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At least 109 records · Page 6

SECURED: Simulator-Enhanced Control and Understanding of Reactor systems for cyber-Event Defense

The study discusses a learning approach for analyzing cyber-events in reactor systems using integrated hardware and personal computer simulator models. Key points include the rise in cyber-attacks and their sophistication in industrial control systems (ICS), the necessity for awareness, understanding, resource allocation, and preparation to combat these threats, and the digital transformation of old and new nuclear plants, increasing their exposure to cyber threats. It highlights the cyber vulnerabilities of advanced reactor systems, which rely on digital instrumentation and control for operations and safety functions, making them susceptible to cyber-attacks. The approach involves demonstrating reactor system plant ICS cyber-attacks under various operational conditions utilizing tools like simulator models and hardware-based kits. A strategic solution approach tailored to critical infrastructure is emphasized, along with community engagement for public and government support, adopting effective learning approaches, and the preparation for anticipated future challenges. The presentation concludes with a call to action to address challenges, leverage opportunities, and advance through lesson learning in cybersecurity for nuclear energy systems.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

How the NRC modernized its digital I&C infrastructure and where it goes from here

The NRC first formally developed infrastructure for the review of digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems in the 1990’s. Although, the current U.S. fleet of nuclear power plants were originally designed and constructed with analog systems, the U.S. nuclear industry has for more that thirty years been working to upgrade these older systems with modern digital systems. Digital systems have many advantages but also pose different engineering challenges and need to be reviewed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in a different way. Because of this the NRC started looking at its regulatory infrastructure to see if changes needed be made to support the expanded safe use of digital systems in nuclear power plants. Several efforts in the 1990’s included a review by the National Academies’ National Research Council, a review of the impact of potential new digital systems by the NRC staff as a result of advanced reactor designs and the NRC staff’s update to the I&C section of the Standard Review Plan (SRP) (Ref 1).

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

A Guide for Selecting Appropriate Human Factors Methods and Measures in Control Room Modernization Efforts in Nuclear Power Plants

Abstract. Many of the U.S. nuclear power plants are approaching the end of their 60-year licensing period. The U.S. Department of Energy Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program is conducting targeted research to extend the lives and ensure long-term reliability, productivity, safety, and security of these plants through targeted research, such as with integrating advanced digital instrumentation and control technologies in the main control room. There are many challenges to this, one being the integration of human factors engineering in the design and evaluation of these upgrades. This paper builds upon recent efforts in developing utility-specific guidance for integrating human factors engineering in the control room modernization process by providing commonly used data collection methods that are applicable at various phases of the upgrade process. Advantages and disadvantages of each method is provided for consideration of an optimal human factors evaluation plan to be used throughout the lifespan of the upgrade process.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Cyber threat assessment of machine learning driven autonomous control systems of nuclear power plants

We report advanced cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure and the energy sector are becoming more common. With the invention of autonomous control systems (ACS) within advanced nuclear reactor designs, system designers, reactor operators, and regulators must consider cybersecurity during the design and operational phases. This article provides a cyber threat assessment of machine learning (ML)-based digital twinning (DT) technologies in the context of advanced reactor ACS. A cyber–physical testbed was created to emulate nuclear reactor digital instrumentation and controls (I&C) and act as a basis for the ACS. The ACS was designed as two plant-level DTs predicting reactor malfunctions and determining control actions and two component-level DTs responsible for classifying component states and forecasting component inputs and outputs (I/O). Two duplicate ACS designs– one using a traditional ML framework and one using an automated ML (AutoML) framework– were created and tested against cyber-attacks on training data, real-time process data, and ML model architectures to determine their respective qualitative cyber-risk in terms of likelihood and impact. Both frameworks showed similar cyber-resilience against training, real-time, and ML architecture attacks, proving that neither is inherently more secure. Recommended safeguard and security measures are posed to system designers, reactor operators, and regulators to maintain the cybersecurity of ML-based DT technologies such as ACS, prompting a holistic view of shared responsibility for maintaining cyber-secure ML-based systems.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Cyber-Informed Engineering Guidance—Implementing CIE in Early Systems Engineering Lifecycle Stages

Traditionally, cybersecurity is not considered in the design process. Design engineers typically focus on building safety and reliability into their products and applications. Security against malicious cyber incidents is often an afterthought, resulting in deployment of security solutions during installation or operation. Unfortunately, waiting to consider cybersecurity until later in the systems engineering lifecycle often results in less effective and more expense security. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) developed the concept of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) in 2015 to provide a framework that enables cybersecurity to be built into systems beginning at the conceptual design stage. In addition to ongoing research by INL, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response has recently developed a National CIE Strategy document for incorporating CIE into the design and operation of infrastructure systems reliant on digital monitoring or controls. This paper provides a brief review of this National CIE Strategy as well as a roadmap to historical, current, and future CIE research by INL through the U.S. DOE Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) Cybersecurity Crosscutting Technology Development Program. A near-term focus of the DOE-NE’s research and development is to extend the foundational CIE work into detailed guidance for implementation during initial systems engineering stages in nuclear digital instrumentation and control projects and to demonstrate use of the guidance in an integrated energy systems project.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Certification of RadICS FPGA-based platform under US NRC requirements - 386

The paper discusses approach, applicable to certify digital instrumentation and control (I and C) platform under US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements. Currently, Radics LLC is certifying its Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)-based RadICS Platform using Platform-based test specimen. The Platform has been recently certified under IEC 61508 to meet Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 3 requirements. Up to now Radics LLC has developed a number of FPGA-based I and C applications based on RadICS Platform. Those applications include applications based on customer's specification and reverse engineering applications (Fit, Form and Function reproduction of existing equipment). The life cycles of applications include independent verification and validation of FPGA-based I and C systems/components, Commercial Grade Dedication of components for FPGA-based I and C systems, turnkey implementation of I and C project, supply of hardware, engineering tools and application design process. The paper also describes in details certification approach, which is based on Digital I and C-ISG- 06 and includes the following stages: general agreement with the US NRC, Topical Report submittal, timely responses and successful audits, and timely issuance of approved Topical Report. Such approach is supported by 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Quality Management System, which is also discussed in the paper. In addition, an overview of RadICS Platform Topical Report is presented, including its overview and structure, certification scope and obligatory appendixes. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program Development of an Initial Business Case Framework for Fleet-Based Control Room Modernization

This milestone report presents a plan or framework for developing a generic business case for implementation of technology that supports Control Room Modernization (CRM) in existing power plants (NPP). The decision fund CRM activities often depends on demonstrating actual cost reductions that can be credited to budgets and thereby truly reduce operations and maintenance (O&M) or capital costs. The proposed Business Case Methodology (BCM) thus addresses the fact that the lack of a business case is often cited by utilities as a barrier to pursuing large-scale CRM activities. Using past BCM analyses for CRM as a model for this framework, this BCM proposes to base cost savings on advanced digital instrumentation and control (I&C), human-system interface (HSI), and work process technologies that allow NPP operators to conduct control room operations with improved human factors and efficiency, and therefore operate with fewer operational events. The technologies employed in CRM include large overview displays, task-based operator displays, computer- based procedures, advanced alarm systems, computerized operator support systems, and wireless networks, among others, but this initial plan will also focus only on a subset of these technologies. Thus, under this BCM model, labor savings can be harvested in terms of reduced overtime and redistribution of work. In short, the BCM addresses the benefits of the technology as opposed to the investment costs of the utility. The methodology provides the means to determine the maximum investment that will result in a positive return. Significant savings are also demonstrated as reduced time to bring the plant back on line after completion of outages. The benefits are quantified to a rough order of magnitude, providing directional guidance to NPPs that are interested in developing similar business cases.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Design and Validation of Control Room Upgrades Using a Research Simulator Facility

Since 1981, the United States (U.S.) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) [1] requires a plant- specific simulator facility for use in training at U.S. nuclear power plants (NPPs). These training simulators are in near constant use for training and qualification of licensed NPP operators. In the early 1980s, the Halden Man-Machine Laboratory (HAMMLab) at the Halden Reactor Project (HRP) in Norway first built perhaps the most well known set of research simulators. The HRP offered a high- fidelity simulator facility in which the simulator is functionally linked to a specific plant but in which the human-machine interface (HMI) may differ from that found in the plant. As such, HAMMLab incorporated more advanced digital instrumentation and controls (I&C) than the plant, thereby giving it considerable interface flexibility that researchers took full advantage of when designing and validating different ways to upgrade NPP control rooms. Several U.S. partners—the U.S. NRC, the Electrical Power Research Institute (EPRI), Sandia National Laboratories, and Idaho National Laboratory (INL) – as well as international members of the HRP, have been working with HRP to run control room simulator studies. These studies, which use crews from Scandinavian plants, are used to determine crew behavior in a variety of normal and off-normal plant operations. The findings have ultimately been used to guide safety considerations at plants and to inform advanced HMI design—both for the regulator and in industry. Given the desire to use U.S. crews of licensed operators on a simulator of a U.S. NPP, there is a clear need for a research simulator facility in the U.S. There is no general-purpose reconfigurable research oriented control room simulator facility in the U.S. that can be used for a variety of studies, including the design and validation of control room upgrades.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Human and Technology Integration Evaluation of Advanced Automation and Data Visualization

While the existing United States (U.S.) light water reactors are highly reliable, safe, and provide a significant proportion of carbon-free electricity, the cost of operating and maintaining them has become less competitive compared to other electricity generating sources. The reason for the gap in operating and maintenance (O&M) costs can be at least in part attributed to the advent of new digital technologies that other electricity generating industries are currently using. Advanced capabilities including digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems, advanced automation and analytics, and greater span of data integration (i.e., connectedness) across these non-nuclear plants has transformed the way work is performed and ultimately given them a competitive advantage in terms of the cost required for operating, maintaining, and supporting them. To reduce O&M cost and address obsolescence of the aging I&C infrastructure of the existing U.S. light water reactors, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program Plant Modernization Pathway is conducting targeting multidisciplinary research that 1) delivers a sustainable business model to enable a cost-competitive U.S. nuclear industry and 2) is developing technology modernization solutions that address aging and obsolescence challenges. The work described in this report supports these two objectives and describes the demonstration of human and technology integration across recent industry collaborations to support their large-scale digital I&C modifications. This technical report describes the demonstration of the human and technology integration methodology in performing full-scale performance-based human-in-the-loop tests to evaluate plant-specific advanced automation and data visualization applications within these collaborators’ digital modifications. This technical report also documents future applications of human and technology integration that expand beyond main control room modernization and digital I&C upgrades, which have been a central focus to date. Thus, this technical report discusses how to implement human and technology integration across new business opportunities and how to develop an evaluation plan that defines measures and criteria, and documents key assumptions to support full plant modernization.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Making Risk Models Operational for Situational Awareness and Decision Support

Modernization of nuclear power operations control systems, in particular the move to digital control systems, creates an opportunity to modernize existing legacy infrastructure and extend plant life. We describe here decision support tools that allow the assessment of different facets of risk and support the optimization of available resources to reduce risk as plants are upgraded and maintained. This methodology could become an integrated part of the design review process and a part of the operations management systems. The methodology can be applied to the design of new reactors such as small nuclear reactors (SMR), and be helpful in assessing the risks of different configurations of the reactors. Our tool provides a low cost evaluation of alternative configurations and provides an expanded safety analysis by considering scenarios while early in the implementation cycle where cost impacts can be minimized. The effects of failures can be modeled and thoroughly vetted to understand their potential impact on risk. The process and tools presented here allow for an integrated assessment of risk by supporting traditional defense in depth approaches while taking into consideration the insertion of new digital instrument and control systems.

cyber security↗

Implications of the 2015 and 2016 Ukrainian electric grid cyber attacks to nuclear power plants - 113

Nuclear plants can be vulnerable from electric grid cyber attacks. In December 2015 and December 2016, cyber attackers attacked the Ukrainian electric grid and 'turned off the lights' by opening substation protective relays. The 2015 cyber attacks targeted electric distribution systems and the 2016 cyber attacks targeted electric transmission systems. In order to accomplish the attacks, the cyber attackers compromised field control system devices to inject malware and then open protective relays in substations. There are some very significant implications to nuclear plant operations from hacking the substations and switchyard breakers that serve nuclear plants. The nuclear plant operational concerns are compromising protective relays to prevent relay protection that would result in damage to large electric equipment; spurious actuation of protective relays causing loss-of-offsite power (LOOP) conditions; and the closing and then reopening of protective relays out-of-phase with the grid causing the Aurora vulnerability damaging generators, Alternating Current (AC) motors, and transformers. All of these protective relay conditions have already occurred in actual or test conditions. The common thread to these scenarios are that switchyard and substation protective relays are out-of-scope of existing nuclear cyber security regulations yet, when compromised, have demonstrated impacts to nuclear plant operations and challenged safety systems. There is one other issue about an attack originating from a protective relay. That is, it would be irrelevant whether the nuclear plant system that would be impacted would have analog or digital instrumentation and control (I and C) systems because the impact is upstream of the I and C. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Survey of Cyber Risk Analysis Techniques for Use in the Nuclear Industry

Using traditional probabilistic risk analysis methods for severe accident safety risk management on non-digital systems, structures, and components at nuclear power plants is well-established. In contrast, cyber risk analysis of digital assets is still an immature field with unproven techniques due, in part, to the continuously changing threat environment and the challenge of digital assets failing in unexpected ways. As the nuclear fleet continues to adopt digital instrumentation and control systems, it is increasingly important to have effective and efficient cyber risk analysis techniques to support risk management decisions, such as risk elimination by system redesign or risk mitigation by implementation of prioritized security controls. To understand the state of the art in cyber risk analysis for future research, we surveyed 36 publications across ten application domains. We describe our survey methodology and rate each technique based upon scope, adoptability, and repeatability. In this work, we examine the unique constraints of the nuclear industry and outline the strengths and weaknesses of using the cyber risk analysis techniques in the industry, highlighting gaps with current techniques. We also discuss challenges and potential research directions for advancing the science for both existing and new advanced reactors.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Barriers to adopting artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies in nuclear power

Artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) technologies offer unique opportunities to transform nuclear plant operations and power generation. Benefits will be felt not only within existing analog and digital instrumentation and control, but also within work processes, the integration of people with technology and most importantly, the business case. The application of this new technology can help simplify complex problems and produce more effective decision-making, making nuclear power safer, more efficient, and more economically viable in the current energy market. Nonetheless, there are potential barriers to its adoption that must be overcome. The purpose of this paper is to categorize, review, and discuss barriers to AI/ML adoption within the nuclear power industry, with a focus on existing commercial reactors. Unique considerations for advanced reactors are also offered. Here we provide a comprehensive overview of the historical, technical, and business barriers that the industry faces, as well as stakeholder readiness, and end-user acceptance. We underscore the importance of user experience and offer potential solutions in overcoming each barrier. These include provisions for easier plant data access, a friendly regulatory environment, and investment in user trust and explainable AI.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Calibration Monitoring for Sensor Calibration Interval Extension: Gaps in the Current Science Base

Currently in the United States, periodic sensor recalibration is required for all safety-related sensors, typically occurring at every refueling outage, and it has emerged as a critical path item for shortening outage duration in some plants. International application of calibration monitoring has shown that sensors may operate for longer periods within calibration tolerances. This issue is expected to also be important as the United States looks to the next generation of reactor designs (such as small modular reactors and advanced concepts), given the anticipated longer refueling cycles, proposed advanced sensors, and digital instrumentation and control systems. Online monitoring (OLM) can be employed to identify those sensors that require calibration, allowing for calibration of only those sensors that need it. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) accepted the general concept of OLM for sensor calibration monitoring in 2000, but no U.S. plants have been granted the necessary license amendment to apply it. This paper summarizes a recent state-of-the-art assessment of online calibration monitoring in the nuclear power industry, including sensors, calibration practice, and OLM algorithms. This assessment identifies key research needs and gaps that prohibit integration of the NRC-approved online calibration monitoring system in the U.S. nuclear industry. Several technical needs were identified, including an understanding of the impacts of sensor degradation on measurements for both conventional and emerging sensors; the quantification of uncertainty in online calibration assessment; determination of calibration acceptance criteria and quantification of the effect of acceptance criteria variability on system performance; and assessment of the feasibility of using virtual sensor estimates to replace identified faulty sensors in order to extend operation to the next convenient maintenance opportunity.

Calibration Interval Extension↗

Cyber-Informed Engineering Case Study of an Integrated Hydrogen Generation Plant

Strategies for securing digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems within the nuclear industry are provided by multiple standards and guidance documents. However, since selection and use of security controls outlined in these documents are frequently only considered during or after installation, there are often limitations on their use, such as technological constraints related to design or operation. Furthermore, alternative controls intended to provide the same or similar security countermeasure as the primary control may also be infeasible at these stages, leaving the I&C system vulnerable to cyber-attacks. The limitations associated with ‘bolting on’ security controls late in the systems engineering lifecycle can be reduced by integrating Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) into the process. This paper evaluates the use of CIE during the high-level design stage of a hydrogen generation project where heat and electricity are provided by a nuclear power plant. Applying CIE to this project highlighted potential cyber vulnerabilities of the initial design, leading to recommendations for process flow and I&C system design modifications to reduce, and at times eliminate, the risk from both deliberate and unintentional cyber incidents.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Prognostics and Health Management in Nuclear Power Plants: A Review of Technologies and Applications

This report reviews the current state of the art of prognostics and health management (PHM) for nuclear power systems and related technology currently applied in field or under development in other technological application areas, as well as key research needs and technical gaps for increased use of PHM in nuclear power systems. The historical approach to monitoring and maintenance in nuclear power plants (NPPs), including the Maintenance Rule for active components and Aging Management Plans for passive components, are reviewed. An outline is given for the technical and economic challenges that make PHM attractive for both legacy plants through Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) and new plant designs. There is a general introduction to PHM systems for monitoring, fault detection and diagnostics, and prognostics in other, non-nuclear fields. The state of the art for health monitoring in nuclear power systems is reviewed. A discussion of related technologies that support the application of PHM systems in NPPs, including digital instrumentation and control systems, wired and wireless sensor technology, and PHM software architectures is provided. Appropriate codes and standards for PHM are discussed, along with a description of the ongoing work in developing additional necessary standards. Finally, an outline of key research needs and opportunities that must be addressed in order to support the application of PHM in legacy and new NPPs is presented.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

A Review of Sensor Calibration Monitoring for Calibration Interval Extension in Nuclear Power Plants

Currently in the United States, periodic sensor recalibration is required for all safety-related sensors, typically occurring at every refueling outage, and it has emerged as a critical path item for shortening outage duration in some plants. Online monitoring can be employed to identify those sensors that require calibration, allowing for calibration of only those sensors that need it. International application of calibration monitoring, such as at the Sizewell B plant in United Kingdom, has shown that sensors may operate for eight years, or longer, within calibration tolerances. This issue is expected to also be important as the United States looks to the next generation of reactor designs (such as small modular reactors and advanced concepts), given the anticipated longer refueling cycles, proposed advanced sensors, and digital instrumentation and control systems. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) accepted the general concept of online monitoring for sensor calibration monitoring in 2000, but no U.S. plants have been granted the necessary license amendment to apply it. This report presents a state-of-the-art assessment of online calibration monitoring in the nuclear power industry, including sensors, calibration practice, and online monitoring algorithms. This assessment identifies key research needs and gaps that prohibit integration of the NRC-approved online calibration monitoring system in the U.S. nuclear industry. Several needs are identified, including the quantification of uncertainty in online calibration assessment; accurate determination of calibration acceptance criteria and quantification of the effect of acceptance criteria variability on system performance; and assessment of the feasibility of using virtual sensor estimates to replace identified faulty sensors in order to extend operation to the next convenient maintenance opportunity. Understanding the degradation of sensors and the impact of this degradation on signals is key to developing technical basis to support acceptance criteria and set point decisions, particularly for advanced sensors which do not yet have a cumulative history of operating performance.

Calibration↗