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NASA NTRS2020

Space Weather Architecture Options to Support Human and Robotic Deep Space Exploration

Understanding solar energetic particle (SEP) event characteristics is critical to the proper design of human and robotic space missions. This report details a study of operational response time for monitoring space weather for crewed flights, specifically targeting lunar and Mars missions. The NESC assessment team evaluated the required minimum latency for data streams and forecasts that will directly affect mission operations using a 41-year database (i.e., European Space Agency (ESA) Solar Energetic Particle Environment Modeling (SEPEM) RSDv2.0) of SEP events. The database contained 192 SEP events that resulted in a dose increase above background levels. Of those, 10% were “multiple events,” or events that occurred in quick succession. The analysis provides probabilistic values for time to peak flux and dose rate for the duration of each event. This NESC assessment also evaluated the SEP threshold levels for exploration missions to determine the relevant energy range of required proton measurements.

Solar energetic particle↗

NASA NTRS2012

Model Calibration Efforts for the International Space Station's Solar Array Mast

The International Space Station (ISS) relies on sixteen solar-voltaic blankets to provide electrical power to the station. Each pair of blankets is supported by a deployable boom called the Folding Articulated Square Truss Mast (FAST Mast). At certain ISS attitudes, the solar arrays can be positioned in such a way that shadowing of either one or three longerons causes an unexpected asymmetric thermal loading that if unchecked can exceed the operational stability limits of the mast. Work in this paper documents part of an independent NASA Engineering and Safety Center effort to assess the existing operational limits. Because of the complexity of the system, the problem is being worked using a building-block progression from components (longerons), to units (single or multiple bays), to assembly (full mast). The paper presents results from efforts to calibrate the longeron components. The work includes experimental testing of two types of longerons (straight and tapered), development of Finite Element (FE) models, development of parameter uncertainty models, and the establishment of a calibration and validation process to demonstrate adequacy of the models. Models in the context of this paper refer to both FE model and probabilistic parameter models. Results from model calibration of the straight longerons show that the model is capable of predicting the mean load, axial strain, and bending strain. For validation, parameter values obtained from calibration of straight longerons are used to validate experimental results for the tapered longerons.

Elliott, Kenny B.↗

NASA NTRS2013

Practical Application of PRA as an Integrated Design Tool for Space Systems

This paper presents the application of the first comprehensive Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) during the design phase of a joint NASA/NOAA weather satellite program, Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite Series R (GOES-R). GOES-R is the next generation weather satellite primarily to help understand the weather and help save human lives. PRA has been used at NASA for Human Space Flight for many years. PRA was initially adopted and implemented in the operational phase of manned space flight programs and more recently for the next generation human space systems. Since its first use at NASA, PRA has become recognized throughout the Agency as a method of assessing complex mission risks as part of an overall approach to assuring safety and mission success throughout project lifecycles. PRA is now included as a requirement during the design phase of both NASA next generation manned space vehicles as well as for high priority robotic missions. The influence of PRA on GOES-R design and operation concepts are discussed in detail. The GOES-R PRA is unique at NASA for its early implementation. It also represents a pioneering effort to integrate risks from both Spacecraft (SC) and Ground Segment (GS) to fully assess the probability of achieving mission objectives. PRA analysts were actively involved in system engineering and design engineering to ensure that a comprehensive set of technical risks were correctly identified and properly understood from a design and operations perspective. The analysis included an assessment of SC hardware and software, SC fault management system, GS hardware and software, common cause failures, human error, natural hazards, solar weather and infrastructure (such as network and telecommunications failures, fire). PRA findings directly resulted in design changes to reduce SC risk from micro-meteoroids. PRA results also led to design changes in several SC subsystems, e.g. propulsion, guidance, navigation and control (GNC), communications, mechanisms, and command and data handling (C&DH). The fault tree approach assisted in the development of the fault management system design. Human error analysis, which examined human response to failure, indicated areas where automation could reduce the overall probability of gaps in operation by half. In addition, the PRA brought to light many potential root causes of system disruptions, including earthquakes, inclement weather, solar storms, blackouts and other extreme conditions not considered in the typical reliability and availability analyses. Ultimately the PRA served to identify potential failures that, when mitigated, resulted in a more robust design, as well as to influence the program's concept of operations. The early and active integration of PRA with system and design engineering provided a well-managed approach for risk assessment that increased reliability and availability, optimized lifecyc1e costs, and unified the SC and GS developments.

Kalia, Prince↗

NASA NTRS2011

Independent Review of U.S. and Russian Probabilistic Risk Assessments for the International Space Station Mini Research Module #2 Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Risk

The Mini-Research Module-2 (MRM-2), a Russian module on the International Space Station, does not meet its requirements for micrometeoroid and orbital debris probability of no penetration (PNP). To document this condition, the primary Russian Federal Space Agency ISS contractor, S.P. Korolev Rocket and Space Corporation-Energia (RSC-E), submitted an ISS non-compliance report (NCR) which was presented at the 5R Stage Operations Readiness Review (SORR) in October 2009. In the NCR, RSC-E argued for waiving the PNP requirement based on several factors, one of which was the risk of catastrophic failure was acceptably low at 1 in 11,100. However, NASA independently performed an assessment of the catastrophic risk resulting in a value of 1 in 1380 and believed that the risk at that level was unacceptable. The NASA Engineering and Safety Center was requested to evaluate the two competing catastrophic risk values and determine which was more accurate. This document contains the outcome of the assessment.

Squire, Michael D.↗

NASA NTRS2015

Integrated Medical Model Project - Overview and Summary of Historical Application

Introduction: The Integrated Medical Model (IMM) Project represents one aspect of NASA's Human Research Program (HRP) to quantitatively assess medical risks to astronauts for existing operational missions as well as missions associated with future exploration and commercial space flight ventures. The IMM takes a probabilistic approach to assessing the likelihood and specific outcomes of one hundred medical conditions within the envelope of accepted space flight standards of care over a selectable range of mission capabilities. A specially developed Integrated Medical Evidence Database (iMED) maintains evidence-based, organizational knowledge across a variety of data sources. Since becoming operational in 2011, version 3.0 of the IMM, the supporting iMED, and the expertise of the IMM project team have contributed to a wide range of decision and informational processes for the space medical and human research community. This presentation provides an overview of the IMM conceptual architecture and range of application through examples of actual space flight community questions posed to the IMM project. Methods: Figure 1 [see document] illustrates the IMM modeling system and scenario process. As illustrated, the IMM computational architecture is based on Probabilistic Risk Assessment techniques. Nineteen assumptions and limitations define the IMM application domain. Scenario definitions include crew medical attributes and mission specific details. The IMM forecasts probabilities of loss of crew life (LOCL), evacuation (EVAC), quality time lost during the mission, number of medical resources utilized and the number and type of medical events by combining scenario information with in-flight, analog, and terrestrial medical information stored in the iMED. In addition, the metrics provide the integrated information necessary to estimate optimized in-flight medical kit contents under constraints of mass and volume or acceptable level of mission risk. Results and Conclusions: Historically, IMM simulations support Science and Technology planning, Exploration mission planning, and ISS program operations by supplying simulation support, iMED data information, and subject matter expertise to Crew Health and Safety and the HRP. Upcoming release of IMM version 4.0 seeks to provide enhanced functionality to increase the quality of risk decisions made using the IMM through a more accurate representation of the real world system.

Myers, J.↗

NASA NTRS1997

Risk Management of NASA Projects

Various NASA Langley Research Center and other center projects were attempted for analysis to obtain historical data comparing pre-phase A study and the final outcome for each project. This attempt, however, was abandoned once it became clear that very little documentation was available. Next, extensive literature search was conducted on the role of risk and reliability concepts in project management. Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) techniques are being used with increasing regularity both in and outside of NASA. The value and the usage of PRA techniques were reviewed for large projects. It was found that both civilian and military branches of the space industry have traditionally refrained from using PRA, which was developed and expanded by nuclear industry. Although much has changed with the end of the cold war and the Challenger disaster, it was found that ingrained anti-PRA culture is hard to stop. Examples of skepticism against the use of risk management and assessment techniques were found both in the literature and in conversations with some technical staff. Program and project managers need to be convinced that the applicability and use of risk management and risk assessment techniques is much broader than just in the traditional safety-related areas of application. The time has come to begin to uniformly apply these techniques. The whole idea of risk-based system can maximize the 'return on investment' that the public demands. Also, it would be very useful if all project documents of NASA Langley Research Center, pre-phase A through final report, are carefully stored in a central repository preferably in electronic format.

Sarper, Hueseyin↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Strategies for Quantifying Human Space Flight Performance in the Crew Health and Performance System

The Crew Health and Performance-Probabilistic Risk Assessment (CHP-PRA) team at NASA Glenn Research Center is planning a customized approach to quantify human spaceflight performance changes with respect to changes to the CHP system functions and capabilities. Using the Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAG) initiated by NASA’s Human Systems Risk Board (HSRB) [1], the team is surveying potential candidate models and novel strategies that generate metrics suitable for supporting decision making related to how the CHP system may influence human system performance risk. One such investigation includes classic Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) models. Traditionally, HRA methods estimate the occurrence of human errors and their impact on the success of an activity when designing and operating a system. While humans perceive, interpret, decide on, and carry out a course of action, the factors affecting performance and error likelihood are commonly referred to as performance shaping factors (PSFs). Originally developed to alleviate safety concerns related to nuclear power plant operations, HRA methods such as THERP [2] and CREAM [3] dismantle an activity into tasks, requiring elemental steps to be executed, and assess their failure due to predefined PSFs. In this study, we compare generic HRA methods and those that incorporate some human spaceflight aspects, such as sleep conditions (SCREAM [4]), with respect to how they may be adopted to capture performance with an intention to mitigate detrimental outcomes elucidated by the HSRB DAGs. We suggest strategies to quantify astronaut performance specific to spaceflight activities and illustrate how such concepts may help in optimizing the CHP system capabilities with respect to Artemis missions.

dag↗

NASA NTRS2024

Quantification of Uncertainty and Risk Sensitivity for Safety of Emerging Operations

The growing need to develop and deploy small unmanned aerial vehicles (sUAVs) for various applications in the airspace necessitates reliable tools to accurately predict the flight trajectories of the sUAVs. The knowledge of the predicted trajectories help decision makers anticipate potential conflict, assess the risk, and take appropriate risk mitigation actions. In addition, uncertainties in vehicle models, weather, and controller action further highlights the need for reliable prediction tools. In this project, the application of mixed sparse grid-based quadrature and generalized polynomial chaos(gPC) expansion method for uncertainty quantification and collision assessment in air traffic consisting of fixed-wing small unmanned aerial vehicles (sUAV) was studied. From the results obtained, it can be concluded that this provides a reliable framework to carry out quantitative conflict assessment in an unmanned air traffic, which when employed, can improve the functionalities of the unmanned traffic management system. It was observed that the results from the gPC expansion framework developed in the project can be utilized to conduct rapid probabilistic collision assessment for near real-time unmanned traffic management in the airspace. From the vehicle models, position updates, and wind-field data, a priori gPC based 3-σcon-fidence ellipses can provide estimates of potential conflict at some future instants. The computational costs scaled linearly when the uncertain inputs were fewer. Further, the largest allowable distribution of para-metric uncertainties that leads to the smallest risk of collision in traffic of small unmanned aerial vehicles could be calculated. The time of closest approach between two sUAVs can be established paving way for development of proactive mitigation strategies. The separation between the sUAVs was found to be most significantly affected by uncertainties in the maximum available thrusts, zero-lift drag coefficients, and wing planform areas of the sUAVs. The study of uncertain wind-fields indicated that a heterogeneous traffic mix resulted in an increased probability of conflict. Increased measurement update rate reduced the uncertain-ties in the trajectories of the vehicles, further reducing the probability of conflict but rapid updates of all vehicles in the airspace poses a stringent communication limitation. The gPC framework also provided the means to analyze vehicle impact (crash region) due to loss of control resulting from actuator failure in sUAS traffic, essentially to predict impact and crash zones for representative vehicles. The predicted regions when compared with non-participant density, provides a means to develop an early mitigation strategy, should the sUAV detect an imminent actuator failure.

Rajnish Bhusal↗

NASA NTRS2018

Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) of a Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU) Dynamic Positioning System (DPS)

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) has been utilized by NASA in a variety of space oriented projects. It has served as one of the primary risk identification and ranking tools. Recent developments in the oil and gas industry have presented opportunities for NASA to lend their PRA expertise to both ongoing and developmental projects within the industry. As a result, NASA has entered into an agreement with Anadarko Petroleum Company (APC) to collaboratively develop PRAs for different aspects of the subsea drilling and completion process of well development. This paper documents how PRA was applied to estimate the probability that a Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU) equipped with a generically configured Dynamic Positioning System (DPS) loses location and needs to initiate an emergency disconnect. Since this project was in essence a pilot project, the PRA described in this paper is intended to be generic such that the vessel meets the general requirements of an International Maritime Organization (IMO) Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)/Circ. 645 Class 3 dynamically positioned vessel. The results of this analysis are not intended to be applied to any specific drilling vessel, although provisions were made to allow the analysis to be configured to a specific vessel if required.

Thigpen, Eric B.↗

NASA NTRS2011

NASA Applications and Lessons Learned in Reliability Engineering

Since the Shuttle Challenger accident in 1986, communities across NASA have been developing and extensively using quantitative reliability and risk assessment methods in their decision making process. This paper discusses several reliability engineering applications that NASA has used over the year to support the design, development, and operation of critical space flight hardware. Specifically, the paper discusses several reliability engineering applications used by NASA in areas such as risk management, inspection policies, components upgrades, reliability growth, integrated failure analysis, and physics based probabilistic engineering analysis. In each of these areas, the paper provides a brief discussion of a case study to demonstrate the value added and the criticality of reliability engineering in supporting NASA project and program decisions to fly safely. Examples of these case studies discussed are reliability based life limit extension of Shuttle Space Main Engine (SSME) hardware, Reliability based inspection policies for Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) turbine disc, probabilistic structural engineering analysis for reliability prediction of the SSME alternate turbo-pump development, impact of ET foam reliability on the Space Shuttle System risk, and reliability based Space Shuttle upgrade for safety. Special attention is given in this paper to the physics based probabilistic engineering analysis applications and their critical role in evaluating the reliability of NASA development hardware including their potential use in a research and technology development environment.

Safie, Fayssal M.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Challenger disaster was caused by an Apollo decision

Harry W Jones↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Challenger tragedy was caused by an Apollo mistake, terminating risk analysis

NASA’s view of risk changed between early Apollo and the Space Shuttle. Risk was a known serious problem at the beginning of Apollo and the risk estimates were disturbingly high. To avoid public concern, risk analysis was discontinued. Risk analysis was avoided in Shuttle, leading to an unnecessarily risky design. The immediate cause of the Challenger tragedy was the mistaken decision to launch in cold weather. The fundamental cause was the high risk of the Shuttle design. Before Challenger, management thought and testified that the probability of an accident was 1 in 100,000. After Challenger, Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) found a roughly 1 in 100 chance of a Shuttle failure. The recent Orion design uses the safer Apollo approach, with a hardened capsule, launch abort escape, and the crew placed above the rocket tanks and engines. During Apollo it was estimated that, “assuming all elements from propulsion to rendezvous and life support were done as well or better than ever before, that 30 astronauts would be lost before 3 were returned safely to the Earth.” The chance of astronaut survival was only 10%. After the Apollo 1 tragedy, the awareness of risk led to an intense focus on achieving safety. “The only possible explanation for the astonishing success – no losses in space and on time – was that every participant at every level in every area far exceeded the norm of human capabilities.” During Apollo, a NASA PRA found that the chance of success was “less than 5 percent.” The NASA Administrator felt that “the numbers could do irreparable harm,” and discontinued numerical risk assessment. This led to decreasing understanding of risk. The head of Apollo reliability and safety decided, “Statistics don’t count for anything,” and that risk is reduced by “attention taken in design.” The great and initially unexpected success of Apollo appeared to validate the neglect of PRA. Continuing to neglect the mathematical estimation of risk led Shuttle into a high risk design that produced tragic results. The initial design of the Shuttle emphasized increasing capability and reducing cost without analysis or even mention of risk. A retired NASA official stated, “some NASA people began to confuse desire with reality. … One result was to assess risk in terms of what was thought acceptable without regard for verifying the assessment. … Note that under such circumstances real risk management is shut out.” Not computing risk led to removing launch abort, removing crew escape, selecting less reliable Solid Rocket Boosters, placing the crew compartment next to the rocket boosters, and accepting more stressed shielding tile designs. Accepting these specific risks directly caused the shuttle disasters. The Challenger tragedy is frequently taught as a case of management failure. The focus is on the Challenger launch decision hours before, which is a dramatic example of bad management. However, the true cause of the Challenger disaster occurred decades earlier in the Apollo era. When the easily predictable failures occurred, failure investigations focused on how they might have been avoided. The Shuttle was cancelled after the space station was completed because of its high risk. The ultimate cause of the Shuttle tragedies was the choice by the Apollo-era NASA administrator to avoid a negative public reaction to realistic risk analysis.

Harry W. Jones↗

NASA NTRS2005

Knowledge Representation Standards and Interchange Formats for Causal Graphs

In many domains, automated reasoning tools must represent graphs of causally linked events. These include fault-tree analysis, probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), planning, procedures, medical reasoning about disease progression, and functional architectures. Each of these fields has its own requirements for the representation of causation, events, actors and conditions. The representations include ontologies of function and cause, data dictionaries for causal dependency, failure and hazard, and interchange formats between some existing tools. In none of the domains has a generally accepted interchange format emerged. The paper makes progress towards interoperability across the wide range of causal analysis methodologies. We survey existing practice and emerging interchange formats in each of these fields. Setting forth a set of terms and concepts that are broadly shared across the domains, we examine the several ways in which current practice represents them. Some phenomena are difficult to represent or to analyze in several domains. These include mode transitions, reachability analysis, positive and negative feedback loops, conditions correlated but not causally linked and bimodal probability distributions. We work through examples and contrast the differing methods for addressing them. We detail recent work in knowledge interchange formats for causal trees in aerospace analysis applications in early design, safety and reliability. Several examples are discussed, with a particular focus on reachability analysis and mode transitions. We generalize the aerospace analysis work across the several other domains. We also recommend features and capabilities for the next generation of causal knowledge representation standards.

Throop, David R.↗

NASA NTRS2016

Human Reliability Assessments: Using the Past (Shuttle) to Predict the Future (Orion)

NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) Johnson Space Center (JSC) Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) uses two human reliability analysis (HRA) methodologies. The first is a simplified method which is based on how much time is available to complete the action, with consideration included for environmental and personal factors that could influence the human's reliability. This method is expected to provide a conservative value or placeholder as a preliminary estimate. This preliminary estimate or screening value is used to determine which placeholder needs a more detailed assessment. The second methodology is used to develop a more detailed human reliability assessment on the performance of critical human actions. This assessment needs to consider more than the time available, this would include factors such as: the importance of the action, the context, environmental factors, potential human stresses, previous experience, training, physical design interfaces, available procedures/checklists and internal human stresses. The more detailed assessment is expected to be more realistic than that based primarily on time available. When performing an HRA on a system or process that has an operational history, we have information specific to the task based on this history and experience. In the case of a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) that is based on a new design and has no operational history, providing a "reasonable" assessment of potential crew actions becomes more challenging. In order to determine what is expected of future operational parameters, the experience from individuals who had relevant experience and were familiar with the system and process previously implemented by NASA was used to provide the "best" available data. Personnel from Flight Operations, Flight Directors, Launch Test Directors, Control Room Console Operators and Astronauts were all interviewed to provide a comprehensive picture of previous NASA operations. Verification of the assumptions and expectations expressed in the assessments will be needed when the procedures, flight rules and operational requirements are developed and then finalized.

DeMott, Diana↗

NASA NTRS2017

Human Reliability Assessments: Using the Past (Shuttle) to Predict the Future (Orion)

NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) Johnson Space Center (JSC) Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) uses two human reliability analysis (HRA) methodologies. The first is a simplified method which is based on how much time is available to complete the action, with consideration included for environmental and personal factors that could influence the human's reliability. This method is expected to provide a conservative value or placeholder as a preliminary estimate. This preliminary estimate or screening value is used to determine which placeholder needs a more detailed assessment. The second methodology is used to develop a more detailed human reliability assessment on the performance of critical human actions. This assessment needs to consider more than the time available, this would include factors such as: the importance of the action, the context, environmental factors, potential human stresses, previous experience, training, physical design interfaces, available procedures/checklists and internal human stresses. The more detailed assessment is expected to be more realistic than that based primarily on time available. When performing an HRA on a system or process that has an operational history, we have information specific to the task based on this history and experience. In the case of a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) that is based on a new design and has no operational history, providing a "reasonable" assessment of potential crew actions becomes more challenging. To determine what is expected of future operational parameters, the experience from individuals who had relevant experience and were familiar with the system and process previously implemented by NASA was used to provide the "best" available data. Personnel from Flight Operations, Flight Directors, Launch Test Directors, Control Room Console Operators, and Astronauts were all interviewed to provide a comprehensive picture of previous NASA operations. Verification of the assumptions and expectations expressed in the assessments will be needed when the procedures, flight rules, and operational requirements are developed and then finalized.

DeMott, Diana L.↗

NASA NTRS2010

NASA Tech Briefs, March 2010

Topics covered include: Software Tool Integrating Data Flow Diagrams and Petri Nets; Adaptive Nulling for Interferometric Detection of Planets; Reducing the Volume of NASA Earth-Science Data; Reception of Multiple Telemetry Signals via One Dish Antenna; Space-Qualified Traveling-Wave Tube; Smart Power Supply for Battery-Powered Systems; Parallel Processing of Broad-Band PPM Signals; Inexpensive Implementation of Many Strain Gauges; Constant-Differential-Pressure Two-Fluid Accumulator; Inflatable Tubular Structures Rigidized with Foams; Power Generator with Thermo-Differential Modules; Mechanical Extraction of Power From Ocean Currents and Tides; Nitrous Oxide/Paraffin Hybrid Rocket Engines; Optimized Li-Ion Electrolytes Containing Fluorinated Ester Co-Solvents; Probabilistic Multi-Factor Interaction Model for Complex Material Behavior; Foldable Instrumented Bits for Ultrasonic/Sonic Penetrators; Compact Rare Earth Emitter Hollow Cathode; High-Precision Shape Control of In-Space Deployable Large Membrane/Thin-Shell Reflectors; Rapid Active Sampling Package; Miniature Lightweight Ion Pump; Cryogenic Transport of High-Pressure-System Recharge Gas; Water-Vapor Raman Lidar System Reaches Higher Altitude; Compact Ku-Band T/R Module for High-Resolution Radar Imaging of Cold Land Processes; Wide-Field-of-View, High-Resolution, Stereoscopic Imager; Electrical Capacitance Volume Tomography with High-Contrast Dielectrics; Wavefront Control and Image Restoration with Less Computing; Polarization Imaging Apparatus; Stereoscopic Machine-Vision System Using Projected Circles; Metal Vapor Arcing Risk Assessment Tool; Performance Bounds on Two Concatenated, Interleaved Codes; Parameterizing Coefficients of a POD-Based Dynamical System; Confidence-Based Feature Acquisition; Algorithm for Lossless Compression of Calibrated Hyperspectral Imagery; Universal Decoder for PPM of any Order; Algorithm for Stabilizing a POD-Based Dynamical System; Mission Reliability Estimation for Repairable Robot Teams; Processing AIRS Scientific Data Through Level 3; Web-Based Requesting and Scheduling Use of Facilities; AutoGen Version 5.0; Time-Tag Generation Script; PPM Receiver Implemented in Software; Tropospheric Emission Spectrometer Product File Readers; Reporting Differences Between Spacecraft Sequence Files; Coordinating "Execute" Data for ISS and Space Shuttle; Database for Safety-Oriented Tracking of Chemicals; Apparatus for Cold, Pressurized Biogeochemical Experiments; Growing B Lymphocytes in a Three-Dimensional Culture System; Tissue-like 3D Assemblies of Human Broncho-Epithelial Cells; Isolation of Resistance-Bearing Microorganisms; Oscillating Cell Culture Bioreactor; and Liquid Cooling/Warming Garment.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2011

Estimating the Loss of Crew and Loss of Mission for Crew Spacecraft

Once the US Space Shuttle retires in 2011, the Russian Soyuz Launcher and Soyuz Spacecraft will comprise the only means for crew transportation to and from the International Space Station (ISS). The U.S. Government and NASA have contracted for crew transportation services to the ISS with Russia. The resulting implications for the US space program including issues such as astronaut safety must be carefully considered. Are the astronauts and cosmonauts safer on the Soyuz than the Space Shuttle system? Is the Soyuz launch system more robust than the Space Shuttle? The Soyuz launcher has been in operation for over 40 years. There have been only two loss of life incidents and two loss of mission incidents. Given that the most recent incident took place in 1983, how do we determine current reliability of the system? Do failures of unmanned Soyuz rockets impact the reliability of the currently operational man-rated launcher? Does the Soyuz exhibit characteristics that demonstrate reliability growth and how would that be reflected in future estimates of success? NASA s next manned rocket and spacecraft development project will have to meet the Agency Threshold requirements set forth by NASA. The reliability targets are currently several times higher than the Shuttle and possibly even the Soyuz. Can these targets be compared to the reliability of the Soyuz to determine whether they are realistic and achievable? To help answer these questions this paper will explore how to estimate the reliability of the Soyuz Launcher/Spacecraft system, compare it to the Space Shuttle, and its potential impacts for the future of manned spaceflight. Specifically it will look at estimating the Loss of Crew (LOC) and Loss of Mission (LOM) probability using historical data, reliability growth, and Probabilistic Risk Assessment techniques used to generate these numbers.

Lutomski, Michael G.↗

NASA NTRS2014

Probabilistic Assessment of Hypobaric Decompression Sickness Treatment Success

The Hypobaric Decompression Sickness (DCS) Treatment Model links a decrease in computed bubble volume from increased pressure (DeltaP), increased oxygen (O2) partial pressure, and passage of time during treatment to the probability of symptom resolution [P(symptom resolution)]. The decrease in offending volume is realized in 2 stages: a) during compression via Boyle's Law and b) during subsequent dissolution of the gas phase via the O2 window. We established an empirical model for the P(symptom resolution) while accounting for multiple symptoms within subjects. The data consisted of 154 cases of hypobaric DCS symptoms along with ancillary information from tests on 56 men and 18 women. Our best estimated model is P(symptom resolution) = 1 / (1+exp(-(ln(Delta P) - 1.510 + 0.795×AMB - 0.00308×Ts) / 0.478)), where (DeltaP) is pressure difference (psid), AMB = 1 if ambulation took place during part of the altitude exposure, otherwise AMB = 0; and where Ts is the elapsed time in mins from start of the altitude exposure to recognition of a DCS symptom. To apply this model in future scenarios, values of DeltaP as inputs to the model would be calculated from the Tissue Bubble Dynamics Model based on the effective treatment pressure: (DeltaP) = P2 - P1 | = P1×V1/V2 - P1, where V1 is the computed volume of a spherical bubble in a unit volume of tissue at low pressure P1 and V2 is computed volume after a change to a higher pressure P2. If 100% ground level O2 (GLO) was breathed in place of air, then V2 continues to decrease through time at P2 at a faster rate. This calculated value of (DeltaP then represents the effective treatment pressure at any point in time. Simulation of a "pain-only" symptom at 203 min into an ambulatory extravehicular activity (EVA) at 4.3 psia on Mars resulted in a P(symptom resolution) of 0.49 (0.36 to 0.62 95% confidence intervals) on immediate return to 8.2 psia in the Multi-Mission Space Exploration Vehicle. The P(symptom resolution) increased to near certainty (0.99) after 2 hrs of GLO at 8.2 psia or with less certainty on immediate pressurization to 14.7 psia [0.90 (0.83 - 0.95)]. Given the low probability of DCS during EVA and the prompt treatment of a symptom with guidance from the model, it is likely that the symptom and gas phase will resolve with minimum resources and minimal impact on astronaut health, safety, and productivity.

Conkin, Johnny↗