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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2005

Technologies for Networked Enabled Operations

Current point-to-point data links will not scale to support future integration of surveillance, security, and globally-distributed air traffic data, and already hinders efficiency and capacity. While the FAA and industry focus on a transition to initial system-wide information management (SWIM) capabilities, this paper describes a set of initial studies of NAS network-enabled operations technology gaps targeted for maturity in later SWIM spirals (201 5-2020 timeframe).

Glass, B.↗
DOE OSTI2024

Formally Verified ZTA Requirements for OT/ICS Environments with Isabelle/HOL

The clean energy transformation includes the integration of distributed energy resources with the power grid, which has led to a substantial increase in the complexity of power grids infrastructure and the underlying operational technology environment. Power grids infrastructure represents an operational technology environment that has become a system of systems, integrating heterogeneous devices which are both software-and hardware-intensive; as a result, there are increasing demands to exploit advances in the commodity of software-hardware infrastructures to improve energy systems requirements such as cybersecurity and resilience. In such a setting, system requirements at different levels mix, which leads to vulnerabilities and undesirable outcomes. The use of formal methods to characterize and prove system requirements removes ambiguity, increases automation, and provides high levels of assurance and reliability. In this paper, we contribute a methodology and a framework for the system-level verification of zero trust architecture requirements in operational technology environments. We define a formal specification for the core functionalities of operational technology environments, the corresponding invariants, and security proofs. Of particular note is our modular approach for the formal verification of asynchronous interactions in operational technology environments. The formal specification and the proofs have been mechanized using the interactive theorem proving environment Isabelle/HOL.

formal methods↗
NASA NTRS2014

Exploration Technologies for Operations

Although the International Space Station (ISS) assembly has been completed, the Operations support teams continue to seek more efficient and effective ways to prepare for and conduct the ISS operations and future exploration missions beyond low earth orbit. This search for improvement has led to a significant collaboration between the NASA research and advanced software development community at NASA Ames Research Center and the Mission Operations community at NASA Johnson Space Center. Since 2001, NASA Ames Research Center has been developing and applying its advanced intelligent systems and human systems integration research to mission operations tools for several of the unmanned Mars missions operations. Since 2006, NASA Ames Research Center has also been developing and applying its advanced intelligent systems and human systems integration research to mission operations tools for manned operations support with the Mission Operations Directorate at NASA Johnson Space Center. This paper discusses the completion of the development and deployment of a variety of intelligent and human systems technologies adopted for manned mission operations. The technologies associated with the projects include advanced software systems for operations and human-centered computing. Human-centered computing looks to the processes and procedures that people do to perform any given job, then attempts to identify opportunities to improve these processes and procedures. In particular, for mission operations, improvements are quantified by specifically identifying how a tool can increase a persons efficiency, enhance a persons functional capability, andor improve the assurance of a persons decisions. The Ames development team has collaborated with the Mission Operations team to identify areas of efficiencies through technology infusion applications in support of the Plan, Train, and Fly activities of human-spaceflight mission operations. The specific applications discussed in this paper are in the areas of mission planning systems, mission operations design modeling and workflow automation, advanced systems monitoring, mission control technologies, search tools, training management tools, spacecraft solar array management, spacecraft power management, and spacecraft attitude planning. We discuss these specific projects between the Ames Research Center and the Johnson Space Centers Mission Operations Directorate, and how these technologies and projects are enhancing the mission operations support for the International Space Station. We also discuss the challenges, problems, and successes associated with long-distance and multi-year development projects between the research team at Ames and the Mission Operations customers at Johnson Space center. Finally, we discuss how these technology infusion applications and underlying technologies might be used in the future to support on-board operations of the crew and spacecraft systems as human exploration expands beyond low earth orbit to destinations in the solar system where communications delays will require more on-board autonomy and planning by the crew. Longer communications delays will require that the ground mission operations support will be primarily strategic in nature, while the tactical level of planning, systems monitoring and control, and failure analysisisolationrecovery will be the responsibility of both the spacecraft autonomous systems and the crew. Our expectation is that the technologies

mission operations↗
NASA NTRS2010

Propulsion Technology Lifecycle Operational Analysis

The paper presents the results of a focused effort performed by the members of the Space Propulsion Synergy Team (SPST) Functional Requirements Sub-team to develop propulsion data to support Advanced Technology Lifecycle Analysis System (ATLAS). This is a spreadsheet application to analyze the impact of technology decisions at a system-of-systems level. Results are summarized in an Excel workbook we call the Technology Tool Box (TTB). The TTB provides data for technology performance, operations, and programmatic parameters in the form of a library of technical information to support analysis tools and/or models. The lifecycle of technologies can be analyzed from this data and particularly useful for system operations involving long running missions. The propulsion technologies in this paper are listed against Chemical Rocket Engines in a Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) format. The overall effort involved establishing four elements: (1) A general purpose Functional System Breakdown Structure (FSBS). (2) Operational Requirements for Rocket Engines. (3) Technology Metric Values associated with Operating Systems (4) Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) of Chemical Rocket Engines The list of Chemical Rocket Engines identified in the WBS is by no means complete. It is planned to update the TTB with a more complete list of available Chemical Rocket Engines for United States (US) engines and add the Foreign rocket engines to the WBS which are available to NASA and the Aerospace Industry. The Operational Technology Metric Values were derived by the SPST Sub-team in the form of the TTB and establishes a database for users to help evaluate and establish the technology level of each Chemical Rocket Engine in the database. The Technology Metric Values will serve as a guide to help determine which rocket engine to invest technology money in for future development.

Robinson, John W.↗
DOE OSTI2026

Building Nuclear-Specific Cybersecurity Expertise in Higher Education

The rapid digitalization of nuclear power plants (NPPs) and the deployment of advanced and small modular reactors (A/SMRs) have expanded the cybersecurity attack surface within the nuclear sector. This evolution introduces unique challenges beyond those faced in general information technology (IT), operational technology (OT) and industrial control system (ICS) security, due to nuclear power’s regulatory rigor, safety-critical nature, and operational needs. A pressing workforce gap persists; cybersecurity graduates typically lack nuclear-specific context and retraining them for industry readiness requires 12–18 months, creating a significant burden. This paper addresses this gap by defining the domains of knowledge that nuclear cybersecurity specialists must master, spanning cybersecurity, nuclear engineering, OT/ICS security, and regulatory governance. We propose a curricular framework integrating technical, regulatory, and applied learning components to accelerate workforce readiness. Our approach builds on existing findings that current curricula inadequately integrate nuclear engineering and cybersecurity, shifting the discourse from why specialization is needed to what knowledge must be taught. The recommendations have implications for workforce development and long-term resilience of the nuclear energy sector.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Large-Scale Hydrogen Storage Cyber Risk Assessment

Hydrogen storage systems may become more widely deployed throughout the country, and so it is possible that individual and interconnected systems will be exposed to cyber-attacks. These events can cause physical and financial harm to employees, people in the vicinity of the facility, and the company that owns the facility. The two main ways bad actors may access information or control from a hydrogen storage facility are through information technology and operations technology devices, the former of which refers to data and information from networked devices and the latter of which refers to onsite controls for the physical system. Both types of entryways into the system should be considered when companies conduct cyber risk assessments and when regulators develop or revise relevant codes and standards. This report analyzes cybersecurity risks associated with a generic hydrogen storage system by outlining the system's purpose and the importance of its cybersecurity. The hydrogen storage system architecture and communication protocols are provided to understand potential cyber vulnerabilities. Later, an event tree analysis is performed on hydrogen operation to identify system weaknesses by outlining potential attack scenarios. This report also identifies critical cyber assets related to different hydrogen operations followed by an examination of potential threats, and the impact of cyber assets on those operational assets.

08 HYDROGEN↗
DOE OSTI2024

Large-Scale Hydrogen Storage Cyber Risk Assessment

Hydrogen storage systems are becoming more widely deployed throughout the country, and as their presence continues to grow, it is possible that individual and interconnected systems will be exposed to cyber-attacks. These events can cause physical and financial harm to employees, people in the vicinity, and to the company that owns the facility. The two main mechanisms malicious actors may access information or control from a hydrogen storage facility are through information technology and operations technology devices, the former of which refers to data and information from networked devices and the latter of which refers to onsite controls for the physical system. Both types of entryways into the system should be considered when facility managers conduct cyber risk assessments and when regulators develop or revise relevant codes and standards. This report analyzes cybersecurity risks applicable to a wide variety of hydrogen storage systems by outlining the system's purpose and the importance of its cybersecurity. The hydrogen storage system architecture and communication protocols are provided to understand potential cyber vulnerabilities. Later, an event tree analysis is performed on hydrogen operation to identify system weaknesses by outlining potential attack scenarios. This report also identifies critical cyber assets related to different hydrogen operations followed by an examination of potential threats, and the impact of cyber assets on those operational assets.

08 HYDROGEN↗
DOE OSTI2023

The Benefits of a Software Bill of Materials Program at Nuclear Facilities

Software supply chain attacks are becoming increasingly more prevalent in both information communications technology and operational technology environments. Often, a supplier or other entity discloses vulnerability information about software components and subcomponents used in a digital asset, but an asset owner is unable to quickly ascertain if the vulnerable component is installed in their facility. The generation and use of a software bill of materials (SBOM) for installed digital assets can enable an asset owner to quickly identify if and where a component is used, allowing them to evaluate the risk and determine necessary risk treatments. The integration of an SBOM program into a nuclear facility not only improves vulnerability management and risk management processes, it also benefits asset and configuration management, cybersecurity, and supply chain programs. This paper reviews the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy Cybersecurity Crosscutting Technology Development program’s work on integrating an SBOM program into a nuclear facility. It also provides a discussion on the benefits of such a program.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Informing Cybersecurity Decisions With the Value-at-Risk Framework

Security at every site is critical to making hydropower a strong contributor to the country's grid, but with ongoing development and expanding capabilities, the diversity of the existing hydropower fleet makes across-the-board investment decisions difficult. The threat of cyberattacks naturally increases as the interconnection of Information Technology and Operational Technology networks broadens. Hydropower plants require custom analyses that are specific to the unique challenges and characteristics of any given facility. Facilities, however, often do not have the necessary resources for managers to make informed decisions on investments based on assessed capabilities and risks.

50 EE - Wind and Water Power Program - Water (EE-4↗
DOE OSTI2023

Informing Cybersecurity Decisions With the Value-at-Risk Framework

Security at every site is critical to making hydropower a strong contributor to the country's grid, but with ongoing development and expanding capabilities, the diversity of the existing hydropower fleet makes across-the-board investment decisions difficult. The threat of cyberattacks naturally increases as the interconnection of Information Technology and Operational Technology networks broadens. Hydropower plants require custom analyses that are specific to the unique challenges and characteristics of any given facility. Facilities, however, often do not have the necessary resources for managers to make informed decisions on investments based on assessed capabilities and risks.

cybersecurity↗
DOE OSTI2023

Cybersecurity Anomaly Detection in SCADA-Assisted OT Networks Using Ensemble-Based State Prediction Model

The cybersecurity threats of power system gradually grow due to the increased sophisticated interactions between Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) networks. False data injection attack (FDIA) that aims to compromise the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) measurement and disturb the system operation is one of such cyber threats. Such attacks can potentially lead to significant operational issues at the control centers and substations, and hence, result in severe physical consequences. To avoid catastrophic failure across the power grid resulting from these attacks, it is essential to arm the OT network with real-time vulnerability assessment tools. To this end, this paper outlines various drawbacks of the Purdue architecture model to defend against cyberattacks in the OT network. Furthermore, a novel ensemble-based state prediction model is proposed to detect cybersecurity anomalies in SCADA assisted OT networks. The proposed model uses control center level generation and load forecasts, scheduled, and forced outages, power flow solutions, and the substation level historical data. The hypothesis of the proposed scheme relies on the fact that additional control center and substation data can hardly be accessed and compromised by attackers. One of the vital features of the proposed scheme is an hour-ahead prediction of the operational feasibility of the SCADA measurement range at the control center and substation in real time helps in detecting anomalies in measurements across both substation and the control center.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
NASA NTRS2012

Control and Non-Payload Communications Links for Integrated Unmanned Aircraft Operations

Technology for unmanned aircraft has advanced so rapidly in recent years that many new applications to public and commercial use are being proposed and implemented. In many countries, emphasis is now being placed on developing the means to allow unmanned aircraft to operate within non-segregated airspace along with commercial, cargo and other piloted and passenger-carrying aircraft.In the U.S., Congress has mandated that the Federal Aviation Administration reduce and remove restrictions on unmanned aircraft operations in a relatively short time frame. To accomplish this, a number of technical and regulatory hurdles must be overcome. A key hurdle involve the communications link connecting the remote pilot located at a ground control station with the aircraft in the airspace, referred to as the Control and Non-Payload Communications (CNPC) link. This link represents a safety critical communications link, and thus requires dedicated and protected aviation spectrum as well as national and international standards defining the operational requirements the CNPC system. The CNPC link must provide line-of-site (LOS) communications, primarily through a ground-based communication system, and beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) communication achieved using satellite communications. In the U.S., the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is charged with providing the technical body of evidence to support spectrum allocation requirements and national and international standards development for the CNPC link. This paper provides a description of the CNPC system, an overview of NASA's CNPC project, and current results in technology assessment, air-ground propagation characterization, and supporting system studies and analyses will be presented.

Kerczewski, Robert J.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Principles for Integrating Mars Analog Science, Operations, and Technology Research

During the Apollo program, the scientific community and NASA used terrestrial analog sites for understanding planetary features and for training astronauts to be scientists. Human factors studies (Harrison, Clearwater, & McKay 1991; Stuster 1996) have focused on the effects of isolation in extreme environments. More recently, with the advent of wireless computing, we have prototyped advanced EVA technologies for navigation, scheduling, and science data logging (Clancey 2002b; Clancey et al., in press). Combining these interests in a single expedition enables tremendous synergy and authenticity, as pioneered by Pascal Lee's Haughton-Mars Project (Lee 2001; Clancey 2000a) and the Mars Society s research stations on a crater rim on Devon Island in the High Canadian Arctic (Clancey 2000b; 2001b) and the Morrison Formation of southeast Utah (Clancey 2002a). Based on this experience, the following principles are proposed for conducting an integrated science, operations, and technology research program at analog sites: 1) Authentic work; 2) PI-based projects; 3) Unencumbered baseline studies; 4) Closed simulations; and 5) Observation and documentation. Following these principles, we have been integrating field science, operations research, and technology development at analog sites on Devon Island and in Utah over the past five years. Analytic methods include work practice simulation (Clancey 2002c; Sierhuis et a]., 2000a;b), by which the interaction of human behavior, facilities, geography, tools, and procedures are formalized in computer models. These models are then converted into the runtime EVA system we call mobile agents (Clancey 2002b; Clancey et al., in press). Furthermore, we have found that the Apollo Lunar Surface Journal (Jones, 1999) provides a vast repository or understanding astronaut and CapCom interactions, serving as a baseline for Mars operations and quickly highlighting opportunities for computer automation (Clancey, in press).

Clancey, William J.↗
NASA NTRS2000

Operations and Range Technology Development

The Operations and Range Technology Project is responsible for the development of key technologies as part of the KSC Spaceport Technology Center Initiative to substantially reduce vehicle launch and processing operations costs and improve the systems safety and reliability. The topics include: 1) Spaceport Technology Areas; 2) Umbilical Systems Development; 3) Automated Payload Handling Systems; 4) Command, Control and Monitor Systems; 5) Intelligent Synthesis Environment; 6) Low TRL Development; 7) Second Generation Project Organization; and 8) ASTP (3rd Generation) Project Organization. This paper is presented in viewgraph form.

Taylor, Dave↗
NASA NTRS2001

Integrated Operations Architecture Technology Assessment Study

As part of NASA's Integrated Operations Architecture (IOA) Baseline, NASA will consolidate all communications operations. including ground-based, near-earth, and deep-space communications, into a single integrated network. This network will make maximum use of commercial equipment, services and standards. It will be an Internet Protocol (IP) based network. This study supports technology development planning for the IOA. The technical problems that may arise when LEO mission spacecraft interoperate with commercial satellite services were investigated. Commercial technology and services that could support the IOA were surveyed, and gaps in the capability of existing technology and techniques were identified. Recommendations were made on which gaps should be closed by means of NASA research and development funding. Several findings emerged from the interoperability assessment: in the NASA mission set, there is a preponderance of small. inexpensive, low data rate science missions; proposed commercial satellite communications services could potentially provide TDRSS-like data relay functions; and. IP and related protocols, such as TCP, require augmentation to operate in the mobile networking environment required by the space-to-ground portion of the IOA. Five case studies were performed in the technology assessment. Each case represented a realistic implementation of the near-earth portion of the IOA. The cases included the use of frequencies at L-band, Ka-band and the optical spectrum. The cases also represented both space relay architectures and direct-to-ground architectures. Some of the main recommendations resulting from the case studies are: select an architecture for the LEO/MEO communications network; pursue the development of a Ka-band space-qualified transmitter (and possibly a receiver), and a low-cost Ka-band ground terminal for a direct-to-ground network, pursue the development of an Inmarsat (L-band) space-qualified transceiver to implement a global, low data rate network for LEO/MEO, mission spacecraft; and, pursue developmental research for a miniaturized, high data rate optical transceiver.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2015

Reduced Crew/Single Pilot Operations for Commercial Aircraft - Concept of Operations and Technology Needs

In 2012, NASA began exploring the feasibility of single pilot operations (SPO) and reduced crew operations (RCO) in the context of scheduled passenger air carrier operations (i.e., Parts 121 and 125). Technology and automation, especially aircraft automation, have significantly advanced in the 21st century and may be enabling to SPO. However, a move to SPO also has significant challenges. The purpose of a three-year NASA effort was to identify those challenges through workshops, analytic studies, and human-in-the-loop simulations assessing promising concepts and prototype solutions. This presentation will describe the progress that has been made in that three year effort.

reduced crew operations↗