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106 records · Page 6

Structural Dynamics Observations in Space Launch System Green Run Hot Fire Testing

The Space Launch System (SLS) Core Stage (CS) Thrust Vector Control (TVC) system is comprised of eight mechanical feedback Shuttle heritage Type III TVC actuators and four RS-25 engines, each attached to a Shuttle heritage gimbal block/bearing. Two actuators are used to move each engine in two planes perpendicular to one another (i.e., pitch and yaw). The TVC system design leverages hardware from the Space Shuttle program as well as new hardware designed specifically for the Core Stage. The Green Run Hot Fire (GRHF) of the SLS Core Stage provided a flight-like ground test environment for verification of integrated vehicle TVC performance. A TVC model coupled to a vehicle structural dynamic model has been developed previously and incrementally validated in subsystem tests and simulations. Still, some aspects of TVC performance in GRHF were not anticipated. The ensuing investigation demonstrated the need for well-instrumented test environments, various levels of modeling fidelity, test-representative structural models, and caution in reuse of legacy components. This paper is the sixth installment in a seven-paper series surveying the design, engineering, test validation, and flight performance of the Core Stage Thrust Vector Control system. It introduces the salient structural dynamic phenomena uncovered in ambient and hot fire testing. During the Green Run test campaign, a comparison of ambient and hot fire step responses showed a significant change in apparent damping due to the presence of friction, challenging long standing assumptions that friction could be neglected. Additionally, the characteristic response of the engine and thrust structure during GRHF proved to be more complex than anticipated, as evidenced by the available actuator, thrust structure, and engine measurements. While the string-potentiometer based test instrumentation was intended to allow for reconstruction of the engine angles along the two control axes, the geometric placement, location uncertainty, and responses in overlapping frequency spectra revealed additional phenomena requiring further analysis and post-processing. The observations from both modal and frequency response testing during the Green Run ambient and hot fire configurations led to Engine and Core Stage FEM (finite element model) updates. When evidence of unexpected engine motion was found in engine section accelerometer data, the authors pursued additional structural analysis leading to FEM updates associated with the TVC gimbal and thrust structure. Through collaboration between structures, TVC, and flight control disciplines, the test-informed models and root-cause analysis led to confident flight rationale for the first flight of the SLS launch vehicle.

Richard Moore↗

Flight Performance and Stability of Space Launch System Core Stage Thrust Vector Control

The Space Launch System (SLS) Core Stage (CS) Thrust Vector Control (TVC) system is comprised of eight mechanical feedback Shuttle heritage Type III TVC actuators and four RS-25 engines, each attached to a Shuttle heritage gimbal block/bearing. The Core Stage TVC shares vehicle control authority with the SLS 5-segment Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) during boost phase flight, and is the sole means of vehicle flight control during in exoatmospheric flight following SRB separation. TVC responses during Green Run Hot Fire (GRHF) testing revealed that the TVC did not meet its performance specifications. Step and frequency responses exhibited unexpected departures from prior laboratory data and modeled behavior. Post-test analysis determined that the characteristics of the structure and gimbal friction are significantly influenced by the thrust-loaded conditions, and the command avionics exhibited a small but important gain nonlinearity. Using the available test data, the design team augmented the flight control TVC models to bound the observed results and include the additional fidelity needed for vehicle flight control analysis so as to build sufficient rationale for flight certification. Prior to the Green Run tests, “simplex” linear models typically used for flight control analysis did not include gimbal friction and other nonlinearities owing to long-standing assumptions that these effects were negligible in the Shuttle Orbiter TVC system. Following the Green Run findings, simulation analysis of the flight dynamics in the time and frequency domain revealed the propensity for a flight control limit cycle oscillation (LCO) if friction and structural compliances fell near the edges of test-predicted bounds. While the “most probable” models did not predict an in-flight LCO, the SLS Program conservatively proceeded with a system-wide evaluation and ultimate acceptance of the possibility for a small amplitude, low-frequency TVC LCO in flight. A final validation of the extensive test and modeling effort occurred when the first flight of SLS successfully demonstrated the fully integrated performance of the vehicle’s TVC system This paper is the final installment in a seven-paper series surveying the design, engineering, test validation, and flight performance of the Core Stage Thrust Vector Control system. In this paper, the development of flight rationale in light of the TVC responses observed in Green Run is discussed, along with a review of the flight telemetry illustrating the correlation of the preflight predictions with the observed performance.

John H. Wall↗

Space Launch System Core Stage Green Run Base Heating: Anomaly, Mitigation and Flight Redesign

The NASA Space Launch System (SLS) vehicle is composed of four RS-25 liquid oxygen and hydrogen rocket engines in the Core Stage (CS). The SLS Core Stage went through Green Run hotfire testing at NASA Stennis Space Center’s B-2 test facility in 2021. The main goal of this testing was to confirm Core Stage tanking, propulsion and thrust vector control systems operations and performance to verify with predicted models. Two hot-fire (HF) test sequences were performed with the first one (HF1) in January for a test duration of 70 seconds and the second (HF2) testing completed in March for a test duration of 500 seconds. This paper focuses on the base heating anomalies observed during HF1 and HF2 where an extensive fire was observed along the Core Stage base heat shield during test operations. This environment was not anticipated and led to extensive unplanned damage to the thermal protection system which was augmented for flight. Green Run observations also led to a reassessment of flight environments for Artemis I. This paper discusses the potential cause of the anomalies, the flow physics, the reconstructed base environments, and mitigation plans for HF2 and flight.

aerothermodynamics↗

Identification of Noise Sources in a Rocket Engine Test Stand using Microphone Phased Array

A new, phased array of microphones, suitable for the harsh environment of a rocket launch, was built and tested during a static firing of a RS-25 engine. It uses 70 piezo-resistive, dynamic pressure sensors, optimally distributed on a 10.5ft diameter open frame dome structure, and has a 200-ft long cable bundle to carry the signals to a weather-protected cabinet containing the data systems. The test stand was imaged using an infra-red camera and a visible wavelength camera, and the beamformed noise maps were superimposed on the photographs. The first-time data from a full-scale engine test stand showed that the plume deflector at the bottom of the engine to be the primary noise source. The openings of the test stand around the nozzle exit were also found to be noise sources particularly at higher frequencies. The final goal is to use the array during NASA’s Artemis-II launch at Kennedy Space Center.

Identification of Noise Source↗

Liftoff Environments

A Launch Environment, or Liftoff Environment, fundamentally represents a source of loading during the hold-down or liftoff phase of a rocket launch. A launch vehicle is subjected to transient and oscillatory pressure loading on its exterior surfaces induced by engines and boosters during vehicle hold-down and liftoff. These pressure loads are a principal source of structural vibration which may result in the malfunction of vehicle components or the fatigue of exterior skin panels or component brackets. Additionally, the pressure loading gives rise to sound pressure levels inside the crew cabin which may impact the crew's health, safety, or ability to communicate. Liftoff Environments can have a significant impact on the launch vehicle or surrounding structures. For SLS, there are eight primary environments supported by the Liftoff Environments team. These are Liftoff Acoustics (LOA), Hold-down Acoustics (HDA), RS-25 Nozzle Flow Transient (NFT) Acoustics, Booster Ignition Overpressure (IOP) & Duct Overpressure (DOP), Igniter Shock, Core Stage Engine (CSE) Overpressure, Excess Hydrogen (H2) Pop, and Infrasonic Acoustics. These can be split generally into acoustics, which are sustained stationary events, and transients, which are short duration nonstationary events.

Matthew J Casiano↗

Evaluating Liftoff Debris for NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) Prior to the Artemis I Launch

The SLS Artemis I launch vehicle is the first of several planned Artemis launch vehicles, with a number of design differences from earlier NASA missions that incur liftoff debris risk to the mission. As a test vehicle, the Artemis I hardware also endured environments and tests not planned for future missions, which led to several additional factors contributing to an evolving liftoff debris risk to the SLS vehicle. This paper will summarize these risk factors and address the processes used to evaluate and communicate the risks to support a successful Artemis I launch. It will discuss how the evolving risks that were quantified and evaluated by a Cross-Program team of debris Subject Matter Experts to mitigate liftoff debris hazards and communicate updated risk to the SLS vehicle. This process was performed through the inaugural use of an SLS debris day-of-launch (DOL) standard operating procedure that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions. This paper addresses the risk of liftoff debris, debris released by the vehicle or from the launch pad during liftoff through vehicle tower clear. Expected liftoff debris is well understood from previous NASA programs’ experience and from tests of materials, processes and functions that are known to release liftoff debris. These expected sources were assessed and cleared well ahead of launch day. However, given the ever-changing schedules and environments, processes were in place to evaluate any additional potential liftoff debris risks identified during launch countdown. Although many of the Artemis vehicle hardware components are similar to those on the NASA Shuttle Program, there are important differences in the architecture of the Artemis I vehicle which require new assessments of liftoff debris risk for the Artemis missions. The more favorable Artemis crew module location and surfaces are far less vulnerable to debris impacts; however, the longer vehicle can result in higher liftoff debris impact energies to those components on the aft end of the vehicle. Additionally, the positional change of the RS-25 liquid engines to nearer the Booster nozzle exit plane along with the change in Booster throat plug design is a disadvantage to the overall liftoff debris risk which resulted in additional test and analysis efforts for evaluating the integrated vehicle debris risk. In spite of the comprehensive tests and analyses of Artemis I expected liftoff debris, a number of additional tests/processes were completed prior to the Artemis I mission that were required to support a complete understanding of a new launch vehicle, but increased the risk of releasing liftoff debris. The hardware endured several additional cryogenic loading cycles, including the Green Run tests at Stennis Space Center, Wet Dress Rehearsals at Kennedy Space Center, and multiple launch attempts. Each of these cycles induced stresses in the thermal protection system (TPS) materials, increasing the risk of damage to and release of the TPS. Additionally, induced and weather environmental factors that could increase the likelihood of debris release were significant. Vibrations and stresses in the TPS were induced by a required roll-back to the Vehicle Assembly Building before Hurricane Ian to protect the vehicle from damage by high winds. Wind damage and potential internal stresses to several outer mold line materials on the integrated SLS vehicle and mobile launcher were caused by weathering Hurricane Nicole at Pad 39B the week before launch. A thorough imagery scan of the vehicle was performed after each event and the damage observed was repaired, removed, or assessed and the risk to the mission evaluated. Mitigation of debris risk can occur by tests and analyses to show debris impacted components as damage tolerant, by new/improved processes for prevention of debris availability, or redesign. Risk mitigation processes for Artemis I-specific liftoff debris events and the development and use of the SLS debris day of launch (DOL) procedures that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions will be described.

Space Launch System↗

Validation of Multiphase CFD Predictions of the SLS Launch Environment against Artemis I Flight Data

NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) is powered by four Aerojet-Rocketdyne RS-25 engines, previously referred to as Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs), with two RSRMV solid rocket boosters (SRBs) derived from the Shuttle booster as seen in Fig. 1. Ignition and the start transient of the SRBs, each of which generate 3.6 million pounds of thrust, create a series of large magnitude pressure waves separate from launch acoustics that have the potential to damage the vehicle if unmitigated. This portion of the SLS launch environment consists of igniter shock (IS), ignition overpressure (IOP), and duct overpressure (DOP).

T. Rivord↗

Multiphase Computational Fluid Dynamics Simulation of Ignition Overpressure and Plume-Water Interaction in the SLS Scale Model Acoustics Test

The solid rocket boosters (SRBs) on the Space Launch System (SLS) generate powerful ignition overpressure (IOP) waves that can potentially damage the vehicle and surrounding ground structures. Based on historical Shuttle experience, the IOP will be mitigated by utilizing an IOP/Sound Suppression (SS) water system which sprays water in and around the SRB and RS-25 engine plumes. However, the complex multiphase physics of the resulting plume-water interaction can lead to undesirable effects, such as high velocity water spray onto the engine nozzles and SRB nozzle side loads. Prior to launch, insight into this environment can be achieved through scale model testing and predictive computational fluid dynamics (CFD) modeling. The Scale Model Acoustic Test (SMAT) was conducted at Marshall Space Flight Center to provide the data necessary to develop the SLS liftoff acoustic environments by using a 5% scale SLS vehicle, fully integrated with a scaled IOP/SS water system, mobile launcher (ML), and tower. NASA engineers have put forth significant effort in validating the Loci/CHEM-Real Fluids multiphase CFD solver on a wet hold down test from the SMAT series. In this paper, the IOP acoustics and plume-water interactions predicted by the CFD model are compared and validated against the experiment, enabling relatively inexpensive, rapid turnaround for multiphase launch environment analyses to support future flights and design evolutions of SLS and other launch vehicles.

John E. Soto↗

Evaluating Liftoff Debris for NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) Prior to the Artemis I Launch

The SLS Artemis I launch vehicle is the first of several planned Artemis launch vehicles, with a number of design differences from earlier NASA missions that incur liftoff debris risk to the mission. As a test vehicle, the Artemis I hardware also endured environments and tests not planned for future missions, which led to several additional factors contributing to an evolving liftoff debris risk to the SLS vehicle. This paper will summarize these risk factors and address the processes used to evaluate and communicate the risks to support a successful Artemis I launch. It will discuss how the evolving risks that were quantified and evaluated by a Cross-Program team of debris Subject Matter Experts to mitigate liftoff debris hazards and communicate updated risk to the SLS vehicle. This process was performed through the inaugural use of an SLS debris day-of-launch (DOL) standard operating procedure that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions. This paper addresses the risk of liftoff debris, debris released by the vehicle or from the launch pad during liftoff through vehicle tower clear. Expected liftoff debris is well understood from previous NASA programs’ experience and from tests of materials, processes and functions that are known to release liftoff debris. These expected sources were assessed and cleared well ahead of launch day. However, given the ever-changing schedules and environments, processes were in place to evaluate any additional potential liftoff debris risks identified during launch countdown. Although many of the Artemis vehicle hardware components are similar to those on the NASA Shuttle Program, there are important differences in the architecture of the Artemis I vehicle which require new assessments of liftoff debris risk for the Artemis missions. The more favorable Artemis crew module location and surfaces are far less vulnerable to debris impacts; however, the longer vehicle can result in higher liftoff debris impact energies to those components on the aft end of the vehicle. Additionally, the positional change of the RS-25 liquid engines to nearer the Booster nozzle exit plane along with the change in Booster throat plug design is a disadvantage to the overall liftoff debris risk which resulted in additional test and analysis efforts for evaluating the integrated vehicle debris risk. In spite of the comprehensive tests and analyses of Artemis I expected liftoff debris, a number of additional tests/processes were completed prior to the Artemis I mission that were required to support a complete understanding of a new launch vehicle, but increased the risk of releasing liftoff debris. The hardware endured several additional cryogenic loading cycles, including the Green Run tests at Stennis Space Center, Wet Dress Rehearsals at Kennedy Space Center, and multiple launch attempts. Each of these cycles induced stresses in the thermal protection system (TPS) materials, increasing the risk of damage to and release of the TPS. Additionally, induced and weather environmental factors that could increase the likelihood of debris release were significant. Vibrations and stresses in the TPS were induced by a required roll-back to the Vehicle Assembly Building before Hurricane Ian to protect the vehicle from damage by high winds. Wind damage and potential internal stresses to several outer mold line materials on the integrated SLS vehicle and mobile launcher were caused by weathering Hurricane Nicole at Pad 39B the week before launch. A thorough imagery scan of the vehicle was performed after each event and the damage observed was repaired, removed, or assessed and the risk to the mission evaluated. Mitigation of debris risk can occur by tests and analyses to show debris impacted components as damage tolerant, by new/improved processes for prevention of debris availability, or redesign. Risk mitigation processes for Artemis I-specific liftoff debris events and the development and use of the SLS debris day of launch (DOL) procedures that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions will be described.

Space Launch System↗

CFD Simulation of Ignition Overpressure and Plume-Water Interaction in the SLS Scale Model Acoustics Test

The solid rocket boosters (SRBs) on the Space Launch System (SLS) generate powerful ignition overpressure (IOP) waves that can potentially damage the vehicle and surrounding ground structures. Based on historical Shuttle experience, the IOP will be mitigated by utilizing an IOP/Sound Suppression (SS) water system which sprays water in and around the SRB and RS-25 engine plumes. However, the complex multiphase physics of the resulting plume-water interaction can lead to undesirable effects, such as high velocity water spray onto the engine nozzles and SRB nozzle side loads. Prior to launch, insight into this environment can be achieved through scale model testing and predictive computational fluid dynamics (CFD) modeling. The Scale Model Acoustic Test (SMAT) was conducted at Marshall Space Flight Center to provide the data necessary to develop the SLS liftoff acoustic environments by using a 5% scale SLS vehicle, fully integrated with a scaled IOP/SS water system, mobile launcher (ML), and tower. NASA engineers have put forth significant effort in validating the Loci/CHEM-Real Fluids multiphase CFD solver on a wet hold down test from the SMAT series. In this paper, the IOP acoustics and plume-water interactions predicted by the CFD model are compared and validated against the experiment, enabling relatively inexpensive, rapid turnaround for multiphase launch environment analyses to support future flights and design evolutions of SLS and other launch vehicles.

Computational Fluid Dynamics↗

Successful First Flight of NASA’s SLS (Space Launch System) Super Heavy-Lift Rocket Lays Groundwork for U. S.’s Most Ambitious Missions

In late 2022, NASA’s SLS (Space Launch System) super heavy-lift rocket launched for the first time. Artemis I sent an uncrewed Orion spacecraft on a 25.5-day round-trip mission to lunar orbit. The near-perfect performance laid the groundwork for the next flights and for NASA’s return of humans to the Moon. The SLS team is now preparing for the launch of Artemis II, which will be the first launch of astronauts to cislunar space since Apollo 17 in December 1972. In addition to preparations on the Artemis II launch vehicle, significant progress is being made on the hardware and software for future flights. Artemis II will include a test of a new military-grade GPS system, which will be fully utilized on Artemis III. Progress is also being made on the exploration upper stage (EUS) for the Block 1B SLS variant, which will debut on Artemis IV. New production RS-25 liquid-propellant engines will be used beginning with Artemis V. These new engines, which are in a final qualification test firing program at the time of writing, realize a cost savings of at least 30 percent and reduced production time due to streamlined manufacturing and advances in technology, including additive manufacturing. The evolved solid rocket boosters, which will debut on Artemis IX as part of the Block 2 variant, are in development now. In addition to propulsion updates, each variant of SLS maintains payload configuration flexibility and can fly crew-only, cargo-only, and crew-cargo combinations. This adaptability ensures that SLS, with its significant mass and volume capability – including the ability to launch large co-manifested payloads with Orion directly to trans-lunar injection (TLI) – can support the country’s most ambitious missions. Results from the Artemis I mission, as well as progress to the next flights and SLS variants, will be covered in the paper and presentation.

Bruce R. Askins↗

Successful First Flight of NASA’s SLS (Space Launch System) Super Heavy-Lift Rocket: Laying Groundwork for U. S.’s Most Ambitious Missions

In late 2022, NASA’s SLS (Space Launch System) super heavy-lift rocket launched for the first time. Artemis I sent an uncrewed Orion spacecraft on a 25.5-day round-trip mission to lunar orbit. The near-perfect performance laid the groundwork for the next flights and for NASA’s return of humans to the Moon. The SLS team is now preparing for the launch of Artemis II, which will be the first launch of astronauts to cislunar space since Apollo 17 in December 1972. In addition to preparations on the Artemis II launch vehicle, significant progress is being made on the hardware and software for future flights. Artemis II will include a test of a new military-grade GPS system, which will be fully utilized on Artemis III. Progress is also being made on the exploration upper stage (EUS) for the Block 1B SLS variant, which will debut on Artemis IV. New production RS-25 liquid-propellant engines will be used beginning with Artemis V. These new engines, which are in a final qualification test firing program at the time of writing, realize a cost savings of at least 30 percent and reduced production time due to streamlined manufacturing and advances in technology, including additive manufacturing. The evolved solid rocket boosters, which will debut on Artemis IX as part of the Block 2 variant, are in development now. In addition to propulsion updates, each variant of SLS maintains payload configuration flexibility and can fly crew-only, cargo-only, and crew-cargo combinations. This adaptability ensures that SLS, with its significant mass and volume capability – including the ability to launch large co-manifested payloads with Orion directly to trans-lunar injection (TLI) – can support the country’s most ambitious missions. Results from the Artemis I mission, as well as progress to the next flights and SLS variants, will be covered in the paper and presentation.

Bruce Askins↗

Artemis I Space Launch System Base Heat Shield Thermal Protection System Performance

The Space Launch System (SLS) Core Stage base heat shield experienced the highest external heating environments on the entire launch vehicle during Artemis I ascent flight. This result was consistent with design predictions. The base heat shield experiences P50 cork combustion dynamics at low altitudes, plume-induced recirculation at moderate altitudes and then in-space base flow physics out to Main Engine Cut-Off (MECO). The base heat shield thermal protection system (TPS) is composed of a P50 cork ablator which is bonded to a substrate. The heat shield protects the gimbal actuation system, RS-25 turbomachinery systems and other aft section sensitive components during ascent. This paper estimates the base heat shield TPS performance from Artemis I using flight data from the NASA Langley Research Center’s Scientifically Calibrated In-Flight Imagery (SCIFLI) Airborne Multispectral Imager (SAMI), development flight instrumentation (DFI) and other TPS recession flight measurements. Predictions from computational and ground test-derived engineering ablation models and observations are also applied. Since no base heat shield substrate thermocouple data were obtained for Artemis I, an estimate of the TPS performance data is derived here. This data assesses thermal margin of the SLS Core Stage base heat shield and best informs the Artemis II Crewed mission to the moon.

aerothermodynamics↗

MSFC-TVC | TB-03: Derivation of Thrust Vector Control (TVC) Actuator-Force / Gimbal-Torque Transformation Matrix

Thrust vector control (TVC) systems for rocket engine propulsion traditionally use a simple linear relationship to convert between actuator forces and torques about the engine gimbal’s center-of-rotation (COR). As shown in Equation (1), the torque about the gimbal COR is proportional to the applied actuator force and the TVC moment arm (MA)—the perpendicular distance between the TVC actuator’s line-of-action (LOA) and the engine gimbal’s COR. While this fundamental relationship remains valid and accurate in a two-dimensional (2D), one-degree-of-freedom (1-DOF) context—particularly in its non-linear formulation as described in the ER63 Technical Bulletin TB-02 (Derivation of Thrust Vector Control (TVC) Engine-Gimbal / Actuator Moment-Arm Geometry)—it becomes limited when extended to three-dimensional (3D), two-degree-of-freedom (2-DOF) analyses. In 3D, out-of-plane angular displacements can arise, causing the gimbaled engine plane-of-motion to become non-coplanar with the respective actuator plane-of-motion. Such misalignments occur due to the rod-end (RE) and/or tail-stock (TE) mounting geometry of individual TVC actuators. These geometric complexities lead to inaccuracies in calculating engine torques and corresponding actuator forces if only the traditional TVC MA relationship is employed. For higher gimbal angular displacements (e.g., greater than 5 degrees), these inaccuracies become more pronounced, necessitating a more robust mathematical framework. This document presents a comprehensive 3D (2-DOF) derivation of a transformation matrix that accurately converts between gimbaled engine torques and TVC actuator forces. By incorporating the necessary geometric and rotational considerations, this new approach corrects the limitations of the traditional TVC MA method. Subsequent sections compare the newly formulated approach to the traditional method, demonstrating its enhanced accuracy and reliability for a broad range of gimbaled engine conditions.

Thrust Vector Control↗

Microstructural Evolution and Mechanical Properties of LP-DED NASA HR-1 – A Hydrogen Resistant AM Superalloy for Space Propulsion Applications

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has actively pursued metal additive manufacturing (AM) technologies for spaceflight applications since the late 2000s. AM offers transformative advantages in cost, schedule, part consolidation, and design flexibility. Among the various AM techniques, laser powder directed energy deposition (LP-DED) is particularly well suited for fabricating complex geometries with fine feature resolution. In propulsion systems that utilize high-pressure gaseous hydrogen—such as liquid hydrogen rocket engines—hydrogen environment embrittlement (HEE) presents a serious threat to material performance 1,2 . Mechanical property degradation under these conditions can compromise component reliability, especially under cyclic loading. To address this challenge, NASA developed NASA HR-1 (Hydrogen Resistant-1) as a solution for liquid rocket engine components operating in hydrogen-rich environments, using the LP-DED technique 3-9 . A key component in a liquid rocket engine is the exhaust nozzle, which is typically regeneratively cooled (regen) due to the high heat flux. NASA HR-1 was specifically developed for regen nozzle applications using hydrogen as a propellant, providing resistance to HEE, a critical issue for many materials. The AM version of NASA HR-1 was also formulated to achieve high ultimate tensile strength, along with high yield strength and ductility in this environment 5,6 . Low-cycle fatigue (LCF) is another important consideration in nozzle design, as components are expected to endure multiple starts and missions. Additionally, the LP-DED version of the alloy exhibits improved thermal conductivity compared to its wrought counterpart, which benefits nozzle cooling. Overall, NASA HR-1 offers an excellent balance of high strength, HEE resistance, LCF performance, thermal conductivity, and ductility to meet the demanding requirements of channel-cooled nozzles and other components used with hydrogen and other propellants. The LP-DED–processed NASA HR-1 requires several post-processing heat treatment steps to achieve the material properties desirable for its intended application 6 . These steps include stress relief, homogenization, solution annealing, and aging for precipitation hardening. The stress relief treatment mitigates residual stresses accumulated during the LP-DED process and minimizes the potential for distortion. Homogenization, a common step for AM materials, reduces elemental segregation and promotes recrystallization to develop a more equiaxed grain structure. The subsequent solution annealing treatment heats the part to a solid solution temperature to dissolve the undesirable η-phase that forms during cooling from homogenization, followed by rapid cooling to retain an η-phase–free microstructure. Finally, aging promotes precipitation of the strengthening γ′ phase in the alloy. The integration of compositional design and optimized thermal processing enables high-quality LP-DED NASA HR-1 components with excellent microstructural and mechanical stability. Improved chemical and microstructure homogeneity enhances ductility and fatigue resistance—both critical for safe and reliable operation in high-pressure hydrogen environments. NASA has successfully fabricated and hot-fire tested multiple subscale and full-scale channel wall nozzles using LP-DED NASA HR-1 5,6, 9-14 . These efforts included process refinements to support thin-wall construction and various channel geometries. Throughout development, several key observations emerged. After homogenization, the as-built columnar grain structure transforms into a fully equiaxed microstructure. However, subsequent treatments—such as solution annealing and aging—result in changes that are more difficult to track. The grain structure remains largely unchanged, and the γ′ precipitates, typically 5–10 nm in diameter, are beyond the resolution of scanning electron microscopy (SEM). While transmission electron microscopy (TEM) can resolve these fine precipitates, TEM sample preparation is time-consuming and difficult for LP-DED material. As an alternative, differential scanning calorimetry (DSC) offers a useful, qualitative approach to monitor precipitate evolution throughout different stages of heat treatment. The overall goal is to improve the understanding of how heat treatment affects the microstructure and mechanical performance of LP-DED NASA HR-1. This paper presents heat treatment design considerations, microstructural characterization, mechanical testing – including tensile and LCF testing in both air and hydrogen environments.

Superalloy↗