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Draft Methodology for Cybersecurity Analysis for Adoption of Wireless Technology in Nuclear Power Plants

The report is delivered as DOE-NE Cybersecurity Program Milestone M2CT-22IN1104014-Industry cybersecurity guidance adoption status. The milestone is specifically to document the process and the status of the efforts towards developing guidance in support of industry’s adoption of wireless communication technologies. To transform the operation of nuclear power plants, including domestic light-water reactors, advanced reactors, microreactors, and fission battery, for grid and non-grid applications, secure and resilient wireless capabilities are required. In addition, to realize new operational concepts such as autonomous operation and remote monitoring, advanced sensor, and instrumentation, wireless technology is essential. However, industry implementation is low, and there is no technical basis for how to understand and address potential risks for wireless communications for critical plant functions. A methodology with a technical basis for implementing secure wireless communication is crucial. This wireless adoption methodology is intended to assist a licensee in identifying an appropriate technological approach for securing wireless communications in nuclear power plant. However, this methodology does not provide guidance for addressing wireless design criteria or for addressing all the cybersecurity commitments in licensees’ cybersecurity plans (CSPs) including addressing security impact analysis that a licensee must perform before an update to a Critical Digital Asset (CDA). This methodology guides a licensee through a process of evaluating a proposed wireless implementation and drafting a plant change notification for an example use case. The example is a generic/nonproprietary version of the first test case of the methodology, which, if successfully implemented, is part of the consideration for protecting other functions’ use of wireless in a cybersecure manner.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Digital risk analysis in nuclear engineering projects: Designing for safety, performance, reliability, and security

Cyber-informed engineering and security-by-design frameworks are important in promoting the need to identify cybersecurity concerns early in the systems engineering lifecycle so risks from adversarial cyber-attacks can be eliminated or reduced through engineering design practices. In addition to adversarial risk, risk in operational technology systems also includes non-adversarial and unintentional risk from other factors such as human performance errors, environmental conditions, design flaws, and device degradation or failure. This paper introduces a new concept for characterizing digital risk, both adversarial and non-adversarial, and provides the basis for initial research into a novel digital risk analysis approach focused on incorporating attack difficulty into a multi-attribute analysis technique using robust decision-making. This digital risk characterization is also used to frame a discussion on the challenges of competing objectives and competing stakeholder requirements in an integrated energy system project that incorporates a small modular reactor and industrial facility.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

The Design and Evaluation of Zero Trust Architecture for Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure: EVs @ Scale Series on EV Charging Station Cybersecurity

Implementing a zero trust architecture can significantly bolster the security of electric vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure. EV charging infrastructure includes numerous networked interfaces, each of which can present potential vulnerabilities. When these vulnerabilities are exploited, they can compromise the entire system, leading to severe operational and security risks. Zero trust is a security model that operates on the principle of "never trust, always verify," which helps manage the attack surface and limit the scope of any potential compromises. Fundamentally, this model ensures that no entity, whether inside or outside the network, is trusted by default. The design principles of zero trust include continuous verification, strict deny-by-default access controls, and micro-segmentation. Continuous verification ensures that every request is thoroughly checked, regardless of its origin. Strict access controls enforce the principle of least privilege, allowing users and devices only the minimum necessary access to perform their functions. Micro-segmentation involves dividing the network into smaller, isolated segments to prevent lateral movement in case of a breach. In the context of EV charging infrastructure, zero trust can be implemented through various strategies. For example, multi-factor authentication (MFA) can be required for engineers to access the management interfaces and control systems of charging stations. Real-time monitoring and analysis of network traffic can help detect and respond to anomalies. Systems that do not need to communicate with each other can be micro-segmented to enhance security. All communications should adhere to predefined policies to be permitted. Additionally, encrypting communications can protect sensitive information exchanged between chargers and management systems. This paper presents a zero trust architecture specifically designed for EV charging infrastructure. Implementing zero trust not only mitigates risks but also builds a resilient infrastructure capable of withstanding and quickly recovering from cyber threats. The architecture addresses six defined security objectives. A comprehensive test plan is developed to assess the architecture against these objectives, and the results of the evaluation are reported. This approach is essential for maintaining the reliability and integrity of EV charging services in an increasingly interconnected and vulnerable digital landscape. This is the first in a planned series of papers exploring the implementation of zero trust in EV charging infrastructure. Each paper will delve into different aspects and applications of zero trust, highlighting how various work processes and requirements can lead to distinct architectural designs. These architectures will be tailored to address specific security challenges and operational needs within the EV charging ecosystem, ensuring a robust and adaptable security framework.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

Application Guide for the Cyber-Resilient Design Framework for Hybrid Systems

As the energy landscape evolves, hybrid power plants—integrating multiple renewable energy sources (e.g., solar, wind, and battery storage) with the bulk power electric system—play a crucial role in meeting growing energy demands. However, with a hybrid power plant’s increased number of components, complex network connectivity and digitization of controls, these systems face growing cybersecurity risks. To help mitigate these risks, Idaho National Laboratory (INL) presents this application guide specifically designed for operators and systems engineers to evaluate the cybersecurity resilience of their hybrid power plant’s design.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Complete Evaluation on Advanced Reactor Machine Learning Subversion Attacks (Final)

Navigating through the world of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in nuclear reactors and their Instrumentation and Control (I&C) systems demands a careful, deliberate journey. AI’s capability to manage massive datasets and streamline control systems has indeed carved out a significant role in various sectors, including nuclear energy. However, while AI, and particularly Large Language Models (LLMs), bring a lot to the table in terms of operational efficiency and anomaly detection, they also expose the sector to a new breed of cybersecurity threats, like Inference Attacks, Adversarial Attacks, and Trojan Attacks. This guide is designed to be a straightforward manual, diving deep into the intertwining worlds of AI and cybersecurity within nuclear reactors, and tailoring insights for three crucial audiences: I&C Vendors/Developers, Nuclear Regulators, and Nuclear Reactor Operators and Cyber Defense Teams. (1) Section 2, directed at I&C Vendors/Developers, will provide a clear and focused look at several cybersecurity attacks, offering practical recommendations and detailed scenarios related to AI cybersecurity. This section isn’t just about identifying problems but also about giving solid, usable solutions. (2) Section 3, meant for Nuclear Regulators, gets straight to the point about regulations, policy suggestions, and guidelines that are needed to lay down a robust, secure, and ethical foundation for the application of AI in nuclear operations. The focus is on making sure that everything adheres to international standards and laws while being practicable and clear-cut. (3) Section 4, aimed at Nuclear Reactor Operators and Cyber Defense Teams, offers an exhaustive exploration and technical reports, with clear recommendations and scenario analyses vital to protect operational environments and guarantee the secure application of AI in nuclear reactor operations. The goal is simple: as we step into an era where AI becomes a fundamental element of our technological and energy infrastructures, this guide is here to act as a clear, direct handbook, ensuring that AI is implemented within the nuclear sector in a manner that is secure, responsible, and practical. It’s about striking a balance – optimizing the undeniable benefits offered by AI while securing and shielding against potential cyber threats as we move through this new and complex landscape.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Cybersecurity Certification Recommendations for Interconnected Grid Edge Devices and Inverter Based Resources

Escalating deployment of PV and grid-edge devices on the distribution grid has increased the sustainability and efficiency of the electric grid. However, the increasing number of distributed energy resources (DERs) deployed creates a heightened cyber-physical interdependency on the distribution grid and thus creates more vectors for cyber-attacks to exploit through information and communication technology (ICT) systems and networks. For example, control signal packets can be modified, intercepted, or corrupted due to vulnerabilities in communication protocols used by microgrid controllers and grid edge devices for power control. Therefore, to mitigate and prevent cyber-attacks on grid edge devices and the inverter-based resources connected to the distribution grid, the U.S. Department of Solar Energy Technologies Office (SETO) awarded funding to the National Renewable Energy Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) to research, develop, and harmonize cybersecurity standards for Photovoltaic (PV) systems and for other kinds of DERs. To help develop a standard for DER cybersecurity, NREL established certification recommendations and test cases, in consensus with the solar industry and UL, for ensuring intrinsic design security for DERs. These recommendations were developed to bolster the cybersecure functionalities such as TLS, MAC, CRL, session resumption/renegotiation, and password, system, and service security management within the DER devices. The proposed test cases verify authentication, authorization, confidentiality, and data integrity for data and communications of DERs that use Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP). They were also developed to protect DER communications from eavesdropping, replay, man-in-the-middle, denial of service (DoS), spoofing through security certificates, least-privilege violation, and brute-force credentials. This report, which has been validated and reviewed by UL, expands upon those test cases to provide DER cybersecurity certification recommendations which increase DER resiliency and help to mitigate cyber-attacks. UL's collaboration with NREL and approval of this document will accelerate the adoption of a UL standard for DER cybersecurity.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Cybersecurity Methods for Grid-Connected Power Electronics

The present work shows a secure-by-design process, defense-in-depth method, and security techniques for a secure distributed energy resource. The distributed energy resource is a cybersecure, solar inverter and battery energy storage system prototype, collectively called the Cybersecure Power Router. Consideration is given to the use of the Smart Green Power Node for a foundation of the present work. Metrics for controller security are investigated to evaluate firmware security techniques. The prototype's ability to mitigate, respond to, and recover from firmware integrity degradation is examined. The prototype shows many working security techniques within the context of a grid-connected, distributed energy resource. Further work is expected in the Cybersecure Power Router project. Consideration is also provided for the migration of the present research and the Smart Green Power Node to realize a pre-production prototype.

Moquin, Stephen Joe↗

Utility-Scale Operational Consequences for Solar Grid Services

This report delves into the critical aspects of grid services provided by solar inverter-based resources (IBRs), with an emphasis on the evolving landscape of microgrids, virtual power plants (VPPs), aggregators, and distributed energy resource management systems (DERMS). As the energy sector undergoes a transformative shift towards more decentralized and resilient grid architectures, understanding the multifaceted risks associated with these technologies becomes paramount. The report categorizes these risks into organizational, technical, and procedural domains, providing a thorough risk assessment framework that stakeholders can utilize to anticipate and mitigate potential issues. In addressing the increasing complexity of grid interconnections, the report highlights the importance of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE). By embedding engineering controls and cybersecurity measures into the early stages of system design, this approach aims to fortify grid infrastructure against emerging cyber threats. The analysis includes an exploration of best practices and strategies for integrating CIE principles to enhance grid security and resilience. To provide practical insights, the report conducts a detailed consequence analysis of various grid services and cyber mitigations that can be applied through the interconnection process. This analysis evaluates the potential impacts of different failure modes and vulnerabilities, offering a clear understanding of the consequences that could arise from disruptions within the energy grid. The findings are further enriched by a series of case studies that illustrate real-world scenarios and lessons learned from past incidents. Through this comprehensive examination of grid services and their criticality, the report aims to prepare industry professionals with the knowledge and tools necessary to navigate the complexities of modern energy systems. By providing a comprehensive approach that includes risk assessment, cybersecurity, and consequence analysis, solar stakeholders can more effectively guarantee the reliability, efficiency, and security of the energy grid.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Aviation Cybersecurity Challenges

Extensible Traffic Management (xTM) is the overarching term for traffic management approaches and/or associated services that address the operation of select new entrants within flexibly allocated, designated airspace. xTM will leverage the decentralized UTM model for traffic management, creating cybersecurity challenges that are common and unique.

Cybersecurty↗

Model Residuals as Shields: A Two-Level Formulation to Defend Smart Grids From Poisoning Attacks

The advancement of smart grids presents both vast opportunities and heightened cybersecurity risks. Data-driven defense mechanisms, though designed as a shield against these threats, can fall prey to poisoning attacks. We delve into regression settings, underscoring the imperative to fortify defenses against a spectrum of poison ratios, notably those above 0.5—an issue scarcely addressed in prior studies. Recognizing the susceptibilities of smart grids and their manipulable sensors, we exploit the very intent of poisoning attacks, compromising model accuracy, as our defense mechanism. Our proposed two-level optimization framework discerns between poisoned and authentic data based on model residuals, outperforming or matching existing methods in 72% to 77% of precision and 75% to 80% of recalls across various poisoning attacks, poison ratios, and datasets. Once the authentic data are identified, the trained model is adaptable for a variety of applications. Comprehensive evaluations on different smart grid datasets, pitted against myriad poisoning schemes, validate our methodology’s edge over existing methods. Here, we also shed light on the implications of model misspecification originating from temporal auto-correlation, a common feature in Internet of Things and smart grid data.

Adversarial machine learning (ML)↗

Advanced Data Structures for Improved Cyber Resilience and Awareness in Untrusted Environments: LDRD Report

This report summarizes the work performed under the project "Advanced Data Structures for Improved Cyber Resilience and Awareness in Untrusted Environments." The goal of the project was to design, analyze, and test new data structures for cybersecurity applications. We had two major thrusts: 1) using new/improved write-optimized data structures and/or algorithms to better man- age and analyze high-speed massive-volume cyberstreams, and 2) adding security features to data structures at minimum cost. Write optimization allows data structures to better use secondary memory to store and search a larger amount of useful information. Secondary memory is large compared to main memory, but data movement to and from secondary memory must be carefully managed to run quickly enough to keep up with fast streams. The first thrust included managing cyberstreams in parallel, both multi-threaded and distributed, and improving the benchmarking infrastructure for testing new streaming data structures. We considered both (near) real-time discovery of particular patterns, and improved logging for improved forensics. We considered two kinds of security-feature problem. The first was high-performance history- independent external-memory data structures. These provide certain protections to data if a disk is stolen. We also prove some trade-offs between speed and security in this setting. The second data-security problem is more secure data look-up in secret-shared data bases. This report summarizes the project's major accomplishments, with the background to under- stand these accomplishments. It gathers the abstracts and references for the six refereed publications that have appeared as part of this work. We summarize several accomplishments that will be submitted for publication. We then archive one piece of partial work that is not likely to be published in the near future: validation of history-independent data structure implementations.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Cyber100 Compass [SWR 23-64]

Cyber100 Compass ("Compass") is a unique risk assessment framework that will enable grid system planners to understand and mitigate cybersecurity risk for grids transitioning to high levels of renewable generation, including 100%. The idea for Compass was developed by NREL based on past work on high-renewable grids and a series of discussions with DOE. Compass is part of Cyber100, a portfolio of proposed research activities that would greatly expand understanding of cybersecurity for high-renewable grids. Compass is a desktop application designed with a user-friendly interface. The tool gathers information from users, conducts probabilistic backend calculations, and outputs a series of visualizations to help users understand and analyze their cybersecurity risks based on the unique features of their future grid. Compass will take as inputs the values for different conditions and produce a risk score of the resulting grid. By trying different configurations, system planners can compare the resultant risks against their own risk tolerance and decide which system-of-system controls to implement as they transition toward a 100% renewable grid.

Martin, Maurice↗

Identification and Testing of Electric Vehicle Fast Charger Cybersecurity Mitigations

Fast-charging infrastructure for electric vehicles (EVs) is needed to enable and achieve the national goals of transitioning the vehicle fleet toward more electrification. Idaho National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) have jointly worked to identify, evaluate, and mitigate potential cyber-related consequences associated with fast charger systems. NREL contributed by considering cyberattack scenarios and consequences associated with integrating distributed energy resources (DERs) at fast-charging stations. The dynamic nature of fast-charger load profiles would encourage site operators to incorporate solar for energy cost reduction and energy storage for peak demand cost management at future charging facilities with multiple fast chargers at a site. These energy resources would be monitored and coordinated via a site energy management controller with data exchange between devices and local power metering infrastructure; thus, networking between devices and the design of the system becomes important in the overall cybersecurity posture. In addition, component vendors and system operators might have remote interfaces to any of these systems. It is therefore important to understand the breadth of the cyberattack surface and potential strategies to mitigate impacts. This project has focused on components and protocols expected to be found within a local charging site that includes multiple chargers and DER resources. Our methods and results are summarized in this final report.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Cybersecurity for a Modern Grid

By understanding how to secure today’s grid, researchers at NREL are working to design and secure the grid of the future. Watch this video to hear from NREL’s Juan Torres on his vision for cybersecurity research at NREL.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Final Report for Industrial Base Cybersecurity Initiative (IBCI) Project (FY2019)

Information security issues impact all manufacturing sectors and are particularly troublesome when designs for advanced weapons systems are lost via attacks that propagate through the relatively unprotected lower tiers of the nation's supply chains. The US Manufacturing Industrial Base (MIB) consists of suppliers and distributors that range in size from large prime contractors with extensive cybersecurity resources to small shops with little or no in-house information technology capabilities. The acquisition and maintenance of the technologies, systems, and financial resources needed to assure secure collaborations can be an overwhelming challenge for many manufacturers yet the cost of poor cybersecurity practices can lead to the compromise of national security information worth hundreds of millions of dollars. The Department of Defense Manufacturing Industrial Base Policy organization and the Department of Energy, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Advanced Manufacturing Office have chartered the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and the Oak Ridge Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) to design, develop, and demonstrate a Manufacturing Threat Evaluation Wargaming System (MTEWS). The MTEWS concept is based on the use of a virtual model of the computer networks and cybersecurity protocols used across the MIB that will be continuously updated to reflect the dynamic threat environment. The MTEWS cyber-physical test range will demonstrate a prototype wargaming system that analyzes the impact of new and existing cybersecurity threats while also providing the information needed to sustain the integrity of the MIB supply chains. A long-term goal is the establishment of an enduring national manufacturing operations center that proactively responds to the continuously changing attacks that threaten the MIB and US national security. LANL and Y-12 have formed an Industrial Base Cybersecurity Initiative Team (IBCI), consisting of partners from the public, private and academic sectors, that is developing the MTEWS. To date, most of the project tasks have been centered on the technologies required to create a representative model of the MIB because this is a foundational element for the entire project. Modeling activities at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte (UNC Charlotte) have demonstrated a VMware-based prototype system that can accommodate a network model with up to 350 nodes and includes features such as the option to incorporate network scanning information when building the model and the ability to down select the elements of duplicative networks to a statistically significant subset that avoids redundantly duplicating network configurations. Broad Ordering Agreements have been established with UNC Charlotte and the University of West Florida (UWF) that support a variety of cybersecurity for manufacturing tasks and wide-spread endorsement has been received from government, industry and academia sectors concerning the IBCI goals and technical direction.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Cybersecurity Workforce Training for SMR Integration into Distribution Grids: A Competency Framework and Containerized Hands-On Lab for the SMR/DER/Microgrid Boundary

Small modular reactors (SMRs) and microreactors are entering the U.S. distribution grid as synchronous generation on feeders designed for loads and inverter-based distributed energy resources (DERs). No existing cybersecurity training program addresses this intersection of nuclear operations, DER management, and operational technology security. As subcontractor to Iowa State University on the CyDERMS Center, Argonne analyzed the relevant standards and training landscape, translated the resulting gaps into a twelve-objective competency framework across distribution-operator and graduate-analyst role tracks, and built a containerized training lab using a ∼400-bus composite grid model behind a realistically simulated Modbus TCP SCADA stack. The analysis isolates the balance-of-plant / energy-management-system (BOP/EMS) boundary as the critical jurisdictional seam where, as of March 2026, neither NRC nor NERC CIP cleanly claims cybersecurity responsibility for distribution-connected SMRs. The framework maps each objective across NIST CSF 2.0, ISA/IEC 62443, NIST NICE Task–Knowledge–Skill statements, and NRC RG 5.71 awareness-and-training controls. The training lab implements operator-recognition assessment scenarios spanning grid-side disturbances and telemetry-layer anomalies.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Integrating Cyber-Informed Engineering into Enterprise Risk Management

This document supports the application of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) within the context of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) to enhance cyber-resilience. It highlights that many critical infrastructure organizations use ERM to manage business risks and emphasizes the importance of evaluating critical systems and assets. The proposed approach can be adopted independently of formal ERM processes and offers a starting point for integrating CIE alongside existing or new ERM practices. Both CIE and ERM are iterative, and their alignment fosters continuous improvement and supports the engineering and operations cultures of an organization.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Engineering-In Cybersecurity

Cyber-Informed Engineering is a framework which allows engineers to build resiliency to the impacts of cyber attack into engineered systems starting in the early design phases. This article introduces the framework and provides a description of some of its principles and resources for learning more.

42 ENGINEERING↗