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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 109 records · Page 6
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2015

New Developments in FPGA: SEUs and Fail-Safe Strategies from the NASA Goddard Perspective

It has been shown that, when exposed to radiation environments, each Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) device has unique error signatures. Subsequently, fail-safe and mitigation strategies will differ per FPGA type. In this session several design approaches for safe systems will be presented. It will also explore the benefits and limitations of several mitigation techniques. The intention of the presentation is to provide information regarding FPGA types, their susceptibilities, and proven fail-safe strategies; so that users can select appropriate mitigation and perform the required trade for system insertion. The presentation will describe three types of FPGA devices and their susceptibilities in radiation environments.

hardware description language (HDL)↗
NASA NTRS2016

New Developments in FPGA Devices: SEUs and Fail-Safe Strategies from the NASA Goddard Perspective

It has been shown that, when exposed to radiation environments, each Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) device has unique error signatures. Subsequently, fail-safe and mitigation strategies will differ per FPGA type. In this session several design approaches for safe systems will be presented. It will also explore the benefits and limitations of several mitigation techniques. The intention of the presentation is to provide information regarding FPGA types, their susceptibilities, and proven fail-safe strategies; so that users can select appropriate mitigation and perform the required trade for system insertion. The presentation will describe three types of FPGA devices and their susceptibilities in radiation environments.

Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)↗
NASA NTRS2016

New Developments in FPGA: SEUs and Fail-Safe Strategies from the NASA Goddard Perspective

It has been shown that, when exposed to radiation environments, each Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) device has unique error signatures. Subsequently, fail-safe and mitigation strategies will differ per FPGA type. In this session several design approaches for safe systems will be presented. It will also explore the benefits and limitations of several mitigation techniques. The intention of the presentation is to provide information regarding FPGA types, their susceptibilities, and proven fail-safe strategies; so that users can select appropriate mitigation and perform the required trade for system insertion. The presentation will describe three types of FPGA devices and their susceptibilities in radiation environments.

Error Correction and Detection (EDAC)↗
NASA NTRS1992

A U.S. perspective on the human exploration and expansion on the planet Mars

A NASA perspective on the human exploration of Mars is presented which is based on the fundamental background available from the many previous studies. A hypothetical architecture of the Mars surface system is described which represents the complete spectrum of envisioned activities. Using the Strategic Implementation Architecture it is possible to construct a thoughtful roadmap which would enable a logical and flexible evolution of missions. Based on that architecture a suite of Martian surface elements is proposed to provide increasing levels of capability to the maturing infrastructure.

Roberts, Barney B.↗
NASA NTRS2025

Private Astronaut Post-Mission Debrief Interviews Study

BACKGROUND The commercialization of space will increasingly include individuals that are not rigorously-selected, highly-trained professional astronauts. Private astronaut missions (PAMs), such as Axiom-1 in 2022, will continue to travel to the International Space Station in the coming years, but the risk of integrating private astronauts with NASA astronauts has not been clearly quantified nor mitigated. An earlier internal NASA operations assessment, which consisted of a comprehensive literature review and interviews of current NASA experts, found that PAMs are likely to increase the risk to NASA astronauts during integrated missions (Landon, Whiting, Russell, Schorn, Passmore, & Roma, 2022). There are ongoing efforts at NASA to mitigate concerns from a medical, psychological, and technical perspective. NASA experts are working closely with PAM providers to offer recommendations and best practices beyond the limits of requirements to ensure crew health and safety. However, efforts are siloed between groups to some extent, and with the rate of PAMs likely to increase, a more comprehensive and integrated process is needed to reduce the burden on NASA resources. AIMS The purpose of this project is to understand private astronauts’ motivations for journeying to space, their pre-mission preparation period, and their experiences in space. Data will be collected via private astronaut post-mission debrief interviews. This data will inform training needs and in-mission support needed for missions that include private astronauts; the preparation NASA astronauts and mission support personnel will need to work with these integrated crews; and gaps in knowledge to guide research and countermeasure development. Our study aims to (1) Characterize risks posed by commercialization and private astronaut crew integration in spaceflight operations, as it relates to Team, Human Systems Integration Architecture (HSIA), and Behavioral Medicine (BMed) Risks, (2) Recommend potential countermeasures and identify gaps in current research. Countermeasures may be related to crew selection and composition, training, crew support systems (e.g., medical/psychological support, support from Mission Control, on-board resources), and habitability and human factors design. METHOD The BHP Lab will conduct 30-minute interviews with up to eight (8) private astronaut mission (PAM) astronauts (e.g., Axiom) and spaceflight participants (e.g., SFPs or “free flyers” on Polaris Dawn) per year from 2024-2030 to discuss knowledge gaps and needs related to selection and assessment, crew composition, training, crew support systems (e.g., medical/psychological support, support from Mission Control, onboard resources), and habitability and human factors design, which may influence the risk to NASA astronauts. Interviews will then be coded using thematic analysis and interpreted with the assistance of lexical analysis software (e.g., LIWC). As of the end of 2024, we have collected data from one PAM crew. At the conclusion of data collection in 2030, a final report will be prepared integrating all data collected by 2031. SUMMARY Post-return interviews of private astronauts are being conducted to understand their experiences and inform training and countermeasures to ensure the safety of all who journey to the ISS.

Private Astronaut Missions↗
NASA NTRS1987

Science on Space Station

Plans for space science activities on the International Space Station are reviewed from a NASA perspective. The present Station reference configuration is based on a dual-keel core unit (one habitation module and three laboratory modules supplied by NASA, ESA, and Japan) and provides for five attached systems (with up to four payloads each to be exposed to space) and several free-flying platforms (both polar orbiters and coorbiters). Particular attention is given to the space science aspects of the primary Station objectives defined by NASA (servicing and repair, platforms, pressurized modules, and attached payloads). Also discussed are the work of the Task Force on Scientific Uses of Space Station, the need for operational flexibility, the value of a continuous manned presence for experimental science, and the skills needed from the Station crew.

Black, David C.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Fracture Control and Structural Certification Guidance for Additive Manufactured Spacecraft Structures

This paper offers a NASA perspective on guidance for fracture control and structural certification of "fracture critical" additive manufactured spacecraft structures. Results of a recent industry survey on the need for maturing NASA guidance for AM certification are presented for the first time. The survey results are placed in the context of a description of what NASA standards in this area already exist, where the gaps are, and what work to address the gaps is underway.

McElroy, Mark↗
NASA NTRS1992

NASA and CFD - Making investments for the future

From a NASA perspective, CFD is a new tool for fluid flow simulation and prediction with virtually none of the inherent limitations of other ground-based simulation techniques. A primary goal of NASA's CFD research program is to develop efficient and accurate computational techniques for utilization in the design and analysis of aerospace vehicles. The program in algorithm development has systematically progressed through the hierarchy of engineering simplifications of the Navier-Stokes equations, starting with the inviscid formulations such as transonic small disturbance, full potential, and Euler.

Hessenius, Kristin A.↗
NASA NTRS1988

The International Space Station complex - Promise and problems

The current planning status of the International Space Station is reviewed from a NASA perspective, with a focus on aspects affecting the contributions of the international partners ESA, Japan, and Canada. The modifications implied by the shift from the previous double-keel configuration to the current phased-deployment (Block 1 - Block 2) approach are considered in detail and illustrated with drawings and a table listing the baseline assembly sequence. It is pointed out that the originally proposed non-NASA components can all be accommodated in the new configuration. The need for intermodule commonality of equipment form, fit, and function is discussed, and it is recommended that independent user boards be set up to select and coordinate experiments, and that the user boards of the partners open channels of cooperation and mutual support.

Halpern, Richard E.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Risk of Performance and Behavioral Health Decrements Due to Inadequate Cooperation, Coordination, Communication, and Psychosocial Adaptation within a Team

A team is defined as: "two or more individuals who interact socially and adaptively, have shared or common goals, and hold meaningful task interdependences; it is hierarchically structured and has a limited life span; in it expertise and roles are distributed; and it is embedded within an organization/environmental context that influences and is influenced by ongoing processes and performance outcomes" (Salas, Stagl, Burke, & Goodwin, 2007, p. 189). From the NASA perspective, a team is commonly understood to be a collection of individuals that is assigned to support and achieve a particular mission. Thus, depending on context, this definition can encompass both the spaceflight crew and the individuals and teams in the larger multi-team system who are assigned to support that crew during a mission. The Team Risk outcomes of interest are predominantly performance related, with a secondary emphasis on long-term health; this is somewhat unique in the NASA HRP in that most Risk areas are medically related and primarily focused on long-term health consequences. In many operational environments (e.g., aviation), performance is assessed as the avoidance of errors. However, the research on performance errors is ambiguous. It implies that actions may be dichotomized into "correct" or "incorrect" responses, where incorrect responses or errors are always undesirable. Researchers have argued that this dichotomy is a harmful oversimplification, and it would be more productive to focus on the variability of human performance and how organizations can manage that variability (Hollnagel, Woods, & Leveson, 2006) (Category III1). Two problems occur when focusing on performance errors: 1) the errors are infrequent and, therefore, difficult to observe and record; and 2) the errors do not directly correspond to failure. Research reveals that humans are fairly adept at correcting or compensating for performance errors before such errors result in recognizable or recordable failures. Astronauts are notably adept high performers. Most failures are recorded only when multiple, small errors occur and humans are unable to recognize and correct or compensate for these errors in time to prevent a failure (Dismukes, Berman, Loukopoulos, 2007) (Category III). More commonly, observers record variability in levels of performance. Some teams commit no observable errors but fail to achieve performance objectives or perform only adequately, while other teams commit some errors but perform spectacularly. Successful performance, therefore, cannot be viewed as simply the absence of errors or the avoidance of failure Johnson Space Center (JSC) Joint Leadership Team, 2008). While failure is commonly attributed to making a major error, focusing solely on the elimination of error(s) does not significantly reduce the risk of failure. Failure may also occur when performance is simply insufficient or an effort is incapable of adjusting sufficiently to a contextual change (e.g., changing levels of autonomy).

Landon, Lauren Blackwell↗
NASA NTRS1986

Ceramics for turbine engines

The Ceramics for Turbine Engines Project is comprised of three main research programs with major elements as indicated: materials and processing (monolithics and fiber reinforcement), design methodology (design code and tribology), and life prediction (environmental effects, nondestructive evaluation, fracture and fatigue, and time dependent behavior). From the NASA perspective an enhanced ceramics technology base directly supports aeronautics initiatives in small engine technology, high-performance turbine engine technology, and hypersonics. An overview of the program, which includes the technical objectives and content of each program, is provided.

Levine, Stanley R.↗