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At least 109 records · Page 6

Review of Palliative Radiation Therapy Patterns of Practice for Adrenal Metastases in British Columbia

The adrenal gland is a common site of metastasis in patients with advanced cancer, but it is rarely symptomatic. A subset of patients develop a complex pain syndrome with anorexia, nausea, and poorly localized visceral pain in the back, flank, or epigastric region. These symptoms can affect quality of life and are occasionally challenging to palliate. The role of palliative radiation therapy (PRT) in these patients is unclear. This population-based retrospective study evaluates PRT practices for patients with adrenal metastases and aims to describe treatment response and acute toxicity.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

Nuclear Power Plant Physical Protection Recommendation Document

This document is aimed at providing guidance to the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of International Nuclear Security’s (INS) country and regional teams for implementing effective physical protection systems (PPSs) for nuclear power plants (NPPs) to prevent the radiological consequences of sabotage. This recommendation document includes input from the Physical Protection Functional Team (PPFT), the Response Functional Team (RFT), and the Sabotage Functional Team (SFT) under INS. Specifically, this document provides insights into increasing and sustaining physical protection capabilities at INS partner countries’ NPP sites. Nuclear power plants should consider that the intent of this document is to provide a historical context as well as technologies and methodologies that may be applied to improve physical protection capabilities. It also refers to relevant guidance from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

RCT: Module 2.14 Personnel Decontamination [Slides]

In our work environment, one of the major concerns of radiological control is the prevention of personnel contamination. When personnel contamination has been identified, it is the responsibility of the RCTs to perform or oversee the decontamination of the individual using the best methods available. n this course we will address the methods used to detect personnel contamination, the factors that determine decontamination actions, the responsibilities of the RCTs, and the approved methods for decontamination of personnel. This course will prepare the student with the skills necessary for RCT qualification.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Analysis of Nuclear Materials on Both Sides of Regulatory Control: from IAEA Safeguards to Global Counter-Nuclear Smuggling

Global nuclear security is dependent upon the sustained and verifiable control of radiological and nuclear (R/N) materials within nuclear facilities, under the administrative purview of national governments. It is the responsibility of each country to account for their R/N materials holdings and to ensure that they do not escape regulatory control and fall into the wrong hands. The Office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NSDD) is tasked with providing support to foreign partners in developing the tools and expertise to detect, disrupt, and investigate R/N materials encountered out of regulatory control, in such circumstances as at border crossings and other checkpoints, or in the course of routine policework. Thankfully, such incidents are infrequent, and NSDD continues to work bilaterally with partner countries to strengthen their capabilities to combat nuclear smuggling and trafficking incidents in their countries. For the vast majority of R/N materials that remain under regulatory control, however, it is critical that their safe storage and use be independently verified. Even a single loss incident of R/N materials, particularly of special nuclear materials (highly-enriched uranium and plutonium) has the potential to cause a catastrophe. How can the international community be assured that R/N materials currently under national regulatory control remain there?

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

IRAD-MPE Radiation Source Recovery (Day 4) [Slides]

The objective of this module is to review emergency response radiation detection equipment, operational and safety procedures, and best practices for planning that are required to conduct a successful radiological source recovery operation.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

FRMAC Assessment Manual Volume 3 - Pre-Assessed Default Scenarios

This volume of the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) Assessment Manual was developed to serve as a quick-start guide to expedite response for pre-assessed scenarios before event-specific information becomes available. The objective of Volume 3 is to provide dose assessors with the scenario-specific protective action guidance questions likely to be asked at the start of a response, along with supporting technical information and assumptions that differ from the default assumptions defined in Volume 2 of the Assessment Manual.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Comparison of Projections for a Short-Term Release, CAP88 vs NARAC

The purpose of this study was to compare the projected dose using different plume models, evaluating a short duration release of tritium to the 16 compliance sectors and 4 additional points of interest using local meteorology. This report is written as guidance to the decision makers when reviewing this specific Gaussian plume model intended for radiological dose assessment and regulatory compliance, called CAP88 1 , as compared to a more-complex model designed for emergency response. The emergency response model, NARAC 2 , can be used to supplement the CAP88 compliance model evaluations, since NARAC is intended for use in situations where releases are shorter in duration and have increased complexity in terrain and meteorology.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

International Radiological/Nuclear Training for Emergency Response - Major Public Events Virtual Workshop: Nuclear Security Planning and Operations (Day 3) [Slides]

This module will provide a basic overview of radiological/nuclear search operations, including the application of radiological detection instrumentation and best practices for operational tactics, techniques and procedures. This module will introduce basic radiological/nuclear search operations and include the following: (1) A review of the principles of optimizing detection, (2) An understanding of radiation hazards and alarms, and (3) An examination of nuclear security measures best practices for buildings and stadium complexes, large areas, roadways and parking areas, and pedestrian and vehicle entrance portals.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Mithramycin A Radiosensitizes EWS:Fli1+ Ewing Sarcoma Cells by Inhibiting Double Strand Break Repair

The oncogenic EWS:Fli1 fusion protein is a key transcriptional mediator of Ewing sarcoma initiation, progression, and therapeutic resistance. Mithramycin A (MithA) is a potent and specific inhibitor of transcription mediated by the EWS:Fli1. We tested the hypothesis that pretreatment with MithA could selectively radiosensitize EWS:Fli1{sup +} tumor cells by altering the transcriptional response to radiation injury.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

A Custom Machine to Convey Radiologically Impacted Cohesive Soils to the Orion ScanSortSM System - 20382

An established method to reduce the volume of material required to be disposed of as radioactive waste is conveyor-based sorting of potentially radiologically impacted soils. With the Orion ScanSortSM system, potentially impacted soils are conveyed beneath radiation detectors and sorted into above and below criteria bins based on the detectors' response. Confident measurements can only be efficiently achieved when the soil column being conveyed has a reasonably consistent geometry. Highly cohesive soils present a very significant challenge as they tend to clump and adhere to the conveyor hopper, strike-off bar, and belt skirting. This causes voids and valleys in the soil column that affect the measurement geometry and reduce the confidence in the measurement. The reduction in confidence necessitates a longer residence time (i.e. reduction in conveyor belt speed and processing rates) or that the soils in highly unfavorable geometries be dispositioned as impacted or segregated for resurvey (should site logistics support that option). These outcomes may increase the volume of material required to be dispositioned as radiological waste and have a negative impact on project cost and schedule. To minimize impact to sorting operations, Wood designed and built a customized Extruder, to optimize the soil column prior to assay. The design was developed and refined to minimize the volume of highly cohesive soils presented in highly unfavorable geometries in the soil column in order to confidently assess and disposition such soils in a high-production environment. The Extruder is a customized 90 cm wide flat conveyor that has an oversized hopper with a pair of motor-driven rollers that force the soils in the hopper through an opening of adjustable height. The soils are extruded through the opening to produce a soil column that is ∼75 cm wide and ∼8-18 cm deep with a design rate of 225 metric tons/hr. The Extruder was recently deployed with the Orion ScanSort{sup SM} System to a site in northeast Ohio. The site has highly cohesive soils that result from the weathering of glacial sediments and consist of clay and clay loam, resulting in poor drainage and high moisture content. The project infrastructure only supported two bins of material (above and below criteria), which necessitated that soils with unfavorable geometries be discharged into the above criteria bin, along with material determined to have been contaminated. The Extruder was extremely successful in producing a stable soil column with favorable geometries for radiological assay. During production, less than 0.5% (by mass) of the soils processed were presented in unsatisfactory geometries requiring disposition as radioactive waste. The Extruder did not get clogged due to the cohesive soils (as is typical with conventional conveyors) and required very little maintenance, again minimizing impacts to sorting operations. The conveyor belt speed was operated at 14 cm/s with a typical belt loading of ∼109 kg/m resulting in a mean process rate of ∼49 metric tons/hr. The process rate was constrained by other project logistics, rather than by the capabilities of the Extruder, which was operated at less than 20% of the maximum design speed (75 cm/s). It is concluded that the Extruder is highly likely to produce a stable highly cohesive soil column suitable for efficient and confident radiological assay in production environments of 250 short tons/hr or more. The Extruder has the capability to drastically reduce the duration and costs of projects with radiologically impacted highly cohesive soils. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Site 300 B-851 Permit: Radiological Assumptions and Source Term - Air Dispersion Modeling for Radiological Dose Assessment

The following modeling assumptions and source term that is provided in the attachments to this document are meant to serve as a guide to the presentation delivered on April 23rd, 2020, to the San Joaquin Air District Permit Services slides. This analysis is in response to the District’s “Project Incompleteness Letter” (Facility Number: N-472 and Project Number: N-1173492) regarding the potential for depleted uranium (DU) to be resuspended from areas of contaminated soil at Site 300 as a result of high explosive (HE) experiments increased to a requested permitted maximum of 1,000 pound detonations with an annual HE throughput not to exceed 7,500 pounds per year. LLNL has taken every step in the radiological health risk concerns in the modeling assumptions and final source term to be at a level of maximum conservativeness. As an example, forty soil samples were taken in the B-851 area (LLNL-AR-738708 – 2018) and assayed for uranium-234, uranium-235, and uranium-238 concentrations. The maximum uranium soil concentrations were used in the assumptions (potential for resuspended dust occurring from detonation experiments) and not the use of median uranium soil concentrations – a more realistic outcome. Additionally, these uranium soil concentrations were considered to be at 100% uptake in the vegetation for prescribed burns; vegetation uptake factors were not used as that would lower the final source term. This level of conservativeness was maintained throughout the modeling assumptions.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Nuclear Emergency Support Team Public Health and Safety [Slides]

RAP is the nation’s premier first-response resource for advising Federal, state, local and tribal decision-makers on steps to take to evaluate and minimize the hazards of a radiological or nuclear incident. RAP support ranges from giving technical information or advice over the telephone to sending highly trained personnel with state-of-the-art equipment to the incident site where team members help identify, characterize and minimize any radiological or nuclear hazards.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Probabilistic predictions and uncertainty estimation for radiological and nuclear effects modeling

Better characterization of meteorological uncertainty is needed to predict the effects of radiological and nuclear releases in the atmosphere. Multi-physics ensembles of atmospheric simulations can estimate uncertainty of physical processes, but they are often limited for computational reasons. Because weather uncertainty is important for emergency response applications, but the conventional way of running multi-physics ensembles is infeasible, we have developed new machine learning-based methods that quickly estimate and identify key sources of meteorological uncertainty. Machine learning accelerates the analysis of weather uncertainty by iteratively learning about model physics options that affect plume predictions. We have demonstrated the power of machine learning by creating a large multi-physics weather and dispersion ensemble dataset containing 1,200 simulations for two hypothetical radiological release scenarios. By training on less than 10% of the ensemble, we can quickly and accurately predict different outcomes, including the mass of radiological material deposited and spatial distribution and extent of contaminated areas.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Uncertainty Analysis of Inhalation Dose Coefficients for Nuclear Incident Response

This study addressed the need to characterize variability in inhalation dose coefficients due to uncertainties in respiratory tract deposition, systemic biokinetics, and physiological parameters. A Python-based implementation of the International Commission on Radiological Protection Publication 66 Human Respiratory Tract Model was developed called the Radiological Exposure Dose Calculator (REDCAL) to propagate parameter uncertainty.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Security of Mobile Radiological Sources: Overview of Industry Applied Technologies

Small radiological sources used in industrial settings recurrently require transit between job sites. Securing these sources, while stationary, can be addressed with standard security approaches and equipment. Transport of these sources increases the risk and complexity of managing and maintaining control of these sources. Implementing methodologies to securely monitor and locate sources improves response and resolution of anomalous events during transit. The Mobile Source Transit Security (MSTS) system was developed to improve security and provide situational awareness of these mobile sources throughout their job cycle. The MSTS development effort focused on creating a set of systems that could be successfully implemented in industrial radiography and well-logging applications. The MSTS team worked to address source presence and location through use and storage. The MSTS system monitors radiological sources as they move from the base of operations to the job site and back. The system provides near-real-time monitoring of the mobile source location and status and early notification of source loss or theft by transmitting operational status and alerting anomalous conditions over telematic links worldwide. The MSTS system can trigger an armed response or initiation of search and recovery operations and will automatically alert management and responsible staff if a radioactive source is lost or stolen whether it is on-site, in transport, or in storage.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

In vitro toxicity assessment of uranium particulates on different human lung epithelial cell models

Inhalation of uranium aerosols produced via human activities such as mining can pose a threat to human respiratory systems. Uranium oxide particulates emit short-range alpha particles that elicit DNA and direct damage, beyond associated physiochemical heavy-metal toxicity, to internal epithelial tissues. The availability of reliable in vitro models to study radiation exposure can greatly enhance our ability to understand and combat the biological impacts of exposure. However, the toxicological effects of alpha emissions and/or the oxidation states of uranium particulates vary across different human lung epithelial cell models and have not been systematically compared. We have endeavored to address this limitation by comparing impacts in three different human lung cell models: primary human bronchial and tracheal epithelial cells, primary human small airway epithelial cells, and human adenocarcinoma alveolar basal epithelial cells. Other studies have mainly investigated the toxicity of depleted uranium. Here, we compared the exposure of uranium oxide particulates (U 3 O 8 and UO 3 ) of different enrichment states on the chosen cell systems. Each cell model was exposed to 0.1, 1, 10, 50, 100, and 500 µg/mL of depleted U 3 O 8 , highly-enriched U 3 O 8 , and natural UO 3 particulates for 24 hours in submerged monolayer cultures. We compared viability and superoxide dismutase activity results across cell lines and uranium enrichment/ oxidative states. The results showed that 1) the oxide state of the particulates affected cell viability, implying that uranium’s different oxidation states contribute to different toxicological responses, and 2) each cell model reacts differently when exposed to uranium oxides, which may provide insights into the mechanistic processes associated with the exposure of radiological particulates on different biological systems. For instance, increased uranium enrichment corresponds to increased toxicity for the primary cells, but not for the immortalized cells. Our study shows that a holistic approach that incorporates similarities between model systems and types of radionuclides is required to truly develop empirical solutions for radiation exposure.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗