2015 Decompression Sickness/Extravehicular Activity Risks: Standing Panel Review Panel Status Review
No abstract available
Steinberg, Susan↗
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2016 Habitat Standing Review Panel: Research Plan Review for Deep Space Habitat, Livability, Well-Being, and Performance
No abstract available
Steinberg, Susan↗
Summary of Technical Peer Review on the Risk Assessment Framework proposed in Report INL/RPT-22-68656 for Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems
This report summarizes the peer review activities initiated by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during fiscal year (FY) 2023 for the evaluation and improvement of the methodology developed under the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) risk assessment project. In FY 2019, the RISA Pathway initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a technical basis to support effective and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. A framework was proposed for this strategy, which aims to (1) provide a best-estimate, risk-informed capability to quantitatively and accurately estimate the risk impact of plant modernization, considering the introduction of high safety-significant safety-related (HSSSR) DI&C systems, (2) support and supplement existing risk-informed DI&C design guides by providing quantitative risk information and evidence, (3) offer a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems, (4) assure the long-term safety and reliability of HSSSR DI&C systems, and (5) reduce uncertainty in costs and support integration of DI&C systems in the plant. The R&D efforts of this project from FY 2019 through FY 2022 were focused on methodology improvement and demonstration of the proposed framework for the risk assessment and design optimization of safety-critical DI&C systems. Collaborations with the nuclear industry have been initiated to support the reliability and risk assessment of their DI&C systems by using the proposed framework. In FY 2023, the framework has reached to a point for a technical peer review and obtain stakeholder feedback. This peer review activity includes coordination of the reviews performed by a group of industry stakeholders, documentation of the peer review suggestions, providing resolutions and responses to the peer review comments. The objective of this technical peer review is to obtain representative feedback on the proposed framework to improve the technical qualities of its methodology and readiness for deployment to the industry. Feedback may identify potential areas for improvement and further development. The Subject Matter experts were invited to review the latest project report documenting the methodology developed in the project and provide evaluations of the technical qualities of the proposed framework and relevant methods. The reviewed project report is “An Integrated Framework for Risk Assessment of High Safety-significant Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems in Nuclear Power Plants: Methodology and Demonstration” INL/RPT-22-68656 (short as “INL/RPT-22-68656” in this report). This peer review report documents the technical questions provided for technical peer review and introduces the technical peer reviewers from the stakeholders including nuclear utilities, regulators, and universities. Comments from technical peer reviewers and the resolutions and responses to these comments are outlined. Insights and lessons learned from the technical peer review are summarized in conclusions and future work. The primary audience of this report are DI&C designers, engineers, and probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) practitioners. This includes stakeholders, such as the nuclear utilities and regulators who consider the deployment and upgrade of DI&C systems, DI&C software developers and reviewers, and cybersecurity specialists.
99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
Proposed guidance for preparing and reviewing a molten salt non-power production or utilization facility application
Development of non-power molten salt reactors (MSRs) are under consideration to further establish an MSR experience base, support the requirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.43(e), and provide any additional analyses needed for development of a full-scale MSR. Guidance provided in this report is based on MSRs operating with liquid fuel (i.e., fuel dissolved within a molten salt). These reactors, unless owned by the DOE or DOD, will require licensing by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff. Standard review plan (SRP) guidance for large light water reactors (LWRs) is available in NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants; Light Water Reactor (LWR) Edition. However, NRC staff observed that NUREG-0800 is very cumbersome to apply to non-power reactors “because of the great differences in complexity and hazards between non-power reactors and nuclear power plants.” Therefore, a program to develop performance-based guidance applicable to non-power reactors was initiated. In 1996, NUREG-1537, Parts 1 and 2, Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors, was published. Part 1, the format and content guide, suggests a uniform format for presenting information in non-power reactor applications that is acceptable to the NRC staff, but conformance with the format and content is not required. Part 2, the SRP, ensures the quality and uniformity of the staff review of an application. Unfortunately, the application guidelines and SRP do not provide adequate guidance for all advanced non-LWR technologies and applications. This discrepancy eventually led to the 2012 development of interim staff guidance (ISG) for NUREG-1537, which includes criteria for describing and reviewing aqueous homogeneous reactors (AHRs). Specifically, NUREG-1537 ISG, 2012 expanded the original document to address three areas: 1. updated criteria for heterogeneous non-power reactors, 2. criteria for licensing AHRs, and 3. criteria for licensing a Part 50-licensed isotope production facility. In 2015, the US Department of Energy (DOE) opted to build on the AHR NUREG-1537 ISG experience by performing a gap analysis of the guidance that would be used to license a non-power MSR. MSRs represent one of the advanced non-LWR technologies selected by DOE for development through a multiyear cost share award with Southern Company Services. Under this Advanced Reactor Concepts 2015 (DOE Advanced Reactor Concepts [ARC] 15) award program, the DOE tasked Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to evaluate the guidance changes that the NRC may need to consider when licensing an MSR non-power reactor. ORNL staff, with support from Boston Government Services, LLC, focused on five system-related chapters in NUREG-1537 that were considered most relevant to inform the effort that would be required for a non-power MSR applicant. ORNL documented this review in a technical report, ORNL/TM-2018/834, Proposed Guidance for Preparing and Reviewing Molten Salt Non-Power Reactor License Applications (NUREG-1537). The report was subsequently shared with industry and the NRC. The 2018 review was limited in scope, focusing on key system chapters based on the expected significance of each chapter relative to expected differences in addressing advanced non-LWR technologies, specifically non-power MSRs, compared with heterogeneously fueled non-power reactors. In the ORNL report, proposed generic adaptations were suggested for the following NUREG-1537 chapters: Chapter 4, “Reactor Description”; Chapter 5, “Reactor Coolant Systems”; Chapter 6, “Engineered Safety Features”; Chapter 9, “Auxiliary Systems”; Chapter 11, “Radiation Protection Program and Waste Management” The inclusion of Chapter 11 in the previous review effort was intended to provide guidance for categorizing the waste-handling process for an MSR operating with homogenous fuel. The introductions from Parts 1 and 2 of the 2012 NUREG-1537 ISG provide guidance for the application and review of production facilities. After a period of operation, non-power MSRs with homogenous fuel will include gaseous and soluble fission products. The gaseous fission products will be collected and held for decay in an off-gas system. There might also be an initiative to polish or filter the soluble fission products in the fuel salt by some mechanical or chemical means. The treatment and handling of fission products in the non-power MSR fuel salt and the description of this process in the safety analysis report (SAR) must be very precise to avoid the waste treatment facility being construed as a co-located special nuclear material (SNM) fuel cycle facility (see Section 2.3 of this report). Subsequent to the release of ORNL/TM-2018/834, NRC staff expressed a desire to continue the regulatory gap analysis that was begun in that report. This would provide additional clarity and information addressed in certain sections of the original report, while also providing new guidance on certain topics not addressed in the original report. This revision would benefit the NRC staff reviewing applications involving non-power MSR designs and would help developers understand how the NRC staff might approach the review of such applications. The focus of this report is to provide infrastructure support to the NRC staff for the regulatory review of non-power MSRs.
22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
Human-System Interface Design Review Guidelines
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff reviews the human factors engineering (HFE) aspects of nuclear power plants in accordance with the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition). The Human Factors Engineering Program Review Model (NUREG-0711, Revision 3, issued November 2012) contains detailed design review procedures. As part of the review process, the interfaces between plant personnel and the plant's systems and components are evaluated for conformance with HFE guidelines. This document, Human-System Interface Design Review Guidelines (NUREG-0700, Revision 3), provides the guidelines necessary to perform this evaluation. The review guidelines address the physical and functional characteristics of human-system interfaces (HSIs). Because these guidelines only address the HFE aspects of design and not other related considerations, such as instrumentation and control and structural design, they are referred to as HFE guidelines. In addition to the review of actual HSIs, the NRC staff can use the NUREG-0700 guidelines to evaluate a design-specific HFE guidelines document or style guide. The HFE guidelines are organized into four basic parts, which are divided into sections. Part I contains guidelines for the basic HSI elements: information displays, user-interface interaction and management, and analog displays and controls. These elements are used as building blocks to develop HSI systems to serve specific functions. Part II contains the guidelines for reviewing the following HSI systems: alarm system, safety parameter display system, group-view display system, soft control system, computer-based procedure system, automation system, and communication system. Part III provides guidelines for the review of workstations and workplaces. Part IV provides guidelines for the review of HSI support (i.e., maintainability of digital systems and degraded HSI and instrumentation and control conditions).
42 ENGINEERING↗
Oak Ridge National Laboratory Technical Input for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Review of the 2017 Edition of ASME Section III, Division 5, ‘High Temperature Reactors’
To assist the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in its decision making on endorsement of the American Society for Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section III, Division 5 (2017 Edition) for development of advanced non-light water reactors, the following Division 5 portions were reviewed: Article HBB-2000 Material; Article HCB-2000 Material; Article HGB-2000 Material; Mandatory Appendix HBB-I-14 Tables and Figures; and, Nonmandatory Appendix HBB-U Guidelines for Restricted Material Specifications to Improve Performance in Certain Service Applications. In addition to the 2017 Edition, the same parts of the 2019 Edition have also been reviewed as indicated in various sections of the report. This review was conducted by a collaboration of national laboratory and private sector participants with significant industrial experience, including some heavy lifting and deep diving from Clarus Consulting, LLC., all intended to achieve an objective, independent, and practical perspective. The report provides recommendations, descriptions of the evaluation methods, and the source references for the data used. To build confidence required for endorsement of the Code, this review was conducted as a verification and validation of the above Code contents. The objective of verification is to ensure that the Code is free of error – direct or implied; contains the information needed for its use, including proper coverage of the Code-specified materials for the intended application, and completeness and adequacy of references to other portions of the Code. The objective of validation is to authenticate that the Code tabulations and graphs represent design inputs consistent with what are determined using rules and methods specified by the Code. The authentication process used data that were assembled and/or generated independent of Code development, while the methods of analysis followed Code-specified methods where appropriate. The designated portions for this review cover the five alloys codified for high temperature reactor applications in Division 5, i.e. 316 SS, 304 SS, 800H, 2¼Cr-1Mo, and 9Cr-1Mo-V, regarding their general requirements, permitted specifications and design stress intensity values for pressure-retaining applications, deterioration in service, fatigue acceptance test, permissible weld materials, tensile and yield strength, expected minimum stress-to-rupture values (including for Alloy 718), weld stress rupture factors, permissible materials for bolting use, and restricted specifications in certain service applications. Additionally, stress intensity values for bolting materials including 316 SS, 304 SS and alloy 718 were reviewed. Analysis and discussion are also provided on contents outside of these designated Code portions where it was deemed relevant and necessary to develop a technically sound understanding of issues relating to the designated portions. Due to unavailability of sufficient test data on welds during the review period, the weld stress rupture factors in Tables HBB-I-10.14A to E, which cover a total of ten tables for the five alloys welded with twenty-eight different weld metals (some with similar properties), have been deferred to a future review effort. The review identified mainly two types of issues. The first type includes instances where the Code is found factually incomplete or incorrect, such as obsolete materials specifications listings, missing tabulation of stresses for bolting. Changes to the Code are recommended in these cases. The second type of issue includes instances where the Code tabulations and graphs are found to be less conservative than the review analysis results. In these cases, recommendations are made for further review and consideration where the difference in conservatism exceeds 10%, which is our threshold for questioning technical adequacy, meriting a risk assessment by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and/or reactor designers. It is noted that this effort has been executed using all available data and established methods of analysis, including methods and criteria specified and used by the Code. As such, the findings that are presented in quantitative detail, in a format for convenient comparison with the Code, and with identification of where further review is recommended, should provide a sound technical basis for decisions about quantifying the implications of the reduced design margins and technical adequacy/inadequacy to form a basis for conditioning specific Code tabulation values on endorsement. Recommendations for specific changes to the Code, however, entail design conservatism considerations beyond the scope of this review effort, and are not made in this report.
22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
The role of peer review and science for advancing public understanding
We live in a time of rapid change. The Covid-19 pandemic has united the world to understand and develop solutions to protect the health and wellbeing of society. At the same time, access to information on the internet and social media has exploded. People are exposed to information with many claims. Some of the information is relevant and accurate. A significant fraction may be inaccurate, biased, and potentially dangerous. With Covid-19, the information might point to cures that are toxic or risks that are not relevant. The scientific community has developed a process to develop and convey knowledge. The validation of results and their interpretation is critical to advancing knowledge. The core of the scientific process is based on developing a hypothesis-driven concept, designing and executing an experimental approach to prove or disprove the hypothesis, conducting a statistical analysis of the results to confirm their validity, and interpreting their meaning and impact. When their work is completed the scientist prepares to publish the work. Publication requires peer review. Hypotheses, experimental approaches, results, and interpretation of results are independently and anonymously reviewed by a scientific peer. The reviewers are selected based on their expertise in the field. The peer review process is essential for the integrity of the scientific process. Without a robust scientific process, society cannot discriminate between validated results and interpretations and biased, inaccurate, and potentially dangerous conjecture. With inaccurate science society and policy makers may make poor decisions that could hurt people and the world around them. While scientists should not censor information available to the public, scientists have a responsibility to inform the public. We must articulate what the scientific process is and why it is essential when considering the validity of information. Scientist are responsible for pointing out when public information has not been vetted through a scientific process and therefore cannot be considered conclusive. Scientists are responsible for highlighting information that has been generated and vetted with the scientific process. Over time, our goal is for the public to value the scientific process based on peer review. The public could become enlightened to the necessity for peer review to support decisions and action. Scientists need to contribute to advancing public knowledge. When invited to serve as a peer reviewer, scientists have a responsibility to contribute to the process. We all are extremely busy making peer review a distraction. While peer review does not directly benefit our own work and career, it benefits our chosen field of science. This is very important for the research area that our journal, Water-Energy Nexus, is focusing on. We cover the convergence of science and technology integrating across large spatial ranges (micro to global) in environmental pollution and the balance of remediation issues with energy use. Water-Energy Nexus wants to provide scientists with a platform for scientific debate and discussion on this rich and complicated topic. With the manuscripts submitted to WEN cover integrated research topics across a broad range of subjects from environment sciences through energy engineering, the role of peer review is essential. Peer review on a new submission to WEN should not be biased towards a specific science field. It should be done considering the complex nature of issues in the water-energy nexus. Scientists need to contribute to the public dialog. To accomplish these goals, we need to be honest, accurate, articulate, and use understandable language. The impact of WEN is very diverse affecting society in many ways. The scientific audience for WEN is diverse and readers may not fully understand the content of the papers outside their research expertise. Therefore, scientists, especially those who want to contribute to WEN, should work with communications specialists to convey message to benefit society. The audience includes the general public and researchers outside the author’s core specialty. While the peer-reviewed journal article is the cornerstone of our careers and critical for advancing scientific knowledge, a general interest story could benefit society even more. The author cannot lose sight that our work has two audiences, the science community, and more importantly, our family, friends, neighbors, and policy makers.
54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
A Study of Technical Engineering Peer Reviews at NASA
This report describes the state of practices of design reviews at NASA and research into what can be done to improve peer review practices. There are many types of reviews at NASA: required and not, formalized and informal, programmatic and technical. Standing project formal reviews such as the Preliminary Design Review and Critical Design Review are a required part of every project and mission development. However, the technical, engineering peer reviews that support teams' work on such projects are informal, some times ad hoc, and inconsistent across the organization. The goal of this work is to identify best practices and lessons learned from NASA's experience, supported by academic research and methodologies to ultimately improve the process. This research has determined that the organization, composition, scope, and approach of the reviews impact their success. Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) can identify key areas of concern before or in the reviews. Product definition tools like the Project Priority Matrix, engineering-focused Customer Value Chain Analysis (CVCA), and project or system-based Quality Function Deployment (QFD) help prioritize resources in reviews. The use of information technology and structured design methodologies can strengthen the engineering peer review process to help NASA work towards error-proofing the design process.
Chao, Lawrence P.↗
Engineering Technical Review Planning Briefing
The general topics covered in the engineering technical planning briefing are 1) overviews of NASA, Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), and Engineering, 2) the NASA Systems Engineering(SE) Engine and its implementation , 3) the NASA Project Life Cycle, 4) MSFC Technical Management Branch Services in relation to the SE Engine and the Project Life Cycle , 5) Technical Reviews, 6) NASA Human Factor Design Guidance , and 7) the MSFC Human Factors Team. The engineering technical review portion of the presentation is the primary focus of the overall presentation and will address the definition of a design review, execution guidance, the essential stages of a technical review, and the overall review planning life cycle. Examples of a technical review plan content, review approaches, review schedules, and the review process will be provided and discussed. The human factors portion of the presentation will focus on the NASA guidance for human factors. Human factors definition, categories, design guidance, and human factor specialist roles will be addressed. In addition, the NASA Systems Engineering Engine description, definition, and application will be reviewed as background leading into the NASA Project Life Cycle Overview and technical review planning discussion.
Gardner, Terrie↗
2024 Annual Merit Review - Vehicle Technologies Office: Results Report
The 2024 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy’s (EERE) Vehicle Technologies Office (VTO) Annual Merit Review (AMR) was held June 3-6, 2024, in Arlington, Virginia. The review encompassed work done by VTO: 226 individual activities were reviewed by 218 reviewers. Exactly 888 individual review responses were received for the VTO technical reviews. Each project was reviewed by 2–7 independent reviewers, with a majority of projects having 4–5 reviewers. The objective of the meeting was to review the accomplishments and plans for VTO over the previous 12 months, and provide an opportunity for industry, government, and academia to give inputs to DOE with a structured and formal methodology. The meeting also provided attendees with a forum for interaction and technology information transfer.
33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗
Support for Systematic Code Reviews with the SCRUB Tool
SCRUB is a code review tool that supports both large, team-based software development efforts (e.g., for mission software) as well as individual tasks. The tool was developed at JPL to support a new, streamlined code review process that combines human-generated review reports with program-generated review reports from a customizable range of state-of-the-art source code analyzers. The leading commercial tools include Codesonar, Coverity, and Klocwork, each of which can achieve a reasonably low rate of false-positives in the warnings that they generate. The time required to analyze code with these tools can vary greatly. In each case, however, the tools produce results that would be difficult to realize with human code inspections alone. There is little overlap in the results produced by the different analyzers, and each analyzer used generally increases the effectiveness of the overall effort. The SCRUB tool allows all reports to be accessed through a single, uniform interface (see figure) that facilitates brows ing code and reports. Improvements over existing software include significant simplification, and leveraging of a range of commercial, static source code analyzers in a single, uniform framework. The tool runs as a small stand-alone application, avoiding the security problems related to tools based on Web browsers. A developer or reviewer, for instance, must have already obtained access rights to a code base before that code can be browsed and reviewed with the SCRUB tool. The tool cannot open any files or folders to which the user does not already have access. This means that the tool does not need to enforce or administer any additional security policies. The analysis results presented through the SCRUB tool s user interface are always computed off-line, given that, especially for larger projects, this computation can take longer than appropriate for interactive tool use. The recommended code review process that is supported by the SCRUB tool consists of three phases: Code Review, Developer Response, and Closeout Resolution. In the Code Review phase, all tool-based analysis reports are generated, and specific comments from expert code reviewers are entered into the SCRUB tool. In the second phase, Developer Response, the developer is asked to respond to each comment and tool-report that was produced, either agreeing or disagreeing to provide a fix that addresses the issue that was raised. In the third phase, Closeout Resolution, all disagreements are discussed in a meeting of all parties involved, and a resolution is made for all disagreements. The first two phases generally take one week each, and the third phase is concluded in a single closeout meeting.
Holzmann, Gerald J.↗
Actions Needed to Ensure Scientific and Technical Information is Adequately Reviewed at Goddard Space Flight Center, Johnson Space Center, Langley Research Center, and Marshall Space Flight Center
This audit was initiated in response to a hotline complaint regarding the review, approval, and release of scientific and technical information (STI) at Johnson Space Center. The complainant alleged that Johnson personnel conducting export control reviews of STI were not fully qualified to conduct those reviews and that the reviews often did not occur until after the STI had been publicly released. NASA guidance requires that STI, defined as the results of basic and applied scientific, technical, and related engineering research and development, undergo certain reviews prior to being released outside of NASA or to audiences that include foreign nationals. The process includes technical, national security, export control, copyright, and trade secret (e.g., proprietary data) reviews. The review process was designed to preclude the inappropriate dissemination of sensitive information while ensuring that NASA complies with a requirement of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (the Space Act)1 to provide for the widest practicable and appropriate dissemination of information resulting from NASA research activities. We focused our audit on evaluating the STI review process: specifically, determining whether the roles and responsibilities for the review, approval, and release of STI were adequately defined and documented in NASA and Center-level guidance and whether that guidance was effectively implemented at Goddard Space Flight Center, Johnson Space Center, Langley Research Center, and Marshall Space Flight Center. Johnson was included in the review because it was the source of the initial complaint, and Goddard, Langley, and Marshall were included because those Centers consistently produce significant amounts of STI.
Information management↗
The Integrated Medical Model: Outcomes from Independent Review
In 2016, the Integrated Medical Model (IMM) v4.0 underwent an extensive external review in preparation for transition to an operational status. In order to insure impartiality of the review process, the Exploration Medical Capabilities Element of NASA's Human Research Program convened the review through the Systems Review Office at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). The review board convened by GSFC consisted of persons from both NASA and academia with expertise in the fields of statistics, epidemiology, modeling, software development, aerospace medicine, and project management (see Figure 1). The board reviewed software and code standards, as well as evidence pedigree associated with both the input and outcomes information. The board also assesses the models verification, validation, sensitivity to parameters and ability to answer operational questions. This talk will discuss the processes for designing the review, how the review progressed and the findings from the board, as well as summarize the IMM project responses to those findings. Overall, the board found that the IMM is scientifically sound, represents a necessary, comprehensive approach to identifying medical and environmental risks facing astronauts in long duration missions and is an excellent tool for communication between engineers and physicians. The board also found IMM and its customer(s) should convene an additional review of the IMM data sources and to develop a sustainable approach to augment, peer review, and maintain the information utilized in the IMM. The board found this is critically important because medical knowledge continues to evolve. Delivery of IMM v4.0 to the Crew Health and Safety (CHS) Program will occur in the 2017. Once delivered for operational decision support, IMM v4.0 will provide CHS with additional quantitative capability in to assess astronaut medical risks and required medical capabilities to help drive down overall mission risks.
medical equipment↗
Deep Learning Systems for Increased Safeguards Surveillance Review Productivity
Nuclear safeguards inspectors expend significant time and maintain intense focus in reviewing video surveillance for safeguards relevant events. To increase efficiency and reduce the time burden of safeguards inspectors performing surveillance data review, this paper presents a novel deep learning (DL) systems concept to integrate generalized DL models into the safeguards surveillance review workflow. The Agency is investigating several DL algorithms for object recognition, localization, tracking, and flagging relevant activities. The project team is working closely with nuclear safeguards inspectors to identify review use cases (based on specific safeguards objectives) and collect their associated requirements. We focused on CANDU and LWR Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) and their associated dry storage areas as these present a particularly heavy burden on the inspector surveillance review process due to the number of these facilities under safeguards worldwide. Initial DL algorithm results on safeguards data are promising. Using a convolutional neural network, the team attained a mean average precision (mAP) of 92.9% identifying and localizing spent fuel (SF) casks from a 475 surveillance image dataset. Further, the team had initial success in training a recurrent neural network to identify reactor area activities in video clips, successfully indicating when SF casks enter or exit a pool. We discuss how such DL algorithms would be integrated into the Next Generation Surveillance Review (NGSR) software application. Another issue impacting review productivity is the long time inspectors may have to wait when running these algorithms in NGSR. We present a concept to pre-process remotely collected surveillance data with DL models as the data arrives to IAEA headquarters so that results are already available when starting a new review in NGSR. The proposed DL system concept shows a pathway and workflow for increasing an inspector’s surveillance review productivity by quickly and accurately identifying declared and undeclared safeguards relevant objects and activities in large quantities of surveillance imagery data.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
Review of Particle Physics
The Review summarizes much of particle physics and cosmology. Using data from previous editions, plus 3,324 new measurements from 878 papers, we list, evaluate, and average measured properties of gauge bosons and the recently discovered Higgs boson, leptons, quarks, mesons, and baryons. We summarize searches for hypothetical particles such as supersymmetric particles, heavy bosons, axions, dark photons, etc. Particle properties and search limits are listed in Summary Tables. We give numerous tables, figures, formulae, and reviews of topics such as Higgs Boson Physics, Supersymmetry, Grand Unified Theories, Neutrino Mixing, Dark Energy, Dark Matter, Cosmology, Particle Detectors, Colliders, Probability and Statistics. Among the 120 reviews are many that are new or heavily revised, including a new review on High Energy Soft QCD and Diffraction and one on the Determination of CKM Angles from B Hadrons. The Review is divided into two volumes. Volume 1 includes the Summary Tables and 98 review articles. Volume 2 consists of the Particle Listings and contains also 22 reviews that address specific aspects of the data presented in the Listings. The complete Review (both volumes) is published online on the website of the Particle Data Group (pdg.lbl.gov) and in a journal. Volume 1 is available in print as the PDG Book. A Pariicle Physics Booklet with the Summary Tables and essential tables, figures, and equations from selected review articles is available in print and as a web version optimized for use on phones as well as an Android app.
72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗
Review of Particle Physics
Abstract The Review summarizes much of particle physics and cosmology. Using data from previous editions, plus 2,143 new measurements from 709 papers, we list, evaluate, and average measured properties of gauge bosons and the recently discovered Higgs boson, leptons, quarks, mesons, and baryons. We summarize searches for hypothetical particles such as supersymmetric particles, heavy bosons, axions, dark photons, etc. Particle properties and search limits are listed in Summary Tables. We give numerous tables, figures, formulae, and reviews of topics such as Higgs Boson Physics, Supersymmetry, Grand Unified Theories, Neutrino Mixing, Dark Energy, Dark Matter, Cosmology, Particle Detectors, Colliders, Probability and Statistics. Among the 120 reviews are many that are new or heavily revised, including a new review on Machine Learning, and one on Spectroscopy of Light Meson Resonances. The Review is divided into two volumes. Volume 1 includes the Summary Tables and 97 review articles. Volume 2 consists of the Particle Listings and contains also 23 reviews that address specific aspects of the data presented in the Listings. The complete Review (both volumes) is published online on the website of the Particle Data Group (pdg.lbl.gov) and in a journal. Volume 1 is available in print as the PDG Book. A Particle Physics Booklet with the Summary Tables and essential tables, figures, and equations from selected review articles is available in print, as a web version optimized for use on phones, and as an Android app.
72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗
Assessment of the NASA Flight Assurance Review Program
The NASA flight assurance review program to develop minimum standard guidelines for flight assurance reviews was assessed. Documents from NASA centers and NASA headquarters to determine current design review practices and procedures were evaluated. Six reviews were identified for the recommended minimum. The practices and procedures used at the different centers to incorporate the most effective ones into the minimum standard review guidelines were analyzed and guidelines for procedures, personnel and responsibilies, review items/data checklist, and feedback and closeout were defined. The six recommended reviews and the minimum standards guidelines developed for flight assurance reviews are presented. Observations and conclusions for further improving the NASA review and quality assurance process are outlined.
Holmes, J.↗