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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 109 records · Page 6
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1973

Thermoelectric Outer Planets Spacecraft (TOPS)

The research and advanced development work is reported on a ballistic-mode, outer planet spacecraft using radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG) power. The Thermoelectric Outer Planet Spacecraft (TOPS) project was established to provide the advanced systems technology that would allow the realistic estimates of performance, cost, reliability, and scheduling that are required for an actual flight mission. A system design of the complete RTG-powered outer planet spacecraft was made; major technical innovations of certain hardware elements were designed, developed, and tested; and reliability and quality assurance concepts were developed for long-life requirements. At the conclusion of its active phase, the TOPS Project reached its principal objectives: a development and experience base was established for project definition, and for estimating cost, performance, and reliability; an understanding of system and subsystem capabilities for successful outer planets missions was achieved. The system design answered long-life requirements with massive redundancy, controlled by on-board analysis of spacecraft performance data.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2011

GSFC Supplier Surveillance

Topics covered include: Develop Program/Project Quality Assurance Surveillance Plans The work activities performed by the developer and/or his suppliers are subject to evaluation and audit by government-designated representatives. CSO supports project by selecting on-site supplier representative s by one of several methods: (1) a Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) person via a Letter Of Delegation (LOD), (2) an independent assurance contractor (IAC) via a contract Audits, Assessments, and Assurance (A3) Contract Code 300 Mission Assurance Support Contract (MASC)

Kelly, Michael P.↗
NASA NTRS1993

The FAA satellite communications program

The Federal Aviation Administration is developing satellite communications capabilities to enhance air traffic services, first in oceanic and remote regions, and later for United States domestic services. The program includes four projects which develop technical standards, assure adequate system performance, support implementation, and provide for research and development for selected areas of U.S. domestic satellite communications. The continuing focus is the application of automated data communications, which is already permitting enhanced and regular position reporting. Voice developments, necessary for non-routine communications, are also included among the necessary activities to improve ATC communications.

Burcham, Karen L.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Troupe System: an Autonomous Multi-Agent Rover Swarm

Autonomous cooperative robotic systems are the future of space exploration. The complexity of such systems makes their development, verification and assurance challenging. The Robust Software Engineering group at NASA Ames has developed the Troupe project that aims to explore the design and development of a swarm of autonomous rovers tasked to perform autonomous exploration and mapping of an unknown terrain. In this paper, we showcase the system design, and accompanying verification and validation tools integrated in the Troupe system development life-cycle.

TROUPE↗
NASA NTRS2024

Workshop on the Role of Design Assurance in System-Wide Safety’s Safety Demonstrator Series

This report summarizes a three-hour hybrid in-person/online workshop on June 7, 2024 on the topic of design assurance and the Safety Demonstrator Series (SDS), which was held at NASA Ames Research Center. The SDS provides an operational demonstration of, and recommendations for, requirements and standards necessary to monitor, assess, and mitigate risks to assure safety in disaster-oriented operations. Over sixty NASA personnel participated in the workshop. Four main topics were discussed: (1) assurance needs for the Safety Demonstrator Series, (2) assurance and the In-Time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS), (3) in-time assurance: existing efforts and future opportunities, and (4) demonstrating assurance tools in the Safety Demonstrators. Key takeaways are as follows: 1. Design assurance tools can be used to assure an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System, the systems that comprise it, and other systems or missions. Assurance must consider both systems and components and include the interactions between elements in both a systems/aircraft context and a systems-of-systems/airspace context. 2. Design-time assurance activities can support the identification of monitors needed for operational assurance activities (i.e., the “monitor” function in the monitor-assess-mitigate paradigm at the heart of the IASMS concept). 3. A major opportunity for design-time assurance tools to contribute to the IASMS concept is to support rapid re-validation of systems. This will be particularly important for (1) supporting novel operations in the IASMS, where operational data may disprove design-time assumptions (motivating re-analysis of system safety) and (2) adapting technologies (e.g., AI/ML for autonomous operations) to new operational domains, where there may be new or different safety considerations not included in the initial scope of operations. 4. There are several design assurance tools under development in the System-Wide Safety project that can support assurance of Services, Functions, and Capabilities (SFCs) in the Safety Demonstrators. Transitioning these tools from one-off research projects into a functioning part of IASMS assurance will require closer integration between these tools. 5. It is not clear whether the role of design assurance tools is primarily as a part of IASMS architecture or as an external check on IASMS. The workshop consisted of four discussion topics initiated via four lightning talks by System-Wide Safety researchers. Discussions utilized Mural to engage both in-person and online participants in the hybrid format. Polls and surveys were also utilized to gather participant input. The workshop closed with a reflection activity for participants, as well as new ideas for collaboration and coordination of ongoing System-Wide Safety research.

design assurance↗
NASA NTRS2019

Model Based Engineering for Software Assurance

NASA's successful development of next generation space vehicles, habitats, and robotic systems will require reliable hardware and software systems. The aim of this initiative is to develop modeling methodology and tools to support Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) for software assurance and reliability analysis. This effort expands the Unified Modeling Language (UML) software design models to include fault data for the extraction of Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) for software. We explored different modeling approaches to integrate the UML software design models with the Systems Modeling Language (SysML) system models to generate an integrated model and reliability tools that take into account software and hardware interfaces.The benefits of this concept directly affect the safety community with quick turnarounds to produce software assurance and reliability analysis artifacts and the ability to visualize failure effects, both hardware and software. The result is enhanced system design integrity and early identification of system risks. This initiative will enable software assurance activities early in the system design lifecycle, facilitating the discovery of design weaknesses and enhancing the capability to produce safe, hazard-free systems

Wang, Lui↗
NASA NTRS1976

Summary of development and recommendations for a quality assurance program for the procurement and manufacture of urban mass transit operating equipment and systems

A viable quality program for the urban mass transit industry, and a management approach to ensure compliance with the program are outlined. Included are: (1) a set of guidelines for quality assurance to be imposed on transit authorities, and a management approach to ensure compliance with them; (2) a management approach to be used by the transit authorities (properties) for assuring compliance with the QA guidelines; and (3) quality assurance guidelines to be imposed by properties and umta for procurement of hardware and systems.

Witkin, S. A.↗
NASA NTRS1987

Space station WP-04 power system. Volume 1: Executive summary

Major study activities and results of the phase B study contract for the preliminary design of the space station Electrical Power System (EPS) are summarized. The areas addressed include the general system design, man-tended option, automation and robotics, evolutionary growth, software development environment, advanced development, customer accommodations, operations planning, product assurance, and design and development phase planning. The EPS consists of a combination photovoltaic and solar dynamic power generation subsystem and a power management and distribution (PMAD) subsystem. System trade studies and costing activities are also summarized.

Hallinan, G. J.↗
NASA NTRS1987

Space station WP-04 power system. Volume 2: Study results

Results of the phase B study contract for the definition of the space station Electric Power System (EPS) are presented in detail along with backup information and supporting data. Systems analysis and trades, preliminary design, advanced development, customer accommodations, operations planning, product assurance, and design and development phase planning are addressed. The station design is a hybrid approach which provides user power of 25 kWe from the photovoltaic subsystem and 50 kWe from the solar dynamic subsystem. The electric power is distributed to users as a utility service; single phase at a frequency of 20 kHz and voltage of 440VAC. The solar array NiH2 batteries of the photovoltaic subsystem are based on commonality to those used on the co-orbiting and solar platforms.

Hallinan, G. J.↗
NASA NTRS1996

Development and status of data quality assurance program at NASA Langley research center: Toward national standards

As part of a continuing effort to re-engineer the wind tunnel testing process, a comprehensive data quality assurance program is being established at NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC). The ultimate goal of the program is routing provision of tunnel-to-tunnel reproducibility with total uncertainty levels acceptable for test and evaluation of civilian transports. The operational elements for reaching such levels of reproducibility are: (1) statistical control, which provides long term measurement uncertainty predictability and a base for continuous improvement, (2) measurement uncertainty prediction, which provides test designs that can meet data quality expectations with the system's predictable variation, and (3) national standards, which provide a means for resolving tunnel-to-tunnel differences. The paper presents the LaRC design for the program and discusses the process of implementation.

Hemsch, Michael J.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Adopting an Objectives-Driven Assurance Case Approach for Achieving Space Flight Mission Planetary Protection Objectives

Traditionally, NASA has utilized prescriptive technical and process requirements to ensure safety and mission assurance performance objectives for space flight missions are achieved. While prescriptive re-quirements may be easier to communicate and manage throughout the systems engineering process, the highly-constrained nature of prescriptive requirements can limit the ability to take advantage of cost-saving opportunities and offer limited ability to explore other options or alternative designs, processes, and methods. It can also be difficult to develop prescriptive requirements for objectives that are prob-abilistic in nature or that cannot be satisfied by direct verification. In contrast, the development of an assurance case allows for a compelling, comprehensible, and valid argument to be developed with support-ing evidence that shows safety and mission assurance objectives have been satisfied. Analogous to how patent applications are constructed for inventions, an assurance case has a high-level claim of meeting a safety and mission assurance objective, followed by a more specific set of sub-claims and technical evidence which supports the claims. The objectives-driven assurance case approach allows for a better understand-ing and exploration of the trade space, more flexibility to balance trades, and the ability to realize and implement technical and process innovations for resource, time, and cost savings. The assurance case is a living case that evolves over the entire program life cycle. Recently, NASA’s Office of Planetary Pro-tection (OPP) has adopted the assurance case approach as an acceptable methodology for demonstrating avoidance of contamination of target solar system bodies explored by NASA space flight missions. This methodology has been incorporated into NASA’s new technical standard for planetary protection and is currently being utilized by the Mars Sample Return campaign for safe sample containment during sample return. This presentation will explore the development and implementation of an assurance case approach in the context of planetary protection, the shift from prescriptive requirements and the ongoing culture change in the technical community, and the support and guidance from NASA’s OPP in adopting the assurance case approach for achieving planetary protection objectives on NASA’s space flight missions.

Elaine Seasly↗
NASA NTRS2020

IV&V Assurance Case Design for Artemis II

As human-rated missions like those in NASA’s Artemis program continue to grow in both size and complexity, and the role of software in achieving mission objectives expands dramatically, NASA’s Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Teams face evolving challenges in assuring the safety and performance of the safety- and mission-critical embedded software that is essential to landing astronauts on the surface of the Moon by 2024. Key among these challenges is IV&V’s desire to present a cohesive, integrated assurance statement to its stakeholders that encapsulates and summarizes our assurance positions across the integrated Artemis systems and their combined role in support of a safe and successful flight. In order to meet this challenge, the IV&V Teams have begun a transition to using formal assurance case concepts and documentation in the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) to build an argument in support of software assurance. IV&V recognizes significant benefits to the logical argumentation structure provided by assurance cases and GSN over our current practices for documenting and managing assurance claims. In order to reap these benefits, IV&V is integrating the use of assurance case concepts with our paradigm of follow-the-risk capability based assurance. Because of this, assurance cases created and used by IV&V are distinct from the sort of assurance case created by a development project or embedded software assurance organization. IV&V’s assurance cases depend much less upon standards and regulations, and more on evidence captured by IV&V regarding the environment, requirements, design, and implementation. IV&V constructs an independent network of claims based on an independent decomposition of arguments. Based upon the risk posture of these claims and their associated software and software artifacts, IV&V then develops and executes engineering analyses and testing, which provide evidence to either support or refute the claim. This emerging risk-informed assurance case methodology is being put into practice as IV&V plans for support of the Artemis II mission, the first flight of the Orion capsule and Space Launch System with astronauts on board.

Gerek Whitman↗
NASA NTRS2020

IV&V Assurance Case Design for Artemis II

As human-rated missions like those in NASA's Artemis program continue to grow in both size and complexity, and the role of software in achieving mission objectives expands dramatically, NASA's Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Teams face evolving challenges in assuring the safety and performance of the safety- and mission-critical embedded software that is essential to landing astronauts on the surface of the Moon by 2024. Key among these challenges is IV&V's desire to present a cohesive, integrated assurance statement to its stakeholders that encapsulates and summarizes our assurance positions across the integrated Artemis systems and their combined role in support of a safe and successful flight. In order to meet this challenge, the IV&V Teams have begun a transition to using formal assurance case concepts and documentation in the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) to build an argument in support of software assurance. IV&V recognizes significant benefits to the logical argumentation structure provided by assurance cases and GSN over our current practices for documenting and managing assurance claims. In order to reap these benefits, IV&V is integrating the use of assurance case concepts with our paradigm of follow-the-risk capability based assurance. Because of this, assurance cases created and used by IV&V are distinct from the sort of assurance case created by a development project or embedded software assurance organization. IV&V's assurance cases depend much less upon standards and regulations, and more on evidence captured by IV&V regarding the environment, requirements, design, and implementation. IV&V constructs an independent network of claims based on an independent decomposition of arguments. Based upon the risk posture of these claims and their associated software and software artifacts, IV&V then develops and executes engineering analyses and testing, which provide evidence to either support or refute the claim. This emerging risk-informed assurance case methodology is being put into practice as IV&V plans for support of the Artemis II mission, the first flight of the Orion capsule and Space Launch System with astronauts on board.

Whitman, Gerek↗
NASA NTRS1980

Development and demonstration of manufacturing processes for fabricating graphite/LARC-160 polyimide structural elements, part 4, paragraph B

A quality assurance program was developed which included specifications for celion/LARC-160 polyimide materials and quality control of materials and processes. The effects of monomers and/or polymer variables and prepeg variables on the processibility of celion/LARC prepeg were included. Processes for fabricating laminates, honeycomb core panels, and chopped fiber moldings were developed. Specimens and conduct tests were fabricated to qualify the processes for fabrication of demonstration components.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1991

Quality and security - They work together

This paper describes the importance of considering computer security as part of software quality assurance practice. The intended audience is primarily those professionals involved in the design, development, and quality assurance of software. Many issues are raised which point to the need ultimately for integration of quality assurance and computer security disciplines. To address some of the issues raised, the NASA Automated Information Security program is presented as a model which may be used for improving interactions between the quality assurance and computer security community of professionals.

Carr, Richard↗
NASA NTRS1993

Overview of DOE space nuclear propulsion programs

An overview of Department of Energy space nuclear propulsion programs is presented in outline and graphic form. DOE's role in the development and safety assurance of space nuclear propulsion is addressed. Testing issues and facilities are discussed along with development needs and recent research activities.

Newhouse, Alan R.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Adopting an Objectives-Driven Assurance Case Approach for Achieving Space Flight Mission Planetary Protection Objectives

Traditionally, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has utilized prescriptive technical and process requirements to ensure safety and mission assurance performance objectives for planetary protection are achieved during space flight missions. While prescriptive requirements may be easier to communicate and manage throughout the systems engineering process, the highly constrained nature of prescriptive requirements can limit the ability to take advantage of cost-saving opportunities and offer limited ability to explore other options or alternative designs, processes, and methods. It can also be difficult to develop prescriptive requirements for objectives that are probabilistic in nature or that cannot be satisfied by direct verification. In contrast, the development of an assurance case allows for a compelling, comprehensible, and valid argument to be developed with supporting evidence that shows safety and mission assurance objectives have been satisfied. Analogous to how patent applications are constructed for inventions, an assurance case has a high-level claim of meeting a safety and mission assurance objective, followed by a more specific set of sub-claims and technical evidence which supports the claims. The objectives-driven assurance case approach allows for a better understanding and exploration of the trade space, more flexibility to balance trades, and the ability to realize and implement technical and process innovations for resource, time, and cost savings. The assurance case is a living case that evolves over the entire program life cycle. Recently, NASA’s Office of Planetary Protection (OPP) has adopted the assurance case approach as an acceptable methodology for demonstrating avoidance of contamination of target solar system bodies explored by NASA space flight missions. This methodology has been incorporated into NASA’s new technical standard for planetary protection and is currently being utilized by the Mars Sample Return campaign for safe sample containment during sample return.

Assurance Case↗
NASA NTRS1977

Space transportation system payload safety policy

A brief description of the Space Transportation System (STS) is given, and the evolution of a payload safety policy for it is described. The policy adopted in June, 1976, minimizes STS involvement in the payload design process while maintaining the assurance of a safe operation. The payload developer is responsible for assurance of safety and verification of compliance with the requirements. The STS will exercise reviews to ensure that interaction between payloads does not create hazards.

Scheller, J. A.↗