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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 109 records · Page 6
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2018

Insect taste receptors relevant to host identification by recognition of secondary metabolite patterns of non-host plants

Highlights: • Three putative bitter gustatory receptor of silkworm respond to several secondary metabolites in non-host plants. • Secondary metabolites responsive to the gustatory receptor are representative feeding-deterrents in non-host plants. • One feeding-deterrent gustatory receptor respond to multiple feeding deterrents. • Feeding deterrent receptors are expressed in silkworm mouthparts. • Representative secondary metabolite of a non-host plant, coumarin exactly had a suppressive effect on food intake of silkworm. The taste sensing system is crucial for food recognition in insects and other animals. It is commonly believed that insect gustatory receptors (Grs) expressed in gustatory organs are indispensable for host plant selection. Many behavioral studies have shown that mono- or oligo-phagous lepidopteran insects use the balance between feeding attractants and feeding deterrents in host plants and that these are sensed by taste organs for host plant recognition. However, the molecular mechanism underlying taste recognition, especially of feeding deterrents, remains to be elucidated. To better understand this mechanism, we studied orphan Grs, including Bombyx mori Gr (BmGr) 16, BmGr18, and BmGr53, from the mono-phagous insect, Bombyx mori. Using Calcium imaging in mammalian cells, we first confirmed in lepidoptera insects that three of the putative bitter Grs widely responded to structurally different feeding deterrents. Although the phylogenetic distance of these Grs was considerable, they responded to partially overlapping deterrents of plant secondary metabolites. These findings suggest that not only these three Grs but also most of the Grs that have been assigned to putative bitter Grs are feeding-deterrent receptors that play a role in host plant recognition.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

The Importance of Addressing Disagreements Between Nominal and Effective Treatments During Bat Mortality Minimization Validation Studies

As the wind energy industry grows, so too does our need for effective and low-cost bat mortality minimization solutions. Despite knowledge gaps in our understanding of what drives bats to collide with spinning turbines, minimization solutions have shown success during validation studies. Curtailment has been consistently effective, reducing bat mortality from 33%-79%, depending on the curtailment scenario and species present. Several validation studies have demonstrated deterrent solutions, specifically ultrasonic deterrents, to be effective, but overall, more variable compared to curtailment solutions. Further, a study combining curtailment with ultrasonic deterrents produced encouraging results, finding that adding ultrasonic deterrents to turbines that were designated to curtail, significantly reduced mortality rates compared to curtailment only turbines. Despite positive results, the strength of inference achieved with validation studies is limited by methodological constraints associated with appropriately assigning fatalities to treatments. Because of the temporal separation between when a bat collides with a turbine and when it is discovered during a ground-based carcass survey, we must assign carcasses to a treatment that ran during the prior night(s). This process may introduce errors at multiple stages. First, for studies that rotate treatments among turbines, mortality surveyors must be confident that carcasses are 'fresh' such that mortalities are correctly assigned to the treatment from the previous night(s). Second, we must reconcile any misalignments between how we assign treatments and how we implement treatments (e.g., turbines assigned with a deterrent treatment may be implemented as another treatment when deterrent devices are not operating as designed). Finally, for curtailment solutions, it is critical to recognize that measured effects are a function of not just the treatment as implemented but the proportion of the night the treatment is realized (e.g., if wind speeds are greater than the curtailment treatment cut-in speed for the entire night, we cannot expect there to me any differences in mortality reduction relative to control turbines). Using a dataset collected between June and October 2017, that rotated 3 treatments (Deterrent Only, 5 m/s Curtail only, and 5 m/s Curtail & Deterrent) and 1 control condition across 16 turbines each night, we explored the importance and implications of accounting for potential errors in assigning fatalities to treatments. We present preliminary results comparing the mortality associated with error-corrected treatments and control conditions highlighting how the measured effect of a treatment (mortality) greatly depends on site specific implementation.

bats↗
DOE OSTI2018

Space in 21st Century Conflict: Calibrating Risks, Tailoring Strategies (Workshop Summary)

U.S. strategic thinking on outer space security has been slow to evolve since the 1990s and the DoD finds itself struggling to develop an adaptive and cohesive strategy for the domain. Russia and China, however, have been thinking about space in a holistic and integrated way for some time. Both countries recognize that U.S. conventional strength relies heavily on technologies and systems enabled by space-based assets. Thus, holding those assets at risk represents an opportunity to asymmetrically counter America’s ability to project power. China and Russia been developing a suite of anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities to accomplish this, to include direct-ascent weapons, space-based weapons, jammers, and cyber capabilities; both countries have also incorporated these systems into their respective tactical and strategic planning. This represents a serious threat to U.S. power projection and assurance of our regional allies and partners. Assuring the U.S.’s ability to operate in space is paramount for supporting regional security missions in both Europe and East Asia. Assuring DoD operations and capabilities in outer space, however, remains a challenge for the defense community. One solution offered by strategists is to enhance U.S. resiliency in space to turn the domain from offense dominant to defense dominant. This, they argue, can be achieved by improving space situational awareness (SSA), protecting space assets with active and passive countermeasures, disaggregating assets and leveraging new commercial space capabilities, and integrating allied space capabilities. However, many barriers remain to accomplishing these objectives. For example, some think that the classified nature of many U.S. space activities is an obstacle to deepening cooperation with commercial partners and allies. Others acknowledge the lack of a working model for incorporating cheaper, diverse, and scalable commercial space systems. Identifying where space fits into broader U.S. deterrence strategies is a subject of contention. While discussions over the past few years have focused on the practicability of deterring attacks on space assets via cross-domain threats, this line of thinking has yielded few useful insights. Consequently, defense practitioners have more recently shifted to thinking of space as part of an integrated deterrence concept, one that envisions building resiliency and defenses into our space architecture while simultaneously holding an adversary’s space-based assets at risk to enhance deterrence more broadly. However, both approaches illuminate a larger problem in the discussion of the relationship between space and deterrence: there is a lack of consensus on what it is we are trying to deter, how space fits into broader deterrence and strategic constructs, and the role of space in extended deterrence and assurance of allies. For example, is the United States’ priority to discourage attacks in space, to ensure regional power projection and alliance support capabilities, to deter broader global conflict or all of the above? Answering such questions will be an important step toward integrating space into a comprehensive defense strategy.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Proceedings from the State of the Science and Technology for Minimizing Impacts to Bats from Wind Energy

The U.S. Department of Energy Wind Energy Technologies Office (DOE WETO), and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory convened a workshop entitled the State of the Science and Technology for Minimizing Impacts to Bats from Wind Energy on 13–14 November 2019. The objectives of the workshop were to (1) Identify the current impact minimization measures that are, or can be, used to reduce bat fatalities at wind energy facilities, (2) Assess the current effectiveness of those minimization measures, (3) Identify and assess the research and development (R&D) opportunities needed to optimize and improve the effectiveness of current minimization and deterrent technologies and inform the development of future solutions; and (4) Identify potential emerging or novel methods for informing impact minimization measures at or around wind energy facilities. Specifically, the workshop focused on deterrent and curtailment strategies. For deterrents, the discussion centered on the existing technology (i.e., ultrasonic deterrents, dim-UV light, and texture coating), integration with wind turbines (either retrofitting or out of the box installation), effectiveness, validation studies, and cost (e.g., technology, installation, validation, and maintenance). For curtailment, the conversation was divided into blanket curtailment (i.e., based on time and wind speed) and smart curtailment (i.e., blanket curtailment plus additional variables such as temperature or bat activity). The workshop included plenary presentations, panels, and breakout sessions to share data and stakeholder perspectives, and engage participants. Although there are several priority topics related to bat and wind energy, this workshop focused the discussion on the current technologies and strategies that are, or can be, used to reduce bat fatalities at wind energy facilities, status of research and development (R&D) of minimization measures, opportunities to optimize costs and improve effectiveness, and potential emerging or novel approaches to explore. This workshop took a holistic approach and discussed all aspects associated with advancing deterrent technologies and curtailment strategies, including the technological, biological, economic, and regulatory barriers faced by the wind energy and wildlife community.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2019

National Nuclear Security Administration Strategic Vision Strengthening our Nation through Nuclear Security

The National Nuclear Security Administration’s enduring mission is to protect our nation by maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear weapons stockpile, reducing global nuclear threats, and providing our submarines and aircraft carriers with militarily effective nuclear propulsion. Although we have numerous strategic partners that enable, contribute to, and benefit from our efforts, no other organization, government or civilian, can accomplish our unique mission on behalf of the American people. In this area, we stand alone. This strategic vision pursues urgent change at a significant scale to develop creative approaches, make sustained investments, and be disciplined in our approach to develop a nuclear capability for our time and for the foreseeable future. It is incumbent on us to anticipate our future security challenges and ensure our country is ready to meet them. Not doing so would have far-reaching consequences. Failure to meet our vital mission objectives will erode confidence in the security that the United States strategic deterrent umbrella provides. In assessing the current mission environment in NNSA, we can count on one thing—change: The geopolitical environment for our deterrent is ever-changing Threats from rogue states and terrorists are evolving Our nuclear weapons and the infrastructure that supports them are aging Science and technology continue to move forward at an ever-increasing pace In this dynamic environment, it is not sufficient to remedy today’s situation and meet our current mission requirements. We must lean forward in the development, planning, and execution of programs that address our current challenges while developing the workforce, infrastructure, tools, and governance systems that will enable us to meet our deterrence, non-proliferation, and naval propulsion mission requirements for the next 50 years. We must embrace a next-generation enterprise that is flexible enough to respond to future challenges. With decades of stagnation following the end of the Cold War, we find ourselves in the unenviable position of implementing near-term fixes while using those lessons learned to better prepare for the future. Without sustained and predictable investments to restore and modernize our infrastructure, we will rapidly lose our ability to deliver on our promise of a safe and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile, which will degrade our deterrent capability and render legacy weapon systems irrelevant to the defense of our nation. We must not and will not allow the next generation of our nuclear security enterprise to simply maintain the status quo. We have a storied past that guides us. For 75 years our enterprise has overcome every challenge, led the country in incredible scientific and engineering endeavors and discoveries, and successfully ensured constant vigilance in maintaining an effective deterrent, reducing global nuclear threats, and powering our nuclear navy. Now is the time for us to take decisive action in forging the enterprise of the future. As I have traveled to all of our labs, plants, and sites and met with people across our complex, I have been left with one overwhelming impression: the incredible workforce that makes up our nuclear security enterprise is up to all of the challenges we have before us. Together we can and will ensure that those in the future workforce have the resources and the responsive, agile infrastructure they need to maintain the systems of today and to design and field the systems of tomorrow.

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2022

Assurance Theory: A Strategic Imperative

A commonly stated goal of many US Military activities, especially in the strategic realm of nuclear weapons, is to “deter potential adversaries and assure allies.” However, sometimes the phrase “assure allies” seems to be an appendage to a larger deterrence objective. Yet, assurance is fundamentally different than deterrence, even extended deterrence, which aims to shape the decisions of potential adversaries. Assurance, on the other hand, seeks to influence the decisions of allies. As such, assurance must not be treated as an appendage to deterrence, but rather as the strategic imperative that it is. A proper understanding of assurance is critical in an age of renewed great power competition where alliances provide an asymmetric strategic advantage over potential adversaries. This paper provides a primer on assurance theory, to include its definition, variables, challenges, and measures of success.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2017

A Game Theoretic Model of Thermonuclear Cyberwar

In this paper we propose a formal game theoretic model of thermonuclear cyberwar based on ideas found in [1] and [2]. Our intention is that such a game will act as a first step toward building more complete formal models of Cross-Domain Deterrence (CDD). We believe the proposed thermonuclear cyberwar game is an ideal place to start on such an endeavor because the game can be fashioned in a way that is closely related to the classical models of nuclear deterrence [4–6], but with obvious modifications that will help to elucidate the complexities introduced by a second domain. We start with the classical bimatrix nuclear deterrence game based on the game of chicken, but introduce uncertainty via a left-of-launch cyber capability that one or both players may possess.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2018

The 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, NATO's Brussels Summit and Beyond

The NATO allies must react to the nuclear policy and posture choices of the Trump administration. In some respects, there are good reasons why the Alliance should move closer to the Trump Administration. In other cases, Allies should seek agreement on slightly different policies. While it is unrealistic to expect that the NATO allies will be able to resolve all the questions posed by the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review at the Summit in Brussels, there are several things that they should be able to agree upon. This includes more specific language about the Russia nuclear challenges, general recognition of U.S. efforts to bolster NATO nuclear deterrence posture, a clear language on the value of nuclear sharing arrangements, and reaffirmation of some of NATO’s statements on arms control and disarmament. Yet, a signal in Brussels of NATO’s efforts to build a new nuclear consensus would be stronger if heads of state and government initiated a broader process aimed at developing a comprehensive deterrence and defense strategy that would treat nuclear deterrence as an integral part of a multi-domain approach.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2022

HEMM Workshop EMRTC [Slides]

Los Alamos is responsible for the NATO deterrent, is critical to the UK at-sea deterrent, and has designed over 90% of the current US stockpile. Los Alamos MUST lead the stockpile into the next phase of nuclear deterrence. To succeed, we need to leverage across several funding sources and sites to both answer the tactical needs of the current stockpile and to develop capabilities and personnel to meet future challenges.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2021

The Eight Levers of Coercive Conflict: No More, No Less

Few concepts are more important to our nation than the principle of deterrence. It is at the very core of our national security strategy. Despite its lasting import to our nation, and the rest of the world, we still lack a complete and explicit formulation of the calculus of deterrence. This has, at times, resulted in failed policies costing the Nation lives and wealth. With the ultimate objective of making the Nation more secure, we establish a complete and explicit formulation of deterrence calculus, which consists of eight levers. As it turns out this formulation also applies to the calculus of compellence, and is thus a unifying model of coercive conflict.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2025

From Stewardship to Transformation: Toward a Nuclear Enterprise for the 21st Century

The erosion of the global security environment over the last two decades has been rapid and dramatic. It appears also to be accelerating. There are deep and widening concerns in the United States and among its allies and partners that deterrence too has eroded at both the conventional and nuclear levels. The Strategic Posture Commission captured the essence of the problem in its October 2023 report—the United States seeks to meet the challenges of complex multipolar nuclear rivalry in the 21 st century with a slimmed down version of a nuclear deterrent designed in the middle of the 20 th century. With great urgency, the Commission recommended that something more and/or different is needed than simply the replacement of legacy systems with modern variants. But the U.S. nuclear security enterprise was reshaped after the Cold War to support the stockpile stewardship mission—not renewed designed, engineering, and production at scale. It has long fallen short of the agility, flexibility, and adaptiveness periodically asked of it by national leaders. In recent years, however, the message of urgency has been clearly received in the enterprise. Its culture has begun to shift. It has also been received by those in Washington D.C. responsible for funding and guiding the enterprise. The result is an enterprise in transition. Stockpile stewardship has given way to stockpile transformation. Risk aversion is giving way to risk management. Innovation and adaptation have been embraced. Experience to date has yielded some important lessons about what works and what doesn’t in terms of accelerating and delivering the needed innovation and adaptation. It has revealed the enduring character of some challenges. But it has also revealed that a much more agile and effective enterprise is within the national reach—something that will pay important dividends for deterrence, assurance, strategic stability, and peace.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗