Results for “INFORMATION ASSURANCE” — Page 6

NASA NTRS1994

Shared Problem Models and Crew Decision Making

The importance of crew decision making to aviation safety has been well established through NTSB accident analyses: Crew judgment and decision making have been cited as causes or contributing factors in over half of all accidents in commercial air transport, general aviation, and military aviation. Yet the bulk of research on decision making has not proven helpful in improving the quality of decisions in the cockpit. One reason is that traditional analytic decision models are inappropriate to the dynamic complex nature of cockpit decision making and do not accurately describe what expert human decision makers do when they make decisions. A new model of dynamic naturalistic decision making is offered that may prove more useful for training or aiding cockpit decision making. Based on analyses of crew performance in full-mission simulation and National Transportation Safety Board accident reports, features that define effective decision strategies in abnormal or emergency situations have been identified. These include accurate situation assessment (including time and risk assessment), appreciation of the complexity of the problem, sensitivity to constraints on the decision, timeliness of the response, and use of adequate information. More effective crews also manage their workload to provide themselves with time and resources to make good decisions. In brief, good decisions are appropriate to the demands of the situation and reflect the crew's metacognitive skill. Effective crew decision making and overall performance are mediated by crew communication. Communication contributes to performance because it assures that all crew members have essential information, but it also regulates and coordinates crew actions and is the medium of collective thinking in response to a problem. This presentation will examine the relation between communication that serves to build performance. Implications of these findings for crew training will be discussed.

Orasanu, Judith↗

NASA NTRS2013

Tool Use Within NASA Software Quality Assurance

As space mission software systems become larger and more complex, it is increasingly important for the software assurance effort to have the ability to effectively assess both the artifacts produced during software system development and the development process itself. Conceptually, assurance is a straightforward idea - it is the result of activities carried out by an organization independent of the software developers to better inform project management of potential technical and programmatic risks, and thus increase management's confidence in the decisions they ultimately make. In practice, effective assurance for large, complex systems often entails assessing large, complex software artifacts (e.g., requirements specifications, architectural descriptions) as well as substantial amounts of unstructured information (e.g., anomaly reports resulting from testing activities during development). In such an environment, assurance engineers can benefit greatly from appropriate tool support. In order to do so, an assurance organization will need accurate and timely information on the tool support available for various types of assurance activities. In this paper, we investigate the current use of tool support for assurance organizations within NASA, and describe on-going work at JPL for providing assurance organizations with the information about tools they need to use them effectively.

software assurance↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance Integration - the Future of Safe Deep Space Human Exploration

As a foundational element of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Artemis Campaign, the Gateway is an incrementally built cislunar spacecraft that will serve as a platform for deep space human exploration, science, and technology demonstration. The Gateway will be a unifying catalyst for international partners around the world to establish sustained deep space scientific investigations, lunar surface access, and missions to Mars. As human exploration moves farther away from Earth, spacecraft designs must prioritize and optimize mass and volume allocations, while minimizing human and spacecraft risk. To accomplish this objective, the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance functions develop, implement, and ensure compliance with requirements, in concert with the accurate characterization and transparent communication of residual hazard risks, for integrated safety, reliability and maintainability and quality assurance. Safety and Mission Assurance was a key contributor during Gateway program pre-formulation and formulation activities where safety and reliability analysis was embedded in the Gateway Systems Engineering and Integration team. During these early program stages, a preliminary Gateway Integrated Hazard Analysis and Preliminary Gateway Probabilistic Risk Assessment assisted in Gateway architectural and operational definition as part of a risk-informed design process. As the deep space architecture has matured, the integrated Safety and Mission Assurance analyses have matured, new safety review processes have been developed, and requirements have been refined to ensure compliance with integrated safety and mission assurance objectives. The Gateway Program is currently concluding the preliminary design review informed milestone, where the primary objectives included: - Ensured completeness and consistency of the preliminary design, including the meeting of all requirements within appropriate margins and acceptable risk posture. - Identification of any major issues moving forward to the Critical Design phase. At this milestone, Safety and Mission Assurance provided numerous products, including Gateway Top Risks and Risk Mitigation Plans, updated integrated hazard analyses, updated probabilistic risk assessment, Crew Survival Analysis Report, and updated Safety and Mission Assurance Requirements and Plans. These products provide a many-faceted perspective on the inherent risk and available mitigations involved in flying the current proposed vehicle design and anticipated stack configurations. In addition, Safety and Mission Assurance identified top technical, process and workforce concerns to be addressed as the program progresses toward the critical design phase. This paper will detail the evolution of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance integration functions, provide its current status and lessons learned for future human spaceflight programs. Throughout this paper the key tenets of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance will be discussed: - Application of a risk-informed approach to identify and mitigate areas of highest risk. - Leverage of valuable processes and lessons learned from earlier spaceflight programs. - Development of Safety and Mission Assurance products to inform design risk trades. - Utilization of common Safety and Mission Assurance practices to identify safety risks for multiple perspectives: top-down, bottom-up, and across lines of integration. - Approval of safety hazards at the appropriate level of authority, keeping most deliberation closest to design expertise and elevating risks of greatest concern for program-level consideration. - Championing of Safety and Mission Assurance processes and forums to foster a pervasive safety culture that is transparent, inclusive, and collaborative between all partners. These tenets have allowed the Gateway Safety and Mission Assurance function to play a key role in optimized vehicle design evolution, and early identification and mitigation of Gateway program and Artemis mission risk.

Helen Vaccaro↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Human Interfaces and Management of Information (HIMI) Challenges for “In-time” Aviation Safety Management Systems (IASMS)

The envisioned transformation of the National Airspace System to integrate an In-time Aviation Safety Management System(IASMS)to assure safety in Advanced Air Mobility(AAM)brings unprecedented challenges to the design of human interfaces and management of safety information. Safety in design and operational safety assurance are critical factors for how humans will interact with increasingly autonomous systems. The IASMS Concept of Operations builds from traditional commercial operator safety management and scales in complexity to AAM. The transformative changes in future aviation systems pose potential new critical safety risks with novel types of aircraft and other vehicles having different performance capabilities, flying in increasingly complex airspace, and using adaptive contingencies to manage normal and non-normal operations. These changes compel development of new and emerging capabilities that enable innovative ways for humans to interact with data and manage information. In-creasing complexity of AAM corresponds with use of predictive modeling, data analytics, machine learning, and artificial intelligence to effectively address known hazards and emergent risks. The roles of humans will dynamically evolve in increments with this technological and operational evolution. The interfaces for how humans will interact with increasingly complex and assured systems designed to operate autonomously and how information will need to be presented are important challenges to be resolved.

Lawrence J Prinzel↗

NASA NTRS1996

Requirement Metrics for Risk Identification

The Software Assurance Technology Center (SATC) is part of the Office of Mission Assurance of the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). The SATC's mission is to assist National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) projects to improve the quality of software which they acquire or develop. The SATC's efforts are currently focused on the development and use of metric methodologies and tools that identify and assess risks associated with software performance and scheduled delivery. This starts at the requirements phase, where the SATC, in conjunction with software projects at GSFC and other NASA centers is working to identify tools and metric methodologies to assist project managers in identifying and mitigating risks. This paper discusses requirement metrics currently being used at NASA in a collaborative effort between the SATC and the Quality Assurance Office at GSFC to utilize the information available through the application of requirements management tools.

Hammer, Theodore↗

NASA NTRS2020

Software assurance of autonomous spacecraft control

The work described addresses assurance of a planning and execution software system being added to an in-orbit CubeSat to demonstrate autonomous control of that spacecraft. Our focus was on how to develop assurance of the correct operation of the added software in its operational context, our approach to which was to use an assurance case to guide and organize the information involved.

Bocchino, Robert↗

NASA NTRS2013

Analysis of Traffic Conflicts in a Mixed-Airspace Evaluation of Airborne Separation Assurance

A pair of human-in-the-loop simulation evaluations of a distributed air/ground separation assurance system have been conducted to investigate the function allocation between humans and automation systems as well as ground-based and airborne agents in the Next Generation Air Transportation System and beyond. This paper focuses on an analysis of certain critical conflicts observed between self-separating aircraft and ground-managed traffic in the same airspace. The principal cause of each conflict is identified and potential mitigations are discussed, such as: the sharing of trajectory intent information between the ground and the air; more cautious trajectory planning by the self-separating aircraft; and more equitable rules-of-the-road between the self-separating aircraft and ground-managed aircraft. This analysis will inform the ongoing design of an airborne separation assurance automation tool.

Lewis, Timothy A.↗

NASA NTRS2013

A Concept of Operations for an Integrated Vehicle Health Assurance System

This document describes a Concept of Operations (ConOps) for an Integrated Vehicle Health Assurance System (IVHAS). This ConOps is associated with the Maintain Vehicle Safety (MVS) between Major Inspections Technical Challenge in the Vehicle Systems Safety Technologies (VSST) Project within NASA s Aviation Safety Program. In particular, this document seeks to describe an integrated system concept for vehicle health assurance that integrates ground-based inspection and repair information with in-flight measurement data for airframe, propulsion, and avionics subsystems. The MVS Technical Challenge intends to maintain vehicle safety between major inspections by developing and demonstrating new integrated health management and failure prevention technologies to assure the integrity of vehicle systems between major inspection intervals and maintain vehicle state awareness during flight. The approach provided by this ConOps is intended to help optimize technology selection and development, as well as allow the initial integration and demonstration of these subsystem technologies over the 5 year span of the VSST program, and serve as a guideline for developing IVHAS technologies under the Aviation Safety Program within the next 5 to 15 years. A long-term vision of IVHAS is provided to describe a basic roadmap for more intelligent and autonomous vehicle systems.

Hunter, Gary W.↗

NASA NTRS1990

An assessment of the government liquid hydrogen requirements for the 1995-2005 time frame

The results of government study of long range liquid hydrogen (LH2) requirements for the time period of 1995 through the year 2005 are presented. To assure an adequate supply of LH2 is available in support of various programs, it is imperative a long range projection of LH2 requirements be developed and maintained. This information is vital in planning for necessary procurement actions and assuring adequate industry lead time to acquiring the necessary production and distribution capabilities. The Advanced Launch System and High-Altitude Long-Endurance programs may represent the predominant government needs for LH2 in the long range. The assembled data clearly indicates a need for KSC (Kennedy Space Center) constant program/project surveillance. Also clear is the need for KSC to monitor industry's plans for LH2 plant production and distribution expansion.

Bain, Addison↗

NASA NTRS2010

Advanced Capabilities for Wind Tunnel Testing in the 21st Century

Wind tunnel testing methods and test technologies for the 21st century using advanced capabilities are presented. These capabilities are necessary to capture more accurate and high quality test results by eliminating the uncertainties in testing and to facilitate verification of computational tools for design. This paper discusses near term developments underway in ground testing capabilities, which will enhance the quality of information of both the test article and airstream flow details. Also discussed is a selection of new capability investments that have been made to accommodate such developments. Examples include advanced experimental methods for measuring the test gas itself; using efficient experiment methodologies, including quality assurance strategies within the test; and increasing test result information density by using extensive optical visualization together with computed flow field results. These points could be made for both major investments in existing tunnel capabilities or for entirely new capabilities.

Kegelman, Jerome T.↗

NASA NTRS2023

Adaptive Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Reduces Risk of Software Impacting Safety in Artemis Missions

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is asking more of its human spaceflight programs than ever before through the collective Artemis Missions. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program contributes to NASA’s human spaceflight goals by providing IV&V services for NASA’s critical spacecraft and ground software. The IV&V Program is tasked with providing assurance from both individual and integrated mission software perspectives. The Artemis IV&V organization is actively supporting six distinct development efforts: Orion, the Space Launch System (SLS), Exploration Ground Systems (EGS), Mission Control Center (MCC), the Lunar Gateway, and the Human Landing System (HLS), representing a wide diversity of developer organizations, management structures, and development approaches. With much of this extremely complex flight and ground software being essential to human safety both on the ground and in space, Artemis IV&V is likewise challenged to provide more value-added assurance to future Artemis missions within a constrained budget. To meet this challenge, Artemis IV&V employs a variety of novel and evolving “Adaptive IV&V” approaches for planning and executing IV&V analysis to increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of the IV&V Program’s assurance activities, and to address the difficulties imposed by assuring software for a large, highly integrated, multi-mission enterprise managed and executed by physically and organizationally distinct programs. Instilling agile principles like iterative planning cycles, self-organizing teams, and regular retrospectives, into IV&V planning and execution has led to a more rapid turnaround of a minimum viable assurance product and allowed for increased alignment of assurance activities with development progress. Adopting an assurance case methodology has led to greater consistency and clearer communication of assurance design and provided a foundation for long-term maintenance of assurance plans, products, and results across missions. The IV&V-developed Assurance / Safety Case Analytical Network (A-SCAN) framework and tool has enabled the quantification and tracking of system/software risk and confidence. These confidence measures provide a means to repeatedly express the impact of planned and completed assurance work and the remaining residual risk. Applied as part of a “Follow-the-Risk” organizational ethos, this allows consistent rightsizing of analysis rigor and intensity commensurate with the perceived risk of defects, as well as appropriate targeting of the highest risk areas of the software to find safety issues before they can manifest. Finally, the development of the IV&V Advanced Risk Reduction Integrated Software Test and Operations Tri-program Lightweight Environment (ARRISTOTLE), an integrated software-only simulation of Orion, SLS, and EGS systems, has made it possible to independently test integrated pad and flight scenarios and inject faults to observe how the Artemis multi-program, mission software behaves in degraded modes and in response to hazards. These adaptive IV&V investments have enabled Artemis IV&V to become more efficient and effective in IV&V planning and execution and respond more readily to changes in the risk landscape, increasing the breadth and depth of risk reduction possible within the available resources. Residual risk tracking allows IV&V to communicate more effectively with stakeholders, both internal and external at all levels, and inform key decision-making personnel. This evolving assurance design approach provides IV&V surety that work is performed in the highest risk, most value-added areas of the software, to keep our astronauts and ground crews safe and ensure mission success.

Gerek A Whitman↗

NASA NTRS2023

Adaptive Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Reduces Risk of Software Impacting Safety in Artemis Missions

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is asking more of its human spaceflight programs than ever before through the collective Artemis Missions. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program contributes to NASA’s human spaceflight goals by providing IV&V services for NASA’s critical spacecraft and ground software. The IV&V Program is tasked with providing assurance from both individual and integrated mission software perspectives. The Artemis IV&V organization is actively supporting six distinct development efforts: Orion, the Space Launch System (SLS), Exploration Ground Systems (EGS), Mission Control Center (MCC), the Lunar Gateway, and the Human Landing System (HLS), representing a wide diversity of developer organizations, management structures, and development approaches. With much of this extremely complex flight and ground software being essential to human safety both on the ground and in space, Artemis IV&V is likewise challenged to provide more value-added assurance to future Artemis missions within a constrained budget. To meet this challenge, Artemis IV&V employs a variety of novel and evolving “Adaptive IV&V” approaches for planning and executing IV&V analysis to increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of the IV&V Program’s assurance activities, and to address the difficulties imposed by assuring software for a large, highly integrated, multi-mission enterprise managed and executed by physically and organizationally distinct programs. Instilling agile principles like iterative planning cycles, self-organizing teams, and regular retrospectives, into IV&V planning and execution has led to a more rapid turnaround of a minimum viable assurance product and allowed for increased alignment of assurance activities with development progress. Adopting an assurance case methodology has led to greater consistency and clearer communication of assurance design and provided a foundation for long-term maintenance of assurance plans, products, and results across missions. The IV&V-developed Assurance / Safety Case Analytical Network (A-SCAN) framework and tool has enabled the quantification and tracking of system/software risk and confidence. These confidence measures provide a means to repeatedly express the impact of planned and completed assurance work and the remaining residual risk. Applied as part of a “Follow-the-Risk” organizational ethos, this allows consistent rightsizing of analysis rigor and intensity commensurate with the perceived risk of defects, as well as appropriate targeting of the highest risk areas of the software to find safety issues before they can manifest. Finally, the development of the IV&V Advanced Risk Reduction Integrated Software Test and Operations Tri-program Lightweight Environment (ARRISTOTLE), an integrated software-only simulation of Orion, SLS, and EGS systems, has made it possible to independently test integrated pad and flight scenarios and inject faults to observe how the Artemis multi-program, mission software behaves in degraded modes and in response to hazards. These adaptive IV&V investments have enabled Artemis IV&V to become more efficient and effective in IV&V planning and execution and respond more readily to changes in the risk landscape, increasing the breadth and depth of risk reduction possible within the available resources. Residual risk tracking allows IV&V to communicate more effectively with stakeholders, both internal and external at all levels, and inform key decision-making personnel. This evolving assurance design approach provides IV&V surety that work is performed in the highest risk, most value-added areas of the software, to keep our astronauts and ground crews safe and ensure mission success.

Gerek Whitman↗

NASA NTRS1978

Technology requirements for an orbital navigation/position finding system

The concept of an orbiting personal navigation system as a possible application for a large space structure is considered. The navigation system would have to be part of a large, integrated, multifunction Information Service Platform to justify its complexity and assured use by a large segment of the civilian population. The navigation configuration is a large cruciform which utilizes a linear phased array antenna design. The two antenna arms generate narrow, orthogonal beam patterns on the ground which are electrically scanned east to west and south to north. A passive ground receiver detecting the beam passage determines the user's position in earth longitude and latitude coordinates.

Lang, A. L., Jr.↗

NASA NTRS2000

Reliability of Space-Shuttle Pressure Vessels with Random Batch Effects

In this article we revisit the problem of estimating the joint reliability against failure by stress rupture of a group of fiber-wrapped pressure vessels used on Space-Shuttle missions. The available test data were obtained from an experiment conducted at the U.S. Department of Energy Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (LLL) in which scaled-down vessels were subjected to life testing at four accelerated levels of pressure. We estimate the reliability assuming that both the Shuttle and LLL vessels were chosen at random in a two-stage process from an infinite population with spools of fiber as the primary sampling unit. Two main objectives of this work are: (1) to obtain practical estimates of reliability taking into account random spool effects and (2) to obtain a realistic assessment of estimation accuracy under the random model. Here, reliability is calculated in terms of a 'system' of 22 fiber-wrapped pressure vessels, taking into account typical pressures and exposure times experienced by Shuttle vessels. Comparisons are made with previous studies. The main conclusion of this study is that, although point estimates of reliability are still in the 'comfort zone,' it is advisable to plan for replacement of the pressure vessels well before the expected Lifetime of 100 missions per Shuttle Orbiter. Under a random-spool model, there is simply not enough information in the LLL data to provide reasonable assurance that such replacement would not be necessary.

Feiveson, Alan H.↗

NASA NTRS2007

Promoting Robust Design of Diode Lasers for Space: A National Initiative

The Diode-laser Array Working Group (DAWG) is a national-level consumer/provider forum for discussion of engineering and manufacturing issues which influence the reliability and survivability of high-power broad-area laser diode devices in space, with an emphasis on laser diode arrays (LDAs) for optical pumping of solid-state laser media. The goals of the group are to formulate and validate standardized test and qualification protocols, operational control recommendations, and consensus manufacturing and certification standards. The group is using reliability and lifetime data collected by laser diode manufacturers and the user community to develop a set of standardized guidelines for specifying and qualifying laser diodes for long-duration operation in space, the ultimate goal being to promote an informed U.S. Government investment and procurement strategy for assuring the availability and durability of space-qualified LDAs. The group is also working to establish effective implementation of statistical design techniques at the supplier design, development, and manufacturing levels to help reduce product performance variability and improve product reliability for diodes employed in space applications

Tratt, David M.↗

NASA NTRS2016

Rapid Application of Space Effects for the Small Satellites Systems and Services Symposium

NASA Ames Research Center (ARC) has engaged Military Branches, the Department of Defense, and other Government Agencies in successful partnerships to design, develop, deliver and support various space effects capabilities and space vehicles on timeline of need. Contracts with Industry are in place to execute operational and enabler missions using physical and informational infrastructures including Responsive Manufacturing capabilities and Digital Assurance. The intent is to establish a secure, web-enabled "store front" for ordering and delivering any capabilities required as defined by the users and directed by NASA ARC and Partner Organizations. The capabilities are envisioned to cover a broad range and include 6U CubeSats, 50-100 kg Space Vehicles, Modular Space Vehicle architecture variations, as well as rapid payload integration on various Bus options. The paper will discuss the efforts underway to demonstrate autonomous manufacturing of low-volume, high-value assets, to validate the ability of autonomous digital techniques to provide Mission Assurance, and to demonstrate cost savings through the identification, characterization, and utilization of Responsive Space components. The culmination of this effort will be the integration of several 6U satellites and their launch in 2016.

Small Satellite Systems↗

NASA NTRS2017

New Approach to Total Dose Specification for Spacecraft Electronics

This presentation provides information on approach to total dose radiation hardness assurance that was developed that includes variability of the space radiation environment.

Total Dose Distributions in Space↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Evolution of NASA’s Nuclear Flight Safety Program to Meet Changing Needs

Over the past 4 years, the United States (U.S.) Government has issued several new National policies that fundamentally change the approach to nuclear flight safety for aerospace applications, including the complete revision of the Federal policy for handling launch of spacecraft containing space nuclear systems. In response, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is updating its nuclear flight safety program while still maintaining consistency with other Federal policies, international conventions, and NASA’s own policies. To achieve this evolution, NASA is factoring in an objectives-driven and assurance case mindset to develop a risk-informed and performance-based program. NASA and others have successfully applied this mindset in other disciplines and contexts and it is being pursued here via broad cooperation within NASA and with external stakeholders. This paper will briefly describe how the NASA nuclear flight safety program is evolving to meet these changing needs.

NASA↗