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Million Worker Study

Radiation health issues have been an important aspect of DOE's Worker Safety and Health programs. The goal is to ensure that workers are adequately protected from the various radiological hazards associated with DOE sites and operations. Since the early 1940’s DOE has supported the conduct of epidemiologic studies of practically every DOE (AEC) facility and collected these data, now managed by the Oak Ridge Associated Universities (ORAU), in remarkable detail. In the early 2000s, the Office of Health, Safety and Security authorized access to specific DOE worker datasets. Shortly thereafter, the DOE Office of Science provided funds for a pilot study that confirmed the feasibility of the Million Worker Study (MWS), and then additional resources were provided (with other agencies) to extend the follow-up of many populations, not just DOE workers, but also atomic veterans, industrial radiographers, nuclear power plant workers and medical radiation workers (the Million Persons Study (MPS)). This proposal was a continuation of support provided by DOE, specifically to extend the follow-up of the worker populations at the Mallinckrodt Chemical Works (MCW) and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The work addresses DOE’s interest in clarifying the health risks of their workers as well as contributing knowledge on radiation risks that is relevant today with regard to compensation schemes. The findings are also important for the US public in light of the increased population exposure to medical imaging, environmental circumstances such as hydraulic fracturing, increased exposures during high altitude flights, and with regard to nuclear accidents such as Fukushima and possible terrorist events. Furthermore, it is important to consider reducing the uncertainty in current risk estimates by developing risk coefficients based on healthy American workers who are more representative of U.S. workers and the general public than 1945 Japanese survivors of the atomic bombs living in a war-torn country which experienced deprivation, malnourishment, and increased rates of infections and other diseases. But more importantly, it is important to learn whether radiation exposures received gradually over time (e.g., years) are more or less effective in causing health effects, cancer in particular, than if the radiation dose is received all at once in a fraction of a second as experienced by the Japanese atomic bomb survivors. Finally, the ability to evaluate and combine large populations with intakes of radionuclides such as uranium, radium, plutonium, americium and polonium will provide new quantitative knowledge on human health effects that hitherto has not been possible. This cost-efficient study has built on the investments made and foundations laid by investigators and government agencies, including DOE, over the past 30-40 years, which have established early worker cohorts that can now provide answers to questions on the lifetime human health risks associated with low-level radiation exposures. Collaborating institutions included: International Epidemiology Institute, Oak Ridge Associated Universities, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Landauer, Inc., and Vanderbilt University. Follow-up of these two populations and the integration of them with the many other cohorts (now a total of 31) in the MPS continues under a separate DOE grant (DE-AU0000046).

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

A Biomathematical Model of Lymphopoiesis and Its Application to Acute and Chronic Irradiation Assessment

After the events of September 11, 2001, there is an increasing concern of the occurrence of radiological terrorism that may result in significant casualties in densely populated areas. Much effort has been made to establish various biomarkers to rapidly assess radiation dose in mass-casualty and population-monitoring scenarios, which are demanded for effective medical management and treatment of the exposed victims. Among these the count of lymphocytes in peripheral blood and their depletion kinetics are the most important early indicators of the severity of the radiation injury. In this study, we examine a biomathematical model of lymphopoiesis which has been successfully utilized to simulate and interpret experimental data of acute and chronic irradiations on rodents [1]. With revised parameters for humans, we find this model can reproduce several sets of clinical lymphocyte data of accident victims over a wide range of absorbed doses. In addition, the absolute lymphocyte counts and the depletion rate constants calculated by this model also show good correlation with the Guskova formula and the Goans model, the two empirical tools which have been widely recognized for early estimation of the exposed dose after radiation accidents [2]. We also use the model to analyze the hematological data of the Techa River residents which were exposed to chronic low-dose irradiation during 1950-1956 [3]. This model can serve as a computational tool in radiation accident management, military operations involving nuclear warfare, radiation therapy, and space radiation risk assessment.

Hu, Shaowen↗

A heat and mass transfer model for evaluation of damaged cesium chloride radiological sources

Radiological sources are vital to many applications, and typically contain byproducts from waste streams which decay over time to form complex mixtures of elements. Daughter products resulting from these decay processes can introduce complicating factors to the integrity and safety of the vessel that contains the radiological material. Sources containing cesium 137 ( 137 Cs) are of particular interest, because the decay of this isotope produces barium metal which reacts readily and exothermically with oxygen. This work employs physics-based numerical tools to examine the thermal response of a radiological source containing a mixture of cesium and barium in the event that vessel walls are damaged and atmospheric gases contact source material. A parametric study was conducted to determine the sensitivity of the response to various factors, including vessel geometry, source material age, the degree of vessel damage, and other parameters. Here, it was found that the peak temperatures that occurred within the source material strongly depend on these parameters, particularly vessel geometry and age, which determine whether a breach would be a relatively minor accident or a catastrophic incident. Finally, the model’s sensitivity to uncertain thermophysical properties is discussed.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Security of Mobile Radiological Sources: Overview of Industry Applied Technologies

Small radiological sources used in industrial settings recurrently require transit between job sites. Securing these sources, while stationary, can be addressed with standard security approaches and equipment. Transport of these sources increases the risk and complexity of managing and maintaining control of these sources. Implementing methodologies to securely monitor and locate sources improves response and resolution of anomalous events during transit. The Mobile Source Transit Security (MSTS) system was developed to improve security and provide situational awareness of these mobile sources throughout their job cycle. The MSTS development effort focused on creating a set of systems that could be successfully implemented in industrial radiography and well-logging applications. The MSTS team worked to address source presence and location through use and storage. The MSTS system monitors radiological sources as they move from the base of operations to the job site and back. The system provides near-real-time monitoring of the mobile source location and status and early notification of source loss or theft by transmitting operational status and alerting anomalous conditions over telematic links worldwide. The MSTS system can trigger an armed response or initiation of search and recovery operations and will automatically alert management and responsible staff if a radioactive source is lost or stolen whether it is on-site, in transport, or in storage.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

A MOOSE-Based Model for Fission Product Transport and Source Term Estimation for High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactors

Thanks to fuel elements containing tristructural isotropic (TRISO) particles combined with a low core power density and passive feedback mechanisms leading to modest temperature rises in the event of accidental events, high-temperature gas-cooled reactors (HTGRs) offer a high degree of reliability in terms of fission product retention. While the anticipated source term for HTGRs is expected to be very low, it is important to provide a quantitative estimate of radiological releases during nominal and accidental conditions. Here, we propose a computationally efficient mechanistic source term methodology relying on the Multiphysics Object Oriented Simulation Environment (MOOSE) for tracking fission product transport from TRISO particles up to the coolant pressure boundary, as well as modeling the transport and potential deposition of these nuclides inside the reactor coolant loop. The proposed computational scheme is applied to estimate source term inventories for a representative 10-MW(thermal) prismatic high-temperature microreactor and is qualitatively compared against known release fractions. In addition to providing an alternate analysis tool, this MOOSE model can help reactor designers quantify the influence of key design parameters relevant for studies of radiological dose consequences.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

A Systematic Evidence Based Performance Approach to Regulation of Nuclear Sites in England and Wales - 20058

The Environment Agency for England has developed a systematic evidence-based approach to pursue our strategic environmental objectives for the regulation of nuclear sites. We use an annual evidence review process to ensure effective and efficient targeting of limited resources to achieve those objectives. Over the last 8 years, we have been developing and refining this approach to ensure risk-based and value driven regulation. The approach comprises nuclear site and nuclear sector review processes known as Site Environment Review (SER) and Nuclear Environment Review (NER). This approach complements our regulation of nuclear site permit holders under the Environmental Permitting Regulations (EPR). We deliver our regulation of nuclear sites in England and Wales alongside the Office for Nuclear Regulation. The SER process involves the lead regulator for each nuclear site assessing the permit holder's environmental performance across 14 themes, set within the context of the site's main activities and associated waste disposals. Our themes include environmental leadership, resources and climate change, radioactive waste management, facility management and decommissioning, groundwater, and environmental radiological protection. We use evidence from site inspections and working within our subject matter groups to grade current and predicted future environmental performance. We are particularly interested in sustainability and the application of Best Available Techniques (BAT) to prevent the creation, and minimise the disposal, of radioactive wastes. We use risk analysis (strengths, weaknesses, threats and opportunities) to examine performance against our strategic environmental objectives, which are set out, in our 5-year Nuclear Delivery Plan (NDP). The output supports the targeting of our resources at each nuclear site. We consult the relevant permit holders on the SER priorities and use their feedback to refine our plans. We expect all permit holders to take account of our priorities when considering their own programmes of work, objectives and plans. The NER process brings together what we learn and achieve through regulation across the sector. It provides input to planning priorities, supported by qualitative and semi-quantitative evidence. It covers the 28 nuclear sites in England and Wales and spans the same 14 environmental themes. During the process we collate, compile and summarise evidence from the SERs and other sources such as inspection reports and evidence from our other nuclear work programmes. The output is the NER annual report. This provides a snapshot of the status of the nuclear sector and gives insights to enable us to regulate more efficiently and effectively. It also takes account of cross-cutting issues and risks such as changes in international standards, domestic policy, regulatory framework, domestic standards and guidance, learning from experience such as incidents, events and good practice, and innovation, research and development. It provides graphics that illustrate the grading of environmental performance for the nuclear sector across the fourteen environmental themes. This analysis allows benchmarking of nuclear site's environmental performance and the visualisation provides a convenient comparison of performance across themes, sites, and over time. We use this intelligence to inform our investment in training and development of our staff, and our cross-cutting engagement on strategic issues with government, the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) and other corporate organisations. Adopting this approach can provide benefits with organisational reputation, stakeholder participation and ensuring value from the public investment. This paper describes the history of the SER/NER process, a selection of outputs from the process and ideas for improvement. The paper will be of interest to other regulators and organisations across the world that are interested in supporting continuous improvement. (authors)

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Combination therapy with lenvatinib and radiation significantly inhibits thyroid cancer growth by uptake of tyrosine kinase inhibitor

Highlights: • Lenvatinib combined with radiation significantly inhibits thyroid cancer growth. • Combined therapy induced apoptosis and G2/M phase cell cycle arrest. • Irradiation increased cellular uptake of lenvatinib into cancer cells. • Combined therapy suggests a new therapeutic strategy for advanced thyroid cancer. Although surgical treatment cures >90% of differentiated thyroid cancer (DTC) patients, the remaining patients, including advanced DTC cases, have poor clinical outcomes. These patients with inoperable disease have only two choices of radioactive iodine therapy and tyrosine kinase inhibitors such as lenvatinib, which have a high incidence of treatment-related adverse events and can only prolong progression free survival by approximately 5–15 months. In this study, we investigated the antitumor effects of combination therapy with lenvatinib and radiation (CTLR) for DTC. CTLR synergistically inhibited cell replication and colony formation in vitro and tumor growth in nude mice without apparent toxicities and suppressed the expression of proliferation marker (Ki-67). CTLR also induced apoptosis and G2/M phase cell cycle arrest. Moreover, quantitative analysis of the intracellular uptake of lenvatinib using liquid chromatography and mass spectrometry demonstrated that intracellular uptake of lenvatinib was significantly increased 48 h following irradiation. These data suggest that increased membrane permeability caused by irradiation increases the intracellular concentration of levatinib, contributing to the synergistic effect. This mechanism-based potential of combination therapy suggests a powerful new therapeutic strategy for advanced thyroid cancer with fewer side effects and might be a milestone for developing a regimen in clinical practice.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

Consequence analyses of sabotage-induced radiological releases in sodium-cooled fast microreactors

Analysis of three sodium-cooled fast microreactors (SFMs) with thermal powers of 10, 30, and 50 MWt showed that smaller reactors result in lower radiological consequences during a postulated sabotage-induced event because of their reduced core inventory. All SFMs used U-10Zr metal fuel enriched to 15 wt% high-assay low-enriched uranium and operated until their respective effective multiplication factor (k eff ) reduced to less than 1 or until the end of their operational lifespan. Sabotage scenarios were simulated at this point, when the fuel inventory within the core contains the highest-level of radioactivity. Radionuclide core inventories were calculated using the SCALE code at shutdown and 3 days post-shutdown. Dose consequence analyses were performed for three sabotage scenarios using the RASCAL tool. As microreactor developers plan for minimal on-site or complete off-site emergency response, it remains essential to evaluate their physical protection needs and potential hazards, including assessing postulated sabotage-induced events that could become more relevant. SFM licensees should identify a credible worst-case, major accident, estimate release source terms, and perform dose consequence analyses to evaluate site-specific physical protection measures. In conclusion, this recommendation supports a risk-informed, performance-based approach, aligning with applicable regulatory requirements, i.e., 10 CFR Parts 100 and 53 rulemaking in the United States.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

A Preliminary Radiological Risk Assessment Model for Disposition of Remote-Handled Transuranic Wastes at Los Alamos National Laboratory Area G - 20116

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) operates a low-level radioactive waste (LLW) disposal site at Material Disposal Area G, in Los Alamos, New Mexico, USA. Area G has been the primary LLW disposal site for Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) since the 1960's. In addition to LLW, Area G is host to a variety of other wastes, the disposition of which must be determined before closure of the site. A probabilistic Radiological Risk Assessment (RRA) for Area G is used in order to support decision making regarding some wastes that are not addressed in the extant Area G Performance Assessment (PA) and Composite Analysis (CA). Between 1979 and 1987, 33 special shafts were augered into the Bandelier Tuff at Area G. This volcanic tuff is present across Pajarito Plateau on the eastern slopes of the Jemez Mountains, and varies widely in its consistency, from weakly indurated non-welded layers to welded layers that uphold the mesa cliffs of the Plateau. These mesas are home to LANL, Area G, and the townsites of Los Alamos and White Rock, with residences about 1400 m from Area G. The 33 Shafts were lined with steel casing, and contain remote-handled (RH) transuranic wastes (TRU) resulting from experiments and analysis performed in special glove boxes at the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research (CMR) facility at LANL. Some of these wastes originated as used nuclear fuel. The purpose of the Area G RRA is to evaluate the potential future risk to humans and the environment from the RH TRU in the 33 Shafts in the context of the risk associated with the surrounding wastes at Area G. The analysis is responsive to expectations outlined in DOE Order 458.1, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment, and is informed by the Manual and Guidance accompanying DOE O 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management. Because the waste meets the definition of TRU, the regulatory context necessarily takes into consideration the regulation governing the disposal of TRU from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA): 40 CFR 191, Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes. Given the broader regulatory context for the RRA, the analysis is subject to different assumptions from those made in the existing DOE O 435.1 PA and CA, such as allowing for future occupation of the site. The analysis begins with a comprehensive evaluation of features, events, processes, and exposure scenarios (FEPS) for Area G and the wastes it contains. These FEPSs are screened to eliminate from further consideration those of extremely low probability and/or consequence, and a conceptual site model (CSM) is subsequently developed. The scope and structure of the Area G RRA Model is informed by this CSM, and the Area G RRA Model is developed using the GoldSim systems analysis modeling platform. This paper presents the initial version of a defensible, transparent, and reasonably realistic model, which is based on the state of knowledge of the wastes, the site, and the FEPSs that govern contaminant transport from wastes into the environment and subsequent exposures to humans and other biota. Probabilistic model input distributions represent uncertainties inherent in the real and modeled systems. The results of the Area G RRA Model inform decisions regarding the disposition of the RH TRU in the 33 Shafts. (authors)

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Technology Applicable to Remote Hazardous Constituents and Waste Stream Grouping

Originally, Rocky Flats transuranic (TRU) waste was managed from waste streams that were composed of similar chemical constituents and were generated from identical processes. Early waste processing at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) maintained the Rocky Flats record until INL began generating their own item description codes (IDCs). Ultimately TRU waste management at INL was driven to combine wastes from all IDCs that were assigned by Rocky Flats to a summary category group regardless of whether the chemical constituents in the waste were known or not. At this point, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) certified program requirements to process the TRU waste according to waste streams was nearly eliminated. In April 2018, operations in the Sludge Repackage Project (SRP) area were halted by a radiological materials release accident in which drums containing waste experienced a loss of containment after over-pressurization occurred. Four SRP drums, repackaged in the Accelerated Retrieval Project (ARP) V area, had an adverse, delayed chemical reaction event occur when prohibited materials from one container were mixed with chemically-incompatible materials from other containers in the repackaging process. This incident was the direct result of processing unknowns under a protocol where the components of the waste were added to incompatible materials resulting in a run-away reaction. After a Difficult Waste Team (DWT) and Los Alamos National Laboratory – Carlsbad Operations (LANL-CO) subject matter expert (SME) visit in September 2019, it was determined by the team that all of the work observed on the September visit was performed upstream of the certified program and that the Visual Examination (VE) and other methods typically used by the certified program were being used for Acceptable Knowledge (AK) augmentation. This augmentation was needed in order to determine what the constituents in the waste might be, and is based primarily on collections of VE results. The waste at INL that is being processed in what is considered to be the Priority 2 (yellow) and Priority 3 (red) lists either needs AK to be completed before certified characterization can occur or is waiting to be processed because the waste has been mixed with unknown wastes resulting in a lack of information that could have impact of the ability to certify and ship the waste to the WIPP.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Predictive Radiation Oncology – A New NCI–DOE Scientific Space and Community

With a widely attended virtual kickoff event on January 29, 2021, the National Cancer Institute (NCI) and the Department of Energy (DOE) launched a series of 4 interactive, interdisciplinary workshops—and a final concluding “World Café” on March 29, 2021—focused on advancing computational approaches for predictive oncology in the clinical and research domains of radiation oncology. These events reflect 3,870 human hours of virtual engagement with representation from 8 DOE national laboratories and the Frederick National Laboratory for Cancer Research (FNL), 4 research institutes, 5 cancer centers, 17 medical schools and teaching hospitals, 5 companies, 5 federal agencies, 3 research centers, and 27 universities. Here we summarize the workshops by first describing the background for the workshops. Participants identified twelve key questions—and collaborative parallel ideas—as the focus of work going forward to advance the field. These were then used to define short-term and longer-term “Blue Sky” goals. In addition, the group determined key success factors for predictive oncology in the context of radiation oncology, if not the future of all of medicine. These are: cross-discipline collaboration, targeted talent development, development of mechanistic mathematical and computational models and tools, and access to high-quality multiscale data that bridges mechanisms to phenotype. The workshop participants reported feeling energized and highly motivated to pursue next steps together to address the unmet needs in radiation oncology specifically and in cancer research generally and that NCI and DOE project goals align at the convergence of radiation therapy and advanced computing.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

Normal Tissue Injury Induced by Photon and Proton Therapies: Gaps and Opportunities

Despite technological advances in radiation therapy (RT) and cancer treatment, patients still experience adverse effects. Proton therapy (PT) has emerged as a valuable RT modality that can improve treatment outcomes. Normal tissue injury is an important determinant of the outcome; therefore, for this review, we analyzed 2 databases: (1) clinical trials registered with ClinicalTrials.gov and (2) the literature on PT in PubMed, which shows a steady increase in the number of publications. Most studies in PT registered with ClinicalTrials.gov with results available are nonrandomized early phase studies with a relatively small number of patients enrolled. From the larger database of nonrandomized trials, we listed adverse events in specific organs/sites among patients with cancer who are treated with photons and protons to identify critical issues. The present data demonstrate dosimetric advantages of PT with favorable toxicity profiles and form the basis for comparative randomized prospective trials. A comparative analysis of 3 recently completed randomized trials for normal tissue toxicities suggests that for early stage non-small cell lung cancer, no meaningful comparison could be made between stereotactic body RT and stereotactic body PT due to low accrual (NCT01511081). In addition, for locally advanced non-small cell lung cancer, a comparison of intensity modulated RT with passive scattering PT (now largely replaced by spot-scanned intensity modulated PT), PT did not provide any benefit in normal tissue toxicity or locoregional failure over photon therapy. Finally, for locally advanced esophageal cancer, proton beam therapy provided a lower total toxicity burden but did not improve progression-free survival and quality of life (NCT01512589). The purpose of this review is to inform the limitations of current trials looking at protons and photons, considering that advances in technology, physics, and biology are a continuum, and to advocate for future trials geared toward accurate precision RT that need to be viewed as an iterative process in a defined path toward delivering optimal radiation treatment. A foundational understanding of the radiobiologic differences between protons and photons in tumor and normal tissue responses is fundamental to, and necessary for, determining the suitability of a given type of biologically optimized RT to a patient or cohort.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

Tool for Developing Integrated Strategies for Decontamination and Waste Management - 20291

Management of waste from chemical, biological, and radiological incidents is complicated by the fact that decontamination decisions have a profound impact on the characteristics of resulting waste streams. Wide-area biological and radiological incidents could produce massive quantities of waste that may need to be treated on-site and sent for subsequent disposal as non-contaminated materials, or else be directly disposed of as contaminated materials. The EPA has developed the Waste Estimation Support Tool (WEST) for characterizing and quantifying biological and radiological waste that may be generated from decontamination efforts. This paper focuses on the WEST's uses for radiological incidents. WEST combines Geographic Information System (GIS)-based analysis of externally-supplied plume data, infrastructure databases derived from the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) Hazus tool [1], and satellite imagery surface recognition algorithms to combine the composition and square footage of the buildings in the plume with estimates of the materials between the buildings in the plume. The resulting GIS data files are then imported into a Microsoft Access database application, where they are combined with information about the nature and concentration of contaminants, and then subjected to decontamination strategies for different contaminated surfaces. The tool provides estimates of the type and quantities of potential wastes resulting from simulated decontamination and/or demolition activities and includes estimates of the remaining contamination levels including residual contamination contained within each waste stream. Estimates are presented at several levels of detail, allowing users to obtain needed data at the desired resolution. These include estimates for the total affected area, estimates by contamination zone, estimates by decontamination method(s), and estimates by building type (occupancy classification). EPA is currently developing the next version of WEST which will include several substantial enhancements. The most significant improvement for the next version of WEST will include the ability for users to develop contamination scenarios and waste estimates based on previously developed, readily available, and geographically specific infrastructure data. Instead of using WEST's default infrastructure data based on FEMA's Hazus tool, users will be able to import their own building data specific to the geographically affected area. This capability may substantially decrease uncertainties in the resulting waste estimates because the results will be based on actual building data (numbers of each type, square footage, building height, etc.). Two other significant enhancements will be the ability to generate waste estimates for vehicles and biomass. In addition to building debris and building decontamination waste, vehicles and biomass will likely constitute a significant percentage of the total waste which may result from wide area contamination events. This presentation will present the most recent version of WEST, which includes such considerations as affected biomass (e.g., trees), vehicles, and the ability to replace the default Hazus infrastructure databases with custom infrastructure databases. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Evaluation of the Radioactive Material Released in the Harborview Research and Training Building and Some Implications for Emergency Response

On 2 May 2019, during the 137 Cs source recovery operation, a source capsule in a research irradiator containing approximately 77.1 TBq was breached. Based on a geometric reconstruction analysis of the damage to the capsule, approximately 46.3 GBq (0.04%) was impacted by the chop saw (grinder) inside a mobile hot cell on the loading dock at the University of Washington Harborview Research and Training (HRT) Building. A very small fraction of the material impacted, less than 1%, was released from the mobile hot cell and then to the rest of the HRT Building. The objectives of this project were to assess the accidental release of 137 CsCl and its implications related to emergency response methods and the ramifications of 137 CsCl transport. The phenomenology of this event was also compared with past alkali halide dispersal events. The vast number of measurements and samples collected by the remediation contractors, the Department of Energy’s Nuclear Emergency Support Team, and the small number of retrospective samples collected by the authors informed the analysis. The techniques included (1) autoradiography and electron microscopy of samples collected from the HRT Building and the irradiator, (2) 3D visualization of deposition on surfaces and within the ventilation system, and (3) a study of the damage to the source capsule to evaluate the Cs particle size and particle composition due to the grinding accident. Subsequently, the cesium contaminant transport through the numerous pathways in the building was reconstructed to assess the deposition on surfaces as a function of particle size. Furthermore, the implications for emergency response are relevant to data quality and management. A Data Quality Objective guides data collection methods so that they have appropriate accuracy and precision for the intended application. Recommendations were made with respect to the sample collection protocols and archiving of samples.

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗

Flammable Gas Generation and Control at the Idaho Completion Project Legacy Combustible Gas Generation - 20191

On April 11, 2018, four drums containing transuranic waste at the Idaho National Laboratory underwent over-pressurization, ejecting their lids and spreading radiological waste within a facility. An investigation has found that waste in the drums generated methane gas, which contributed to the event. Subsequent to the investigation, the potential for drums to have methane and other flammable analytes whose concentrations could approach or exceed the lower flammability limit (LFL) and the adequacy of the controls to prevent or mitigate a possible deflagration was evaluated. An extensive review of the historical records was performed to determine how many drums exceed the LFL. The historical record identified a small quantity of drums that exceeded the LFL for xylene, hydrogen, and methane. The primary codified applicable code or standard for handling drums is 29 CFR 1910.120 (j) 'Handling Drums and Containers.' It is used throughout the commercial and government sector. This code is integrated throughout the Fluor Idaho safety management programs and procedures to control the Standard Industrial Hazards (SIHs) associated with drum and container handling. Example requirements include: - Drums and containers are inspected, and their integrity assured prior to being moved. - Site operations are organized to minimize the amount of drum or container movement. - When there is a reasonable possibility of flammable atmospheres being present, material handling equipment and hand tools are of the type to prevent sources of ignition. Drums and containers under pressure, as evidenced by bulging or swelling, are not moved until the cause for excess pressure is determined and appropriate containment procedures have been implemented to protect employees from explosive relief of the drum. Drums which exceed the WIPP FGA limit have NCRs associated with them. Once a drum fails flammable gas sampling, an NCR is initiated. The NCR drives placement into NCR dense pack rows. A standing order drives placement of the FGA failures to a single planer segregation location. These drums are not allowed for further processing or shipment until the NCR has been cleared. Once in the single planer rows, follow-up FGA testing is performed by CCP. The NCR is dispositioned by follow-up sampling occurring after adequate time has been provided for the gas to diffuse through the filter assembly, or, in some cases, the drums are repackaged into additional drums to reduce the source term. To date, the ICP project has performed approximately 1.5 million drums moves without a deflagration event due to combustible gas generation. Flammable gas generation in a transuranic waste drum is not unique to the ICP but is common across the DOE complex. Based on the experience at Idaho, application of industry standards is sufficient to control the risk of drum deflagration due to drum movements. (authors)

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