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Evolution of Space Shuttle Range Safety (RS) Ascent Flight Envelope Design

Ascent flight envelopes are trajectories that define the normal operating region of a space vehicle s position from liftoff until the end of powered flight. They fulfill part of the RS data requirements imposed by the Air Force s 45th Space Wing (45SW) on space vehicles launching from the Eastern Range (ER) in Florida. The 45SW is chartered to protect the public by minimizing risks associated with the inherent hazards of launching a vehicle into space. NASA s Space Shuttle program has launched 130+ manned missions over a 30 year period from the ER. Ascent envelopes were delivered for each of those missions. The 45SW envelope requirements have remained largely unchanged during this time. However, the methodology and design processes used to generate the envelopes have evolved over the years to support mission changes, maintain high data quality, and reduce costs. The evolution of the Shuttle envelope design has yielded lessons learned that can be applied to future endevours. There have been numerous Shuttle ascent design enhancements over the years that have caused the envelope methodology to evolve. One of these Shuttle improvements was the introduction of onboard flight software changes implemented to improve launch probability. This change impacted the preflight nominal ascent trajectory, which is a key element in the RS envelope design. While the early Shuttle nominal trajectories were designed preflight using a representative monthly mean wind, the new software changes involved designing a nominal ascent trajectory on launch day using real-time winds. Because the actual nominal trajectory position was not known until launch day, the envelope analysis had to be customized to account for this nominal trajectory variation in addition to the other envelope components.

Brewer, Joan D.↗

Advanced Electric Propulsion System (AEPS) Enabling a Sustainable Return to the Lunar Surface through NASA Gateway

NASA continues to evolve a human exploration approach for beyond low-Earth orbit. The center of this approach is NASA’s Gateway that is envisioned to provide a maneuverable outpost in lunar orbit to extend human presence in deep space and expand on NASA exploration goals. The Gateway represents the initial step in NASA’s architecture for human cislunar operations, lunar surface access and missions to Mars. NASA announced at the May 2020 NASA Advisory Council’s Human Explorations and Operations Committee a new plan that calls for launching the first two elements of Gateway as a co-manifested mission in the late 2023 timeframe [2]. Launching the Power and Propulsion Element (PPE) and the Habitation and Logistics Outpost (HALO) together reduces mission risk, utilizes the PPE high-powered Electric Propulsion (EP) system to transport both elements to the lunar orbit, and reduces overall cost. NASA and Maxar Technologies have a commercial partnership to develop and demonstration a high-powered Solar Electric Propulsion (SEP) spacecraft [3, 4]. The PPE is baselined to include three 12.5-kW Advanced Electric Propulsion Systems (AEPS) and four 6-kW Hall thrusters, currently under development by Maxar, for a total beginning of life propulsion power of over 48-kW [5]. High-power solar electric propulsion is one of the key technologies that has been prioritized because of its significant exploration benefits, specifically, for missions beyond low Earth orbit. Spacecraft size and mass are currently dominated by onboard chemical propulsion systems and propellants that may constitute more than 50 percent of spacecraft mass. This impact can be substantially reduced through the utilization of SEP, due to its higher specific impulse and lower propellant load required to meet the equivalent mission delta-V. Studies performed for NASA’s HEOMD and Science Mission Directorate (SMD) have demonstrated that 40-kW-class SEP provides the necessary capabilities that would enable near term and future architectures, and science missions [6]. Accordingly, NASA has been developing a 12 kW Hall thruster electric propulsion thruster that can serve as the building block for a 40-kW-class SEP capability. The AEPS development, led by the NASA Glenn Research Center (GRC) and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), began with the maturation of the high-power Hall thruster. The technology development work has transitioned to AR via a competitive procurement selection for the AEPS contract in May 2016. Management of the AEPS contract is being led by NASA GRC with funding from NASA’s Science Technology Mission Directorate (STMD) under the Technology Demonstration Missions (TDM) program. NASA continues to support the AEPS development leveraging in-house expertise, plasma modeling capability, and world-class test facilities.

AEPS↗

Probabilistic Modeling of a Three-Stage Human Landing System Architecture

Space Policy Directive-1 has led to NASA partnerships with commercial entities on procurement which includes the development of the Human Landing System (HLS) [1]. With the goal of delivering human crew to the lunar surface by 2024, system uncertainties become an important obstacle to the maturation of multiple new, driving technologies and mission concepts of the HLS program. As unmitigated uncertainties have previously led to failed development programs, these risks and their impacts must be understood and handled to ensure program success [2]. Sources of uncertainty include novel engine designs and configurations, increased reliance on cryogenic fluid management(CFM), and refueling technologies—which propagate as high-level performance metrics such as overall propellant mass and engine performance. Also, the occurrence of operational uncertainties—e.g. launch conditions or need to abort during the mission—can cause cascading effects on the rest of the mission that are difficult to definitively quantify, and are outside the scope of control. These concrete examples and other occurrences can be categorized as either epistemic or aleatory uncertainties.Epistemic uncertainty arises due to a lack of knowledge and can be alleviated with design and program maturation. Aleatory uncertainty is due to the inherent randomness of the system and cannot be directly reduced, unlike epistemic uncertainty. Robust design and probabilistic methods can compensate for aleatory effects. A taxonomy of uncertainty is referred to for this work [3]. In this paper, a probabilistic methodology to handle uncertainties has been demonstrated on a three-element HLS concept [1, 4], which allows tracking of current best estimates of the concept and assessment of concept design robustness against uncertainties. A sample case has been completed for this abstract, and an expansion on the methodology will be included in the final paper. This methodology has two key parts: first, the creation of a dynamic architecture model of a three-element HLS concept; and second, its use with surrogate modeling and range estimating techniques to capture and propagate uncertainties. This abstract will cover the basics of the approach used, and further details and justifications will be in the final paper.The mission profile associated with this three-element concept (Fig 1) was modeled as a set of mission events that facilitated mass changes, idles, or spacecraft maneuvers. The mission profile scope starts with each element’s NRHO orbit insertion and aggregation and ends at post-sortie rendezvous with Orion. More detail on the mission profile will be in the final paper. The DYnamic Rocket EQuation Tool (DYREQT), a space systems synthesis and sizing framework used by NASA, was used as the physics framework to model the HLS architecture for applying the probabilistic methodology [5, 6]. Specifically, a parametric representation of the lander, ascent, and transfer elements and the mission profile of each element was established, with vehicle and mission parameters available as inputs to allow for a dynamic model. Each vehicle stage was modeled with high-level performance metrics, using Isp and propellant mass fraction (PMF) to remain parametric. For the probabilistic analysis, uncertainties of interest within the HLS concept were enumerated and represented as parameters within the DYREQT model as inputs for vehicle stages or mission profile events. These parameters were frozen at their nominal values for the purposes of baselining architecture performance and sizing the vehicle appropriately based on reference documentation [1]. Range estimating—a probabilistic method that combines Monte Carlo sampling, focus on critical parameters, and heuristics to assess risk and opportunities—is traditionally used with Mass Equipment Lists (MELs), but has been adapted with operational parameters as well as vehicle parameters in theDYREQT model to capture mission uncertainty alongside vehicle uncertainty [7, 3]. This method was selected due to its application and insight on a system from a bottom-up perspective, independence from historical rules of thumb, and ability to generate sensitivities based on design decisions and uncertainties. As a sample case for the abstract, the boiloff rates of the vehicle elements and the loiter times during the mission (simulating launch time variations and changing window of opportunities) were used with range estimating to provide preliminary results. To perform the range estimation portion of this methodology (depicted in Fig. 3, further details in final paper), the DYREQT model was sampled using a Design of Experiments (DoE) to efficiently explore the architecture design space with respect to the sample set of uncertainty parameters; 5,000 cases via Latin Hypercube Sampling were computed on the DYREQT architecture model. Then, the results were used to create surrogate models, multivariate regressions that can visualize hypercube trends in the design space, of the architecture with respect to the uncertainty parameters. Range estimating was applied to the surrogates instead of the actual models, which saves computational expense due to the bulk of cases needed for the Monte Carlo simulation as part of range estimating. Uncertainty parameters were sampled independently from triangular distributions using the DoE ranges as ‘min’ and ‘max’, and the nominal value as ‘most likely’. Based engineering intuition, some uncertainty parameters are correlated—e.g. if the main propellant has a high boil-off rate, the oxidizer should follow suit as both are related to CFM technology.While a Monte Carlo simulation samples all inputs as independent, the results would show model correlations; thus, it is efficient to sample the inputs as correlated. Using a correlation matrix constructed for the uncertainty parameters, previously independent samples were transformed to perform a Correlated Monte Carlo. A table for the DoE ranges and probability distribution parameters is shown in Table 1, and more details on Correlated Monte Carlo Simulations will be discussed in the final paper. The model’s resulting DoE showed that multivariate polynomial equations fit via least squares method captured its behavior accurately for the sample case. For the Correlated Monte Carlo Simulation, a positive correlation between fuel and oxidizer boiloff rates was used as a demonstration. 10,000 cases were computed with the surrogates and the launched masses for each vehicle element was collated. The results can be displayed in a probability density function (PDF), showing the impact of the uncertainty parameters chosen. Integrating the PDFs will yield a cumulative distribution function (CDF) that shows the cumulative probability of a given value on the x-axis. For the sample case, the elements’ launch mass margin was calculated and represented in as CDFs, as a demonstrated representation of figures of merit for the HLS concept. For the lander and ascent elements, the NRHO mass insertion limit is 16t; the transfer element has a limit of 30t [1]. It can be seen with Figure 2 that this probabilistic methodology can provide insight into mass margin with respect to the uncertainties being modeled. Currently, the results show that the lander (descent) vehicle element has the most restrictive design space; it is the only element to show a 10% probability of negative margin. Further analysis on the Monte Carlo results will show sensitivities for driving constraints and parameters for architecture feasibility, which can lead to establishing potential mission rules.The combination of range estimating with a parametric architecture model for HLS demonstrated the capability of this probabilistic methodology in a sample case. As the HLS development progresses, this methodology has the potential for keeping current best estimates of architecture performance for awarded concepts due to the flexibility in DYREQT’s modeling framework and its parametric nature. Concept maturation and increased epistemic knowledge can be injected into the model probabilistic modeling, and thus continue to track probability of mission success.

Stephanie Y Zhu↗

Status of the Landsat Data Continuity Mission

Efforts to begin implementing a successor mission to Landsat 7, called the Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM), suffered a set back in 2003. NASA and the Department of Interior (DOI)/U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) currently manage the Landsat Program as an interagency partnership. The two agencies had planned to purchase data meeting LDCM specifications from a privately owned and commercially operated satellite system beginning in March, 2007. This approach represented a departure from the traditional procurement of a government owned and operated satellite system. NASA, however, cancelled a Request-for-Proposals (RFP) for providing the required data after an evaluation of proposals received from private industry. NASA concluded that the proposals failed to meet a key objective and expectation of the RFP, namely, to form a fair and equitable partnership between the Government and private industry. Alternative strategies for implementing an LDCM are now under consideration. The Executive Office of the President formed an interagency working group on the LDCM following the RFP cancellation. The working group is considering other options for implementing a successor system to Landsat 7 consistent with the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-555). This Act lists four management options for consideration: 1) private sector funding and management; 2) an international consortium; 3) funding and management by the U.S. Government; and 4) a cooperative effort between the US. Government and the private sector. The working group is currently attempting to minimize the risk of a Landsat data gap through development of a strategy that leads to a Landsat 7 successor mission. The selected strategy and the status of the mission will be presented at the Symposium.

Irons, James R.↗

Strategy for Developing Technologies for Megawatt-class Nuclear Electric Propulsion Systems

In late fiscal year 2020, the Space Nuclear Propulsion (SNP) project began the process of formulating an investment strategy to support development of the technologies required for a high-power (megawatt-class) nuclear electric propulsion (NEP) system capable of performing human-scale missions. This activity was initiated concurrent with several high-level studies and assessments were either under way or had just concluded. Studies of human-scale Mars missions have been performed several times over the past two decades. One of the most recent studies examined opposition-class human Mars missions to occur in the late 2030s timeframe [1,2]. The mission architecture assumed a hybrid NEP/chem-propelled vehicle that used a high specific impulse (Isp) NEP-system and a liquid oxygen (LOx)-liquid methane high thrust chemical stage (two 110 kN (25 klbf) thrust, 365 s Isp engines) for maneuvers performed to enter and exit gravity wells. Trajectory analyses performed in this study showed that such a mission could be performed with 2-4 MWe directed into the electric propulsion system (operating for 20,000+ hours), with the large range representing different opposition-class Mars mission opportunities and permutations on the trajectory design, concept of operations, and technology choices. In 2020, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) performed a study to evaluate the maturity of the different technologies required for nuclear propulsion systems [3]. The executive summary of this report provided the following top-level conclusions: • “The majority of critical technologies for… NEP/Chem… systems are relatively immature” • “TRLs [technology readiness levels] in the literature are often overestimated” • “The majority of critical technologies… for NEP/Chem… systems are at a relatively high level of advancement degree of difficulty (AD2 > 4) for maturation, requiring a dual development approach” • “The proper assessment of baseline TRL and AD2 values and the estimation of requirements and resources required for advancement have been consistent issues for NEP,” • “Non-advocate reviews should occur at the start of a technology program and at all key milestones.” In 2021, the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) issued a separate report [4] identifying the “primary technical and programmatic challenges, merits, and risks for maturing space nuclear propulsion technologies of interest to a future human Mars exploration mission.” That work contained several important findings, including: • “Developing a MWe-class NEP system for the baseline mission would require increasing power by orders of magnitude relative to NEP system flight- or ground-based technology demonstrations completed to date.” • “Subscale in-space flight testing of NEP systems cannot address many of the risks and potential failure modes associated with the baseline mission NEP system. With sufficient M&S [modeling & simulation] and ground testing, including modular subsystem tests at full scale and power, flight qualification requirements can be met by the cargo missions that will precede the first crewed mission to Mars. Fully integrated ground testing may not be required.” • “As a result of low and intermittent investment over the past several decades, it is unclear if even an aggressive program would be able to develop an NEP system capable of executing the baseline mission in 2039.” These efforts motivated the SNP project to investigate the technologies available for a megawatt-class high power nuclear electric propulsion system. That system is illustrated schematically in Figure 1 and is comprised of five separate top-level critical technology elements (CTEs). 1. Nuclear Reactor – Thermal power source for the system, utilizing high-assay low enriched uranium (HALEU) as the nuclear fuel. Reactor radiation shielding is also included in this CTE. 2. Power Conversion – Operates as a thermodynamic cycle, accepting nuclear reactor thermal power as an input and converting it to mechanical power. 3. Power Management and Distribution (PMAD) – Accepts as an input mechanical power from the power conversion system, which is used to generate electrical power. The PMAD system also distributes the generated electrical power to all other parts of the spacecraft, including the high-power EP system. The PMAD system may also perform duties such as isolation, fault detection, and power transformation/rectification for different spacecraft systems, including the thrusters. 4. Electric Propulsion (EP) – Accepts as an input electrical power, which is used to accelerate a propellant to high speeds to produce thrust. This system includes the power processing unit (PPU), which converts the power it receives to the correct current and voltage required by the thrusters, and the propellant storage and feed systems, which contain and meter the flow of propellant to the thrusters. 5. Thermal Management (Radiators/Heat Rejection) – The cold side of the thermodynamic power conversion cycle, accepts thermal power from the power conversion system and radiatively rejects that heat to space. In this paper, we describe the SNP project formulation and investment strategy that aims to accomplish the research and development required to advance the technology readiness for each CTE. The strategy relies heavily upon experimental testing supported by modeling and simulation to yield realistic assessments of the technologies, which in turn will be used to inform future NEP system-level design decisions and any potential technology downselects.

Kurt A Polzin↗

Science Goal Monitor: Science Goal Driven Automation for NASA Missions

Infusion of automation technologies into NASA s future missions will be essential because of the need to: (1) effectively handle an exponentially increasing volume of scientific data, (2) successfully meet dynamic, opportunistic scientific goals and objectives, and (3) substantially reduce mission operations staff and costs. While much effort has gone into automating routine spacecraft operations to reduce human workload and hence costs, applying intelligent automation to the science side, i.e., science data acquisition, data analysis and reactions to that data analysis in a timely and still scientifically valid manner, has been relatively under-emphasized. In order to introduce science driven automation in missions, we must be able to: capture and interpret the science goals of observing programs, represent those goals in machine interpretable language; and allow spacecrafts onboard systems to autonomously react to the scientist's goals. In short, we must teach our platforms to dynamically understand, recognize, and react to the scientists goals. The Science Goal Monitor (SGM) project at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center is a prototype software tool being developed to determine the best strategies for implementing science goal driven automation in missions. The tools being developed in SGM improve the ability to monitor and react to the changing status of scientific events. The SGM system enables scientists to specify what to look for and how to react in descriptive rather than technical terms. The system monitors streams of science data to identify occurrences of key events previously specified by the scientist. When an event occurs, the system autonomously coordinates the execution of the scientist s desired reactions. Through SGM, we will improve om understanding about the capabilities needed onboard for success, develop metrics to understand the potential increase in science returns, and develop an operational prototype so that the perceived risks associated with increased use of automation can be reduced.

Koratkar, Anuradha↗

An Integrated Approach to Life Cycle Analysis

Life Cycle Analysis (LCA) is the evaluation of the impacts that design decisions have on a system and provides a framework for identifying and evaluating design benefits and burdens associated with the life cycles of space transportation systems from a "cradle-to-grave" approach. Sometimes called life cycle assessment, life cycle approach, or "cradle to grave analysis", it represents a rapidly emerging family of tools and techniques designed to be a decision support methodology and aid in the development of sustainable systems. The implementation of a Life Cycle Analysis can vary and may take many forms; from global system-level uncertainty-centered analysis to the assessment of individualized discriminatory metrics. This paper will focus on a proven LCA methodology developed by the Systems Analysis and Concepts Directorate (SACD) at NASA Langley Research Center to quantify and assess key LCA discriminatory metrics, in particular affordability, reliability, maintainability, and operability. This paper will address issues inherent in Life Cycle Analysis including direct impacts, such as system development cost and crew safety, as well as indirect impacts, which often take the form of coupled metrics (i.e., the cost of system unreliability). Since LCA deals with the analysis of space vehicle system conceptual designs, it is imperative to stress that the goal of LCA is not to arrive at the answer but, rather, to provide important inputs to a broader strategic planning process, allowing the managers to make risk-informed decisions, and increase the likelihood of meeting mission success criteria.

Chytka, T. M.↗

Severe Space Weather Events--Understanding Societal and Economic Impacts: A Workshop Report - Extended Summary

The effects of space weather on modern technological systems are well documented in both the technical literature and popular accounts. Most often cited perhaps is the collapse within 90 seconds of northeastern Canada's Hydro-Quebec power grid during the great geomagnetic storm of March 1989, which left millions of people without electricity for up to 9 hours. This event exemplifies the dramatic impact that severe space weather can have on a technology upon which modern society critically depends. Nearly two decades have passed since the March 1989 event. During that time, awareness of the risks of severe space weather has increased among the affected industries, mitigation strategies have been developed, new sources of data have become available, new models of the space environment have been created, and a national space weather infrastructure has evolved to provide data, alerts, and forecasts to an increasing number of users. Now, 20 years later and approaching a new interval of increased solar activity, how well equipped are we to manage the effects of space weather? Have recent technological developments made our critical technologies more or less vulnerable? How well do we understand the broader societal and economic impacts of severe space weather events? Are our institutions prepared to cope with the effects of a 'space weather Katrina,' a rare, but according to the historical record, not inconceivable eventuality? On May 22 and 23, 2008, a one-and-a-half-day workshop held in Washington, D.C., under the auspices of the National Research Council's (NRC's) Space Studies Board brought together representatives of industry, the federal government, and the social science community to explore these and related questions. The key themes, ideas, and insights that emerged during the presentations and discussions are summarized in 'Severe Space Weather Events--Understanding Societal and Economic Impacts: A Workshop Report' (The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2008), which was prepared by the Committee on the Societal and Economic Impacts of Severe Space Weather Events: A Workshop. The present document is an expanded summary of that report.

Source record↗

Towards Effective Drought Monitoring in the Middle East and North Africa (Mena) Region: Implications From Assimilating Leaf Area Index and Soil Moisture Into the Noah-Mp Land Surface Model for Morocco

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has experienced more frequent and severe drought events in recent decades, leading to increasingly pressing concerns over already strained food and water security. An effective drought monitoring and early warning system is thus critical to support risk mitigation and management by countries in the region. Here we investigate the potential for assimilation of leaf area index (LAI) and soil moisture observations to improve the representation of the overall hydrological and carbon cycles and drought by an advanced land surface model. The results reveal that assimilating soil moisture does not meaningfully improve model representation of the hydrological and biospheric processes for this region, but instead it degrades the simulation of the interannual variation in evapotranspiration (ET) and carbon fluxes, mainly due to model weaknesses in representing prognostic phenology. However, assimilating LAI leads to greater improvement, especially for transpiration and carbon fluxes, by constraining the timing of simulated vegetation growth response to evolving climate conditions. LAI assimilation also helps to correct for the erroneous interaction between the prognostic phenology and irrigation during summertime, effectively reducing a large positive bias in ET and carbon fluxes. Independently assimilating LAI or soil moisture alters the categorization of drought, with the differences being greater for more severe drought categories. We highlight the vegetation representation in response to changing land use and hydroclimate as one of the key processes to be captured for building a successful drought early warning system for the MENA region.

Wanshu Nie↗

Human Factors and Behavioral Performance Exploration Measures Harmonized Across HERA, NEK, and ISS: Teams Risk

BACKGROUNDThe Human Factors and Behavioral Performance Exploration Measures (HFBP-EM) suite is a set of standardized measures to assess behavioral health and performance risk related to future exploration class missions, and to support reduction of the Human Research Program’s (HRP) Behavioral Medicine (BMed), Team, Sleep, and Human Systems Integration Architecture risks. HFBP-EM were collected during Human Exploration Research Analogs (HERA) campaigns 4 (C4) and 5 (C5), and during SIRIUS 17 and 19 missions in the Russian Ground Based Experiment Complex, NEK, to document the feasibility, flexibility, and acceptability of these measures in analogsof the spaceflight environment. A subset of the HFBP-EM suite was collected during spaceflight as part HRP’s Standard Measures in Spaceflight Project. Whenever possible, the HFBP-EM protocol and measures are kept the same across studies, however, differences across research settings (e.g., experimental manipulations, mission scenarios, mission length) and implementation of the measures require the data are harmonized to ensure comparable views across missions. The purpose of our project is to develop a harmonized database of HFBP-EM data from different settings, and to summarize the trajectory of behavioral health and performance within and between research settings. In this presentation, we will summarize the harmonized dataset and the trajectory of measures related to the Team Risk, including team performance, team cohesion, team processes, and psychological safety, over time and between and within settings.METHODSWe followed best practices for data harmonization. Characteristics of each research setting were assessed for harmonization potential, and we deemed NEK-SIRIUS 17 as inappropriate due to study aims, length, and data quality. Common variables of interest were identified. Study characteristics and key variables with which datafiles could be merged were defined as “meta-data.” HFBP-EM data from all settings were processed under a common format. We then created a harmonized team-level database designed to facilitate analyses that address HRP research gaps related to HRP’s Team risk. In this database, team cohesion, processes, performance, psychological safety, and group living were operationalized as the team mean of the crew responses for each data collection (e.g., on mission day 7). Data collected on the International Space Station (ISS) included a subset of scale items administered to participants. Data collected from ISS team members within +/- 7 days of the first data collection and every following 30 +/-4 days were aggregated to the team level. We generated figures that display the mean and variability of team constructs across research settings. We also generated plots of changes in team constructs with mission day and with percentage of the mission completed. Where possible, we compared data from spaceflight analogs with data from astronauts aboard the ISS. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONThe team-level harmonized database was structured such that each row represents data for a team on a specific mission day. Team constructs (e.g., team cohesion) were included as columns (i.e., wide format) with repeated measures across mission days given in rows (i.e., long format). The database included data from 18 crews: five, 4-person American crews in HERA C4, four 4-person American crews in HERA C5, one 6-person multinational crew in NEK-SIRIUS 19, and eight, 2–11-person multinational crews aboard the ISS. Results provide insights into mission and campaign differences in team functioning and performance. For example, between campaign differences were observed for team processes—the interdependent team actions that orchestrate taskwork in pursuit of the team’s goals [1]. Greater between-team variability on team processes was detected during HERA C4 than during C5, and a downward trend was observed over the duration of C4, but not C5 or SIRIUS 19. This may be due to the campaign-level differences such as the sleep deprivation implemented during C4. Responses on the subset of team process items administered on the ISS indicate between-crew variability more like those observed in C4 than C5 and NEK, with some, but not all ISS crews demonstrating a downward trend over time. Additional findings will be presented. REFERENCESMarks, M. A., et al (2001) Academy of Management Review, 26(3), 356-376.

S T Bell↗

Effects and Responses to Spaceflight in the Mouse Retina

Several stress environmental factors are combined in a unique fashion during spaceflight, affecting living beings widely across their physiological systems. Recently, attention has been placed on vision changes in astronauts returning from long duration missions. Alterations include hyperoptic shift, globe flattening, choroidal folds and optic disc edema, which are probably associated with increased intracranial pressure. These observations justify a better characterization of the ocular health risks associated with spaceflight. This study investigates the impact of spaceflight on the biology of the mouse retina. Within a successful tissue sharing effort, eyes from albino Balb/cJ mice aboard STS-133 were collected for histological analysis and gene expression profiling of the retina at 1 and 7 days after landing. Both vivarium and AEM (Animal Enclosure Module) mice were used as ground controls. Oxidative stress-induced DNA damage was higher in the flight samples compared to controls on R+1, and decreased on R+7. A trend toward higher oxidative and cellular stress response gene expression was also observed on R+1 compared to AEM controls, and these levels decreased on R+7. Several genes coding for key antioxidant enzymes, namely, heme-oxygenase-1, peroxiredoxin, and catalase, were among those upregulated after flight. Likewise, NF B and TGFbeta1, were upregulated in one flight specimen that overall showed the most elevated oxidative stress markers on R+1. In addition, retinas from vivarium control mice evidenced higher oxidative stress markers, NF B and TGFbeta1, likely due to the more intense illumination in vivarium cages versus the AEM. These preliminary data suggest that spaceflight represents a source of environmental stress that translates into oxidative and cellular stress in the retina, which is partially reversible upon return to Earth. Further work is needed to dissect the contribution of the various spaceflight factors (microgravity, radiation) and to evaluate the impact of the stress response on retinal health.

Zanello, Susana B.↗

Technology Benefit Estimator (T/BEST): User's Manual

The Technology Benefit Estimator (T/BEST) system is a formal method to assess advanced technologies and quantify the benefit contributions for prioritization. T/BEST may be used to provide guidelines to identify and prioritize high payoff research areas, help manage research and limited resources, show the link between advanced concepts and the bottom line, i.e., accrued benefit and value, and to communicate credibly the benefits of research. The T/BEST software computer program is specifically designed to estimating benefits, and benefit sensitivities, of introducing new technologies into existing propulsion systems. Key engine cycle, structural, fluid, mission and cost analysis modules are used to provide a framework for interfacing with advanced technologies. An open-ended, modular approach is used to allow for modification and addition of both key and advanced technology modules. T/BEST has a hierarchical framework that yields varying levels of benefit estimation accuracy that are dependent on the degree of input detail available. This hierarchical feature permits rapid estimation of technology benefits even when the technology is at the conceptual stage. As knowledge of the technology details increases the accuracy of the benefit analysis increases. Included in T/BEST's framework are correlations developed from a statistical data base that is relied upon if there is insufficient information given in a particular area, e.g., fuel capacity or aircraft landing weight. Statistical predictions are not required if these data are specified in the mission requirements. The engine cycle, structural fluid, cost, noise, and emissions analyses interact with the default or user material and component libraries to yield estimates of specific global benefits: range, speed, thrust, capacity, component life, noise, emissions, specific fuel consumption, component and engine weights, pre-certification test, mission performance engine cost, direct operating cost, life cycle cost, manufacturing cost, development cost, risk, and development time. Currently, T/BEST operates on stand-alone or networked workstations, and uses a UNIX shell or script to control the operation of interfaced FORTRAN based analyses. T/BEST's interface structure works equally well with non-FORTRAN or mixed software analysis. This interface structure is designed to maintain the integrity of the expert's analyses by interfacing with expert's existing input and output files. Parameter input and output data (e.g., number of blades, hub diameters, etc.) are passed via T/BEST's neutral file, while copious data (e.g., finite element models, profiles, etc.) are passed via file pointers that point to the expert's analyses output files. In order to make the communications between the T/BEST's neutral file and attached analyses codes simple, only two software commands, PUT and GET, are required. This simplicity permits easy access to all input and output variables contained within the neutral file. Both public domain and proprietary analyses codes may be attached with a minimal amount of effort, while maintaining full data and analysis integrity, and security. T/BESt's sotware framework, status, beginner-to-expert operation, interface architecture, analysis module addition, and key analysis modules are discussed. Representative examples of T/BEST benefit analyses are shown.

Generazio, Edward R.↗

Large Vehicle Lunar Landing Surface Interaction and In-Situ Resource Based Risk Mitigation: Landing & Launch Pads

A key capability required for the exploration of planetary bodies is the ability to land on the surface. Previous work performed by NASA and other institutions has primarily focused on landing small spacecraft on planetary surfaces and the associated small-to-medium thrusters required for the soft landing. In the case of human exploration—particularly the establishment of long duration exploration and habitation outposts—the ability to land large landers, such as the SpaceX Starship, is necessary. These larger landing systems require the use of more powerful engines, with higher engine exhaust temperatures and higher landing loads. Understanding the excavation of material by the engines, as well as the potential for the landing legs to sink into the subsurface, is key in ensuring reliable and safe landings. A further improvement in landing reliability can be achieved by constructing landing / launch pads, especially with in-situ resources. Some material excavation by the plume is inevitable, leaving at least a portion of the surface scoured and uneven under the lander and ejecting regolith particles and rocks at very high velocities. One possible solution would be to robotically build landing / launch pads (ideally autonomously) at the destination using in-situ materials. In this case, the first one or few landers will need to land on unimproved surfaces at higher risk; however, they would bring the required equipment to build the landing pads with mostly local resources, thus increasing the reliability of safe landing for subsequent larger landers. A number of methods to build in-situ landing and launch pads have already been developed. These methods include no, or some, addition of required binder additives to the local regolith material, different processing approaches and result in varying landing pad strengths. A sub-scale rocket engine plume, was used to simulate some of the conditions of a landing on the Moon to assess the effectiveness of various materials for an in-situ built landing pad, The GO2/GCH4rocket engine fired on a 1m2area coupons of representative pad materials. The results will allow continued development towards materials that satisfy the landing pad properties required for the effective risk reduction and increased reliability for landing people and equipment on the lunar surface. This work contained two parts: (1) computer modeling of a large rocket engine plume interacting with regolith on the Moon, using the Granular Gas Flow Solver (GGFS) provided by CFD Research Corporation as well as other computational fluid dynamics codes (CFD) such as Loci/CHEM. (2) Developing landing/launch pad materials that could be used for in-situ construction on the lunar surface in the future, to mitigate the calculated effects of a large vehicle rocket engine landing and launching on the Moon.

Lunar↗

Large Vehicle Lunar Landing Surface Interaction and In-Situ Resource Based Risk Mitigation: Landing & Launch Pads

A key capability required for the exploration of planetary bodies is the ability to land on the surface. Previous work performed by NASA and other institutions has primarily focused on landing small spacecraft on planetary surfaces and the associated small-to-medium thrusters required for the soft landing. In the case of human exploration—particularly the establishment of long duration exploration and habitation outposts—the ability to land large landers, such as the SpaceX Starship, is necessary. These larger landing systems require the use of more powerful engines, with higher engine exhaust temperatures and higher landing loads. Understanding the excavation of material by the engines, as well as the potential for the landing legs to sink into the subsurface, is key in ensuring reliable and safe landings. A further improvement in landing reliability can be achieved by constructing landing / launch pads, especially with in-situ resources. Some material excavation by the plume is inevitable, leaving at least a portion of the surface scoured and uneven under the lander and ejecting regolith particles and rocks at very high velocities. One possible solution would be to robotically build landing / launch pads (ideally autonomously) at the destination using in-situ materials. In this case, the first one or few landers will need to land on unimproved surfaces at higher risk; however, they would bring the required equipment to build the landing pads with mostly local resources, thus increasing the reliability of safe landing for subsequent larger landers. A number of methods to build in-situ landing and launch pads have already been developed. These methods include no or some addition of required binder additives to the local regolith material, different processing approaches and result in varying landing pad strengths. A sub-scale rocket engine plume, was used to simulate some of the conditions of a landing on the Moon to assess the effectiveness of various materials for an in-situ built landing pad, The GO2/GCH4 rocket engine fired on 1m2 area coupons of representative pad materials. The results will allow continued development towards materials that satisfy the landing pad properties required for the effective risk reduction and increased reliability for landing people and equipment on the lunar surface. This work contained two parts: (1) computer modeling of a large rocket engine plume interacting with regolith on the Moon, using the Granular Gas Flow Solver (GGFS) provided by CFD Research Corporation as well as other computational fluid dynamics codes (CFD) such as Loci/CHEM. (2) Developing landing/launch pad materials that could be used for in-situ construction on the lunar surface in the future, to mitigate the calculated effects of a large vehicle rocket engine landing and launching on the Moon. The resulting computed values of plume impingement surface temperature, stagnation pressure, gas velocity, shear stress and heat flux were then matched as closely as possible in the Earth’s atmosphere in a sub-scale rocket engine GO2/CH4 test which was provided by Masten Space Systems in Mojave, California. The rocket engine was mounted on a test stand with vertical translation capabilities so that the landing operations of a lander could be simulated (Figure 1).The pad materials test coupons were placed at the surface of a large bin containing simulated lunar basalt regolith and subjected to a test firing as shown in Figure 2. The results of this testing will be presented with related findings, analysis and discussion.

Plume Surface Interaction↗

Extraction and Separation Modeling of Orion Test Vehicles with ADAMS Simulation

The Capsule Parachute Assembly System (CPAS) project has increased efforts to demonstrate the performance of fully integrated parachute systems at both higher dynamic pressures and in the presence of wake fields using a Parachute Compartment Drop Test Vehicle (PCDTV) and a Parachute Test Vehicle (PTV), respectively. Modeling the extraction and separation events has proven challenging and an understanding of the physics is required to reduce the risk of separation malfunctions. The need for extraction and separation modeling is critical to a successful CPAS test campaign. Current PTV-alone simulations, such as Decelerator System Simulation (DSS), require accurate initial conditions (ICs) drawn from a separation model. Automatic Dynamic Analysis of Mechanical Systems (ADAMS), a Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) tool, was employed to provide insight into the multi-body six degree of freedom (DOF) interaction between parachute test hardware and external and internal forces. Components of the model include a composite extraction parachute, primary vehicle (PTV or PCDTV), platform cradle, a release mechanism, aircraft ramp, and a programmer parachute with attach points. Independent aerodynamic forces were applied to the mated test vehicle/platform cradle and the separated test vehicle and platform cradle. The aero coefficients were determined from real time lookup tables which were functions of both angle of attack ( ) and sideslip ( ). The atmospheric properties were also determined from a real time lookup table characteristic of the Yuma Proving Grounds (YPG) atmosphere relative to the planned test month. Representative geometries were constructed in ADAMS with measured mass properties generated for each independent vehicle. Derived smart separation parameters were included in ADAMS as sensors with defined pitch and pitch rate criteria used to refine inputs to analogous avionics systems for optimal separation conditions. Key design variables were dispersed in a Monte Carlo analysis to provide the maximum expected range of the state variables at programmer deployment to be used as ICs in DSS. Extensive comparisons were made with Decelerator System Simulation Application (DSSA) to validate the mated portion of the ADAMS extraction trajectory. Results of the comparisons improved the fidelity of ADAMS with a ramp pitch profile update from DSSA. Post-test reconstructions resulted in improvements to extraction parachute drag area knock-down factors, extraction line modeling, and the inclusion of ball-to-socket attachments used as a release mechanism on the PTV. Modeling of two Extraction parachutes was based on United States Air Force (USAF) tow test data and integrated into ADAMS for nominal and Monte Carlo trajectory assessments. Video overlay of ADAMS animations and actual C-12 chase plane test videos supported analysis and observation efforts of extraction and separation events. The COTS ADAMS simulation has been integrated with NASA based simulations to provide complete end to end trajectories with a focus on the extraction, separation, and programmer deployment sequence. The flexibility of modifying ADAMS inputs has proven useful for sensitivity studies and extraction/separation modeling efforts. 1

Fraire, Usbaldo, Jr.↗

Conceptual Launch Vehicle and Spacecraft Design for Risk Assessment

One of the most challenging aspects of developing human space launch and exploration systems is minimizing and mitigating the many potential risk factors to ensure the safest possible design while also meeting the required cost, weight, and performance criteria. In order to accomplish this, effective risk analyses and trade studies are needed to identify key risk drivers, dependencies, and sensitivities as the design evolves. The Engineering Risk Assessment (ERA) team at NASA Ames Research Center (ARC) develops advanced risk analysis approaches, models, and tools to provide such meaningful risk and reliability data throughout vehicle development. The goal of the project presented in this memorandum is to design a generic launch 7 vehicle and spacecraft architecture that can be used to develop and demonstrate these new risk analysis techniques without relying on other proprietary or sensitive vehicle designs. To accomplish this, initial spacecraft and launch vehicle (LV) designs were established using historical sizing relationships for a mission delivering four crewmembers and equipment to the International Space Station (ISS). Mass-estimating relationships (MERs) were used to size the crew capsule and launch vehicle, and a combination of optimization techniques and iterative design processes were employed to determine a possible two-stage-to-orbit (TSTO) launch trajectory into a 350-kilometer orbit. Primary subsystems were also designed for the crewed capsule architecture, based on a 24-hour on-orbit mission with a 7-day contingency. Safety analysis was also performed to identify major risks to crew survivability and assess the system's overall reliability. These procedures and analyses validate that the architecture's basic design and performance are reasonable to be used for risk trade studies. While the vehicle designs presented are not intended to represent a viable architecture, they will provide a valuable initial platform for developing and demonstrating innovative risk assessment capabilities.

Launch Vehicle↗

Constellation Program: Lessons Learned: Executive Summary - Volume 1

This document (Volume I) provides an executive summary of the lessons learned from the Constellation Program. A companion Volume II provides more detailed analyses for those seeking further insight and information. In this volume, Section 1.0 introduces the approach in preparing and organizing the content to enable rapid assimilation of the lessons. Section 2.0 describes the contextual framework in which the Constellation Program was formulated and functioned that is necessary to understand most of the lessons. Context of a former program may seem irrelevant in the heady days of new program formulation. However, readers should take some time to understand the context. Many of the lessons would be different in a different context, so the reader should reflect on the similarities and differences in his or her current circumstances. Section 3.0 summarizes key findings developed from the significant lessons learned at the program level that appear in Section 4.0. Readers can use the key findings in Section 3.0 to peruse for particular topics, and will find more supporting detail and analyses in Section 4.0 in a topical format. Appendix A contains a white paper describing the Constellation Program formulation that may be of use to readers wanting more context or background information. The reader will no doubt recognize some very similar themes from previous lessons learned, blue-ribbon committee reviews, National Academy reviews, and advisory panel reviews for this and other large-scale human spaceflight programs; including Apollo, Space Shuttle, Shuttle/Mir, and the ISS. This could represent an inability to learn lessons from previous generations; however, it is more likely that similar challenges persist in the Agency structure and approach to program formulation, budget advocacy, and management. Perhaps the greatest value of these Constellation lessons learned can be found in viewing them in context with these previous efforts to guide and advise the Agency and its stakeholders.

Constellation Program↗

Human System Risk Management for Space Flight

This brief abstract reviews the development of the current day approach to human system risk management for space flight and the development of the critical components of this process over the past few years. The human system risk management process now provides a comprehensive assessment of each human system risk by design reference mission (DRM) and is evaluated not only for mission success but also for long‐term health impacts for the astronauts. The discipline of bioastronautics is the study of the biological and medical effects of space flight on humans. In 1997, the Space Life Sciences Directorate (SLSD) initiated the Bioastronautics Roadmap (Roadmap) as the "Critical Path Roadmap", and in 1998 participation in the roadmap was expanded to include the National Space Biomedical Research Institute (NSBRI) and the external community. A total of 55 risks and 250 questions were identified and prioritized and in 2000, the Roadmap was base-lined and put under configuration control. The Roadmap took into account several major advisory committee reviews including the Institute of Medicine (IOM) "Safe Passage: Astronaut care for Exploration Missions", 2001. Subsequently, three collaborating organizations at NASA HQ (Chief Health and Medical Officer, Office of Space Flight and Office of Biological & Physical Research), published the Bioastronautics Strategy in 2003, that identified the human as a "critical subsystem of space flight" and noted that "tolerance limits and safe operating bands must be established" to enable human space flight. These offices also requested a review by the IOM of the Roadmap and that review was published in October 2005 as "A Risk Reduction Strategy for Human Exploration of Space: A Review of NASA's Bioastronautics Roadmap", that noted several strengths and weaknesses of the Roadmap and made several recommendations. In parallel with the development of the Roadmap, the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) began a process in 2004 of evaluating the tolerance limits and safe operating bands called for in the Bioastronautics Strategy. Over the next several years, the concept of the "operating bands" were turned into Space Flight Human System Standards (SFHSS), developed by the technical resources of the SLSD at the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC). These standards were developed and reviewed at the SLSD and then presented to the OCHMO for acceptance. The first set of standards was published in 2007 as the NASA‐STD‐3001, Volume 1, Crew Health that elaborated standards for several physiological areas such as cardiovascular, musculoskeletal, radiation exposure and nutrition. Volume 2, Human Factors, Habitability and Human Health was published in 2011, along with development guidance in the Human Integration Design Handbook (HIDH). Taken together, the SFHSS Volumes 1 and 2, and the HIDH replaced the NASA‐STD‐3000 with new standards and revisions of the older document. Three other changes were also taking place that facilitated the development of the human system risk management approach. In 2005, the life sciences research and development portfolio underwent a comprehensive review through the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) that resulted in the reformulation of the Bioastronautics Program into Human Research Program (HRP) that was focused on appropriate mitigation results for high priority human health risks. The baseline HRP budget was established in August 2005. In addition, the OCHMO formulated the Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) in 2006 that established the position of the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) at the NASA JSC along with other key technical disciplines, and the OCHMO became the responsible office for the SFHSS as noted above. The final change was the establishment in 2008 of the Human System Risk Board (HSRB), chaired by the CMO with representation from the HRP, SLSD management and technical experts. The HSRB then began to review all human system risks, established a comprehensive risk management and configuration management plan and data sharing policy. These major developments of standards, the HRP, the HMTA and a forum for review of human system risks (HSRB) facilitated the integration of human research, medical operations, systems engineering and many other disciplines in the comprehensive review of human system risks. The HSRB began a comprehensive review of all potential inflight medical conditions and events and over the course of several reviews consolidated the number of human system risks to 30 where the greatest emphasis is placed for investing program dollars for risk mitigation. The HSRB considers all available evidence from human research, medical operations and occupational surveillance in assessing the risks for appropriate mitigation and future work. All applicable DRMs (low earth orbit 6 and 12 months, deep space sortie for 30 days and 1 year, a one year lunar mission, and a planetary mission for 3 years) are considered as human system risks are modified by the hazards associated with space flight such as microgravity, exposure to radiation, distance from the earth, isolation and a closed environment. Each risk has a summary assessment representing the state of knowledge/evidence base for that risk, the available risk mitigations, traceability to the SFHSS and program requirements, and future work required. These data then can drive coordinated budgets across the HRP, the International Space Station, Crew Health and Safety and Advanced Exploration System budgets. These risk assessments were completed for 6 DRMs in December of 2014 and serve as the baseline for which subsequent research and technology development and crew health care portfolios can be assessed. The HSRB will review each risk at least annually and especially when new information is available that must be considered for effective risk mitigation. The current status of each risk can be reported to program management for operations, budget reviews and general oversight of the human system risk management program.

Davis, Jeffrey↗