Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Nuclear security”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 109 records · Page 6

Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation: Disposal of the Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC Classified Mixed Waste Asbestos Neutron Generators at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation assesses whether the Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS) Classified Mixed Waste (MW) Asbestos Neutron Generators is suitable for shallow land burial at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site on the Nevada National Security Site. Disposal of the waste stream meets all performance objectives in DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, Chapter IV, Section P. The CNS Classified MW Asbestos Neutron Generators waste stream is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Nuclear Security Mission Growth: A regional strategy for meeting operational challenges [Slides]

The nation's growing nuclear security requirements have yielded three major conclusions: (1) LANL possesses an exceptionally diversified workforce, multidimensional infrastructure and mission-focused strategy to fulfill the responsibilities entrusted to us; (2) However, amidst significant opportunity and growth, regional considerations have exposed several operational challenges; and (3) Given these challenges and the Lab's many strengths, assistance is needed to successfully execute our mission.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

The National Nuclear Security Administration

The mission of NNSA, as designated by Congress, is to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent; to provide naval nuclear propulsion; and to prevent, counter, and respond to threats of nuclear proliferation and terrorism worldwide.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

International Radiological/Nuclear Training for Emergency Response - Major Public Events Virtual Workshop: Nuclear Security Planning and Operations (Day 3) [Slides]

This module will provide a basic overview of radiological/nuclear search operations, including the application of radiological detection instrumentation and best practices for operational tactics, techniques and procedures. This module will introduce basic radiological/nuclear search operations and include the following: (1) A review of the principles of optimizing detection, (2) An understanding of radiation hazards and alarms, and (3) An examination of nuclear security measures best practices for buildings and stadium complexes, large areas, roadways and parking areas, and pedestrian and vehicle entrance portals.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Evaluation of the Need to Consider Colloid-Facilitated Plutonium Transport in Contaminant Boundary Calculations for Pahute Mesa at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site

The testing of nuclear weapons at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), formerly the Nevada Test Site, has led to the deposition of substantial quantities of plutonium (Pu) into the environment. While tritium ( 3 H) is the most abundant anthropogenic radionuclide deposited in the NNSS subsurface from an activity standpoint (4.7×10 6 TBq decay corrected to September 23, 1992), Pu is the most abundant anthropogenic element by mass. Between 1951 and 1992, 828 underground nuclear tests were performed and approximately 2.8 metric tons (3.1×10 4 TBq) of Pu remains in the NNSS subsurface (Smith et al., 2003). The vast majority of this Pu is sequestered in nuclear melt glass that pools at the bottom of cavities formed by nuclear explosions.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Lifecycle Management of Nuclear Security Radiation Detection Systems: Testing and Evaluation

The lifecycle of radiation detection systems functioning within a State’s Nuclear Security Detection Architecture encompasses all activities associated with acquisition, deployment, and eventual disposal. Throughout a system’s lifecycle, testing and evaluation activities are needed to ensure requirements are continually met, as underscored by recent experiences.This paper provides:1.A discussion of reasons why testing should be part of the radiation detection equipment lifecycle before, during, and after acquisition.2.A general process for determining applicable evaluation methods.3.A discussion of issues related to integrating testing and evaluation into procurement and operational processes and mitigation strategies.

Harris, Tyrone↗

The Impact of Cultural Values and Organizational Processes on Nuclear Security Operations

Human performance is a pivotal factor in the design, testing, maintenance, and operation of security systems. The effectiveness of these systems relies not only on the capabilities, limitations, motives, and attitudes of the individuals involved, but also on the quality of training, instructional content, and evaluation methods provided. To uphold security standards, seamless integration between technologies and operators necessitates reliable human input. In security operations, human errors, often attributed to blame, sanctions, low motivation, individual accountability, or complacency, are primary causes of system failures. Complacency, characterized by a false sense of security, reflects a lack of awareness of potential threats and is a significant contributing factor to lapses in security. Security incidents arise from various factors, many extend beyond individual control, highlighting the need for a holistic approach to human performance that integrates organizational processes and team collaboration. Historically, errors have been attributed to individual moral or cognitive failures. However, insights from Operational Experiences (OEs) suggest that organizational processes weakness and deficiencies in nuclear cultural values contribute more significantly to security failures than individual mistakes. This paper consolidates lessons learned from diverse international nuclear security cultures and aims to highlight the importance of security culture in shaping global perspectives on nuclear security. It underscores the role of cultural values in shaping nuclear security practices and enhancing the resilience of security systems in the nuclear sector.

Zineddin, Dr. Z. [ORNL] (ORCID:0009000848740725)↗

Evaluation of Cavity Collapse and Surface Crater Formation at the Norbo Underground Nuclear Test in U8c, Nevada Nuclear Security Site, and the Impact on Stability of the Ground Surface

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Containment Program performed a review of nuclear test-related data for the Norbo underground nuclear test in U8c to assist in evaluating this legacy site as a test bed for application technologies for use in On-Site Inspections (OSI) under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. This request is similar to one made for the Salut site in U8c (Pawloski, 2012b). Review of the Norbo site is complicated because the test first exhibited subsurface collapse, which was not unusual, but it then collapsed to the surface over one year later, which was unusual. Of particular interest is the stability of the ground surface above the Norbo detonation point. Proposed methods for on-site verification include radiological signatures, artifacts from nuclear testing activities, and imaging to identify alteration to the subsurface hydrogeology due to the nuclear detonation. Aviva Sussman from the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has also proposed work at this site. Both proposals require physical access at or near the ground surface of specific underground nuclear test locations at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site (NNSS), formerly the Nevada Test Site (NTS), and focus on possible activities such as visual observation, multispectral measurements, and shallow and deep geophysical surveys.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

National Nuclear Security Administration Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program Annual Report in Brief: October 2007 - May 2008

This abbreviated Annual Report covers program activities of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program (NGFP) from October 2007 through May 2008--the timeframe between the last Annual Report (which covered activities through September 2007) and the next report (which will begin with June 2008 activities). In that timeframe, the NGFP continued building a solid foundation as the program began reaping the benefits of recently implemented changes. This report is organized by Fellowship class and the pertinent program activities for each, including: October 2007 Recruiting events and final applications (Class of 2008) Winter 2007 Selection and hiring (Class of 2008) Spring 2008 Career development roundtables (Class of 2007) Orientation planning (Class of 2008) Recruitment planning and university outreach (Class of 2009) May 2008 Closing ceremony (Class of 2007)

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

United States Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration Sandia Field Office NESHAP Annual Report CY2014 for Sandia National Laboratories New Mexico

This report provides a summary of the radionuclide releases from the United States (U.S.) Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration facilities at Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico (SNL/NM) during Calendar Year (CY) 2014, including the data, calculations, and supporting documentation for demonstrating compliance with 40 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) 61, Subpart H--NATIONAL EMISSION STANDARDS FOR EMISSIONS OF RADIONUCLIDES OTHER THAN RADON FROM DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY FACILITIES. A description is given of the sources and their contributions to the overall dose assessment. In addition, the maximally exposed individual (MEI) radiological dose calculation and the population dose to local and regional residents are discussed.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Nuclear Security Futures Scenarios.

This report provides an overview of the scenarios used in strategic futures workshops conducted at Sandia on September 21 and 29, 2016. The workshops, designed and facilitated by analysts in Center 100, used scenarios to enable thought leaders to think collectively about the changing aspects of global nuclear security and the potential implications for the US Government and Sandia National Laboratories.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Simulation and Modeling of Optical Properties of U, Th, Pb, and Co Nanoparticles of Interest to Nuclear Security Using Finite Element Analysis

In this work, the optical characteristics of uranium (U), lead (Pb), cobalt (Co), and thorium (Th) nanoparticles are fashioned and simulated employing the finite element analysis (FEA) approach concerning multiple particle sizes. Applying finite element analysis, it was found that the simulated absorption peaks of electronic excitations of nuclear nanoparticles are red-shifted from 365 nm to 555 nm for U; from 355 nm to 550 nm for Pb; from 415 nm to 610 nm for Co; and from 350 nm to 540 nm for Th, comparing expanding particle sizes from 60 nm to 100 nm (except for Co, which varied from 70 nm to 100 nm). The FEA-simulated optical band gap energies and far-field radiation patterns were also obtained for nuclear materials. The simulation approach in this research enables the prediction of optical properties and design of nuclear materials before manufacture for nuclear security applications.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Hard X-ray mirrors for Nuclear Security

Research performed under this LDRD aimed to demonstrate the ability to detect and measure hard X-ray emissions using multilayer X-ray reflective optics above 400 keV, to enable the development of inexpensive and high-accuracy mirror substrates, and to investigate applications of hard X-ray mirrors of interest to the nuclear security community. Experiments conducted at the European Synchrotron Radiation Facility demonstrated hard X-ray mirror reflectivity up to 650 keV for the first time. Hard X-ray optics substrates must have surface roughness under 3 to 4 Angstrom rms, and three materials were evaluated as potential substrates: polycarbonates, thin Schott glass and a new type of flexible glass called Willow Glass®. Chemical smoothing and thermal heating of the surface of polycarbonate samples, which are inexpensive but have poor intrinsic surface characteristics, did not yield acceptable surface roughness. D263 Schott glass was used for the focusing optics of the NASA NuSTAR telescope. The required specialized hardware and process were costly and motivated experiments with a modified non-contact slumping technique. The surface roughness of the glass was preserved and the process yielded cylindrical shells with good net shape pointing to the potential advantage of this technique. Finally, measured surface roughness of 200 and 130 μm thick Willow Glass sheets was between 2 and 2.5 A rms. Additional results of flexibility tests and multilayer deposition campaigns indicated it is a promising substrate for hard X-ray optics. The detection of U and Pu characteristics X-ray lines and gamma emission lines in a high background environment was identified as an area for which X-ray mirrors could have an impact and where focusing optics could help reduce signal to noise ratio by focusing signal onto a smaller detector. Hence the first one twelvetant of a Wolter I focusing optics for the 90 to 140 keV energy range based on aperiodic multilayer coating was designed. Finally, we conducted the first demonstration that reflective multilayer mirrors could be used as diagnostic for HED experiment with an order of magnitude improvement in signal-to-noise ratio for the multilayer optic compared a transmission crystal spectrometer.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Los Alamos National Laboratory Input for the National TRU Program 5 Year Plan for National Nuclear Security Administration TRU Waste

On July 16, 2018, Los Alamos National Security (LANS) received a Corporate Board Data Call for Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) site input to the National TRU Program 5 Year Plan from the Office of the National TRU Program. This report summarizes LANL input for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) TRU waste and captures the shipping needs to support the LANL mission. Information is included for the current waste inventory and projected generation rates. The site’s location, characteristics, role and mission are described. Additional information for consideration and pictures for inclusion are provided. A separate submittal will be prepared by N3B for LANL legacy TRU waste managed by N3B under contract to EM-LA.

, LANL↗