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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) (Final Technical Report)

Electric grids have historically been susceptible to both physical attacks and environmental hazards but the implementation of smart grids, remote management, and self-healing networks, has now made the grid vulnerable to cyber attacks. To address risks introduced by routable connectivity, utilities must establish dynamic solutions to identify, protect, detect, respond to, and recover from cyber security threats and vulnerabilities. In response to the evolving threat landscape U.S. Department of Energy-Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (DOE CESER) initiated the Cybersecurity for the OT Environment (CyOTE) pilot program, a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) effort designed to leverage U.S. intelligence capabilities to prevent, detect, or mitigate a cyber attack on utility operational technology (OT) networks. As part of the CyOTE pilot, The Southern Company (Southern Company or Southern) researched, evaluated and deployed emerging Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) technologies and cyber security monitoring architectures to provide previously unrealized network visibility and situational awareness through deep packet inspection and data analytics. This Final Scientific/Technical Report documents the objectives, methodology, lessons learned, and results of Southern Company’s participation in the CyOTE pilot from December 2018 to September 2023.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

Hawaii Threat Brief

The Digital Energy Transformation is redefining how power systems operate, integrating physical infrastructure with digital technologies to enhance efficiency, visibility, and resilience. For islanded and digitally modernizing systems like Hawai‘i’s, this shift presents both new opportunities and evolving challenges in cybersecurity, supply chain assurance, and environmental resilience. This brief provides an overview of critical infrastructure dependencies and systemic risks associated with increasing digital integration. It summarizes recent energy-sector threat activity and case studies that illustrate adversary tactics and supply chain vulnerabilities, and identifies pathways to strengthen resilience.

25 - ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2024

Cyber Informed Engineering (CIE) Principles Slide Presentation [Slides]

This document describes the concept and application of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE), a methodology that integrates cyber threat awareness into all stages of the systems engineering life cycle. It delineates how CIE enhances the security posture of critical infrastructure systems, which are increasingly targeted by sophisticated cyber threats. The exposition proceeds to methodically walk through the twelve foundational principles of CIE, each serving as a strategic guidepost for embedding cybersecurity into the fabric of system design, development, operation, and maintenance. The principles highlight the importance of proactive and comprehensive security measures that span from risk assessment to continuous improvement, ensuring that systems are not only designed with security in mind but are also resilient in the face of evolving cyber threats.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2026

Aggregation and Grid Security Workshop Report

The Aggregation and Grid Security Workshop - held on June 17-18, 2025, National Laboratory of the Rockies (NLR) in Golden, Colorado - brought together approximately 40 external stakeholders from the energy sector, including VPP owner/operators, aggregators, OEMs, utilities, testing & certification labs, trade associations, and cybersecurity vendors. Led by key facilitators, the workshop focused on addressing cybersecurity challenges and enhancing grid resilience for aggregated Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) and Virtual Power Plants (VPPs). The workshop was catalyzed by recognition that traditional, rearward-looking regulatory frameworks are insufficient to keep pace with technological change. There is a "missing understanding" of risk, an "absent security basis" for managing it, and an "untenable responsibility" due to unclear ownership and requirements. The workshop aimed to shift the mindset from reacting to past crises to proactively preparing for emerging threats, fostering forward resilience through risk simulation and collaborative action. This report summarizes the outcomes of the workshop, marking it a significant step toward a secure, reliable and affordable energy future.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2024

Field Programmable Gate Array-Based Reactor Protection Systems and Potential for Inclusion of Secure Elements to Improve Cybersecurity

For acceptable implementations of technologies like wireless communications, remote monitoring, etc., strong mitigations must be developed and evaluated to ensure that new attack pathways do not increase risk for Advanced Reactors. Secure Elements can be adopted and adapted for this purpose based on tamper resistance and cryptographic abilities, but research must be done to properly integrate into critical components such as FPGA-based Important to Safety systems in conjunction with current and future regulations on cyber security features in Advanced Reactors. Typically, the integration of a Secure Element happens during the POST and UEFI boot of a computing platform, performed by the Operating System, which is not possible with FPGAs because they do not include these firmware components. Work must be done to identify a reliable and secure method for integration in FPGA-based systems which lack Operating Systems and therefore complex boot procedures, system calls, etc.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Field Programmable Gate Array-Based Reactor Protection Systems and Potential for Inclusion of Secure Elements to Improve Cybersecurity

For acceptable implementations of technologies like wireless communications, remote monitoring, etc., strong mitigations must be developed and evaluated to ensure that new attack pathways do not increase risk for Advanced Reactors. Secure Elements can be adopted and adapted for this purpose based on tamper resistance and cryptographic abilities, but research must be done to properly integrate into critical components such as FPGA-based Important to Safety systems in conjunction with current and future regulations on cyber security features in Advanced Reactors. Typically, the integration of a Secure Element happens during the POST and UEFI boot of a computing platform, performed by the Operating System, which is not possible with FPGAs because they do not include these firmware components. Work must be done to identify a reliable and secure method for integration in FPGA-based systems which lack Operating Systems and therefore complex boot procedures, system calls, etc.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Correlation Between Weather Alerts and Grid Component Failures for Grid Alert

Weather events cause most grid failures. Often, we even get notifications on our phones to take cover or be prepared for an imminent event. If electric grid utilities had a similar warning that also included probable scenarios and the equipment involved, they could prepare and minimize the effects. Recent research at Idaho National Laboratory into electric grid risk analysis methods resulted in a tool that allows for the development of the most likely scenarios given failure probabilities of grid components. INL has a project with the U.S. Department of Energy’s Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) program to develop a Grid Alert application that receives messages from the existing emergency alert system, filters and determines components possibly affected by the emergency event, calculates probable scenarios uses MASTERRI and then notifies the utility if there is significant risk. Historical failure data of elements that comprise the U.S. electric grid have been compiled by utilities and organizations such as the international regulatory body North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC). Nominal failure rates are obtained from this data. To make this tool possible, estimated failure rates are needed for different component types given the alert type, severity, and location. Historic weather-related grid element failures are correlated with historic weather events from Integrated Public Alert & Warning System (IPAWS). These correlated events and failures are used along with Bayesian updates from the historical norms to provide a modified failure rate for grid elements in the alert areas and calculate probable scenarios. This discusses the Grid Alert project plan but focuses on the data gathered and process used in determining failure rates for possible grid failure scenarios.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Securing Digital Energy Infrastructure: BESS Procurement Guidance & Sample Contract Terms

Presentation for Procurement webinar providing technical guidance for entities, procuring Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS), Inverter Based Resources (IBR), Distributed Energy Resource Management Systems (DERMS) and other energy digital systems and services on how to incorporate cybersecurity requirements into the procurement process to enhance both supply chain security as well as entity-specific supply chain risk management (SCRM) programs.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Security of DERs and Grid Edge Technologies [Slides]

Distributed energy resources (DERs) offer significant value for incorporating diverse generation technologies and improving reliability. They also present a new set of cybersecurity challenges. The move of generation to the grid edge can also mean more distributed control systems and expanded communication networks, resulting in an increase in attack surface. This presentation will discuss definitions and essential terms related to DERs; developments and deployment trends for DERs; recent cyber attacks on operational technology and industrial systems; cyber risk arising from distributed grid resources; and ways in which standards may help mitigate some of these risks.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2026

Large Load Integration - Task List and Overview

Large Load Integration Tasks: Task 1 – Workshops Support stakeholder engagement across industry to promote collaboration and identify solutions to challenges that will guide other work Task 2 – Ancillary Services Characterize different types of large loads to assess under what conditions they may be utilized to provide grid stability services Task 3 – Communications Explore the cybersecurity and communications infrastructure required to enable large loads to interface with grid operations to provide ancillary services Task 4 – Nuclear Integration Explore risks and methods for supporting large load energy needs with SMRs and incorporating them into the wider power system Task 5 – Decision Support and TA Provide support to stakeholders through the creation of planning tools and direct technical assistance.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

Data Centers and Digital Assurance Introduction to Supply Chain and Cybersecurity for Data Centers, Session 1

The first session of the TADA (Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance) Data Centers Cohort Workshop, held on October 30, 2025, introduced foundational concepts of Digital Assurance in the context of data center and grid integration. Sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy, the workshop brought together utilities, data center operators, developers, and vendors to address cybersecurity and supply chain vulnerabilities. The session emphasized the growing criticality of data centers within the electric grid and the need for secure, real-time, bidirectional communication. Participants explored the principles of Digital Assurance, including cybersecurity, cyber-informed engineering (CIE), and lifecycle security, and applied a threat-vulnerability-consequence framework to identify and mitigate risks at the data center–grid interface. Discussions covered a range of threats such as spoofed dispatch signals and insider threats, architectural vulnerabilities like SCADA interfaces and insecure protocols, and potential consequences including cascading grid failures. The session also raised strategic questions about business value, vendor assurance, and defining cyber boundaries and responsibilities. This foundational workshop set the stage for deeper technical analysis and the development of actionable frameworks in subsequent sessions. Session 1 of 3.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

GridSTIX

SF-25-112 Grid-STIX is a comprehensive extension of the STIX (Structured Threat Information Expression) 2.1 ontology specifically designed for electrical grid cybersecurity applications. This ontology provides a standardized, machine-readable framework for modeling grid assets, operational technology devices, threats, vulnerabilities, supply chain risks, and security relationships in electrical power systems. ## Key Features - **Comprehensive Grid Coverage**: Physical assets, OT devices, grid components, sensors, and energy storage systems - **Zero Trust Architecture**: Policy decision points, enforcement points, trust brokers, and continuous monitoring - **AMI Infrastructure**: Advanced metering networks, head-end systems, mesh gateways, and MDM systems - **Advanced Security Modeling**: Attack patterns, vulnerabilities, mitigations, and supply chain risks - **Critical Grid Relationships**: Power flow, protection, control, and synchronization relationships - **Supply Chain Security**: Supplier modeling, country of origin tracking, and risk assessment - **Protocol Support**: DNP3, Modbus, IEC 61850, IEC 60870-5-104, OPC-UA, and IEEE standards - **Python Code Generation**: Automated STIX-compliant Python class generation from ontologies - **Interactive Visualization**: Enhanced HTML network graphs with grid-specific categorization - **STIX 2.1 Compliance**: Full compatibility with STIX threat intelligence ecosystem

Blakely, Benjamin [Argonne National Laboratory (AN↗
DOE OSTI2025

Intern Deliverable Poster 2025

An Incident Response Plan (IRP) is a document that is created and maintained by an organization that provides guidance in the event of a cyber incident. The primary objectives of an IRP are to aid in the detection, response, and recovery from incidents, as well as to enhance preparation and preventative measures. An IRP should outline specific procedures at each stage of an incident, with the goal of minimizing asset damage, data leakage, and operational impact. By investing in a well-defined IRP, organizations can better manage and mitigate risks associated with cyber threats, ensuring business continuity and resilience. This poster summarizes incident response guidelines for wind energy, which faces unique cybersecurity and physical challenges.

17 - WIND ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2025

Natural Hazard Forecast Alert Grid Risk System

Weather events cause most power outages. Often, we even get notifications on our phones to take cover or be prepared for an imminent event. If electric grid utilities had a similar warning that also included probable scenarios and the equipment involved, they could prepare and minimize the effects. Idaho National Laboratory had a project with the U.S. Department of Energy’s Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response program to develop a grid alert application that receives messages from the existing emergency alert system, filters and determines components possibly affected by the emergency event, calculates probable scenarios using MASTERRI (Modeling And Simulation for Targeted Reliability and Resilience Improvement). For high-risk events, the application can then send alert links to subscribed electric distribution utility operations staff to allow them to see and evaluate the scenarios and the impact in a web based interactive map tool. This proof of concept application used data from utilities and organizations, such as the international regulatory body North American Electric Reliability Corporation, which have complied historical failure data of elements that comprise the U.S. electric grid. Nominal failure rates are obtained from this data. To make this tool possible, estimated failure rates were calculated for different component types given the alert type, severity, and location. Historic weather-related grid element failures were correlated with historic weather events from the Integrated Public Alert & Warning System. These correlated events and failures are used along with Bayesian updates from the historical norms to provide a modified failure rate for grid elements in the alert areas and calculate probable scenarios. Working with an industry collaborator, actual grid models and data were used for demonstration cases. This report outlines the work performed for this project.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Component Criticality in BESS for Cybersecurity

Battery energy storage systems (BESS), inverters, and associated digital equipment are integral pieces of interdependent energy delivery systems. When considering the supply chain security of such systems, there is often a misplaced focus on the origin of energy generation and storage materials like battery cells, overlooking the more significant cyber risks that stem from digital power electronics control systems. Part of this misplaced focus is due to the relative costs of these components, with more attention given to expensive raw materials rather than the impactful digital elements themselves. The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is addressing this gap in supply chain security through a systems-of-systems approach that considers the impact various components in digital energy systems can have should misoperation occur. Therefore, INL assigns a cyber criticality score based on quantitative analysis, which enables informed prioritization of mitigations and allows operators to reduce risk in light of the prevalence of a BESS and associated systems foreign supply chain.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2024

ARCADE (Advanced Reactor Cyber Analysis and Development Environment)

SAND2025-11780O ARCADE (Advanced Reactor Cyber Analysis and Development Environment) software performs cybersecurity experiments on Defensive Cyber Security Architectures (DCSA) for Distributed Control Systems (DCSs). The application is integrated into a cohesive environment that performs cyber risk analyses and reduces costs. ARCADE can investigate the entire cyber-attack surface of a DCS from the physics of control, down to the firmware of individual components with automated efficiency. ARCADE has five major functional components: the Data Broker system, the virtualization environment, the cyber-attack simulator, the cyber-physical analysis system, and the physics simulator. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525.

Valme, Romuald↗
DOE OSTI2026

Robotic automation of maintenance work in nuclear power plants a cross-sector survey and roadmap

Nuclear power plants face increasing cost pressures, workforce constraints (aging workforce and skilled labor shortages), and safety requirements that are accelerating interest in robotic systems for inspection and maintenance. We conducted semi-structured interviews with personnel from seven U.S. nuclear utilities and compared deployment models, operational use cases, and integration practices with those reported by participants in the oil, gas, and petrochemical sector. In nuclear plants, robotic use remains concentrated in inspection—particularly indoor unmanned aerial vehicles and submersible remotely operated vehicles—with limited application to physical maintenance tasks. Reported near-term value includes reduced radiological and industrial risk, reduced outage labor, and improved data for planning and condition assessment. Key barriers include integration and data-interoperability constraints, operator qualification requirements, cybersecurity review burden, and difficulty demonstrating reliability in plant-representative environments. Cross-sector benchmarking highlights organizational and deployment practices that may help nuclear plants scale from pilots to routine use. We propose a deployment-oriented roadmap emphasizing modular payload strategies, representative qualification pathways and testing environments, and improved data governance to support safe and economically justified expansion of robotics in operating nuclear power plants.

11 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗