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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 109 records · Page 6
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NASA NTRS1972

Calculated maximum Hl ground-level concentrations downwind from launch pad aborts of the space shuttle and Titan 3 C vehicles at Kennedy Space Center

A quantitative assessment is described of the potential environmental hazard posed by the atmospheric release of HCl resulting from the burning of solid propellant during two hypothetical on-pad aborts of the Titan 3 C and space shuttle vehicles at Kennedy Space Center. In one pad-abort situation, it is assumed that the cases of the two solid-propellant engines are ruptured and the burning propellant falls to the ground in the immediate vicinity of the launch pad where it continues to burn for 5 minutes. In the other pad-abort situation considered, one of the two solid engines on each vehicle is assumed to ignite and burn at the normal rate while the vehicle remains on the launch pad. Calculations of maximum HCl ground-level concentration for the above on-pad abort situations were made using the computerized NASA/MSFC multilayer diffusion models in conjunction with appropriate meteorological and source inputs. Three meteorological regimes are considered-fall, spring, and afternoon sea-breeze. Source inputs for the hazard calculations were developed. The principal result of the calculations is that maximum ground-level HCl concentrations at distances greater than 1 kilometer from the launch pad are less than 3 parts per million in all cases considered.

Dumbauld, R. K.↗
NASA NTRS2010

The NASA MLAS Flight Demonstration - A Review of a Highly Successful Test

NASA has tested the Max Launch Abort System (MLAS) as a risk-mitigation design should problems arise with the baseline Orion spacecraft launch abort design. The Max in MLAS is not Maximum, but rather dedicated to Max Faget, The renowned NASA Spacecraft designer. In the fall of 2009, the mission was flown, with great success, from the NASA Wallops Flight Facility. The MLAS flight test vehicle prototype consists of a boost ring, coast ring, and the MLAS fairing itself, which houses an Orion Command Module (CM) boilerplate. The objective of the MLAS flight test is to reorient the fairing with the CM, weighing approximately 29,000 lbs and traveling 290 fps, 180 degrees to an orientation suitable for the release of the CM during a pad abort and low altitude abort. Although multiple parachute deployments are used in the MLAS flight test vehicle to complete its objective, there are only two parachute types employed in the flight test. Five of the nine parachutes used for MLAS are 27.6 ft DO ribbon parachutes, and the remaining four are standard G-12 cargo parachutes. This paper presents an overview of the 27.6 ft DO ribbon parachute system employed on the MLAS flight test vehicle for coast ring separation, fairing reorientation, and as drogue parachutes for the CM after separation from the fairing. Discussion will include: the process used to select this design, previously proven as a spin/stall recovery parachute; descriptions of all components of the parachute system; the minor modifications necessary to adapt the parachute to the MLAS program; the techniques used to analyze the parachute for the multiple roles it performs; a discussion of the rigging techniques used to interface the parachute system to the vehicle; a brief description of how the evolution of the program affected parachute usage and analysis; and a summary of the results of the flight test, including video of the flight test and subsequent summary analysis. . A discussion of the flight test which was highly successful as well as the flight test observations will be a significant portion of the review.

Taylor, Anthony P.↗
NASA NTRS2011

A Review of the NASA MLAS Flight Demonstration

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) has tested the Max Launch Abort System (MLAS) as a risk-mitigation design should problems arise with the baseline Orion spacecraft launch abort design. The Max in MLAS is not Maximum, but rather dedicated to Max Faget, the renowned NASA Spacecraft designer. In July 2009, the mission was flown, with great success, from the NASA Wallops Flight Facility. The MLAS flight test vehicle prototype consists of a boost skirt, coast skirt, and the MLAS fairing itself, which houses an Orion Command Module (CM) boilerplate. The objective of the MLAS flight test is to reorient the fairing with the CM, weighing approximately 29,000 lbs and traveling 290 fps, 180 degrees to an orientation suitable for the release of the CM during a pad abort or low altitude abort. The boost and coast skirts provide the necessary thrust and stability to establish the flight test conditions and are released prior to the reorientation of the fairing. A secondary test objective after successful release of the CM from the fairing is to demonstrate the removal of the CM forward bay cover (FBC) with the CM drogue parachutes, and subsequent deployment of the CM main parachutes attached to the FBC. Although multiple parachute deployments are used in the MLAS flight test vehicle to complete its objective, there are only two parachute types employed in the flight test. Five of the nine parachutes used for MLAS are 27.6 ft DO ribbon parachutes already proven as a spin/stall parachute for military aircraft, and the remaining four are G-12 cargo parachutes modified for increased strength and reefing. This paper presents an overview of the 27.6 ft DO ribbon parachute system employed on the MLAS flight test vehicle for coast skirt separation, fairing reorientation, and as CM drogue parachutes. Discussion will include: the process used to select this design; descriptions of all components of the parachute system; the minor modifications necessary to adapt the parachute to the MLAS program; the techniques used to analyze the parachute for the multiple roles it performs including discussions of how the evolution of the program affected parachute usage and analysis; a summary of the results of the highly successful flight test, including video of the flight test; and an overview of the subsequent post-test analysis.

Taylor, Anthony P.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Ares I-X: On the Threshold of Exploration

Ares I-X, the first flight of the Ares I crew launch vehicle, is less than a year from launch. Ares I-X will test the flight characteristics of Ares I from liftoff to first stage separation and recovery. The flight also will demonstrate the computer hardware and software (avionics) needed to control the vehicle; deploy the parachutes that allow the first stage booster to land in the ocean safely; measure and control how much the rocket rolls during flight; test and measure the effects of first stage separation; and develop and try out new ground handling and rocket stacking procedures in the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) and first stage recovery procedures at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) in Florida. All Ares I-X major elements have completed their critical design reviews, and are nearing final fabrication. The first stage--four-segment solid rocket booster from the Space Shuttle inventory--incorporates new simulated forward structures to match the Ares I five-segment booster. The upper stage, Orion crew module, and launch abort system will comprise simulator hardware that incorporates developmental flight instrumentation for essential data collection during the mission. The upper stage simulator consists of smaller cylindrical segments, which were transported to KSC in fall 2008. The crew module and launch abort system simulator were shipped in December 2008. The first stage hardware, active roll control system (RoCS), and avionics components will be delivered to KSC in 2009. This paper will provide detailed statuses of the Ares I-X hardware elements as NASA's Constellation Program prepares for this first flight of a new exploration era in the summer of 2009.

Davis, Stephan R.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Ares I-X Flight Test Vehicle: Stack 5 Modal Test

Ares I-X was the first flight test vehicle used in the development of NASA's Ares I crew launch vehicle. The Ares I-X used a 4-segment reusable solid rocket booster from the Space Shuttle heritage with mass simulators for the 5th segment, upper stage, crew module and launch abort system. Three modal tests were defined to verify the dynamic finite element model of the Ares I-X flight test vehicle. Test configurations included two partial stacks and the full Ares I-X flight test vehicle on the Mobile Launcher Platform. This report focuses on the first modal test that was performed on the top section of the vehicle referred to as Stack 5, which consisted of the spacecraft adapter, service module, crew module and launch abort system simulators. This report describes the test requirements, constraints, pre-test analysis, test operations and data analysis for the Ares I-X Stack 5 modal test.

Buehrle, Ralph D.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Challenger tragedy was caused by an Apollo mistake, terminating risk analysis

NASA’s view of risk changed between early Apollo and the Space Shuttle. Risk was a known serious problem at the beginning of Apollo and the risk estimates were disturbingly high. To avoid public concern, risk analysis was discontinued. Risk analysis was avoided in Shuttle, leading to an unnecessarily risky design. The immediate cause of the Challenger tragedy was the mistaken decision to launch in cold weather. The fundamental cause was the high risk of the Shuttle design. Before Challenger, management thought and testified that the probability of an accident was 1 in 100,000. After Challenger, Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) found a roughly 1 in 100 chance of a Shuttle failure. The recent Orion design uses the safer Apollo approach, with a hardened capsule, launch abort escape, and the crew placed above the rocket tanks and engines. During Apollo it was estimated that, “assuming all elements from propulsion to rendezvous and life support were done as well or better than ever before, that 30 astronauts would be lost before 3 were returned safely to the Earth.” The chance of astronaut survival was only 10%. After the Apollo 1 tragedy, the awareness of risk led to an intense focus on achieving safety. “The only possible explanation for the astonishing success – no losses in space and on time – was that every participant at every level in every area far exceeded the norm of human capabilities.” During Apollo, a NASA PRA found that the chance of success was “less than 5 percent.” The NASA Administrator felt that “the numbers could do irreparable harm,” and discontinued numerical risk assessment. This led to decreasing understanding of risk. The head of Apollo reliability and safety decided, “Statistics don’t count for anything,” and that risk is reduced by “attention taken in design.” The great and initially unexpected success of Apollo appeared to validate the neglect of PRA. Continuing to neglect the mathematical estimation of risk led Shuttle into a high risk design that produced tragic results. The initial design of the Shuttle emphasized increasing capability and reducing cost without analysis or even mention of risk. A retired NASA official stated, “some NASA people began to confuse desire with reality. … One result was to assess risk in terms of what was thought acceptable without regard for verifying the assessment. … Note that under such circumstances real risk management is shut out.” Not computing risk led to removing launch abort, removing crew escape, selecting less reliable Solid Rocket Boosters, placing the crew compartment next to the rocket boosters, and accepting more stressed shielding tile designs. Accepting these specific risks directly caused the shuttle disasters. The Challenger tragedy is frequently taught as a case of management failure. The focus is on the Challenger launch decision hours before, which is a dramatic example of bad management. However, the true cause of the Challenger disaster occurred decades earlier in the Apollo era. When the easily predictable failures occurred, failure investigations focused on how they might have been avoided. The Shuttle was cancelled after the space station was completed because of its high risk. The ultimate cause of the Shuttle tragedies was the choice by the Apollo-era NASA administrator to avoid a negative public reaction to realistic risk analysis.

Harry W. Jones↗
NASA NTRS1972

Users guide for guidance and control Launch and Abort Simulation for Spacecraft (LASS), volume 1

The mathematical models and computer program which are used to implement LASS are described. The computer program provides for a simulation of boost to orbit and abort capability from boost trajectories to a prescribed target. The abort target provides a decision point for engine shutdown from which the vehicle coasts to the vicinity of the selected abort recovery site. The simulation is a six degree of freedom simulation describing a rigid body. The vehicle is influenced by forces and moments from nondistributed aerodynamics. An adaptive autopilot is provided to control vehicle attitudes during powered and unpowered flight. A conventional autopilot is provided for study of vehicle during powered flight.

Havig, T. F.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Application of Fault Management Theory to the Quantitive Selection of a Launch Vehicle Abort Trigger Suite

SHM/FM theory has been successfully applied to the selection of the baseline set Abort Triggers for the NASA SLS center dot Quantitative assessment played a useful role in the decision process  M&FM, which is new within NASA MSFC, required the most "new" work, as this quantitative analysis had never been done before center dot Required development of the methodology and tool to mechanize the process center dot Established new relationships to the other groups  The process is now an accepted part of the SLS design process, and will likely be applied to similar programs in the future at NASA MSFC  Future improvements center dot Improve technical accuracy ‒Differentiate crew survivability due to an abort, vs. survivability even no immediate abort occurs (small explosion with little debris) ‒Account for contingent dependence of secondary triggers on primary triggers ‒Allocate "Δ LOC Benefit" of each trigger when added to the previously selected triggers. center dot Reduce future costs through the development of a specialized tool  Methodology can be applied to any manned/unmanned vehicle, in space or terrestrial

Lo, Yunnhon↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Safety & Mission Assurance (SMA) Activities in Support of Artemis I and Plans for Artemis II

The Artemis I mission in 2022 accomplished humanity’s first venture beyond Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) with a human-rated spacecraft in over fifty years. Artemis comprises several key Program elements – Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) Orion Crew Module, Service Module, Launch Abort System; the Space Launch System (SLS) and the Exploration Ground System (EGS). Much of our human spaceflight experience with crewed lunar missions is captured in historical program documents, but first-hand knowledge is limited to a few spaceflight veterans. Missions to LEO have offered the opportunity of direct, near-instantaneous communications and assistance, and the ability to return to Earth within a matter of hours in case of emergency. Outward-bound missions do not have these features and will require a more autonomous and reliable spacecraft. The assessment of compliance with applicable safety requirements and adequacy of hazard controls and verifications is the responsibility of the MPCV Safety and Engineering Review Panel (MSERP), along with a Joint [NASA/ESA] Safety and Engineering Review Panel (JSERP) for the review of the European Service Module (ESM). The MSERP has two features that are relatively unique amongst NASA safety panels. First, NASA Engineering was added as a Panel co-chair, which enhanced the Engineering organization’s engagement and level of understanding of hazard analysis methodology and results. The MSERP has representation from each office, including Flight Operations Directorate (FOD) and Health and Medical Technical Authority, supporting the Orion Program in addition to the Engineering and Safety Technical Authority co-chairs. Second, the JSERP has a second set of co-chairs from ESA Engineering and ESA Product Assurance and Safety organizations, which recognizes the international arrangement as one of partnership. This paper will focus on SMA processes, activities, and plans for the Orion element and explore unique challenges associated with Artemis II as we approach the flight of the first crewed Orion vehicle.

Paul J. Collier↗
NASA NTRS2015

The Orion Pad Abort 1 (PA-1) Flight Test: A Propulsion Success

This poster provides a concise overview of the highly successful Orion Pad Abort 1 (PA-1) flight test, and the three rocket motors that contributed to this success. The primary purpose of the Orion PA-1 flight was to help certify the Orion Launch Abort System (LAS), which can be utilized in the unlikely event of an emergency on the launchpad or during mission vehicle ascent. The PA-1 test was the first fully integrated flight test of the Orion LAS, one of the primary systems within the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV). The Orion MPCV is part of the architecture within the Space Launch System (SLS), which is being designed to transport astronauts beyond low-Earth orbit for future exploration missions. Had the Orion PA-1 flight abort occurred during launch preparations for a real human spaceflight mission, the PA-1 LAS would have saved the lives of the crew. The PA-1 flight test was largely successful due to the three solid rocket motors of the LAS: the Attitude Control Motor (ACM); the Jettison Motor (JM); and the Abort Motor (AM). All three rocket motors successfully performed their required functions during the Orion PA-1 flight test, flown on May 6, 2010 at the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, culminating in a successful demonstration of an abort capability from the launchpad.

JM↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Orion @ Ames

NASA Ames is a key contributor in Orion heatshield development, aerothermodynamics and aerodynamic and launch abort system modeling of the Artemis generation spacecrafts. This talk will provide an overview and highlights of various present and past activities that ARC staff has been contributing to the program.

heatshield↗
NASA NTRS2008

Constellation Training Facility Support

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration is developing the next set of vehicles that will take men back to the moon under the Constellation Program. The Constellation Training Facility (CxTF) is a project in development that will be used to train astronauts, instructors, and flight controllers on the operation of Constellation Program vehicles. It will also be used for procedure verification and validation of flight software and console tools. The CxTF will have simulations for the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), Crew Module (CM), CEV Service Module (SM), Launch Abort System (LAS), Spacecraft Adapter (SA), Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV), Pressurized Cargo Variant CM, Pressurized Cargo Variant SM, Cargo Launch Vehicle, Earth Departure Stage (EDS), and the Lunar Surface Access Module (LSAM). The Facility will consist of part-task and full-task trainers, each with a specific set of mission training capabilities. Part task trainers will be used for focused training on a single vehicle system or set of related systems. Full task trainers will be used for training on complete vehicles and all of its subsystems. Support was provided in both software development and project planning areas of the CxTF project. Simulation software was developed for the hydraulic system of the Thrust Vector Control (TVC) of the ARES I launch vehicle. The TVC system is in charge of the actuation of the nozzle gimbals for navigation control of the upper stage of the ARES I rocket. Also, software was developed using C standards to send and receive data to and from hand controllers to be used in CxTF cockpit simulations. The hand controllers provided movement in all six rotational and translational axes. Under Project Planning & Control, support was provided to the development and maintenance of integrated schedules for both the Constellation Training Facility and Missions Operations Facilities Division. These schedules maintain communication between projects in different levels. The CxTF support provided is one that requires continuous maintenance since the project is still on initial development phases.

Flores, Jose M.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Mode Selection Techniques in Variable Mass Flexible Body Modeling

In developing a flexible body spacecraft simulation for the Launch Abort System of the Orion vehicle, when a rapid mass depletion takes place, the dynamics problem with time varying eigenmodes had to be addressed. Three different techniques were implemented, with different trade-offs made between performance and fidelity. A number of technical issues had to be solved in the process. This paper covers the background of the variable mass flexibility problem, the three approaches to simulating it, and the technical issues that were solved in formulating and implementing them.

Launch Abort System↗
NASA NTRS2010

TPSAS-NF1676L-11132-DND

The Orion Pad Abort 1 Flight Test occurred on May 6th, 2010 at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico. The test was the first for the Orion vehicle and was primarily a test of the Orion Launch Abort System’s ability to execute an abort from the launch pad. The test was successful, and, in most cases, results were well within predicted outcomes. For this test, the thermal control subsystem was an inherent part of the flight operations team. The thermal team provided pre-launch predictions of component temperatures, set component temperature limits, and monitored those limits during the flight operations process as part of the primary flight operations team. The thermal team was also responsible for day-of-flight predictions of the main abort motor’s propellant mean bulk temperature, a key launch constraint for the test. After the test, thermal data was collected, reviewed, and compared against pre-launch predictions showing very good agreement in most areas. Based on the pre-test and flight operations experience, a detailed list of lessons learned has been developed and will be reviewed prior to potential future Orion or other such flight tests.

Joseph F Gasbarre↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

TPSAS-NF1676L-11021-DND

The Orion Pad Abort 1 Flight Test occurred on May 6th, 2010 at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico. The test was the first for the Orion vehicle and was primarily a test of the Orion Launch Abort System’s ability to execute an abort from the launch pad. The test was successful and in most cases results were well within predicted outcomes. For this test, the thermal control subsystem was an inherent part of the flight operations team. The thermal team provided pre-launch predictions of component temperatures, set component temperature limits, and monitored those limits during the flight operations process as part of the primary flight operations team. The thermal team was also responsible for day-of-flight predictions of the main abort motor’s propellant mean bulk temperature, a key launch constraint for the test. After the test, thermal data was collected, reviewed, and compared against pre-launch predictions showing very good agreement in most areas. Based on the pre-test and flight operations experience, a detailed list of lessons learned has been developed and will be reviewed prior to potential future Orion or other such flight tests.

Joseph F Gasbarre↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Agile-Like Approach to Hardware Development: The Ejectable Data Recorder (EDR) for Orion's Ascent Abort 2 (AA-2) Test Flight

On July 2, 2019, the Ascent Abort 2 (AA-2) Flight Test Vehicle was launched from Cape Canaveral, with the goal of demonstrating the performance of Orion’s Launch Abort System (LAS) and collecting data from hundreds of sensors throughout the vehicle. The data collected during this test flight is of paramount importance, as it will be used to certify the Orion vehicle for human spaceflight. Originally, the data was to be downlinked via a single string network of antennas on the LAS, with the associated risk of potential data dropouts, as well as loss of data once the LAS was jettisoned. Thus, additional antennas were added onto the crew module (CM) to support data downlink post-LAS jettison, a buffer rebroadcast capability was added to fill in any gaps in data downlink transmissions, and an ejectable data recorder (EDR) subsystem was added to the CM as a redundant measure to collect all the instrumentation data. The EDR subsystem was added to the project about one year after the project commenced, which significantly reduced the available development time when compared with the other subsystems of the AA-2 Test Flight. The project was further accelerated by six months, around the critical design review gate. Due to the schedule compression challenge and the fact that the EDR subsystem was a backup system and not flight critical, the EDR subsystem was further challenged to find a new and more efficient way to develop hardware. Thus, the EDR subsystem experimented with different management and systems engineering processes, team sizes, communication methods, and tools. Some examples are novel uses of SharePoint as a Data-centric Project Management & Systems Engineering environment, a continuous testing approach through the lifecycle, and a Skunkworks approach to managing the team. The EDR subsystem blended Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) hardware with in-house developed hardware and software to create a novel data retrieval capability. The capability evolved rapidly through a hardware in the loop simulation environment that enabled incremental component updates for not only the EDR subsystem but across the entire Crew Module. This paper will present an overview of how the EDR subsystem was managed and compare it to an Agile approach to managing projects. The paper will further provide a recommended approach to future Agile-like hardware development that incorporates lessons learned from the EDR experience.

Agile↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Ejectable Data Recorder: A Lean, Risk-Informed Approach for Hardware Development

NASA is developing the Orion spacecraft to transport crew from the Earth to the Moon as part of the Artemis series of missions. To provide a crew escape capability from pre-launch through ascent, the Orion vehicle is equipped with a Launch Abort System (LAS), built by Lockheed Martin, which pulls the capsule away from the launch vehicle in the event of an abort scenario. The Ascent Abort 2 (AA-2) test flight occurred on July 2, 2019,and tested a production version of the LAS to ensure that it can operate as intended, and to collect a large data set from hundreds of sensors on the vehicle to support Orion flight certification. In the original AA-2 architecture, a single-string set of communications antennas on the LAS would downlink all of the in-flight test data to ground stations. However, that communications architecture was predicted to have data dropouts during abort and jettison of the LAS, and would not support data transmission at all after LAS jettison. As a result, a comprehensive trade study was completed, yielding the addition of antennas on the crew module (CM), a buffer/rebroadcast capability for key portions of the flight, and an ejectable data recorder (EDR) subsystem. This EDR subsystem would serve as a backup to the radio frequency (RF) communications system, and would be non-flight critical, providing a unique capability that enabled management to take a different approach with the hardware and software development. The Crew Module and Separation Ring were developed as “Class 1”Flight Hardware, albeit with some tailoring approaches to enable efficiencies. The Class 1 designation requires full rigor for flight hardware and software, documenting everything that happens to a piece of hardware from procurement through disposal, requiring a full spectrum of acceptance tests, and the highest rigor of quality assurance processes. At the other end of the spectrum, Class 3hardware is controlled, but not intended for flight, and leaves the level of rigor up to the project manager. This classification is often used for research and development projects. Similarly,Class-1E has been recently defined at NASA for ISS payloads and technology development projects that are not flight critical and do not need the full rigor of Class 1 to be successful. The EDR subsystem was challenged at commencement to adopt a skunkworks and agile-like approach to hardware development, allowing for a different risk posture than the rest of the AA-2 hardware. After initially pursuing Class 1 processes, the EDR subsystem design evolved to incorporating numerous commercial components, leading to re-designation as a Class-1E subsystem. The resulting EDR subsystem was fully successful in meeting all flight system requirements, and achieved 100% retrieval of flight test data. This paper will discuss the risk posture of the EDR subsystem and the subsequent tailoring that was enacted as part of its Class-1E status.

EDR↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Comparison of Surface Pressure Fluctuations from Flight and Wind Tunnel Tests on the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle

Transonic and supersonic wind-tunnel test of scaled-models are used to predict the surface pressure fluctuations on aerospace vehicles. An outstanding question is how good are such tests? The present paper attempts to answer this question for the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle by comparing data from the Ascent Abort-2 (AA2) flight test with those measured in two different scaled-model wind tunnel tests (WTT) 51AS and 134AS. A sensor by sensor and a Mach by Mach comparisons of spectra of surface pressure fluctuations are presented for nominal ascent part of flight. Spectra measured over a large part of the vehicle surface were found to be dominated by the wake vortices shed from the four Abort Motor nozzles situated on the upper part of the Launch Abort System. It was found that the shapes of the scaled-up spectra from WTTs were very close to those measured in the flight, but the levels, for the most part, were found to be lower than the flight data. The highest differences were from the regions of complex flows where wakes from the adjacent nozzles interacted with the free-stream flow. There the WTT predicted levels were consistently 2dB to 6dB lower than the flight data, across all spectral bands. Another region of significant under-prediction was the local separated flow region at the Fillet-Ogive junction. The accuracy of the sharp spectral peaks from regions along a nozzle axis was found to be dependent on the fidelity of the model. The model in the 51AS WTT used a simplified contour, which resulted in a large under prediction of the spectral peak by 1dB to 10dB. A limited number of data from 134AS, where the model accurately captured all features of the nozzles of the flight vehicle, however; showed that the under prediction was lower: 1-2dB. The fluctuation spectra on the large protuberance of the Umbilical Cover was found to be reasonably well-predicted by 134AS WTT, which meticulously reproduced a scaled-down shape of this protuberance. Such information will help to determine the margins to be applied to wind-tunnel data to create flight environments.

MPCV↗