Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Intrusion Protection”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 109 records · Page 6

AI-based Detection and Defense Against Cyberattacks in Distributed Energy Resources

This study will provide comprehensive artificial intelligence (AI)-based solution tools for network security, malware prevention, and sensor data anomaly detection for distributed energy resource (DER) research, development, and demonstration. DER technologies are energy systems (e.g., solar panels, wind turbines, and energy storage systems) that are often connected to the internet and thus vulnerable to cyberattacks. Cybersecurity should be of primary concern for DERs, which is why we propose an integrated multi-layer cyber-defense system for DERs. This system encompasses risk assessments, network security, malware prevention, and detection of anomalies in the sensor data. Implementation of a comprehensive risk assessment with an overview of the model architecture should be the primary step, and should include the potential impact of experiencing, at a given time, one or more cyberattacks on the system. The second step is to ensure that the network security includes firewalls, intrusion detection, and malware prevention. The third step is to provide solution tools that enable sensor data anomaly detection for DERs. By incorporating these considerations into DER research, development, and demonstration, organizations can help ensure the safety and security of their systems and protect against potential cyberattacks.

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗

Deliberate Motion Analytics Applied to CUAS Sensor Fusion

The Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security (ARSS) program in the Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) seeks to identify new technology solutions for safeguards and security challenges associated with domestic deployment of advanced nuclear reactors. Research in the ARSS program is investigating alternative physical protection system (PPS) approaches that leverage new detection technologies. This report shows test results from a new form of artificial intelligence (AI) that is called deliberate motion analytics (DMA) when used to spatially and temporally fuse active radar and passive radio frequency (RF) detection that significantly improves detection of uncrewed aircraft systems (UASs). DMA is designed to filter out false positive alarms yet provide highly reliable intrusion detection at nuclear power plants (NPPs) and advanced small modular reactor (ASMR) perimeters. This form of AI is considered to be an enabling technology for security of the future and supports the ARSS investigation of alternative PPSs.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Safety Assessment of El Cabril, the Spanish Surface Disposal facility for LILW and VLLW - 17233

El Cabril project was launched in 1986, for Low and Intermediate Level Waste (LILW) disposal, based on concrete barriers and concrete disposal units. The operation of a Very Low Leve Waste (VLLW) complementary facility based on clay and High Density Polyethylene (HDPE) barriers and different types of disposal units started in 2008. Two main objectives are considered in the design: Immediate and post-closure protection and no radiological restrictions, after institutional control period. To fulfil these objectives several design criteria like waste isolation through a multi-barrier system, surveillance period no longer than 300 years and limitation of activity are applied. The Safety Assessment process follows a methodology which, taking into account important facts like safety and design criteria, time frame, radiological protection criteria, waste characteristics, environment, FEPs (features, events and processes), etc., develops different scenarios, models and calculations to define the safety approach. This safety approach follows the current guides and recommendations of international organizations, it covers the potential impact of the facility for the operational and long-term periods and it includes normal evolution and less likely accidental and inadvertent human intrusion events. All the studies and considerations done for the Safety Assessment have to be included in a safety Report, required for getting the Operation License for Nuclear Installations in Spain. The content of this Report is defined by the Spanish regulation and it has to be revised if there is a change in the facility that may affect the safety. It is also mandatory making a Safety Periodic Review (every 10 years in the case of El Cabril) that has to be presented to the Regulatory Council. This paper outlines the principles, objectives and criteria of El Cabril's disposal installation and it explains the safety assessment performed, for both LILW and VLLW disposal, as part of the documentation produced to obtain the authorization to operate. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Precursor Analysis Report: Conti Ransomware Attack on the Health Service Executive of Ireland 2021

The Conti Ransomware Attack on the Health Service Executive (HSE) of Ireland 2021 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed by the adversary. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. The HSE provides public healthcare corporate services and operational services throughout Ireland, with critical functions including the acute national ambulance service, acute hospital service, and community healthcare service. On 14 May 2021, Conti ransomware encrypted 80 percent of the HSE’s Information Technology (IT) infrastructure across corporate, hospital, community, and electronic health record services. Conti is a ransomware-as-a-service operation that encrypts local files, uses double extortion against victims, and is facilitated by many intrusion tools. The attack forced the HSE to shut down its entire IT infrastructure to contain the ransomware, forcing employees to revert to pen and paper recordkeeping and leading to the cancellation of many appointments and procedures. The adversary also exfiltrated 700 GB of data, compromising the confidentiality of patients’ protected health information. Had the adversary targeted the COVID-19 cloud systems or operational technology assets, such as Internet of Medical Things medical devices or smart building management systems, the impact of the attack would almost certainly have been far more severe. Researchers and analysts identified 21 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 23 steps) likely utilized during the attack with a total of 1,185 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Twenty-one of the identified techniques used during the attack on the HSE were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 1,086 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 850 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 57 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Cyber-intrusion Auto-response and Policy Management System (CAPMS)

The Cyber-intrusion Auto-response and Policy Management System (CAPMS) project was funded by a grant from the US Department of Energy (DOE) Cybersecurity for Energy Delivery Systems (CEDS) program with contributions from two partner electric utilities: Southern California Edison (SCE) and Duke Energy. The goal of the project was to demonstrate protecting smart grid assets from a cyber attack in a way that “does not impede critical energy delivery functions.” This report summarizes project goals and activities for the CAPMS project and explores what did and did not work as expected. It concludes with an assessment of possible benefits and value of the system for the future.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

US EPA Superfund Radiation Risk Assessment Update: Superfund Update: Revisions to Risk and Dose Assessment Tools - 19057

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Superfund remedial program is finishing up a significant number of revisions to its guidance for the risk assessment process at radioactively contaminated Superfund sites. The six Preliminary Remediation Goal (PRG) and Dose Compliance Concentration (DCC) internet-based calculators for radiation risk and dose assessment at Superfund sites are being revised to reflect better science, revisions to existing exposure scenarios and new scenarios, and changes to match up more closely with the EPA chemical Regional Screening Level calculator. A comprehensive set of revisions to the PRG calculator was finished in November 2014. Additional revisions to the other 5 calculators were made in 2015. A set of further revisions are expected to be finalized prior to December 2018 and will be discussed in this abstract. A new Radon Vapor Intrusion Screening Level (RVISL) calculator is expected to be finished in 2019, similar to the Vapor Intrusion Screening Level (VISL) for chemical calculator that was finished in 2018. There are several additional revisions that may be finished prior to WM 2019 and will be presented if finished or discussed in more general terms if still underway. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

New affordable options for infrastructure and asset protection

Securitas is one of the leaders evolving with technology and delivering new forms of affordable security for mining facilities. It was called in to protect a large mothballed coal mine in the central USA, the victim of repeated thefts. First, Mobile Surveillance Units (MSUs) were installed but thefts continued. Later, a new wireless video security system called Videofied which used MotionViewers which use infrared detectors to detect movement and send a 10 second clip of the intrusion to an operator. This led to the thieves being caught. 2 photos.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

Security Evaluation of Two Intrusion Detection Systems in Smart Grid SCADA Environment

The increased complexity and interconnectivity of SCADA infrastructure in the power system have exposed it to the multitude of vulnerabilities. There is a growing emphasis towards developing an efficient intrusion detection system (IDS) to strengthen the security of the SCADA control system. This is a research-in-progress paper which presents the application of two anomaly-based intrusion detection systems (AIDS) in detecting the stealthy cyber-attack on the SCADA control system. We have applied the IDS tools Snort and Bro, in designing the IDS and later, compared their performances in terms of detection rate and latency in the alert packets with a motive of selecting better IDS for the SCADA security. Specifically, the timing-based rule is applied to identify the malicious packets based on the high temporal frequency in the network traffic. For the case study, we have implemented the SCADA based protection scheme which performs an autonomous protection to mitigate the system disturbances. We first implemented the stealthy cyber-attack which compromised the SCADA controller followed by data integrity attack on the system generator. Next, we perform the impact analysis during the attack followed by performance evaluation of IDS tools. Our experimental results show that the IDS tools are efficient in detecting cyber-attacks within an acceptable time frame for different sizes of network packets.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Communicating with future generations - Major obstacles to overcome - 15009

The Department of Energy (DOE) Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) is responsible for managing activities related to the disposal of transuranic (TRU) and TRU-mixed waste in the geologic repository at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), 2150 feet (655 meters) below the land surface, at the WIPP, near Carlsbad, New Mexico. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations Part 191.14(c) [1] and Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations Part 194.43 [2] require a Passive Institutional Controls program be developed for the WIPP. The primary purpose of the Passive Institutional Controls program is to indicate the location of the repository and the risk it presents to an intruder, thus reducing the likelihood of inadvertent human intrusion into the repository. A plan was put into place during the 1990's with records management and storage, awareness triggers, permanent marker design concepts, including languages, graphics and engineered drawings, plus testing schedules for materials and structures. This work included the thoughts of expert panels and individuals. The plan held up under peer review and met the regulatory requirements. But will it really work? Will future generations a thousand years, two thousand years, or seven thousand years from now really be able to decipher and understand the message? This is the challenge international constructors, operators, and regulators of repositories for the disposal of any hazardous materials must face. It is important to explore the history of language, both written words and graphics; and what we can learn from the past to assist us in communicating with the future. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Fissile and Non-Fissile Material Detection Using Nuclear Acoustic Resonance Signatures

The objective of this project is to develop anovel technique for remote, non-destructive, non-radiation-based detection of materials of interest to Nonproliferation Programs. We propse the development of a detection system based on magnetic resonance principles (NAR), which would work where radiation detection is not possible. The approach would be non-intrusive, penetrating, applicable to many materials of interest for Nonproliferation, and be able to identify the nuclear samples under investigation.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

SDN-Based Dynamic Cybersecurity Framework of IEC-61850 Communications in Smart Grid

In recent years, critical infrastructure and power grids have experienced a series of cyber-attacks, leading to temporary, widespread blackouts of considerable magnitude. Since most substations are unmanned and have limited physical security protection, cyber breaches into power grid substations present a risk. Nowadays, the susceptibility of SDN architecture to cyber-attacks has exhibited a notable increase in recent years, as indicated by research findings. This suggests a growing concern regarding the potential for cybersecurity breaches within the SDN framework. In this paper, we propose a hybrid intrusion detection system (IDS)-integrated SDN architecture for detecting and preventing the injection of malicious IEC 61850-based generic object-oriented system event (GOOSE) messages in a digital substation. Additionally, this program locates the fault’s location and, as a form of mitigation, disables a certain port. Furthermore, implementation examples are demonstrated and verified using a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed that mimics the functioning of a digital substation.

Liu, Chen-Ching [Virginia Tech] (ORCID:00000002894↗

Risks from Past, Current, and Potential Hanford Single Shell Tank Leaks

Due to significant delays in constructing and operating the Waste Treatment Plant, which is needed to support retrieval of waste from Hanford’s single shell tanks (SSTs), SSTs may now be required to store tank waste for two to three more decades into the future. Many SSTs were built almost 70 years ago, and all SSTs are well beyond their design lives. Recent examination of monitoring data suggests several of the tanks, which underwent interim stabilization a decade or more ago, may be leaking small amounts (perhaps 150–300 gallons per year) to the subsurface environment. A potential leak from tank T-111 is estimated to have released approximately 2,000 gallons into the subsurface. Observations of past leak events, recently published simulation results, and new simulations all suggest that recent leaks are unlikely to affect underlying groundwater above regulatory limits. However, these recent observations remind us that much larger source terms are still contained in the tanks and are also present in the vadose zone from historical intentional and unintentional releases. Recently there have been significant improvements in methods for detecting and characterizing soil moisture and contaminant releases, understanding and controlling mass-flux, and remediating deep vadose zone and groundwater plumes. To ensure extended safe storage of tank waste in SSTs, the following actions are recommended: 1) Improve capabilities for intrusion and leak detection. 2) Develop defensible conceptual models of intrusion and leak mechanisms. 3) Apply enhanced subsurface characterization methods to improve detection and quantification of moisture changes beneath tanks. 4) Maintain a flux-based assessment of past, present, and potential tank leaks to assess risks and to maintain priorities for applying mitigation actions. 5) Implement and maintain effective mitigation and remediation actions to protect groundwater resources. These actions will enable limited resources to be applied to the most beneficial actions. A systems-based approach will support extended safe storage of tank waste, reduce the risks from tank leaks, and protect human health and the environment.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The Revised WIPP Passive Institutional Controls Program - A Conceptual Plan - 13145

The Department of Energy/Carlsbad Field Office (DOE/CBFO) is responsible for managing all activities related to the disposal of TRU and TRU-mixed waste in the geologic repository, 650 m below the land surface, at WIPP, near Carlsbad, New Mexico. The main function of the Passive Institutional Controls (PIC's) program is to inform future generations of the long-lived radioactive wastes buried beneath their feet in the desert. For the first 100 years after cessation of disposal operations, the rooms are closed and the shafts leading underground sealed, WIPP is mandated by law to institute Active Institutional Controls (AIC's) with fences, gates, and armed guards on patrol. At this same time a plan must be in place of how to warn/inform the future, after the AIC's are gone, of the consequences of intrusion into the geologic repository disposal area. A plan was put into place during the 1990's with records management and storage, awareness triggers, permanent marker design concepts and testing schedules. This work included the thoughts of expert panels and individuals. The plan held up under peer review and met the requirements of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Today the NEA is coordinating a study called the 'Preservation of Records, Knowledge and Memory (RK and M) Across Generations' to provide the international nuclear waste repository community with a guide on how a nuclear record archive programs should be approached and developed. CBFO is cooperating and participating in this project and will take what knowledge is gained and apply that to the WIPP program. At the same time CBFO is well aware that the EPA and others are expecting DOE to move forward with planning for the future WIPP PIC's program; so a plan will be in place in time for WIPP's closure slated for the early 2030's. The DOE/CBFO WIPP PIC's program in place today meets the regulatory criteria, but complete feasibility of implementation is questionable, and may not be in conformance with the international guidance being developed. International guidance currently under development may suggest that the inter-generational equity principle strives to warn the future, however, in doing so not to unduly burden present generations. Building markers and monuments that are out of proportion to the risk being presented to the future is not in keeping with generational equity. With this in mind the DOE/CBFO is developing conceptual plans for re-evaluating and revising the current WIPP PIC's program. These conceptual plans will suggest scientific and technical work that must be completed to develop a 'new' PICs program that takes the best ideas of the present plan, blended with new ideas from the RK and M project, and proposed alternative permanent markers designs and materials in consideration. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Panel Session 4 and 15: Japan Fukushima Daiichi D and D Update and Technological Challenges at Japan Fukushima Daiichi D and D and Update on Nuclear Overview and Development in Japan - Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Sessions 4 and 15 represent a two-part panel series that discusses progress and challenges associated with cleanup at Fukushima. Severe limitations on availability of original panelists from Japan due to strict restrictions put in place to alleviate the spread of coronavirus necessitated changes to both panels. The result was a significantly modified panel for Session 04 (shown above) and the elimination of all panelists for Session 15. The 4 and 15 Panel Sessions provide an overview of activities related to both the progress and challenges of cleanup and decommissioning of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (NPS) in Japan. Five panelists discussed perspectives of the cleanup following a Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) video showing the progress on site since the devastating Great East Earthquake and tsunami that caused the explosions at three of the six reactors on the site. Three of the five panelists discussed on-going work being performed for the effort, while the other two provided expert perspectives of on strategic efforts at the site. The panel was attended by over 80 technologists and policy makers spanning the globe and was opened by Dr. Monica Regalbuto of Idaho National Laboratory and a short video provided by TEPCO. The video described changes at the site that spanned the cleanup efforts from stabilizing water intrusion into the contaminated reactor buildings to construction of new administrative facilities. The video explained the processes underway to retrieve spent fuel rods and challenges in retrieval of the compromised fuel debris. The video highlighted working condition improvements that included establishment of rest housing and a small convenience store on the site, and the rollback of protective equipment around the site due to decreases contamination. Panelists with presentations: Revision of 'the Mid-and-Long-Term Road-map towards the Decommissioning of TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station' (Paul Dickman); Sharing UK experience at Fukushima Daiichi (Adrian Simper); SRNL Japan (Andrew Fellinger); ABLE's Initiative to Dismantle the Exhaust Stack (Daniel Walter); JAEA R and D in Fukushima (Tokio Fukahori); TEPCO - Overview and Update of the Fukushima Decommissioning Process (Monica Regalbuto); Toshiba's Involvement in the Decommissioning of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (Yasuhiro Yuguchi); Remote Dismantling of the Exhaust Stack At Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS (Takashi Okutsu)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

SDN Project

The SDN Project completed on time and on budget and successfully accomplished 100% of the scope of work outlined in the original Statement of Project Objective (SOPO). The SDN Project formed an alliance between Ameren Corporation, University of Illinois Urbana- Champaign (UIUC), Pacific Northwest National Laboratories (PNNL), and Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc. (SEL). The objective of the SDN Project is to address Topic Area of Interest 2: Sustain critical energy delivery functions while responding to a cyber-intrusion under Funding Opportunity Announcement DE-FOA-0000797. The goal of the project is to design and commercially release technology that provides a method to sustain critical energy delivery functions during a cyber intrusion and to do this control system operators need the ability to quickly identify and isolate the affected network areas, and re-route critical information and control flows around. The objective of the SDN Project is to develop a Flow Controller that monitors, configures, and maintains the safe, reliable network traffic flows of all the local area networks (LANs) on a control system in the Energy sector. The SDN team identified the core attributes of a control system and produced an SDN flow controller that has the same core attributes enabling networks to be designed, configured and deployed that maximize the whitelisted, deny-bydefault and purpose built networks. This project researched, developed and commercially released technology that: Enables all field networks be to configured and monitored as if they are a single asset to be protected; Enables greatly improved and even precalculated response actions to reliability and cyber events; Supports pre-configured localized response actions tailored to provide resilience against failures and centralized response to cyber-attacks that improve network reliability and availability; Architecturally enables the right subject matter experts, who are usually the information technology and operational technology engineers, to be the ones centrally administering the technology and responding to events; Simplifies network configuration, improving deterministic Ethernet transport times, and providing instant visualization on where the communication circuits are and how all circuits are impacted when changes (e.g., configuration changes, failures or intrusions) happen, allowing operators to minimize downtime; and Improves the ability to identify deviations in network behavior resulting in detection and analysis of potential cyber intrusions and faster response times Results: This project has forever changed the way critical infrastructure networks are designed, secured, deployed and maintained. The cybersecurity and performance advantages achieved are significant, simply put traditional networking has been obsoleted while the team maintained Ethernet interoperability avoiding any legacy concerns. The team commercially released technology that accomplished all the cybersecurity goals outlined in the SOPO and completed it by executing the project management plan approved in the initial contract. The resulting Energy sector SDN flow controller model number is SEL-5056 and can be freely downloaded from the www.SELinc.com website. This technology not only improves the cybersecurity of control systems but has measured results that it improves the performance and reliability of the control system as well. This means the system owners can confidently apply it to their systems knowing that it will, “first do no harm” but actually improve the system as well. Success of the project is best measured by the sales and deployment of the technology. System owners in industrial, electric, defense, and oil and gas only months after commercial release have approved plans for deployment.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Alternate Retrieval A-105 Application Assessment Report

This report summarizes the historical development of the Confined Sluicing End Effector (CSEE) technology as well scarification technology. We also summarize the systems integration and deployment of that technology in the Gunite and Associated Tanks (GAAT) at the Oak Ridge Reservation where the retrieval system successfully removed the remaining sludge and heel in the eight tanks for tank closure and disposition. We also summarize the lessons learned from the deployment at Oak Ridge. Simulant development and testing have been key activities for any waste retrieval effort as many of the physical properties of the waste are unknown; therefore, this report discusses a bounding series of simulants that helps to reduce uncertainty for operations. These simulants have been developed for potential Hanford waste retrieval deployment. The potential key attributes for retrieval, based upon information provided by Washington River Protection Services (WRPS), of single-shell tank A-105 are discussed along with the potential application of CSEE technology to the challenges presented by the unique nature of A-105. These unique features include a major tear in the bottom of the tank, which necessitates technologies other than past practice sluicing to be deployed to prevent further intrusion of waste into the vadose zone. In addition, significant in-tank hardware makes A-105 particular challenging. However, there appear to be a number of parameters that should be investigated through additional testing or review of prior testing that may demonstrate the applicability of the CSEE technology to A-105. Testing of the Waste Retrieval End Effector (WREE), which was based on the original CSEE design, to demonstrate the ability to remove sludge and hardpan from Tank 241-C-106 will be reviewed to determine relevance to the Tank A-105 retrieval. There may be new requirements for the deployment system that accesses the tank with the CSEE because the tank bottom may not be flat, requiring the ability to maneuver the CSEE to maintain the appropriate stand-off distance from the CSEE and the tank bottom. Finally, we provide a set of recommendations, a set of task descriptions, and a range of estimated costs for a demonstration of the technology by the end of FY17. These tasks are summarized as: Complete system-level functional requirements; Procure or access the capacity to perform; Generate simulant development and simulant testing; Develop CSEE functionality; Develop demonstration plan; Perform demonstration; Analyze and document testing results; Perform project management and engineering.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Safety assessment for the radon-type surface disposal facility at Saakadze, Georgia - 15406

The Saakadze disposal facility is located about 40 km from Tbilisi and was planned and constructed during Soviet times as Radon-type surface facility to accommodate up to 600 m{sup 3} of low and intermediate level waste generated on the territory of Georgia. The disposal facility was operated from 1963 until its closure in 1995. The vast majority of waste in the Saakadze facility has been disposed of in two near surface concrete vaults with typical Radon-type dimensions, which cover layers already show significant structural damages. In order to assess the present safety of the site and provide the competent Georgian authorities with the necessary basis to take decisions in regard to the future of the repository, the European Commission launched and financially supported a project, which was assigned to a consortium of TUV-Nord ENSYS GmbH and DBE Technology GmbH. The safety assessment of Saakadze facility, which was an essential part of this project and which is the subject of this paper was carried out by DBE Technology GmbH. The Government of Georgia has been gradually increasing efforts to improve the regulatory processes and the legislation on nuclear and radiation safety, and, in particular, on safe management of radioactive waste and sealed radioactive sources. Currently, however, there are still areas where specific Georgian laws and regulations do not exist. Accordingly, in certain aspects IAEA recommendations and best practices were used as guidelines for the methodology of the safety assessment. In spite of the large uncertainties to be considered, especially in regard to the inventory, preliminary results of the safety assessment indicate that scenarios related to the groundwater pathway do not lead to radiological impacts that are above or near to limiting values. However, human intrusion scenarios might lead to dose rates for the critical group that are exceeding these values. This is mainly due to the fact that today there is no proper engineered cover on top of the concrete vaults. Based on the comparison of existing options and considering the results of the long-term safety assessment, it is recommended to backfill the remaining voids inside the concrete vaults and to construct an engineered cover to reduce the probability of human intrusion scenarios and to minimize their potential impact. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 566: EMAD Compound, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada with ROTCs 1-2, Revision 0

This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 566: EMAD Compound, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 566 comprises Corrective Action Site (CAS) 25-99-20, EMAD Compound, located within Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site. The purpose of this CR is to provide documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and provide data confirming that the closure objectives for CAU 566 were met. To achieve this, the following actions were performed: • Review the current site conditions, including the concentration and extent of contamination. • Implement any corrective actions necessary to protect human health and the environment. • Properly dispose of corrective action and investigation wastes. • Document Notice of Completion and closure of CAU 566 issued by the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection. From October 2010 through May 2011, closure activities were performed as set forth in the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for CAU 566: EMAD Compound, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada. The purposes of the activities as defined during the data quality objectives process were as follows: • Determine whether contaminants of concern (COCs) are present. • If COCs are present, determine their nature and extent, implement appropriate corrective actions, and properly dispose of wastes. Analytes detected during the closure activities were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) to determine COCs for CAU 566. Assessment of the data from collected soil samples, and from radiological and visual surveys of the site, indicates the FALs were exceeded for polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), semivolatile organic compounds (SVOCs), and radioactivity. Corrective actions were implemented to remove the following: • Radiologically contaminated soil assumed greater than FAL at two locations • Radiologically contaminated soil assumed greater than FAL with lead shot • PCB-contaminated soil • Radiologically contaminated filters and equipment • Fuels, lubricants, engine coolants, and oils • Lead debris • Electrical and lighting components assumed to be potential source materials, including - fluorescent light bulbs - mercury switches (thermostats) - circuit boards - PCB-containing ballasts Closure of CAU 566 was achieved through a combination of removal activities and closure in place. Corrective actions to remove COCs, and known and assumed potential source materials, were implemented as was practical. The PCBs remaining at the site are bounded laterally, but not vertically, within CAS 25-99-20 based upon step-out sampling; the sources (e.g., PCB transformer oils, diesel fuel from locomotive reservoirs) have been removed; the practice of the application of PCB-containing oils for soil stabilization has ceased; and the COCs are not readily mobile in the environment. Closure in place is necessary, and future land use of the site will be restricted from intrusive activities. This will effectively eliminate inadvertent contact by humans with the contaminated media. The DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, provides the following recommendations: • No further corrective action is required at CAS 25-99-20. • Closure in place of CAS 25-99-20. • A use restriction is required at CAU 566. • A Notice of Completion to the DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 566. • Corrective Action Unit 566 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗