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DOE OSTI2025

PFAS Removal by Ion Exchange Resins: Background and Knowledge Gaps with Respect to the Hanford Site

Per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) have been a rising concern for the past two decades, with the United States Department of Defense and Environmental Protection Agency investing millions of dollars in research into remediation and clean-up technologies. Due to the environmental persistence, toxicity, biological uptake, and ongoing changes in both federal and state regulatory space, understanding the fate and transport of PFAS compounds has been of growing concern to the US Department of Energy (DOE). The DOE’s Hanford Site is investigating historical use of PFAS and will be doing site characterization for PFAS. Thus, PFAS have not yet been identified as a contaminant concern in regulatory documents. Based on historical records that mention the discharge of aqueous film-forming foam containing PFAS and having on-site fire stations (a risk factor for PFAS contamination), it seems likely that environmental releases of PFAS may have occurred. Pump and treat (P&T) remediation is the selected remedy for multiple groundwater contaminant plumes at Hanford. These P&T systems use ion exchange (IX) as a component of aboveground treatment, with the specific resins depending on the target contaminants. There is potential that these IX resins may be able to remove PFAS from groundwater, but investigation is needed to understand affinity/selectivity and removal capacity given the groundwater composition and the operating conditions. This report provides background on PFAS uses and chemistry, then provides a review of IX resin applications for PFAS, identifying knowledge gaps. Recommendations are provided regarding research needed to address knowledge gaps and acquire information needed to propose IX as a future PFAS remediation technology at the Hanford Site, as well as other U.S. Department of Energy sites. Generally, PFAS compounds are fluorinated substances that contain at least one fully fluorinated methyl or methylene carbon – with a few noted exceptions, any chemical with at least a perfluorinated methyl group (–CF3) or a perfluorinated methylene group (–CF2–) is a PFAS. These chemical compounds are characterized as non-biodegradable, non-reactive, non-photolytic, and hydrolysis resistant. This makes them highly recalcitrant within the environment, however polyfluoroalkyl materials are less recalcitrant as the carbon chains contain C–H bonds which are more easily broken than carbon – fluorine (C–F) bonds. The backbone carbon structures are commonly punctuated with a head group, the most well-known of them are perfluorooctanesulfonic acid and perfluorooctanoic acid, which possess a sulfonate and a carboxylate group, respectively. IX resins are marketed for the removal of PFAS from water systems and industrial water, however, the mechanism of removal is not as well understood as for anion or cation removal. A better understanding of the mechanism of removal would enable the development of IX resins that have improved specificity for PFAS removal. Four knowledge gaps were identified: 1) the effect of dissolved ions on the IX resin PFAS removal effectiveness, 2) the effect of additional primary contaminants of concern (PCOCs) or secondary contaminants of concern (SCOCs) on the effectiveness of PFAS via IX resin, 3) the mechanisms of PFAS removal from water, and 4) practical solutions to IX resin regeneration and waste disposal.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Defending the Homeland: Growing Foreign Challenges to the U.S. Missile Defense Posture

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for Policy requested that Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory conduct a Congressionally directed study on homeland missile defense, pursuant to Section 1692 of the fiscal year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act. In accordance with the statutory language, this study considers whether the security benefits obtained by deployment of homeland missile defenses of the United States are undermined or counterbalanced by adverse reactions of potential adversaries, and considers the effectiveness of homeland missile defense efforts of the United States to deter the development of ballistic missiles. Almost a half-century has elapsed since the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and almost two decades since the former withdrew. Since withdrawing, the United States has sought to develop and deploy a layered missile defense system to defend against regional threats to U.S. and allied interests abroad and to counter limited threats to the U.S. homeland. As such, missile defense supports key national defense policy objectives. Protecting the U.S. homeland, forces abroad, allies, and partners. Deterring attacks against the United States, its allies, and partners. Assuring allies an strengthening U.S. diplomatic activities in peacetime and crisis. We offer five key findings: 1. The primary benefit of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system is the protection it provides the U.S. homeland against a limited but evolving rogue-state missile threat. While this system has never been tested in combat, it appears thus far to have effectively paced North Korea’s development and deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In the absence of such a defensive capability, the United States would likely have been more heavily exposed to North Korean actions, would have operated at a much higher-risk posture, and would have had less negotiating room with which to navigate coercive tactics and crises. Its allies would have been more concerned about U.S. willingness in time of crisis and war to run the risks of protecting them. The GMD system also serves as a hedge against Iranian breakout. 2. Potential adversaries continue to develop long-range ballistic missiles despite deployment of a U.S. homeland missile defense system. This includes both rogue states and major power rivals whose long-range missile programs predated the deployment of U.S. missile defenses. While North Korea has continued its long-range missile developments and achieved an intercontinental capability, Iran has not yet reached this threshold. The broader proliferation of long-range missiles anticipated in the late 1990s has not materialized. 3. While Russia has used the existence of a U.S. homeland missile defense system as a justification for its substantial and continuing weapon modernization program, neither Russian force modernization nor the limited U.S. homeland missile defense system has altered the strategic balance. Russia has long considered U.S. missile defenses—both theater and homeland—as directed against its strategic forces and as a capability that could rapidly advance, thereby eroding Russian confidence in its nuclear deterrent. Russia’s political and military actions appear excessive and negatively impact areas such as arms control, but they do not undermine the primary benefit of the U.S. system cited in Key Finding 1. 4. China’s expansion and diversification of nuclear and missile forces has been influenced by its concerns about U.S. homeland missile defense, but those concerns are only one of many factors in China’s force planning. Although China’s actions to preserve and expand its assured retaliation prospects have not fundamentally altered the strategic balance, its buildup and lack of transparency about its force modernization goals are troubling. Taken together, the aggregate pattern of China’s modernization activities over the past two decades strongly suggests a concerted effort to develop a modern military force commensurate with its intended geopolitical status. Whatever China’s legacy concerns over the survivability of its strategic nuclear forces, its ability to overwhelm the GMD system appears intact today and will be further strengthened in the years ahead as it continues its long-term modernization program. China’s political and military actions negatively affect U.S. security interests but do not undermine the primary benefit of the U.S. system cited in Key Finding 1. 5. The basic finding that benefits have not so far been undermined by adverse reactions is a function of circumstances that are increasingly in flux. The existing GMD-centered system is under increasing pressure from the pace and scope of North Korean missile deployments. The proposed “layered” system seeks to mitigate this impending capability gap in the near term and to complement future capabilities, such as the Next Generation Interceptor, when they come online. Given the pace of U.S. missile defense developments since 2000, it is possible that adversary advances in capability will outpace the U.S. system’s ability to adapt. Additionally, because this layered system is in principle more readily scaled, it will almost certainly be viewed skeptically by China and Russia. In a context of growing great-power security competition, the Department of Defense (DoD) should consider undertaking a broader net assessment of the U.S., Russian, and Chinese force balance.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
NASA NTRS2010

Adaptive Planning: Understanding Organizational Workload to Capability/ Capacity through Modeling and Simulation

In August 2003, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) established the Adaptive Planning (AP) initiative [1] with an objective of reducing the time necessary to develop and revise Combatant Commander (COCOM) contingency plans and increase SECDEF plan visibility. In addition to reducing the traditional plan development timeline from twenty-four months to less than twelve months (with a goal of six months)[2], AP increased plan visibility to Department of Defense (DoD) leadership through In-Progress Reviews (IPRs). The IPR process, as well as the increased number of campaign and contingency plans COCOMs had to develop, increased the workload while the number of planners remained fixed. Several efforts from collaborative planning tools to streamlined processes were initiated to compensate for the increased workload enabling COCOMS to better meet shorter planning timelines. This paper examines the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) directed contingency planning and staffing requirements assigned to a combatant commander staff through the lens of modeling and simulation. The dynamics of developing a COCOM plan are captured with an ExtendSim [3] simulation. The resulting analysis provides a quantifiable means by which to measure a combatant commander staffs workload associated with development and staffing JSCP [4] directed contingency plans with COCOM capability/capacity. Modeling and simulation bring significant opportunities in measuring the sensitivity of key variables in the assessment of workload to capability/capacity analysis. Gaining an understanding of the relationship between plan complexity, number of plans, planning processes, and number of planners with time required for plan development provides valuable information to DoD leadership. Through modeling and simulation AP leadership can gain greater insight in making key decisions on knowing where to best allocate scarce resources in an effort to meet DoD planning objectives.

Hase, Chris↗
DOE OSTI2020

Facility Cybersecurity Framework Best Practices

Federal facilities are increasingly adopting automation and connecting to the Internet creating an energy-internet-of-things environment that converges operational technology (OT) and information technology (IT). Today's buildings increasingly weave together networked sensors and cyber and physical systems that enable data to be collected, aggregated, exchanged, stored and monetized in new ways. Building technological advances have created new energy technology, services, markets and value creation opportunities (e.g. transactive energy, two-way grid communications, machine learning, and increased use of renewable and distributed energy resources). But as larger data sets are being exchanged at faster speeds between an increasing number of OT systems, it becomes more difficult to protect the security of the data lifecycle and the physical equipment it interacts with. These challenges are especially difficult to overcome because the economic and environmental gain (interoperability, big data, social networks and ubiquitous information sharing) are driving these prominent trends in the digital age. Often cybersecurity is an afterthought. The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) funded the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to develop various cybersecurity tools, trainings, and reports to aid federal facility managers – and other building owners and operators – in better applying frameworks and lessons learned from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF), risk management framework (RMF), DOE’s cybersecurity capability maturity model (C2M2), and a wide variety of industry best practices and guidance documents (i.e., NIST 800 series, Department of Defense United Facilities Criteria). This set of tools, collectively known as the FEMP Facility-Related Control System Cyber Toolkit (FRCS Cyber Toolkit)2, is focused on cybersecurity concerns from facility-related control systems and other operational technology (OT), such as industrial control systems (ICS). The FRCS Cyber Toolkit can be applied across six of the sixteen critical infrastructure sectors designated by the Department of Homeland Security, including government facilities, healthcare and public health, commercial facilities (e.g., public assembly, offices, lodging), financial services (e.g., banking and insurance), emergency services (e.g., fire and police stations), and information technology. With increasingly converged IT and OT systems, it is crucial to address OT cybersecurity considerations and assess how the seam of these two systems could impact the overall cybersecurity posture of a facility. The objective of this report is to provide an overview of the best possible method to use FRCS Cyber Toolkit (section 2.0) and distilled cybersecurity best practices for the federal facilities to address growing non-linear cyber threats (section 3.0). Recommendations in this document are aggregated from several NIST and other documents (see Appendix A for additional details).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2023

5G Securely Energized and Resilient: Task 2 and 3 Progress Report

The 5G Securely Energized and Resilient project implemented at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory is sponsored by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense and is designed to demonstrate the successful deployment of 5G-6G (FutureG) technologies in the context of electrical microgrid scenarios. Through implementation of this project, cybersecurity researchers were able to design a platform to better understand the fundamental system architecture, limitations, and benefits of 5G systems supporting energy system requirements. Although the work for this project was developed in the context of “FutureG Advanced Component Development & Prototypes,” which is a U.S. Department of Defense effort to ensure communications system resilience in the context of military deployments, the results can also apply to communications for electrical grids in general. Several key points were established in Tasks 2 and 3 of this project that are further expanded on in the body of this document.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
NASA NTRS2006

Earth Observations and the Role of UAVs: A Capabilities Assessment

This document provides an assessment of the civil UAV missions and technologies and is intended to parallel the Office of the Secretary of Defense UAV Roadmap. The intent of this document is four-fold: 1. Determine and document desired future missions of Earth observation UAVs based on user-defined needs 2. Determine and document the technologies necessary to support those missions 3. Discuss the present state of the platform capabilities and required technologies, identifying those in progress, those planned, and those for which no current plans exist 4. Provide the foundations for development of a comprehensive civil UAV roadmap to complement the Department of Defense (DoD) effort (http://www.acq.osd.mil/uas/). Two aspects of the President's Management Agenda (refer to the document located at: www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2002/mgmt.pdf ) are supported by this undertaking. First, it is one that will engage multiple Agencies in the effort as stakeholders and benefactors of the systems. In that sense, the market will be driven by the user requirements and applications. The second aspect is one of supporting economic development in the commercial sector. Market forecasts for the civil use of UAVs have indicated an infant market stage at present with a sustained forecasted growth. There is some difficulty in quantifying the value of the market since the typical estimate excludes system components other than the aerial platforms. Section 2.4 addresses the civil UAV market forecast and lists several independent forecasts. One conclusion that can be drawn from these forecasts is that all show a sustained growth for the duration of each long-term forecast.

Cox, Timothy H.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Hexavalent Chrome Free Coatings for Electronics Applications: Joint Test Report

Regardless of the corrosivity of the environment, all metals require periodic maintenance activity to guard against the insidious effects of corrosion and thus ensure that alloys meet or exceed design or performance life. The standard practice for protecting metallic substrates is the application of a coating system. Applied coating systems work via a variety of methods (barrier, galvanic, and/or inhibitor) and adhere to the substrate through a combination of chemical and physical bonds. For years hexavalent chromium has been a widely used element within applied coating systems because of its self healing and corrosion resistant properties. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) studies have concluded that hexavalent chromium (hex chrome) is carcinogenic and poses significant risk to human health. On May 5, 2011 amendments to the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) were issued in the Federal Register. Subpart 223.73 prohibits contracts from requiring hexavalent chromium in deliverables unless certain exceptions apply. These exceptions include authorization from a general or flag officer and members of the Senior Executive Service from a Program Executive Office, and unmodified legacy systems. Otherwise, Subpart 252.223-7008 provides the contract clause prohibiting contractors from using or delivering hexavalent chromium in a concentration greater than 0.1 percent by weight for all new contracts and to be included down to subcontractors for supplies, maintenance and repair services, and construction materials. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Department of Defense (DoD), and industry stakeholders continue to search for alternatives to hex chrome in coatings applications that meet their performance requirements in corrosion protection, cost, operability, and health and safety, while typically specifying that performance must be equal to or greater than existing systems.

Kessel, Kurt↗
NASA NTRS1992

Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on National Aero-Space Plane (NASP) Program

Six years ago, the Defense Science Board (DSB) initiated a review of the concept, technical basis, program content, and missions of the National Aerospace Plane (NASP) program. The report was completed in Sep. 1988, and the recommendations contributed to strengthening the technical efforts in the NASP program. Since then, substantial technological progress has been made in the technology development phase (Phase 2) of the program. Phase 2 of the program is currently scheduled to end in late Fiscal Year 1993, with a decision whether to proceed to the experimental flight vehicle phase (Phase 3) to be made at that time. This decision will be a very significant one for the Department of Defense (DoD) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). In February of this year, the DSB was chartered to revisit the NASP program to assess the degree to which the many technical challenges of the program have been resolved, or are likely to be resolved by the end of Phase 2.

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2025

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 116: Area 25 Test Cell C Facility, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada with ROTC-1

CR loaded to this OSTI record. Just adding new file which includes CR plus new ROTC 1 and update the metadata to the following: This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 116, Area 25 Test Cell C Facility. This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; the U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management (FFACO, 1996 [as amended March 2010]). CAU 116 consists of the following two Corrective Action Sites (CASs), located in Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site: (1) CAS 25-23-20, Nuclear Furnace Piping and (2) CAS 25-41-05, Test Cell C Facility. CAS 25-41-05 consisted of Building 3210 and the attached concrete shield wall. CAS 25-23-20 consisted of the nuclear furnace piping and tanks. Closure activities began in January 2007 and were completed in August 2011. Activities were conducted according to Revision 1 of the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for CAU 116 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2008). This CR provides documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and provides data confirming that closure objectives for CAU 116 were met. Site characterization data and process knowledge indicated that surface areas were radiologically contaminated above release limits and that regulated and/or hazardous wastes were present in the facility. The Record of Technical Change 1 updated the use restriction information.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
NASA NTRS2015

2015 Space Radiation Standing Review Panel

The 2015 Space Radiation Standing Review Panel (from here on referred to as the SRP) met for a site visit in Houston, TX on December 8 - 9, 2015. The SRP met with representatives from the Space Radiation Element and members of the Human Research Program (HRP) to review the updated research plan for the Risk of Radiation Carcinogenesis Cancer Risk. The SRP also reviewed the newly revised Evidence Reports for the Risk of Acute Radiation Syndromes Due to Solar Particle Events (SPEs) (Acute Risk), the Risk of Acute (In-flight) and Late Central Nervous System Effects from Radiation Exposure (CNS Risk), and the Risk of Cardiovascular Disease and Other Degenerative Tissue Effects from Radiation (Degen Risk), as well as a status update on these Risks. The SRP would like to commend Dr. Simonsen, Dr. Huff, Dr. Nelson, and Dr. Patel for their detailed presentations. The Space Radiation Element did a great job presenting a very large volume of material. The SRP considers it to be a strong program that is well-organized, well-coordinated and generates valuable data. The SRP commended the tissue sharing protocols, working groups, systems biology analysis, and standardization of models. In several of the discussed areas the SRP suggested improvements of the research plans in the future. These include the following: It is important that the team has expanded efforts examining immunology and inflammation as important components of the space radiation biological response. This is an overarching and important focus that is likely to apply to all aspects of the program including acute, CVD, CNS, cancer and others. Given that the area of immunology/inflammation is highly complex (and especially so as it relates to radiation), it warrants the expansion of investigators expertise in immunology and inflammation to work with the individual research projects and also the NASA Specialized Center of Research (NSCORs). Historical data on radiation injury to be entered into the Watson “big data” study must be used with caution. The general scientific issues of reproducibility, details of experimental methods and data analysis from preclinical and basic research laboratories have been raised broadly over the last few years (not specific to this work) and indicate that caution must be applied in the ways these data are used. This pertains to preclinical data and also to phase 3 clinical trials in radiation oncology and medical oncology. Of course, appropriate use and analysis of these “big-data” sets also offer the potential of pinpointing limitations and extracting remaining useful information. Emphasis should be placed on the latter possibility. A key target is risk reduction from radiation exposure. Progress of the entire space program, now moving towards the Mars mission, requires timely answers to key components of human risk, which are known to be complex. Periodic review of progress should be conducted with additional resources directed into achieving critical milestones. Turning the long red bars to yellow and green (or for some risks such as CNS possibly to grey) must be high priority. That such progress will require new science and not engineering means that it should be viewed in a knowledge-based light. The technology-based aspects of engineering issues are certainly as important, however, science and knowledge-based problems are solved in a different way than engineering. Timelines for engineering are more predictable, while for science, progress can be methodical with occasional major incremental findings that can rapidly change the rate of progress. As opportunities for rapid incremental changes arise, periodic enhancement of investment is strongly recommended to enable such new knowledge to be quickly and efficiently exploited. Collaborations and linkages with National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) and the Department of Defense (DoD) are in place and more are encouraged, where possible, with the radiation injury and medical countermeasure studies. This could include utilizing some of their animal model testing contracts to facilitate obtaining results using common platforms. Such approach will facilitate the comparison of results among laboratories, and will facilitate and accelerate the development of medical countermeasures. It is particularly noteworthy that the NASA Space Radiation Element is reaching out to the Multidisciplinary European Low Dose Initiative (MELODI) platform coordinating low dose radiation risk research, and to other international agencies that are studying low dose radiation effects in an effort to fill the void generated by the cancelation of the Department of Energy (DOE) low dose radiation program. While NASA is working actively with NIAID and BARDA to integrate their relevant findings of radiation mitigator investigations to NASA programs, the committee notes its disappointment that the United States currently lacks a dedicated low dose radiation program with clear mechanistic orientation and aimed at the quantification and mitigation of human radiation risk on Earth. This void gives to the NASA Space Radiation Program Element special societal value, but also makes its overall design more challenging.

Steinberg, Susan↗
DOE OSTI2022

Operation Upshot-Knothole

A thundering boom and sheet of fire announced a dramatic, once in a lifetime event – the firing of a nuclear projectile from a 280 mm cannon. Travelling seven miles downrange, the projectile detonated 500 feet over the Nevada Test Site’s Frenchman Flat with a force of fifteen kilotons. Although the test was successful, the massive cannon, designed for tactical battlefield use, had a critical flaw. It was too large and cumbersome for mobile combat. The cannon test, codenamed Grable, was part of Operation Upshot-Knothole, the fourth test series conducted in Nevada. Beginning with the Annie test on March 17, 1953, and concluding with the Climax test on June 4th, the Operation consisted of three airdrops, seven tower detonations, and the one artillery shot. As with previous Nevada tests, the demarcation between the weapon development series, Upshot, and the DOD effects tests, Knothole, was blurred. All eleven tests generated data in support of weapon development as well as tactical battlefield applications. During Upshot-Knothole, the University of California Radiation Laboratory (UCRL), conducted its first ever tests, Ruth and Ray. Although neither test was successful, these failures, along with another a year later at Operation Castle, provided the new laboratory with design data leading to future successful tests. The Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) participated in a test series with the general goal of preparing for societal recovery from a nuclear attack. Known as Operation Doorstep, the FCDA’s experiments evaluated the effects of a nuclear attack on food supplies, housing and urban structures, and even a copse of trees transplanted from nearby Mt. Charleston. A contingent of the press witnessed test Annie from an outcropping of rocks, subsequently named News Nob. The presence of the news media, along with the FCDA’s participation, marked a fundamental change in the Nevada test program - a change that that now included the general populace, whose survival was, of course, the rationale for testing. The Department of Defense continued and expanded its Desert Rock exercises of troop exercises, helicopter operations, and evaluation of blast damage to military aircraft, tanks, and guns. Annie, Nancy, Badger, Simon, Encore, and Grable involved larger numbers of personnel than the other five shots. Below is an edited and condensed account of Desert Rock activities compiled by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
NASA NTRS2004

Joint Lead-Free Solder Test Program for High Reliability Military and Space Applications

Current and future space and defense systems face potential risks from the continued use of tin-lead solder, including: compliance with current environmental regulations, concerns about potential environmental legislation banning lead-containing products, reduced mission readiness, and component obsolescence with lead surface finishes. For example, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) has lowered the Toxic Chemical Release reporting threshold for lead to 100 pounds. Overseas, the Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) and the Restriction on Hazardous Substances (RoHS) Dicctives in Europe and similar mandates in Japan have instilled concern that a legislative body will prohibit the use of lead in aerospace/military electronics soldering. Any potential banning of lead compounds could reduce the supplier base and adversely affect the readiness of missions led by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). Before considering lead-free electronics for system upgrades or future designs, however, it is important for the DoD and NASA to know whether lead-free solders can meet their systems' requirements. No single lead-free solder is likely to qualify for all defense and space applications. Therefore, it is important to validate alternative solders for discrete applications. As a result of the need for comprehensive test data on the reliability of lead-free solders, a partnership was formed between the DoD, NASA, and several original equipment manufactures (OEMs) to conduct solder-joint reliability (laboratory) testing of three lead-free solder alloys on newly manufactured and reworked circuit cards to generate performance data for high-reliability (IPC Class 3) applications.

Brown, Christina↗
NASA NTRS2001

Making Sense of Remotely Sensed Ultra-Spectral Infrared Data

NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), Pasadena, California, Earth Observing System (EOS) programs, the Deep Space Network (DSN), and various Department of Defense (DOD) technology demonstration programs, combined their technical expertise to develop SEASCRAPE, a software program that obtains data when thermal infrared radiation passes through the Earth's atmosphere and reaches a sensor. Licensed by the California Institute of Technology (Caltech), SEASCRAPE automatically inverts complex infrared data and makes it possible to obtain estimates of the state of the atmosphere along the ray path. Former JPL staff members created a small entrepreneurial firm, Remote Sensing Analysis Systems, Inc., of Altadena, California, to commercialize the product. The founders believed that a commercial version of the software was needed for future U.S. government missions and the commercial monitoring of pollution. With the inversion capability of this software and remote sensing instrumentation, it is possible to monitor pollution sources from safe and secure distances on a noninterfering, noncooperative basis. The software, now know as SEASCRAPE_Plus, allows the user to determine the presence of pollution products, their location and their abundance along the ray path. The technology has been cleared by the Department of Commerce for export, and is currently used by numerous research and engineering organizations around the world.

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2020

Southwest Wind Power R&D Test Site Development at the National Wind Technology Center (CRADA CRD-12-00472 Final Report)

Southwest Windpower, Inc. (SWWP) has been designing and distributing small wind turbines for more than 22 years and is the recognized global leader in the design, manufacturing and distribution of small wind systems (400-3000 watts). The company has been a pioneer in the development of wind technology and has built and shipped more than 170,000 wind turbines to over 120 countries worldwide. Headquartered in Flagstaff AZ, SWWP has sales representatives in over 88 countries. Applications for SWWP systems include residential homes, commercial properties, micro grids, remote cabins, telecom transmitters, offshore platforms, water pumping and sailboats. In addition, U.S. Department of Defense uses SWWP’s products in Forward Operating Bases (FOB’s), USGS uses them for remote monitoring of glacier movements and the CIA uses them to provide power seismic monitoring. Today, SWWP plans development of new technologies to address distributed energy market needs and become even more aggressive in international markets. This strategy includes extensive Research, Development, Demonstration & Deployment (RDD&D) activities to improve existing production line into more simple, reliable, and cost-effective wind turbine systems. Important part of such activities is the field testing of the new systems, which should provide: (i) validation of the reliable operation of hardware and software; (ii) validation of numerical models of the system and its components; (iii) field comparison of various control and optimization strategies; (iv) customized reliability testing; (v) customized monitoring and analysis testing; and (vi) IEC certification testing (vii) filed demonstration of system performance and reliability. Such field testing facility should encompass multiple towers and appropriate data acquisition systems. SWWP is exploring to move part of the engineering department to Colorado, and execute its RDD&D strategies in this new location. Partnership with NREL will provide great insights into SWWP’s RDD&D processes and more efficient commercialization by utilizing NWTC as the field testing site, and working close with NREL personnel. NWTC is ideally suited to strain the design. NREL is very experienced with customized and IEC testing. During this project, Southwest Windpower aims to improve the value proposition of distributed renewable energy, and make it a competitive choice in the energy markets. As of today, more then 170,000 small wind turbines, manufactured in the U.S., are installed in more then 180 countries. With the improved value proposition, Southwest Windpower wants to create and address new market needs, substantially increase its sales domestically and internationally, which should have positive impact on the creation of American jobs, competitiveness of U.S. economy, export or U.S. products, and the use of renewable energy.

17 WIND ENERGY↗
NASA NTRS1998

Studying Turbulence Using Numerical Simulation Databases: Proceedings of the Summer Program - No. 7

The Seventh Summer Program of the Center for Turbulence Research took place in the four-week period, July 5 to July 31, 1998. This was the largest CTR Summer Program to date, involving thirty-six participants from the U. S. and nine other countries. Thirty-one Stanford and NASA-Ames staff members facilitated and contributed to most of the Summer projects. A new feature, and perhaps a preview of the future programs, was that many of the projects were executed on non-NASA computers. These included supercomputers located in Europe as well as those operated by the Departments of Defense and Energy in the United States. In addition, several simulation programs developed by the visiting participants at their home institutions were used. Another new feature was the prevalence of lap-top personal computers which were used by several participants to carry out some of the work that in the past were performed on desk-top workstations. We expect these trends to continue as computing power is enhanced and as more researchers (many of whom CTR alumni) use numerical simulations to study turbulent flows. CTR's main role continues to be in providing a forum for the study of turbulence for engineering analysis and in facilitating intellectual exchange among the leading researchers in the field. Once again the combustion group was the largest. Turbulent combustion has enjoyed remarkable progress in using simulations to address increasingly complex and practically more relevant questions. The combustion group's studies included such challenging topics as fuel evaporation, soot chemistry, and thermonuclear reactions. The latter study was one of three projects related to the Department of Energy's ASCI Program (www.llnl.gov/asci); the other two (rocket propulsion and fire safety) were carried out in the turbulence modeling group. The flow control and acoustics group demonstrated a successful application of the so-called evolution algorithms which actually led to a previously unknown forcing strategy for jets yielding increased spreading rate. A very efficient algorithm for flow in complex geometries with moving boundaries based on the immersed boundary forcing technique was tested with very encouraging results. Also a new strategy for the destruction of aircraft trailing vortices was introduced and tested. The Reynolds Averaged Modeling (RANS) group demonstrated that the elliptic relaxation concept for RANS calculations is also applicable to transonic flows with shocks; however, prediction of laminar/turbulent transition remains an important pacing item. A large fraction of the LES effort was devoted to the development and testing of a new algorithmic procedure (as opposed to phenomenological model) for subgrid scale modeling based on regularized de-filtering of the flow variables. This appears to be a very promising approach, and a significant effort is currently underway to assess its robustness in high Reynolds number flows and in conjunction with numerical methods for complex flows. As part of the Summer Program two review tutorials were given on Turbulent structures in hydrocarbon pool fires (Sheldon Tieszen), and Turbulent combustion modeling: from RANS to LES via DNS (Luc Vervisch); and two seminars entitled Assessment of turbulence models for engineering applications (Paul Durbin) and Subgrid-scale modeling for non-premixed, turbulent reacting flows (James Riley) were presented. A number of colleagues from universities, government agencies, and industry attended the final presentations of the participants on July 31 and participated in the discussions. There are twenty-six papers in this volume grouped in five areas. Each group is preceded with an overview by its coordinator.

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NASA NTRS2004

Simulation Based Acquisition for NASA's Office of Exploration Systems

In January 2004, President George W. Bush unveiled his vision for NASA to advance U.S. scientific, security, and economic interests through a robust space exploration program. This vision includes the goal to extend human presence across the solar system, starting with a human return to the Moon no later than 2020, in preparation for human exploration of Mars and other destinations. In response to this vision, NASA has created the Office of Exploration Systems (OExS) to develop the innovative technologies, knowledge, and infrastructures to explore and support decisions about human exploration destinations, including the development of a new Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV). Within the OExS organization, NASA is implementing Simulation Based Acquisition (SBA), a robust Modeling & Simulation (M&S) environment integrated across all acquisition phases and programs/teams, to make the realization of the President s vision more certain. Executed properly, SBA will foster better informed, timelier, and more defensible decisions throughout the acquisition life cycle. By doing so, SBA will improve the quality of NASA systems and speed their development, at less cost and risk than would otherwise be the case. SBA is a comprehensive, Enterprise-wide endeavor that necessitates an evolved culture, a revised spiral acquisition process, and an infrastructure of advanced Information Technology (IT) capabilities. SBA encompasses all project phases (from requirements analysis and concept formulation through design, manufacture, training, and operations), professional disciplines, and activities that can benefit from employing SBA capabilities. SBA capabilities include: developing and assessing system concepts and designs; planning manufacturing, assembly, transport, and launch; training crews, maintainers, launch personnel, and controllers; planning and monitoring missions; responding to emergencies by evaluating effects and exploring solutions; and communicating across the OExS enterprise, within the Government, and with the general public. The SBA process features empowered collaborative teams (including industry partners) to integrate requirements, acquisition, training, operations, and sustainment. The SBA process also utilizes an increased reliance on and investment in M&S to reduce design risk. SBA originated as a joint Industry and Department of Defense (DoD) initiative to define and integrate an acquisition process that employs robust, collaborative use of M&S technology across acquisition phases and programs. The SBA process was successfully implemented in the Air Force s Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program.

Hale, Joe↗
NASA NTRS2014

Control and Non-Payload Communications Generation 1 Prototype Radio Flight Test Report

Unmanned aircraft (UA) represent a new capability that will provide a variety of services in the Government (public) and commercial (civil) aviation sectors. The growth of this potential industry has not yet been realized because of the lack of a common understanding of what is required to safely operate Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the National Airspace System (UAS in the NAS). The desire and ability to fly UA is of increasing urgency. The application of UA to perform national security, defense, scientific, and emergency management are driving the critical need for less restrictive access by UA to the NAS. Existing Federal Aviation Regulations, procedures, and technologies do not allow routine UA access to the NAS. Access to the NAS is hampered by challenges such as the lack of an onboard pilot to see and avoid other aircraft; the ability of a single pilot or operator to control multiple UA; the reliance on command and control (C2) links; the altitudes, speeds, and duration at which the aircraft fly; and the wide variation in UA size and performance. NASA is working with other Government agencies to provide solutions that reduce technical barriers and make access to the NAS routine. This goal will be accomplished through system-level integration of key concepts, technologies, or procedures and through demonstrations of these integrated capabilities in an operationally relevant environment. This project provides an opportunity to transition the acquired empirical data and knowledge to the Federal Aviation Administration and other stakeholders to help them define the requirements for routine UA access to the NAS.Radio communications channels for UA are currently managed through exceptions and use either Department of Defense frequencies for line-of-sight (LOS) and satellite-based communications links, low-power LOS links in amateur bands, or unlicensed Industrial/Scientific/Medical (ISM) frequencies. None of these frequency bands are designated for safety and regularity of flight. Only recently has radiofrequency (RF) spectrum been allocated by the International Telecommunications Union specifically for commercial UA C2, LOS communication (L-Band: 960 to 1164 MHz, and C-Band: 5030 to 5091 MHz). The safe and efficient integration of UA into the NAS requires the use of protected RF spectrum allocations and a new data communications system that is both secure and scalable to accommodate the potential growth of these new aircraft. Data communications for UA-referred to as control and non-payload communications (CNPC)-will be used to exchange information between a UA and a ground station (GS) to ensure safe, reliable, and effective UA flight operation. The focus of this effort is on validating and allocating new RF spectrum and data link communications to enable civil UA integration into the NAS. Through a cost-sharing cooperative agreement with Rockwell Collins, Inc., the NASA Glenn Research Center is exploring and performing the necessary development steps to realize a prototype UA CNPC system. These activities include investigating signal waveforms and access techniques, developing representative CNPC radio hardware, and executing relevant testing and validation activities. There is no intent to manufacture the CNPC end product, rather the goals are to study, demonstrate, and validate a typical CNPC system that will allow safe and efficient communications within the L-Band and C-Band spectrum allocations. The system is addressing initial "seed" requirements from RTCA, Inc., Special Committee 203 (SC-203) and is on a path to Federal Aviation Administration certification. This report provides results from the flight testing campaign of the Rockwell Collins Generation 1 prototype radio, referred hereafter as the "radio." The radio sets operate within the 960- to 977-MHz frequency band with both air and ground radios using identical hardware. Flight tests involved one aircraft and one GS. Results include discussion of aircraft flight paths and associated radio performance.

Shalkhauser, Kurt A.↗
NASA NTRS2015

NASA and ESA Collaboration on Hexavalent Chrome Alternatives - Pretreatments with Primers Screening Final Test Report

Hexavalent chromium (hex chrome or Cr(VI)) is a widely used element within applied coating systems because of its self-healing and corrosion-resistant properties. The replacement of hex chrome in the processing of aluminum for aviation and aerospace applications remains a goal of great significance. Aluminum is the major manufacturing material of structures and components in the space flight arena. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the European Space Agency (ESA) are engaged in a collaborative effort to test and evaluate alternatives to hexavalent chromium containing corrosion coating systems. NASA and ESA share common risks related to material obsolescence associated with hexavalent chromium used in corrosion-resistant coatings. In the United States, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) studies have concluded that hexavalent chromium is carcinogenic and poses significant risk to human health. On May 5, 2011, amendments to the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) were issued in the Federal Register. Subpart 223.73 prohibits contracts from requiring hexavalent chromium in deliverables unless certain exceptions apply. Subpart 252.223-7008 provides the contract clause prohibiting contractors and subcontractors from using or delivering hexavalent chromium in a concentration greater than 0.1 percent by weight for all new contracts associated with supplies, maintenance and repair services, and construction materials. ESA faces its own increasingly stringent regulations within European directives such as Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of Chemical (REACH) substances and the Restriction of Hazardous Substances Directive (RoHS) which have set a mid-2017 sunset date for hexavalent chromium. NASA and ESA continue to search for an alternative to hexavalent chromium in coatings applications that meet their performance requirements in corrosion protection, cost, operability, and health and safety, while typically specifying that performance must be equal to or greater than existing systems. The overall objective of the collaborative effort between NASA TEERM and ESA is to test and evaluate coating systems (pretreatments, pretreatments with primer, and pretreatments with primer and topcoat) as replacements for hexavalent chrome coatings in aerospace applications. This objective will be accomplished by testing promising coatings identified from previous NASA, ESA, Department of Defense (DOD), and other project experience. Additionally, several new materials will be analyzed according to ESA-identified specifications.

coating↗