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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 109 records · Page 6
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2018

Simplified Aid for Extra-Vehicular Activity Rescue (SAFER) Battery Assessment

In 2013, the Boeing Company model 787-8 Dreamliner commercial aircraft experienced three catastrophic lithium (Li) battery failures. The cause of each failure resulted in a single-cell thermal runaway (TR) condition, which propagated to adjacent battery cells. Two of the failures involved rechargeable lithium-ion (Li-Ion) batteries, and the third event involved a nonrechargeable lithium-manganese dioxide (Li-MnO2) battery. In response to these Li battery failures, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) approved a technical assessment of the International Space Station Simplified Aid for Extra-Vehicular Activity Rescue (SAFER) Li non-rechargeable battery. This assessment was conducted to evaluate the SAFER Li nonrechargeable battery safety design features against Boeing 787 Dreamliner Li battery failure lessons learned. Specifically, this investigation focused on assessing the severity of a SAFER battery TR hazard conditions.

Iannello, Christopher J.↗
NASA NTRS2018

The TechEdSat-N Series: A Collaborative Technology Development Platform in the Nano-Satellite Form Factor

The TechEdSat-1 (TES-1) was the first U.S. CubeSat to be deployed from the ISS (International Space Station). This permitted the initiation of a flight series that has recently de-orbited the 6th nano-satellite with subsequent numbers 7-10 under development. The nano-satellites range from 1U (1 unit) to 6U (TechEdSat-8) but have the critical ISS Safety design features standardized in order to focus on the particular experiment objectives. Incremental experimental development has included unique communication subsystems such as command/control of the nanosatellite through email commands -as well as a recent record for Wifi transmission. Also, the thermophysics of controlled drag devices (Exo-Brake) has been developed which will prelude sample return and planetary exploration applications. The successful "rapid incremental experiment" approach has also been incorporated into collaborations with academia, permitting professors/student interns to be exposed to the rigors of space mission hardware design and execution. The TechEdSat-8, a linear 6U configuration, allows for 5 different groups to contribute an "experiment, sensor, or sub-system" through a well-defined common interface. Lastly, the flying laboratory concept is helpful in developing future interplanetary nano-satellite subsystems which will advance exploration goals by allowing rapid demonstration/validation first in LEO (Low Earth Orbit).

Small Payload Quick Return↗
NASA NTRS2019

NASA Marshall Space Flight Center Tools for Human Factors Engineering Assessments for Safe Sls Worksites

NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Human Factors Engineering (HFE) Team is implementing mockup fabrication, virtual reality (VR) and motion capture (MoCap) into HFE analyses of SLS worksites through its Virtual Environments Lab (VEL). MSFC HFE Team is responsible for the Space Launch System (SLS) worksite analyses of the integration activities performed at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC). With a wide variety of tasks, it is important to verify that SLS can be safely integrated at KSC early in the design process. If the ground support crew cannot safely complete the tasks, redesign efforts must be implemented. MSFC HFE is responsible for verification through methods such as drawing inspection, observation of tasks performed, and building physical mockups. There is a need, however, for a faster analysis early in the process that can impact design safety before drawings are finalized. This need is addressed through MSFC’s VEL.

Andrews, Tanya↗
NASA NTRS2018

Buoyancy Effects on Concurrent Flame Spread Over Thick PMMA

The flammability of combustible materials in a spacecraft is important for fire safety applications because the conditions in spacecraft environments differ from those on earth. Experimental testing in space is difficult and expensive. However, reducing buoyancy by decreasing ambient pressure is a possible approach to simulate on-earth the burning behavior inside spacecraft environments. The objective of this work is to determine that possibility by studying the effect of pressure on concurrent flame spread, and by comparison with microgravity data, observe up to what point low-pressure can be used to replicate flame spread characteristics observed in microgravity. Specifically, this work studies the effect of pressure and microgravity on upward/concurrent flame spread over 10 mm thick polymethyl methacrylate (PMMA) slabs. Experiments in normal gravity were conducted over pressures ranging between 100 and 40 kPa and a forced flow velocity of 200 mm/s. Microgravity experiments were conducted during NASA’s Spacecraft Fire Experiment (Saffire II), on board the Cygnus spacecraft at 100 kPa with an air flow velocity of 200 mm/s. Results show that reductions of pressure slow down the flame spread over the PMMA surface approaching that in microgravity. The data is correlated in terms of a non-dimensional mixed convection analysis that describes the convective heat transferred from the flame to the solid, and the primary mechanism controlling the spread of the flame. The extrapolation of the correlation to low pressures predicts well the flame spread rate obtained in microgravity in the Saffire II experiments. Similar results were obtained by the authors with similar experiments with a thin composite cotton/fiberglass fabric (published elsewhere). Both results suggest that reduced pressure can be used to approximately replicate flame behavior of untested gravity conditions for the burning of thick and thin solids. This work could provide guidance for potential ground-based testing for fire safety design in spacecraft and space habitats.

Environmental conditions↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Interplanetary Terminal Procedure Design Applied to Lunar Landing

The impending NASA Artemis mission to the Moon will enable deep space exploration. The planned cadence of crewed Moon missions under Artemis necessitates scalable, safe lunar landings. This paper describes the development of Interplanetary Terminal Procedure Design (iTERP) which leverages current terminal procedure design criteria augmented with lunar physics to support the exploration of the Moon, Mars and beyond. The iTERPS model combines lessons learned from decades of commercial airspace operations with novelties of human space exploration on other worlds. This paper will highlight some of the key functional areas in procedure design safety, training, and operations reimagined for human space flight.

lunar approach procedures, Artemis Moon base, inte↗
NASA NTRS1975

Program for developing and implementing a new approach to designing for fire safety in buildings

The traditional method of providing for fire safety in buildings through reliance on codes and standards that prescribe specific measures to be taken in the design and construction of buildings to minimize the potential for a fire occurring and to protect property and life should a fire occur was evaluated. A new approach to designing for fire safety in buildings is outlined.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2009

Brazed Joints Design and Allowables: Discuss Margins of Safety in Critical Brazed Structures

This slide presentation tutorial discusses margins of safety in critical brazed structures. It reviews: (1) the present situation (2) definition of strength (3) margins of safety (4) design allowables (5) mechanical testing (6) failure criteria (7) design flowchart (8) braze gap (9) residual stresses and (10) delayed failures. This presentation addresses the strength of the brazed joints, the methods of mechanical testing, and our ability to evaluate the margins of safety of the brazed joints as it applies to the design of critical and expensive brazed assemblies.

FLom, Yury↗
NASA NTRS2023

NASA Engineering and Safety Center Technical Bulletin No. 23-01: Including Key Design Features in Safety-Critical Pyrotechnic Firing Circuits

Pyrotechnic systems often fall into a unique category in that inadvertent activation of these systems resulting from a fault and/or lack of safe margins can lead directly to loss of crew. For example, untimely activation of pyrotechnics used for a flight termination system could override an abort capability. Over the years, NASA and the military have learned lessons about safe pyrotechnic circuit design and test, many of which are codified. However, with NASA’s recent efforts to move toward a development model than leans more heavily on Commercial Partners these requirements have not always been directly levied on projects and in some cases been misinterpreted. This bulletin describes key safety features of pyrotechnic firing circuit design and provides rationale for inclusion of each feature.

Pyrotechnic Firing Curcuits↗
NASA NTRS1972

Manned space flight nuclear system safety. Volume 5: Nuclear System safety guidelines. Part 1: Space base nuclear safety

The design and operations guidelines and requirements developed in the study of space base nuclear system safety are presented. Guidelines and requirements are presented for the space base subsystems, nuclear hardware (reactor, isotope sources, dynamic generator equipment), experiments, interfacing vehicles, ground support systems, range safety and facilities. Cross indices and references are provided which relate guidelines to each other, and to substantiating data in other volumes. The guidelines are intended for the implementation of nuclear safety related design and operational considerations in future space programs.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1973

Nuclear safety considerations for the design of a shuttle launched 500 to 2000 watt isotope Brayton power system.

An extensive study was conducted to evaluate the safety requirements for the design of a heat source assembly for use in a shuttle launched, isotope Brayton electric power system for the 500-W(e) to 2 kWe range. The assembly is a self-contained package which supplies heat to a power conversion system. A typical mission profile for a shuttle launched, earth orbital mission was assumed. Critical mission accidents were identified and evaluated to determine their impact upon the design of the Heat Source Assembly. Earth-orbital decay reentry analyses were performed to demonstrate survivability of the heat source. Safety design requirements were developed to ensure survivability under credible accident conditions including loss of the power conversion system in orbit.

Garate, J. A.↗
NASA NTRS1972

Manned space flight nuclear system safety. Voluem 5: Nuclear system safety guidelines. Part 2: Space shuttle/nuclear payloads safety

The design and operations guidelines and requirements developed in the study of space shuttle nuclear system transportation are presented. Guidelines and requirements are presented for the shuttle, nuclear payloads (reactor, isotope-Brayton and small isotope sources), ground support systems and facilities. Cross indices and references are provided which relate guidelines to each other, and to substantiating data in other volumes. The guidelines are intended for the implementation of nuclear safety related design and operational considerations in future space programs.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2024

Control Effectiveness: Metric Development and Application to Resilient Lunar Habitat Design

System safety engineering in its bare essence involves identifying, assessing, and mitigating, or controlling, hazards. Appropriate safety controls are selected using hazard reduction precedence principles, prior experience, or by assessing their impact on residual risk (together with other factors like cost). We propose a control effectiveness metric as one way to systematically and consistently evaluate potential safety controls individually and thereby facilitate selecting a shortlist of potential controls for subsequent integrated evaluation. The control effectiveness metric considers a safety control’s availability when needed, the probability that its design is adequate in addressing the targeted hazard, the probability that the design will be implemented as intended, and the relationship between the time it takes for the safety control to address its target hazard and the time before the hazard propagates. We demonstrated the use of our metric on a lunar habitat design using a physics-based habitat simulator. High control effectiveness and safety controls result in a habitat with high resilience, while low control effectiveness results in lower resilience.

Rashi Jain↗
NASA NTRS2007

Design for Reliability and Safety Approach for the NASA New Launch Vehicle

The United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is in the midst of a space exploration program intended for sending crew and cargo to the international Space Station (ISS), to the moon, and beyond. This program is called Constellation. As part of the Constellation program, NASA is developing new launch vehicles aimed at significantly increase safety and reliability, reduce the cost of accessing space, and provide a growth path for manned space exploration. Achieving these goals requires a rigorous process that addresses reliability, safety, and cost upfront and throughout all the phases of the life cycle of the program. This paper discusses the "Design for Reliability and Safety" approach for the NASA new crew launch vehicle called ARES I. The ARES I is being developed by NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in support of the Constellation program. The ARES I consists of three major Elements: A solid First Stage (FS), an Upper Stage (US), and liquid Upper Stage Engine (USE). Stacked on top of the ARES I is the Crew exploration vehicle (CEV). The CEV consists of a Launch Abort System (LAS), Crew Module (CM), Service Module (SM), and a Spacecraft Adapter (SA). The CEV development is being led by NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC). Designing for high reliability and safety require a good integrated working environment and a sound technical design approach. The "Design for Reliability and Safety" approach addressed in this paper discusses both the environment and the technical process put in place to support the ARES I design. To address the integrated working environment, the ARES I project office has established a risk based design group called "Operability Design and Analysis" (OD&A) group. This group is an integrated group intended to bring together the engineering, design, and safety organizations together to optimize the system design for safety, reliability, and cost. On the technical side, the ARES I project has, through the OD&A environment, implemented a probabilistic approach to analyze and evaluate design uncertainties and understand their impact on safety, reliability, and cost. This paper focuses on the use of the various probabilistic approaches that have been pursued by the ARES I project. Specifically, the paper discusses an integrated functional probabilistic analysis approach that addresses upffont some key areas to support the ARES I Design Analysis Cycle (DAC) pre Preliminary Design (PD) Phase. This functional approach is a probabilistic physics based approach that combines failure probabilities with system dynamics and engineering failure impact models to identify key system risk drivers and potential system design requirements. The paper also discusses other probabilistic risk assessment approaches planned by the ARES I project to support the PD phase and beyond.

Safie, Fayssal, M.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Expanding Our Understanding of What Constitutes a Safety-Relevant Occurrence

Focusing on undesired operator behaviors is pervasive in system design and safety management cultures. This focus limits the data that are collected, the questions that are asked during data analysis, and therefore our understanding of what operators do in everyday work. Human performance represents a significant source of safety data that includes both desired and undesired actions. When safety is characterized only in terms of errors and failures, the vast majority of human impacts on system safety and performance are ignored. The outcomes of safety data analyses dictate what is learned from those data, which in turn informs safety policies and safety-related decision making. When learning opportunities are systematically restricted by focusing only on rare failure events, not only do we learn less (and less often), but we can draw misleading conclusions by relying on a non-representative sample of human performance data. The study of human contributions to safety represents a vast and largely unexplored opportunity to learn. Changes in how we define and think about safety can highlight new opportunities for collection and analysis of safety-relevant data. Developing an integrated safety picture to better inform system design, safety-related decision making and policies depends upon identifying, collecting, and interpreting safety producing behaviors in addition to safety reducing behaviors.

Jon B Holbrook↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Data-Driven Approach to Recognizing and Understanding Human Contributions to Aviation Safety

Data-driven decisions about safety management and design of safety-critical systems are limited by the available data, which influence, and are influenced by, how decision makers characterize problems and identify solutions. In the commercial aviation domain, large volumes of data are collected and analyzed on the failures and errors that result in infrequent incidents and accidents, but in the absence of data on safety-producing behaviors, safety management and system design decisions are based on a small sample of non-representative safety data. Analysis of aviation accident data suggests that human error is implicated in up to 80% of accidents, which has been used to justify future visions for aviation in which the roles of human operators are greatly diminished or eliminated in the interest of creating a safer aviation system. However, failure to fully consider the human contributions to aviation safety represents a significant and largely unrecognized risk when making policy decisions about safety management and system design. Opportunities exist to leverage the vast amount of data that have already been collected, or could be easily obtained, to increase our understanding of human contributions to safety in commercial aviation. This presentation will focus on those opportunities as well as the challenges associated with collecting and analyzing data on operators’ safety-producing behaviors.

Safety↗
NASA NTRS2019

Human Performance Contributions to Safety in Commercial Aviation

Every day in aviation, pilots, air traffic controllers, and other front-line personnel perform countless correct judgments and actions in a variety of operational environments. These judgments and actions are often the difference between an accident and a non-event. Ironically, data on these behaviors are rarely collected or analyzed. Data-driven decisions about safety management and design of safety-critical systems are limited by the available data, which influence how decision makers characterize problems and identify solutions. Large volumes of data are collected on the failures and errors that result in infrequent incidents and accidents, but in the absence of data on behaviors that result in routine successful outcomes, safety management and system design decisions are based on a small sample of nonrepresentative safety data. This assessment aimed to find and document “safety successes” made possible by human operators. With many Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) Programs and Projects focusing on increased automation and autonomy and decreased human involvement, failure to fully consider the human contributions to successful system performance in civil aviation represents a significant risk — a risk that has not been recognized to date. Without understanding how humans contribute to safety, any estimate of predicted safety of autonomous capabilities is incomplete and inherently suspect. Furthermore, understanding the ways in which humans contribute to safety can promote strategic interactions among safety technologies, functions, procedures and the people using them. Without this understanding, the full benefits of an integrated, optimized human/technology or autonomous system will not be realized. Historically, safety has been consistently defined in terms of the occurrence of accidents or recognized risks (i.e., in terms of things that go wrong). These adverse outcomes are explained by identifying their causes, and safety is restored by eliminating or mitigating these causes. An alternative to this approach is to focus on what goes right and identify how to replicate that process. Focusing on the rare cases of failures attributed to “human error” provides little information about why human performance routinely prevents adverse events. Hollnagel has proposed that things go right because people continuously adjust their work to match their operating conditions. These adjustments become increasingly important as systems continue to grow in complexity. Thus, the definition of safety should reflect not only “avoiding things that go wrong” but “ensuring that things go right.” The basis for safety management requires developing an understanding of everyday activities. However, few mechanisms to monitor everyday work exist in the aviation domain, which limits opportunities to learn how designs function in reality. This concept of safety thinking and safety management is reflected in the emerging field of resilience engineering. According to Hollnagel, a system is resilient if it can sustain required operations under expected and unexpected conditions by adjusting its functioning prior to, during, or following changes, disturbances, and opportunities. To explore “positive” behaviors that contribute to resilient performance in commercial aviation, the assessment team examined a range of existing sources of data about pilot and air traffic control (ATC) tower controller performance, including subjective interviews with domain experts and objective aircraft flight data records. These data were used to identify strategies that support resilient performance, methods for exploring and refining those strategies in existing data, and proposed methods for capturing and analyzing new data.

Null, Cynthia H.↗
NASA NTRS1979

Safety considerations in the design and operation of large wind turbines

The engineering and safety techniques used to assure the reliable and safe operation of large wind turbine generators utilizing the Mod 2 Wind Turbine System Program as an example is described. The techniques involve a careful definition of the wind turbine's natural and operating environments, use of proven structural design criteria and analysis techniques, an evaluation of potential failure modes and hazards, and use of a fail safe and redundant component engineering philosophy. The role of an effective quality assurance program, tailored to specific hardware criticality, and the checkout and validation program developed to assure system integrity are described.

Reilly, D. H.↗