surface survey that was conducted following the STS-114 mission. Two windows were removed and replaced due to hypervelocity impact. Nineteen impacts were recorded on the payload bay door radiators, with one face sheet penetration. Three impact sites were identified on the FRSI. There were four hypervelocity impact sites detected on the wing leading edge RCC panels. One impact was detected on the top cover of the TPS sample box (TSB) payload that was mounted on a carrier in the aft portion of the payload bay.

Hyde, J.

Sensitivity Analysis of Launch Vehicle Debris Risk Model

As part of an analysis of the loss of crew risk associated with an ascent abort system for a manned launch vehicle, a model was developed to predict the impact risk of the debris resulting from an explosion of the launch vehicle on the crew module. The model consisted of a debris catalog describing the number, size and imparted velocity of each piece of debris, a method to compute the trajectories of the debris and a method to calculate the impact risk given the abort trajectory of the crew module. The model provided a point estimate of the strike probability as a function of the debris catalog, the time of abort and the delay time between the abort and destruction of the launch vehicle. A study was conducted to determine the sensitivity of the strike probability to the various model input parameters and to develop a response surface model for use in the sensitivity analysis of the overall ascent abort risk model. The results of the sensitivity analysis and the response surface model are presented in this paper.

Gee, Ken

The Ejectable Data Recorder: A Lean, Risk-Informed Approach for Hardware Development

NASA is developing the Orion spacecraft to transport crew from the Earth to the Moon as part of the Artemis series of missions. To provide a crew escape capability from pre-launch through ascent, the Orion vehicle is equipped with a Launch Abort System (LAS), built by Lockheed Martin, which pulls the capsule away from the launch vehicle in the event of an abort scenario. The Ascent Abort 2 (AA-2) test flight occurred on July 2, 2019,and tested a production version of the LAS to ensure that it can operate as intended, and to collect a large data set from hundreds of sensors on the vehicle to support Orion flight certification. In the original AA-2 architecture, a single-string set of communications antennas on the LAS would downlink all of the in-flight test data to ground stations. However, that communications architecture was predicted to have data dropouts during abort and jettison of the LAS, and would not support data transmission at all after LAS jettison. As a result, a comprehensive trade study was completed, yielding the addition of antennas on the crew module (CM), a buffer/rebroadcast capability for key portions of the flight, and an ejectable data recorder (EDR) subsystem. This EDR subsystem would serve as a backup to the radio frequency (RF) communications system, and would be non-flight critical, providing a unique capability that enabled management to take a different approach with the hardware and software development. The Crew Module and Separation Ring were developed as “Class 1”Flight Hardware, albeit with some tailoring approaches to enable efficiencies. The Class 1 designation requires full rigor for flight hardware and software, documenting everything that happens to a piece of hardware from procurement through disposal, requiring a full spectrum of acceptance tests, and the highest rigor of quality assurance processes. At the other end of the spectrum, Class 3hardware is controlled, but not intended for flight, and leaves the level of rigor up to the project manager. This classification is often used for research and development projects. Similarly,Class-1E has been recently defined at NASA for ISS payloads and technology development projects that are not flight critical and do not need the full rigor of Class 1 to be successful. The EDR subsystem was challenged at commencement to adopt a skunkworks and agile-like approach to hardware development, allowing for a different risk posture than the rest of the AA-2 hardware. After initially pursuing Class 1 processes, the EDR subsystem design evolved to incorporating numerous commercial components, leading to re-designation as a Class-1E subsystem. The resulting EDR subsystem was fully successful in meeting all flight system requirements, and achieved 100% retrieval of flight test data. This paper will discuss the risk posture of the EDR subsystem and the subsequent tailoring that was enacted as part of its Class-1E status.

EDR

Space Shuttle MMOD Threat Mitigation Techniques

Prior to each shuttle mission, threat assessments are performed to determine the risk of critical penetration, payload bay door radiator tube leak and crew module window replacement from Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD). Mission parameters, such as vehicle attitude, exposure time and altitude are used as inputs for the analysis. Ballistic limit equations, based on hypervelocity impact testing of shuttle materials are used to estimate the critical particle diameters of the outer surfaces of the vehicle. The assessments are performed using the BUMPER computer code at the NASA/JSC Hypervelocity Impact Technology Facility (HITF). The most critical involves the calculation of Loss of Crew and Vehicle (LOCV) risk. An overview of significant MMOD impacts on the Payload Bay Door radiators, wing leading edge reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) panels and crew module windows will be presented, along with a discussion of the techniques NASA has implemented to reduce the risk from MMOD impacts. This paper will describe on-orbit inspection of the RCC regions and the methods used discern hypervelocity impact damage. Impact damage contingency plans and on-orbit repair techniques will also be discussed. The wing leading edge impact detection system (WLEIDS) and it s role in the reduction of on-orbit risk reduction will be presented. Finally, an analysis of alternative shuttle flight attitudes on MMOD risk will be demonstrated.

Hyde, J. L.

Orion Artemis I Descent and Landing Performance

The Artemis I mission successfully demonstrated the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Module ability to trigger parachute deployment, control angular rate and touch-down heading using reaction control jets while under parachutes, and automatically detect splashdown. Guidance and control logic is implemented to initiate para-chute events in a favorable dynamic state and select a touchdown heading direction that will minimize impact loads at splashdown. Detection of splashdown inhibits control to prevent firing reaction control jets under water and begin the transition into post-landing activities that cut parachutes and deploy the Crew Module Up-righting System (CMUS). This paper presents analysis of Orion descent and landing guidance and control performance for the Artemis I mission utilizing imagery taken from the vehicle, recorded flight data, and results from high fidelity simulations.

Artemis 1

Executive Summary of Propulsion on the Orion Abort Flight-Test Vehicles

The NASA Orion Flight Test Office was tasked with conducting a series of flight tests in several launch abort scenarios to certify that the Orion Launch Abort System is capable of delivering astronauts aboard the Orion Crew Module to a safe environment, away from a failed booster. The first of this series was the Orion Pad Abort 1 Flight-Test Vehicle, which was successfully flown on May 6, 2010 at the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico. This paper provides a brief overview of the three propulsive subsystems used on the Pad Abort 1 Flight-Test Vehicle. An overview of the propulsive systems originally planned for future flight-test vehicles is also provided, which also includes the cold gas Reaction Control System within the Crew Module, and the Peacekeeper first stage rocket motor encased within the Abort Test Booster aeroshell. Although the Constellation program has been cancelled and the operational role of the Orion spacecraft has significantly evolved, lessons learned from Pad Abort 1 and the other flight-test vehicles could certainly contribute to the vehicle architecture of many future human-rated space launch vehicles.

Jones, Daniel S.