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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 109 records · Page 6
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

Impact of cyber attacks on distributed compressive sensing based state estimation in power distribution grids

Modern power distribution grids suffer from multiple vulnerabilities due to the tight integration between the physical system and the cyber infrastructure. Sophisticated and malicious cyber attacks continue to adversely impact the grid operation leading to performance degradation, service interruption, and grid failure. State estimation plays an essential role in grid monitoring and advancing cyber-attack situational awareness. In this regard, this paper first proposes a distributed compressive sensing (CS) state estimation approach for an unobservable distribution grid. Further, the proposed distributed CS approach divides the distribution grid into sub-areas to perform local state estimation. Then an alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) based iterative information exchange among neighboring areas is employed to complete the estimation process. In this estimation process, the impact of loss of measurement data, false data injection (FDI), replay, and neighborhood cyber-attacks is analyzed. Extensive simulations are performed on the IEEE 37-bus and IEEE 123-bus standard networks to demonstrate the algorithm’s robustness to the aforementioned cyber-attacks. A quantitative analysis of computational complexity and simulation time of the distributed CS based approach is also presented.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Moving Target Defense Routing for SDN-enabled Smart Grid

The increasing attack surface area in the smart grid communication networks is making the grid more susceptible to cyber attacks that can lead to instability of the grid and even blackouts. While there are multiple types of cyber attacks that can impact the grid, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are relatively easier to inject as they require lesser knowledge about the system as compared to data integrity attacks. Various research works showcase methods to prevent or mitigate the impacts of DoS attacks in the smart grid but the research still lacks in demonstrating the feasibility and efficacy of the solutions in a real-world environment. In this paper, we propose a Moving Target Defense (MTD)-enabled Software Defined Network (SDN) for the Smart Grid communication implemented on a Hardwarein- the-Loop (HIL) Testbed. We showcase the implementation of the proposed architecture of MTD-enabled SDN using Mininet 2.3.0 which enables communication between the physical grid and the control center. The results show the advantages of using MTD based on SDN for the wide-area network (WAN) with much lower packet drop percentages in the case of MTD-based routing in the SDN WAN. Index Terms—SDN,

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

ThunderSecure: deploying real-time intrusion detection for 100G research networks by leveraging stream-based features and one-class classification network

Nowadays, data generated by large-scale scientific experiments are on the scale of petabytes per month. These data are transferred through dedicated high-bandwidth networks (40/100G) across distributed sites for processing, storage, and analysis. Like general purpose networks, research networks experience intrusions. However, monitoring anomalies in such high-speed network traffics is challenging given current cyber-infrastructure. Moreover, traditional network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) are signature based. However, anomaly patterns are difficult to define and that rulesets are often not updated frequently enough to reflect the changes of attack behaviors. We present ThunderSecure, a high-throughput, unsupervised learning-based intrusions detection system for 100G research networks. ThunderSecure implements an efficient packet processing and detection pipeline using multi-cores and GPUs. It extracts statistical and temporal features from real-time network data streams and feeds them to a one-class anomaly detection network. A baseline of normal distribution will be created based on the training observation. Testing traffic deviated from the learned profile will be marked as anomalies. We trained ThunderSecure on hundreds of billions of science data packets mirrored from two 100G network connections at Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory. The detection performance was evaluated on traffic captured from the same research network days and weeks after the training with different types of attack flows injected. Results show that ThunderSecure can recognize science data traffic captured long after the training and made nearly certain detection on the segment of the streams where anomalous flows were injected.

100G research network↗
DOE OSTI2022

Implementation Aspects of Smart Grids Cyber-Security Cross-Layered Framework for Critical Infrastructure Operation

Communication networks in power systems are a major part of the smart grid paradigm. It enables and facilitates the automation of power grid operation as well as self-healing in contingencies. Such dependencies on communication networks, though, create a roam for cyber-threats. An adversary can launch an attack on the communication network, which in turn reflects on power grid operation. Attacks could be in the form of false data injection into system measurements, flooding the communication channels with unnecessary data, or intercepting messages. Using machine learning-based processing on data gathered from communication networks and the power grid is a promising solution for detecting cyber threats. In this paper, a co-simulation of cyber-security for cross-layer strategy is presented. The advantage of such a framework is the augmentation of valuable data that enhances the detection as well as identification of anomalies in the operation of the power grid. The framework is implemented on the IEEE 118-bus system. The system is constructed in Mininet to simulate a communication network and obtain data for analysis. A distributed three controller software-defined networking (SDN) framework is proposed that utilizes the Open Network Operating System (ONOS) cluster. According to the findings of our suggested architecture, it outperforms a single SDN controller framework by a factor of more than ten times the throughput. This provides for a higher flow of data throughout the network while decreasing congestion caused by a single controller’s processing restrictions. Furthermore, our CECD-AS approach outperforms state-of-the-art physics and machine learning-based techniques in terms of attack classification. The performance of the framework is investigated under various types of communication attacks.

cross-layered↗
DOE OSTI2023

Forced Power Systems Oscillations Due to Cyberattacks: Threats, Detection and Partial Mitigation

Forced oscillations in power systems can be caused by misconfigured controllers at generator stations. They can also be caused by cyberattacks against the exciters or governors. This paper explores the effects of forced oscillations from cyberattacks on generator excitation and governor systems and the effectiveness of a novel control system for a static var compensator in mitigating those oscillations to enhance transmission system resilience. A brief overview of oscillations, especially forced oscillations, within power systems is presented, along with an overview of cyberattacks on power systems. This paper also examines and implements FACTS devices to partially mitigate the forced oscillations created by cyberattacks by reducing the magnitude of the oscillations caused by the attack. The proposed approach is more effective against attacks targeting exciters.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

Cybersecurity Challenges in Low-Inertia Power-Electronics-Dominated Grids

Here, the low inertia characteristics of the power electronics dominated grid (PEDG) introduces challenges while restoring voltage and frequency to their nominal values. These stability challenges create new cybersecurity vulnerabilities that are not thoroughly discussed in the literature. Cyber events such as false data injection (FDI), denial of service (DoS), man-in-the-middle attacks, stealthy attacks, and advanced persistent threats target PEDG to disrupt grid stability or gain financial benefits. The low inertia of PEDG (< 2s) compared to traditional grids (~10s) exacerbates these vulnerabilities. In response to stealthy attacks on state variables that supervisory layers cannot detect until significant harm occurs, the low inertia characteristics of PEDG offer substantial stealthy attack surfaces. To counteract such threats, PEDG must be equipped with ultra-fast real-time anomaly detection system and trajectory prediction mechanism to achieve effective cyberattack resiliency.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2021

Design and evaluation of a cyber‐physical testbed for improving attack resilience of power systems

Abstract A power system is a complex cyber‐physical system whose security is critical to its function. A major challenge is to model, analyse and visualise the communication backbone of the power systems concerning cyber threats. To achieve this, the design and evaluation of a cyber‐physical power system (CPPS) testbed called Resilient Energy Systems Lab (RESLab) are presented to capture realistic cyber, physical, and protection system features. RESLab is architected to be a fundamental platform for studying and improving the resilience of complex CPPS to cyber threats. The cyber network is emulated using Common Open Research Emulator (CORE), which acts as a gateway for the physical and protection devices to communicate. The physical grid is simulated in the dynamic time frame using Power World Dynamic Studio (PWDS). The protection components are modelled with both PWDS and physical devices including the SEL Real‐Time Automation Controller (RTAC). Distributed Network Protocol 3 (DNP3) is used to monitor and control the grid. Then, the design is exemplified and the tools are validated. This work presents four case studies on cyberattack and defence using RESLab, where we demonstrate false data and command injection using Man‐in‐the‐Middle and Denial of Service attacks and validate them on a large‐scale synthetic electric grid.

Sahu, Abhijeet↗
DOE OSTI2020

Robust Medium-Voltage Distribution System State Estimation using Multi-Source Data

Due to the lack of sufficient online measurements for distribution system observability, pseudo-measurements from short-term load or distributed renewable energy resources (DERs) forecasting are used. However, the accuracy of them is low and thus significantly limits the performance of distribution system state estimation (DSSE). In this paper, a robust DSSE that integrates multi-source measurement data is proposed. Specifically, the historical low-voltage (LV) side smart meters are used to forecast load and DERs injections via the support vector machine (SVM) with optimally tuned parameters. By contrast, the online smart meters at LV side are utilized to derive equivalent power injections at the MV/LV transformers, yielding more accurate pseudo-measurements compared to the forecasted injections. Furthermore, to deal with bad data caused by communication loss, instrumental errors and cyber attacks, robust DSSE that relies on generalized maximum-likelihood (GM)-estimation criterion is developed. The projection statistics are developed to adjust the weights of each measurement, leading to better balance between pseudo- and real-time measurements. Numerical results conducted on modified IEEE 33-bus system with DG integration demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of the proposed method.

distribution system state estimation↗
DOE OSTI2021

Directional Laplacian Centrality for Cyber Situational Awareness

Cyber operations is drowning in diverse, high-volume, multi-source data. To get a full picture of current operations and identify malicious events and actors, analysts must see through data generated by a mix of human activity and benign automated processes. Although many monitoring and alert systems exist, they typically use signature-based detection methods. We introduce a general method rooted in spectral graph theory to discover patterns and anomalies without a priori knowledge of signatures. We derive and propose a new graph-theoretic centrality measure based on the derivative of the graph Laplacian matrix in the direction of a vertex. To build intuition about our measure, we show how it identifies the most central vertices in standard network datasets and compare to other graph centrality measures. Finally, we focus our attention on studying its effectiveness in identifying important IP addresses in network flow data. Using both real and synthetic network flow data, we conduct several experiments to test our measure’s sensitivity to two types of injected attack profiles and show that vertices participating in injected attack profiles exhibit noticeable changes in our centrality measures, even when the injected anomalies are relatively small, and in the presence of simulated network dynamics.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

Real-time Intrusion Detection for High-bandwidth Research Networks using Unsupervised Deep Learning

Nowadays, data generated by large-scale scientific experiments are on the scale of petabytes per month. These data are transferred through dedicated high-bandwidth networks across distributed collaboration sites for processing, storage, and analysis. Like general purpose networks, research networks experience attacks. However, monitoring traffic in such high-bandwidth network environments is challenging with conventional deep packet inspection (DPI)- based network intrusion detection systems (NIDS). Recently, machine learning (ML) algorithms have shown potential in detecting anomalous patterns with better generalizability and faster speed. Compared to the general purpose networks, traffic movement in research network is less volatile and more likely to benefit from the ML-based anomaly analysis. We present ThunderSecure, an efficient AI-powered system for detecting anomalies in 100G research networks. ThunderSecure implements a high-throughput packet processing infrastructure using multi-cores and GPUs. It takes time-series statistics from a variety of network measurements and uses 2D Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) to explore both spatial and temporal dependencies in network data stream. Patterns of science data traffic are learned with a one-class neural network, which blends an Adversarial Autoencoder (AAE) with Gaussian mixture density estimation. Testing traffic flows exhibiting significant deviations from the learned baseline of normality are marked as anomalies. We trained ThunderSecure on hundreds of billions of science data packets recorded from a 100G research network at Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory. The detection performance was evaluated on traffic captured from the same research network days and weeks after the training with different types of attack flows injected. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first ML work in the area of network anomaly detection that has been validated on such extreme scale datasets. Results show that ThunderSecure can recognize science data traffic that are captured long after the training and make nearly certain detection on those with anomalous flows injected, even in the case when the anomaly-to-normal mixing ratio is 0.1%.

Gong, Qian↗
DOE OSTI2020

On the Performance of Detecting Injection of Fabricated Messages into the CAN Bus

There have been several public demonstrations of attacks on connected vehicles showing the ability of an attacker to take control of a targeted vehicle by injecting messages into their Controller Area Network (CAN) bus. In this article, using injected speed reading and Revolutions Per Minute (RPM) reading messages in in-motion vehicle, we examine the ability of the Pearson correlation and the unsupervised learning methods k-means clustering and Hidden Markov Model (HMM) to differentiate ’no-attack’ and ’under-attack’ states of the given vehicle. We found that the Pearson correlation distinguishes the two states, the k-means clustering method has an acceptable accuracy but high false positive rate and HMM detects attacks with acceptable detection rate but has a high false positive in detecting attacks from speed readings when there is no attack. The accuracy of these unsupervised learning methods are comparable to the ones of the supervised learning methods used by CAN bus Intrusion Detection System (IDS) suppliers. In addition, the article shows that studying CAN anomaly detection techniques using off-vehicle test facilities may not properly evaluate the performance of the detection techniques. Finally, the results suggest using other features besides the data content of the CAN messages and integrate knowledge about how the Electronic Control Units (ECUs) collaborate in building effective techniques for the detection of injection of fabricated message attacks.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

On the Limits of EM Based Detection of Control Logic Injection Attacks In Noisy Environments

The difficulty in applying traditional security mechanisms in Industrial Control System (ICS) environments makes a large portion of these mission-critical assets vulnerable to cyber attacks. Therefore, there is a dire need for the development of novel security mechanisms specifically designed to protect such critical systems. Recently a lot of attention has been given to mechanisms that exploit the EM emanations of devices for defense purposes. Such practices may lead to the development of robust external and non-intrusive anomaly detection systems. Nevertheless, the majority of current work in the area neglects to consider the implications of real-life environments, particularly environmental noise. In this work, we explore the limits of EM-based anomaly detection towards identifying injection attacks in control logic software in noisy environments. Our study conducted upon both synthetically generated and real signals identified that indeed environmental noise might significantly degrade the accuracy of the anomaly detection process. Experiments done upon synthetic data indicated that assuming that signals are captured with high sampling rates, even minor code injections can be detected with above-90% accuracy in noisy environments where SNR is up to -2dB. This is true even if naive detection methods are considered. Moreover, experiments done using a real-life testbed attest that even single-instruction injections can be detected with near-perfect accuracy in relatively clean environments. Finally, noise-elimination techniques can drastically improve the reliability of the detection mechanism even in noisy environments.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Differentially Private Adaptive Noise Injection (DP-ANI) v1.0

Location data is collected from users continuously to understand their mobility patterns. Releasing the user trajectories may compromise user privacy. Therefore, the general practice is to release aggregated location datasets. However, private information may still be inferred from an aggregated version of location trajectories. Differential privacy (DP) protects the query output against inference attacks regardless of background knowledge. This software implements a differential privacy-based privacy model that protects the user's origins and destinations from being inferred from aggregated mobility datasets. This is achieved by injecting Planar Laplace noise to the user origin and destination GPS points. The noisy GPS points are then transformed into a link representation using a link-matching algorithm. Finally, the link trajectories form an aggregated mobility network. The injected noise level is selected using the Sparse Vector Mechanism. This DP selection mechanism considers the link density of the location and the functional category of the localized links. Compared to the different baseline models, including a k-anonymity method, our differential privacy-based aggregation model offers query responses that are close to the raw data in terms of aggregate statistics at both the network and trajectory-levels with maximum 9% deviation from the baseline in terms of network length.

Peisert, Sean [Lawrence Berkeley National Laborato↗
DOE OSTI2024

Isolating Signatures of Cyberattacks under Stressed Grid Conditions

In a controlled cyber-physical network, such as a power grid, any malicious data injection in the sensor measurements can lead to widespread impact due to the actions of the closed-loop controllers. While fast identification of the attack signatures is imperative for reliable operations, it is challenging to do so in a large dynamical network with tightly coupled nodes. A particularly challenging scenario arises when the cyberattacks are strategically launched during a grid stress condition, caused by non-malicious physical disturbances.

Ghosh, Sanchita [BATTELLE (PACIFIC NW LAB)]↗
DOE OSTI2022

Experimental Setup for Grid Control Device Software Updates in Supply Chain Cyber-Security

Supply chain cyberattacks that exploit insecure third-party software are a growing concern for the security of the electric power grid. These attacks seek to deploy malicious software in grid control devices during the fabrication, shipment, installation, and maintenance stages, or as part of routine software updates. Malicious software on grid control devices may inject bad data or execute bad commands, which can cause blackouts and damage power equipment. This paper describes an experimental setup to simulate the software update process of a commercial power relay as part of a hardware-in-the-loop simulation for grid supply chain cyber-security assessment. The laboratory setup was successfully utilized to study three supply chain cyber-security use cases.

Keller, Joseph↗
DOE OSTI2025

Securing Smart Manufacturing: Detection of Cyber-Physical Attacks in CNC-Based Systems

As Industry 4.0 advances, the integration of computer numerical control (CNC) machines and advanced manufacturing technologies is transforming production into smart manufacturing systems that blend physical and digital processes as cyber-physical systems. However, this increased cyber-physical connectivity exposes manufacturing systems to cyber threats that can cause severe operational and financial disruptions. This paper presents a comparative study on cyber attacks and anomaly detection techniques in manufacturing, focusing on network traffic from CNC machines. The data extracted from network packets includes machine commands and control signals exchanged between the machine's interface and control system, crucial for maintaining operational integrity. We explore two types of cyber attacks, design modification and command injection, which pose substantial risks to CNC machine productivity and system integrity. Our investigation involves experiments on a real CNC system, highlighting the urgent need for effective detection mechanisms. To address these threats, we evaluate three anomaly detection methods: dynamic time warping (DTW), rolling average, and a deep learning, long short-term memory (LSTM) time-series-based autoencoder. Each is assessed for its effectiveness in identifying anomalous behaviors caused by the attacks. Our findings demonstrate the unique strengths and limitations of each detection technique, providing a deeper understanding of their applicability in realworld manufacturing environments. The comparative analysis indicates that while certain methods are highly effective against specific attack types, others offer broader applicability across different attacks. This study contributes to the accurate detection of anomalies in CNC machining processes, thereby enhancing the reliability and security of smart manufacturing systems against diverse cyber threats.

Williams, Bethanie [Tennessee Technological Univer↗
DOE OSTI2025

Employing a Hardware-in-the-Loop Approach to Realize a Fully Homomorphic Controller for a Small Modular Advanced High Temperature Reactor

This paper addresses the cybersecurity challenges of advanced nuclear reactors by integrating fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) into their control systems, enabling encrypted processing of control signals without compromising functionality. Advanced nuclear reactors, including Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) and microreactors, aim to achieve autonomous and remote operations, reducing costs and enhancing competitiveness. However, these advancements expand the attack surface for cyberattacks, particularly in autonomous and remote operation scenarios. Cyberattacks can exploit vulnerabilities to manipulate physical processes, causing shutdowns, asset damage, or public harm. Such attacks begin with passive reconnaissance, where adversaries intercept communications or observe behaviors to gather information, which is then leveraged to execute cyber-physical attacks by injecting malicious commands. Nuclear power must adopt cybersecurity protection measures to secure the integrity and availability of their digital control systems. This paper demonstrates the application of FHE to secure operations by enabling encrypted processing of sensitive signals and parameters -- ensuring privacy without exposing data. FHE supports secure mathematical operations on encrypted data without requiring decryption. Using a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) approach, this paper implements an FHE-integrated controller on a BeagleBone Black (BBB) controlling a simulation of the Small Modular Advanced High Temperature Reactor (SmAHTR). By doing so, the encrypted controller protects the integrity of critical set points and control signals during transmission and processing. Thus, FHE-integrated controllers enhance secure operations of advanced nuclear reactors while maintaining functionality.

control systems↗