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At least 109 records · Page 6

Using the System Complexity Metric (SCM) to Compare CO2 Removal Systems

A fundamental cause of difficulty in large engineering projects is their inherent complexity. An impression of complexity occurs if a system is simply difficult to understand, where there is no obvious mental model that correctly predicts its behavior. Higher system complexity is usually associated with higher cost and higher failure rate. Complexity is perceived if a system has many diverse components, multiple interactions and feedback loops, transients and dynamic behavior, and unanticipated failure modes. Identifying and removing these signs of complexity should improve performance and reduce the cost and failure rate. Complexity can be directly measured by the number of components and their interactions. The System Complexity Metric (SCM) is defined as the sum of the number of parts in a system, N, plus the number of the one-way interconnections between them, I. SCM = N + I. The SCM is easily determined by direct inspection of the system block diagram. SCM can be used to compare systems and to guide their redesign to reduce cost and failure rate. Carbon dioxide removal systems are analyzed using SCM, cost, and failure rate. As in previous work, cost is directly proportional to SCM and that failure rate increases as a power of SCM for large differences in SCM. The SCM ranking of carbon dioxide removal systems is the same as their ranking in detailed analysis and practice.

Harry W. Jones↗

Using the System Complexity Metric (SCM) to Compare CO2 Reduction Systems

A fundamental cause of difficulty in large engineering projects is their inherent complexity. An impression of complexity occurs if a system is simply difficult to understand, where there is no obvious mental model that correctly predicts its behavior. Higher system complexity is usually associated with higher cost and higher failure rate. Complexity is perceived if a system has many diverse components, multiple interactions and feedback loops, transients and dynamic behavior, and unanticipated failure modes. Identifying and removing these signs of complexity should improve performance and reduce the cost and failure rate. Complexity can be directly measured by the number of components and their interactions. The System Complexity Metric (SCM) is defined as the sum of the number of parts in a system, N, plus the number of the one-way interconnections between them, I. SCM = N + I. The SCM is easily determined by direct inspection of the system block diagram. SCM can be used to compare systems and to guide their redesign to reduce cost and failure rate. Carbon dioxide reduction systems are analyzed using SCM, cost, and failure rate. As in previous work, cost is directly proportional to SCM and that failure rate increases as a power of SCM for large differences in SCM. The SCM ranking of carbon dioxide reduction systems is the same as their ranking in detailed analysis and practice.

Harry W. Jones↗

redMaPPer – III. A detailed comparison of the Planck 2013 and SDSS DR8 redMaPPer cluster catalogues

We compare the Planck Sunyaev–Zeldovich (SZ) cluster sample (PSZ1) to the Sloan Digital Sky Survey (SDSS) redMaPPer catalogue, finding that all Planck clusters within the redMaPPer mask and within the redshift range probed by redMaPPer are contained in the redMaPPer cluster catalogue. These common clusters define a tight scaling relation in the richness-SZ mass (λ–MSZ) plane, with an intrinsic scatter in richness of σλ|MSZ=0.266±0.017. The corresponding intrinsic scatter in true cluster halo mass at fixed richness is ≈21 percent. The regularity of this scaling relation is used to identify failures in both catalogues. The failure rates for redMaPPer and PSZ1 1.2 percent and 14.7 percent, respectively. The PSZ1 failure rates decreases to 9.8 percent after removing incorrect redshifts that were drawn from the literature. We note the failure rates in the PSZ1 from this analysis are specific to the SDSS overlap region, and may not be indicative of failure rates over the full Planck survey. We have further identified five PSZ1 sources that suffer from projection effects (multiple rich systems along the line of sight of the SZ detection) and 17 new high-redshift (z ≳ 0.6) cluster candidates of varying degrees of confidence.

Astrophysics,ASTRO↗

Redundancy: How Many Unreliable Spares are Needed for High Reliability and Confidence?

This paper investigates the number of redundant units needed to achieve high reliability with high confidence. The approach is developed for the case when the system failure rate is too high for a single unit to provide the required reliability over the mission duration. To achieve high reliability, N redundant units can be used, one operating unit and N – 1 spares. If the unit failure rate is f, the mission length is L, and f * L is small (not the case assumed here), the unit failure probability over the mission duration is F1 = f * L << 1. In this case, the probability that all N units will fail is Ffail = F1 N , and the needed redundancy N = LN(F)/LN(F1). For the case of large f * L assumed here, F1 = f * L > 1, and F1 is the expected number of failures during the mission. (When F1 = f * L << 1, F1 is the probability that a unit will fail during the mission. When F1 = f * L > 1, F1 is the expected number of failures during the mission.) The needed redundancy, N, to achieve the required N redundant unit reliability, FN, can be computed using the cumulative Poisson distribution with mean equal to F1. The number of spares, N - 1, is increased until the probability - that the total number of failures will be less than N -1 - is equal to the required reliability. The confidence that this reliability can be achieved can be computed using the cumulative Poisson distribution or the chi-square distribution. Since the measured unit failure rate, f, has some probabilistic uncertainty, the actual failure rate will be randomly higher or lower. This means that the reliability of the N redundant systems will be overestimated about half the time. Adding more redundant units increases the confidence that the required reliability will be achieved. For a fixed number of redundant units, the expected reliability and confidence can be traded off, since lower reliability goals will be achieved with higher confidence. Both the desired reliability and confidence can be specified as initial requirements and the needed number of redundant units estimated using the measured failure rate.

Redundancy↗

A system debugging model.

Consideration of the nature of the 'debugging' process applied to a new complex system during the initial period of its life. During this period failures and errors are corrected as they occur, with resulting improvement in the subsequent performance of the system. One mathematical idealization of this process leads to the assumption that system failure rate is decreasing with time. In practice, the debugging phase is considered completed when the failure rate reaches an equilibrium or constant value. Models are formulated for this phenomenon. Maximum likelihood estimates are obtained for relevant failure rate functions and for the end of the debugging period. A conservative upper confidence bound on the stable failure rate is obtained.

Barlow, R. E.↗

Prediction of Safety Level of Low-Head and Ownerless Hydraulic Structures

Methods of systems reliability theory are applied to the results of an expert inspection of more than 1000 low-head hydraulic power systems in the Moscow region. The rates of failure of homogeneous earth dams are estimated. A state graph of a hydraulic structure, represented as a system that passes through discrete states from a normal to a dangerous level without maintenance or repair, is proposed. The constant failure rates for these states are calculated. The probabilistic characteristics of the safety level of low-head earth dams are predicted.

42 ENGINEERING↗

A Phase II Comparative Study of Gross Tumor Volume Definition With or Without PET/CT Fusion in Dosimetric Planning for Non-Small-Cell Lung Cancer (NSCLC): Primary Analysis of Radiation Therapy Oncology Group (RTOG) 0515

Background: Radiation Therapy Oncology Group (RTOG) 0515 is a Phase II prospective trial designed to quantify the impact of positron emission tomography (PET)/computed tomography (CT) compared with CT alone on radiation treatment plans (RTPs) and to determine the rate of elective nodal failure for PET/CT-derived volumes. Methods: Each enrolled patient underwent definitive radiation therapy for non-small-cell lung cancer ({>=}60 Gy) and had two RTP datasets generated: gross tumor volume (GTV) derived with CT alone and with PET/CT. Patients received treatment using the PET/CT-derived plan. The primary end point, the impact of PET/CT fusion on treatment plans was measured by differences of the following variables for each patient: GTV, number of involved nodes, nodal station, mean lung dose (MLD), volume of lung exceeding 20 Gy (V20), and mean esophageal dose (MED). Regional failure rate was a secondary end point. The nonparametric Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test was used with Bonferroni adjustment for an overall significance level of 0.05. Results: RTOG 0515 accrued 52 patients, 47 of whom are evaluable. The follow-up time for all patients is 12.9 months (2.7-22.2). Tumor staging was as follows: II = 6%; IIIA = 40%; and IIIB = 54%. The GTV was statistically significantly smaller for PET/CT-derived volumes (98.7 vs. 86.2 mL; p < 0.0001). MLDs for PET/CT plans were slightly lower (19 vs. 17.8 Gy; p = 0.06). There was no significant difference in the number of involved nodes (2.1 vs. 2.4), V20 (32% vs. 30.8%), or MED (28.7 vs. 27.1 Gy). Nodal contours were altered by PET/CT for 51% of patients. One patient (2%) has developed an elective nodal failure. Conclusions: PET/CT-derived tumor volumes were smaller than those derived by CT alone. PET/CT changed nodal GTV contours in 51% of patients. The elective nodal failure rate for GTVs derived by PET/CT is quite low, supporting the RTOG standard of limiting the target volume to the primary tumor and involved nodes.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

A Causal Approach to Integrate Component Health Data into System Reliability Models

Two of the challenges of current plant reliability approaches are the ability to integrate plant health data, and to support decision making. Condition based data and diagnostic/prognostic information are in fact not considered into plant reliability models to inform system engineers on the most critical components. Currently, the propagation of quantitative health data from the component to the system level is a challenge given the diverse nature/structure of the data. On the other hand, plant reliability methods (which are typically based on fault-trees or reliability block diagrams) can effectively propagate data from the component to the system level, but values of failure rates or failure probabilities are an approximated integral representation of the past industry-wide operational experience, and it neglects the present component health status (e.g., diagnostic and condition-based data) and health projection (when available from prognostic data). Our first claim is that system reliability models should propagate health information from the component to the system/plant level in order to provide a quantitative snapshot of system/plant health and identify the most critical components. Our second claim is that component health should be informed solely by that specific component current and historical performance data and should not be an approximated integral representation of the past industry-wide operational experience. This paper is directly supporting these two claims by proposing a different approach to perform reliability modeling which relies on available component diagnostic, prognostic and condition-based data to measure component health, and it propagates this information through fault tree models. The propagation of health data from the component to the system level is performed not in terms of probability, but in terms of margins where margin is defined as the “distance” between the present actual status and an undesired event (e.g., failure or unacceptable performance). Through a cause-effect lens, while classical reliability models target the effect associated to a component performance, a margin-based approach focuses on the cause of an undesired component performance (i.e., component health). Hence, thinking of reliability in terms of margins implies decision making based on causal reasoning. We will show how fault tree models can be solved using a margin language and how this process can effectively assist system engineers to identify the most critical components.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

The fault-tree compiler

The Fault Tree Compiler Program is a new reliability tool used to predict the top event probability for a fault tree. Five different gate types are allowed in the fault tree: AND, OR, EXCLUSIVE OR, INVERT, and M OF N gates. The high level input language is easy to understand and use when describing the system tree. In addition, the use of the hierarchical fault tree capability can simplify the tree description and decrease program execution time. The current solution technique provides an answer precise (within the limits of double precision floating point arithmetic) to the five digits in the answer. The user may vary one failure rate or failure probability over a range of values and plot the results for sensitivity analyses. The solution technique is implemented in FORTRAN; the remaining program code is implemented in Pascal. The program is written to run on a Digital Corporation VAX with the VMS operation system.

Martensen, Anna L.↗

The Fault Tree Compiler (FTC): Program and mathematics

The Fault Tree Compiler Program is a new reliability tool used to predict the top-event probability for a fault tree. Five different gate types are allowed in the fault tree: AND, OR, EXCLUSIVE OR, INVERT, AND m OF n gates. The high-level input language is easy to understand and use when describing the system tree. In addition, the use of the hierarchical fault tree capability can simplify the tree description and decrease program execution time. The current solution technique provides an answer precisely (within the limits of double precision floating point arithmetic) within a user specified number of digits accuracy. The user may vary one failure rate or failure probability over a range of values and plot the results for sensitivity analyses. The solution technique is implemented in FORTRAN; the remaining program code is implemented in Pascal. The program is written to run on a Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) VAX computer with the VMS operation system.

Butler, Ricky W.↗

Reliability and Safety Assessment of Urban Air Mobility Concept Vehicles

The following work was commissioned by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to guide industry and future regulation related to urban air mobility (UAM). Prior studies compared the relative safety of NASA concept vehicles, Figure ES1, designed for UAM and provided recommendations for industry research, aircraft architectural improvements, and regulatory updates. After the prior study completed, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) released regulatory guidance in the form of a special condition (SC), SC-VTOL-01, for multirotors with distributed propulsion and flight controls (DPFC). The objective of the current work was to develop DPFC architectures that will comply with SC-VTOL-01. Vehicle designs, DPFC architectures, and stability & control (S&C) models were developed to find limitations and trends to guide industry. To guide this task, NASA developed quad, hex, and an octorotor to better define vehicle attributes and trade space. Aircraft for study included electric, hybrid-electric, and turboshaft powerplants and collective and RPM control schemes. Assessments are in terms of the safety level achieved, and/or aircraft component/features needed to meet SC-VTOL-01. The most challenging criteria being the catastrophic failure rate, ≤10-9 catastrophic failures per flight hour, and that no single failures may result in a catastrophic event. A disciplined process was followed, similar to that in Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) 4761. A preliminary system safety assessment (PSSA) leveraged prior work as a basis of creating failure rate budgets for system design teams. System designs were updated and iterated upon, working with reliability and safety subject matter experts to develop SC-VTOL-01 compliant designs. Design changes were reflected in updated PSSAs for initial verification of compliance. The DPFC architecture was broken into four system design teams, the (1) flight control system (FCS), (2) drive and power system, (3) thermal management system (TMS), and (4) electrical power and distribution system. The FCS including elements necessary to control the aircraft, drive and power including elements necessary to generate and transmit shaft power, the TMS including elements necessary to maintain temperature limits in all operating environments, and electrical pow-er and distribution including equipment necessary to store and transmit electrical energy. Results found that all aircraft evaluated may have paths to comply with SC-VTOL-01, Figure ES2. However, S&C models showed large power transients that must be addressed and PSSA results show that future work is needed in single load path structures, high voltage power storage and distribution, and in motor/rotor overspeed protection.

Boeing↗

Coupling RAVEN to SAPHIRE for Performing Time Dependent Probabilistic Risk Assessment

Cost Risk Analysis Framework Tool (CRAFT) was recently developed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to perform economical risk analysis by combining physics, risk and cost information of components in a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) that can be quickly deployable through the nuclear industry to evaluate the risk associated to capital projects and asset management [1]. In this framework, RAVEN is coupled with SAPHIRE to perform the time dependent risk/safety assessment of NPPs. Traditionally, the risk associated to the NPPs can be determined by classical Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) tools, such as SAPHIRE, under the assumption that all failure rates are constant over time. In some circumstances, however, the assumption is rendered invalid since that the failure rate of a component may gradually change in a systematic way, for example, because of aging and degradation. In addition, recent data analysis in [2] has suggested decreasing values of failure rates for several important components of NPPs. A PRA that includes these components should employ the time-dependent failure rates in order to accurately estimate the risk at any given time. This time-dependent PRA is achieved by the coupling between RAVEN and SAPHIRE.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Coupling RAVEN to SAPHIRE for Performing Time Dependent Probabilistic Risk Assessment

Cost Risk Analysis Framework Tool (CRAFT) was recently developed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to perform economical risk analysis by combining physics, risk and cost information of components in a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) that can be quickly deployable through the nuclear industry to evaluate the risk associated to capital projects and asset management [1]. In this framework, RAVEN is coupled with SAPHIRE to perform the time dependent risk/safety assessment of NPPs. Traditionally, the risk associated to the NPPs can be determined by classical Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) tools, such as SAPHIRE, under the assumption that all failure rates are constant over time. In some circumstances, however, the assumption is rendered invalid since that the failure rate of a component may gradually change in a systematic way, for example, because of aging and degradation. In addition, recent data analysis in [2] has suggested decreasing values of failure rates for several important components of NPPs. A PRA that includes these components should employ the time-dependent failure rates in order to accurately estimate the risk at any given time. This time-dependent PRA is achieved by the coupling between RAVEN and SAPHIRE.

42 ENGINEERING↗

High Reliability Requires More than Providing Spares

It is sometimes optimistically hoped that a space life support system can be kept working throughout a long duration mission by repairing failed components, as long as sufficient spares are flown. It is usually assumed that the components have constant known failure rates. Then the needed numbers of spares can be computed to have any particular probability that all failed components can be replaced by available spares. This approach can provide high reliability if its favorable assumptions, including constant known failure rates, are satisfied. Other favorable assumptions are that the failures are statistically independent, repair will be successful without causing further failures, and all failures are due to internal component failures. These assumptions are not usually justified. The failure rates may be estimates that are inadequately verified because of insufficient testing. Failure rates may change due to materials substitutions, manufacturing changes, redesigns to fix failures, and new failures caused by redesigns. Failures that are not statistically independent may result from one common cause, such as a design or manufacturing error or a cascade of cause and effect, possibly caused by an external event such as a power outage. Repair may be unsuccessful or cause damage. Many failures occur at component interfaces or at the overall systems level, not within isolated components. Other failures causes are completely external to the system, due to assembly, maintenance, and operational errors or to unexpected environmental challenges. Replacement with sufficient spares can compensate for expected internal component failures but may not be able to cope with unpredictable design and manufacturing flaws, human errors, and environmental impacts. Reliability estimates based on providing sufficient spares to compensate for expected failures may be far too high. They are essentially upper bounds on reliability that might be approached if many frequent but often unconsidered failure causes can be eliminated.

spares↗

How Much Testing is Needed to Manage Supportability Risks for Beyond-LEO Missions?

Supportability will be a significantly greater driver of cost and risk for future deep-space crewed missions than it has been in the past. Spares requirements and maintenance risk mitigation in particular present an unprecedented challenge for missions beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO), since, for the first time in human spaceflight history, crews will be weeks or months away from resupply or a safe return to Earth in the event of an abort. Under these conditions, failure rates are a critical parameter that must be well-understood in order to manage logistics and risk effectively. However, failure rates cannot be measured directly, and can only be estimated based on past experience and test results. Previous research has shown that International Space Station (ISS) operational experience has provided significant benefits to future missions by reducing uncertainty and improving accuracy in failure rate estimates, resulting in significant reductions in mass and risk for beyond-LEO missions. This paper updates and expands on that research and quantifies the potential value of continued testing for future mission supportability. Frequentist and Bayesian models for evaluating, validating, and updating failure rate estimates are described, and are combined with supportability models to examine potential impacts of additional operating experience for future missions in terms of logistics mass reduction. The implications of these results for technology development, system design, and program planning are discussed along with lessons learned and recommendations for future system development. In the end, there is no simple answer to the question of how much testing is required, but the models described in this paper provide a way to evaluate the potential impacts of testing in order to inform test planning.

Andrew C Owens↗

Applying the System Complexity Metric (SCM)

A fundamental cause of difficulty in larger engineering projects is their inherent complexity. An impression of complexity occurs if a system is simply difficult to understand, so that there is no obvious mental model that correctly predicts its behavior. Higher complexity is usually associated with higher cost and higher failure rate. Complexity is indicated by a system having more and diverse components, multiple interactions and feedback loops, transients and dynamic behavior, and often the emergence of unanticipated failure modes. Identifying and removing these signs of complexity should reduce complexity and improve performance. Here we limit complexity measurement to the number of components and their interactions. A System Complexity Metric (SCM) is defined as equal to the sum of the number of parts in a system, N, plus the sum of the one-way interconnections between them, I. SCM = N + I. The SCM is easily determined by direct inspection of system block diagrams. Previous work found that life support system cost was directly proportional to SCM and that failure rate increased faster than SCM squared. SCM can be used to compare systems or to guide their redesign to reduce cost and failure rate. Carbon dioxide removal systems will be analyzed using SCM, cost, and failure rate.

Harry W Jones↗

Payload maintenance cost model for the space telescope

An optimum maintenance cost model for the space telescope for a fifteen year mission cycle was developed. Various documents and subsequent updates of failure rates and configurations were made. The reliability of the space telescope for one year, two and one half years, and five years were determined using the failure rates and configurations. The failure rates and configurations were also used in the maintenance simulation computer model which simulate the failure patterns for the fifteen year mission life of the space telescope. Cost algorithms associated with the maintenance options as indicated by the failure patterns were developed and integrated into the model.

White, W. L.↗

Reliability analysis and fault-tolerant system development for a redundant strapdown inertial measurement unit

A methodology is developed and applied for quantitatively analyzing the reliability of a dual, fail-operational redundant strapdown inertial measurement unit (RSDIMU). A Markov evaluation model is defined in terms of the operational states of the RSDIMU to predict system reliability. A 27 state model is defined based upon a candidate redundancy management system which can detect and isolate a spectrum of failure magnitudes. The results of parametric studies are presented which show the effect on reliability of the gyro failure rate, both the gyro and accelerometer failure rates together, false alarms, probability of failure detection, probability of failure isolation, and probability of damage effects and mission time. A technique is developed and evaluated for generating dynamic thresholds for detecting and isolating failures of the dual, separated IMU. Special emphasis is given to the detection of multiple, nonconcurrent failures. Digital simulation time histories are presented which show the thresholds obtained and their effectiveness in detecting and isolating sensor failures.

Motyka, P.↗