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NASA NTRS1994

Decision Making in Action: Applying Research to Practice

The importance of decision-making to safety in complex, dynamic environments like mission control centers, aviation, and offshore installations has been well established. NASA-ARC has a program of research dedicated to fostering safe and effective decision-making in the manned spaceflight environment: Because access to spaceflight is limited, environments with similar characteristics, including aviation and nuclear power plants, serve as analogs from which space-relevant data can be gathered and theories developed. Analyses of aviation accidents cite crew judgement and decision making as causes or contributing factors in over half of all accidents. Yet laboratory research on decision making has not proven especially helpful in improving the quality of decisions in these kinds of environments. One reason is that the traditional, analytic decision models are inappropriate to multi-dimensional, high-risk environments, and do not accurately describe what expert human decision makers do when they make decisions that have consequences. A new model of dynamic, naturalistic decision making is offered that may prove useful for improving decision making in complex, isolated, confined and high-risk environments. Based on analyses of crew performance in full-mission simulators and accident reports, features that define effective decision strategies in abnormal or emergency situations have been identified. These include accurate situation assessment (including time and risk assessment), appreciation of the complexity of the problem, sensitivity to constraints on the decision, timeliness of the response, and use of adequate information. More effective crews also manage their workload to provide themselves with time and resources to make good good decisions are appropriate to the demands of the situation. Effective crew decision making and overall performance are mediated by crew communication. Communication contributes to performance because it assures that all crew members have essential information, but it also regulates and coordinates crew actions and is the medium of collective thinking in response to a problem. This presentation will examine the relations between leadership, communication, decision making and overall crew performance. Implications of these findings for training will be discussed.

Orasanu, Judith↗
NASA NTRS1994

Decision Making in Action: Applying Research to Practice

The importance of decision-making to safety in complex, dynamic environments like mission control centers and offshore installations has been well established. NASA-ARC has a program of research dedicated to fostering safe and effective decision-making in the manned spaceflight environment. Because access to spaceflight is limited, environments with similar characteristics, including aviation and nuclear power plants, serve as analogs from which space-relevant data can be gathered and theories developed. Analyses of aviation accidents cite crew judgement and decision making as causes or contributing factors in over half of all accidents. A similar observation has been made in nuclear power plants. Yet laboratory research on decision making has not proven especially helpful in improving the quality of decisions in these kinds of environments. One reason is that the traditional, analytic decision models are inappropriate to multidimensional, high-risk environments, and do not accurately describe what expert human decision makers do when they make decisions that have consequences. A new model of dynamic, naturalistic decision making is offered that may prove useful for improving decision making in complex, isolated, confined and high-risk environments. Based on analyses of crew performance in full-mission simulators and accident reports, features that define effective decision strategies in abnormal or emergency situations have been identified. These include accurate situation assessment (including time and risk assessment), appreciation of the complexity of the problem, sensitivity to constraints on the decision, timeliness of the response, and use of adequate information. More effective crews also manage their workload to provide themselves with time and resources to make good decisions. In brief, good decisions are appropriate to the demands of the situation. Effective crew decision making and overall performance are mediated by crew communication. Communication contributes to performance because it assures that all crew members have essential information, but it also regulates and coordinates crew actions and is the medium of collective thinking in response to a problem. This presentation will examine the relations between leadership, communication, decision making and overall crew performance. Implications of these findings for spaceflight and training for offshore installations will be discussed.

Orasanu, Judith↗
NASA NTRS1994

Decision Making in Action

The importance of decision-making to safety in complex, dynamic environments like mission control centers and offshore installations has been well established. NASA-ARC has a program of research dedicated to fostering safe and effective decision-making in the manned spaceflight environment. Because access to spaceflight is limited, environments with similar characteristics, including aviation and nuclear power plants, serve as analogs from which space-relevant data can be gathered and theories developed. Analyses of aviation accidents cite crew judgement and decision making as causes or contributing factors in over half of all accidents. A similar observation has been made in nuclear power plants. Yet laboratory research on decision making has not proven especially helpful in improving the quality of decisions in these kinds of environments. One reason is that the traditional, analytic decision models are inappropriate to multidimensional, high-risk environments, and do not accurately describe what expert human decision makers do when they make decisions that have consequences. A new model of dynamic, naturalistic decision making is offered that may prove useful for improving decision making in complex, isolated, confined and high-risk environments. Based on analyses of crew performance in full-mission simulators and accident reports, features that define effective decision strategies in abnormal or emergency situations have been identified. These include accurate situation assessment (including time and risk assessment), appreciation of the complexity of the problem, sensitivity to constraints on the decision, timeliness of the response, and use of adequate information. More effective crews also manage their workload to provide themselves with time and resources to make good decisions. In brief, good decisions are appropriate to the demands of the situation. Effective crew decision making and overall performance are mediated by crew communication. Communication contributes to performance because it assures that all crew members have essential information, but it also regulates and coordinates crew actions and is the medium of collective thinking in response to a problem. This presentation will examine the relations between leadership, communication, decision making and overall crew performance. Implications of these findings for spaceflight and training for offshore installations will be discussed.

Orasanu, Judith↗
NASA NTRS1995

Decision Making in the Airplane

The Importance of decision-making to safety in complex, dynamic environments like mission control centers, aviation, and offshore installations has been well established. NASA-ARC has a program of research dedicated to fostering safe and effective decision-making in the manned spaceflight environment. Because access to spaceflight is limited, environments with similar characteristics, including aviation and nuclear power plants, serve as analogs from which space-relevant data can be gathered and theories developed. Analyses of aviation accidents cite crew judgement and decision making as causes or contributing factors in over half of all accidents. Yet laboratory research on decision making has not proven especially helpful In improving the quality of decisions in these kinds of environments. One reason is that the traditional, analytic decision models are inappropriate to multi-dimensional, high-risk environments, and do not accurately describe what expert human decision makers do when they make decisions that have consequences. A new model of dynamic, naturalistic decision making is offered that may prove useful for improving decision making in complex, isolated, confined and high-risk environments. Based on analyses of crew performance in full-mission simulators and accident reports, features that define effective decision strategies in abnormal or emergency situations have been identified. These include accurate situation assessment (including time and risk assessment), appreciation of the complexity of the problem, sensitivity to constraints on the decision, timeliness of the response, and use of adequate information. More effective crews also manage their workload to provide themselves with time and resources to make good decisions. In brief, good decisions are appropriate to the demands of the situation. Effective crew decision making and overall performance are mediated by crew communication. Communication contributes to performance because it assures that all crew members have essential information, but it also regulates and coordinates crew actions and is the medium of collective thinking In response to a problem, This presentation will examine the relations between leadership, communication, decision making and overall crew performance. Implications of these findings for training will be discussed.

Orasanu, Judith↗
NASA NTRS2019

Proceedings of the NASA Technical Interchange Meeting on Active Optical Systems for Supporting Science, Exploration, and Aeronautics Measurements Needs

Active optical (Laser/Lidar) measurement techniques are critical for the future National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Earth, Planetary Science, Exploration, and Aeronautics measurements. The latest science decadal surveys recommend a number of missions requiring active optical systems to meet the science measurement objectives and the aeronautics community continues to use Laser/Lidar technologies to meet the aeronautics measurement objectives. With these drivers, the NASA Agency Program Management Council (APMC), chaired by the NASA Associate Administrator, has tasked the NASA Sensors and Instrumentation (S&I) Capability Leadership Team (CLT) Leader to determine if the Agency has the necessary expertise and capabilities to execute successfully the active optical-based systems necessary to make the required measurements for Science, Exploration, and Aeronautics. This NASA Technical Interchange Meeting (TIM) was a forum to exchange perspectives on the current state of the discipline’s technologies and the direction NASA needs to take in the future to raise the Technical Readiness Level (TRL) of the measurement technologies to meet these measurement needs in the applications domains. The information developed at this TIM was used in formulating the Agency-level strategy and solutions for advancing high-risk Laser/Lidar technologies that are not currently being sufficiently planned, developed, or risk-reduced to meet NASA’s mission requirements. Given the crosscutting synergies in critical Active Optical measurements for NASA Science, Exploration, and Aeronautics, a strategic approach is needed to identify areas where NASA should “lead, leverage or collaborate” with existing national and international industries to meet its future needs. The TIM aimed at focusing NASA’s directions to attain the necessary TRLs to meet the Agency-level priority Active Optical measurements in Space and Aeronautics. The TIM presentations and strategic inputs were synthesized by the NASA Active Optical Tiger Team for presentation to the NASA APMC with a suggested strategy to address the Agency’s needs in a crosscutting, synergistic and cost-effective manner.

Singh, Upendra N↗
NASA NTRS2002

Second Generation RLV Space Vehicle Concept

NASA has a long history of conducting development programs and projects in a consistent fashion. Systems Engineering within those programs and projects has also followed a given method outlined by such documents as the NASA Systems Engineering Handbook. The relatively new NASA Space Launch Initiative (SLI) is taking a new approach to developing a space vehicle, with innovative management methods as well as new Systems Engineering processes. With the program less than a year into its life cycle, the efficacy of these new processes has yet to be proven or disproven. At $776M for phase 1, SLI represents a major portion of the NASA focus; however, the new processes being incorporated are not reflected in the training provided by NASA to its engineers. The NASA Academy of Program and Project Leadership (APPL) offers core classes in program and project management and systems engineering to NASA employees with the purpose of creating a "knowledge community where ideas, skills, and experiences are exchanged to increase each other's capacity for strong leadership". The SLI program is, in one sense, a combination of a conceptual design program and a technology program. The program as a whole doesn't map into the generic systems engineering project cycle as currently, and for some time, taught. For example, the NASA APPL Systems Engineering training course teaches that the "first step in developing an architecture is to define the external boundaries of the system", which will require definition of the interfaces with other systems and the next step will be to "define all the components that make up the next lower level of the system hierarchy" where fundamental requirements are allocated to each component. Whereas, the SLI technology risk reduction approach develops architecture subsystem technologies prior to developing architectures. The higher level architecture requirements are not allowed to fully develop and undergo decomposition and allocation down to the subsystems before the subsystems must develop allocated requirements based on the highest level of requirements. In the vernacular of the project cycles prior to the mid 1990's, the architecture definition portion of the program appears to be at a generic Phase A stage, while the subsystems are operating at Phase B. Even the management structure of the SLI program is innovative in its approach to Systems Engineering and is not reflected in the APPL training modules. The SLI program has established a Systems Engineering office as an office separate from the architecture development or the subsystem technology development, while that office does have representatives within these other offices. The distributed resources of the Systems Engineering Office are co-located with the respective Project Offices. This template is intended to provide systems engineering as an integrated function at the Program Level. the program management of SLI and the MAT agree that "program/project managers and the systems engineering team must work closely together towards the single objective of delivering quality products that meet the customer needs". This paper will explore the differences between the methods being taught by NASA, which represent decades of ideas, and those currently in practice in SLI. Time will tell if the innovation employed by SLI will prove to be the model of the future. For now, it is suggested that the training of the present exercise the flexibility of recognizing the new processes employed by a major new NASA program.

Bailey, Michelle↗
NASA NTRS2013

Orbital Debris: Past, Present, and Future

In the early days of spaceflight, the gBig Sky h theory was the near universally accepted paradigm for dealing with collisions of orbiting objects. This theory was also used during the early years of the aviation industry. Just as it did in aviation, the gBig Sky h theory breaks down as more and more objects accumulate in the environment. Fortunately, by the late 1970 fs some visionaries in NASA and the US Department of Defense (DoD) realized that trends in the orbital environment would inevitably lead to increased risks to operational spacecraft from collisions with other orbiting objects. The NASA Orbital Debris Program was established at and has been conducted at Johnson Space Center since 1979. At the start of 1979, fewer than 5000 objects were being tracked by the US Space Surveillance Network and very few attempts had been made to sample the environment for smaller sizes. Today, the number of tracked objects has quadrupled. Ground ]based and in situ measurements have statistically sampled the LEO environment over most sizes and mitigation guidelines and requirements are common among most space faring nations. NASA has been a leader, not only in defining the debris environment, but in promoting awareness of the issues in the US and internationally, and in providing leadership in developing policies to address the issue. This paper will discuss in broad terms the evolution of the NASA debris program from its beginnings to its present broad range of debris related research. The paper will discuss in some detail current research topics and will attempt to predict future research trends.

Stansbery, Gene↗
NASA NTRS2012

Human Systems Integration in Practice: Constellation Lessons Learned

NASA's Constellation program provided a unique testbed for Human Systems Integration (HSI) as a fundamental element of the Systems Engineering process. Constellation was the first major program to have HSI mandated by NASA's Human Rating document. Proper HSI is critical to the success of any project that relies on humans to function as operators, maintainers, or controllers of a system. HSI improves mission, system and human performance, significantly reduces lifecycle costs, lowers risk and minimizes re-design. Successful HSI begins with sufficient project schedule dedicated to the generation of human systems requirements, but is by no means solely a requirements management process. A top-down systems engineering process that recognizes throughout the organization, human factors as a technical discipline equal to traditional engineering disciplines with authority for the overall system. This partners with a bottoms-up mechanism for human-centered design and technical issue resolution. The Constellation Human Systems Integration Group (HSIG) was a part of the Systems Engineering and Integration (SE&I) organization within the program office, and existed alongside similar groups such as Flight Performance, Environments & Constraints, and Integrated Loads, Structures and Mechanisms. While the HSIG successfully managed, via influence leadership, a down-and-in Community of Practice to facilitate technical integration and issue resolution, it lacked parallel top-down authority to drive integrated design. This presentation will discuss how HSI was applied to Constellation, the lessons learned and best practices it revealed, and recommendations to future NASA program and project managers. This presentation will discuss how Human Systems Integration (HSI) was applied to NASA's Constellation program, the lessons learned and best practices it revealed, and recommendations to future NASA program and project managers on how to accomplish this critical function.

Zumbado, Jennifer Rochlis↗
NASA NTRS2017

Update on NASA Microelectronics Activities

Mission Statement: The NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program provides NASA's leadership for developing and maintaining guidance for the screening, qualification, test. and usage of EEE parts by NASA as well as in collaboration with other government Agencies and industry. NASA Space Technology Mission Directorate (STMD) "STMD rapidly develops, demonstrates, and infuses revolutionary, high-payoff technologies through transparent, collaborative partnerships, expanding the boundaries of the aerospace enterprise." Mission Statement: The Space Environments Testing Management Office (SETMO) will identify, prioritize, and manage a select suite of Agency key capabilities/assets that are deemed to be essential to the future needs of NASA or the nation, including some capabilities that lack an adequate business base over the budget horizon. NESC mission is to perform value-added independent testing, analysis, and assessments of NASA's high-risk projects to ensure safety and mission success. NASA Space Environments and Avionics Fellows as well as Radiation and EEE Parts Community of Practice (CoP) leads.

NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP)↗
DOE OSTI2024

A Cast of Thousands: How the IDEAS Productivity Project Has Advanced Software Productivity and Sustainability

Computational and data-enabled science and engineering are revolutionizing advances throughout science and society, at all scales of computing. For example, teams in the U.S. Department of Energy’s Exascale Computing Project have been tackling new frontiers in modeling, simulation, and analysis by exploiting unprecedented exascale computing capabilities—building an advanced software ecosystem that supports next-generation applications and addresses disruptive changes in computer architectures. However, concerns are growing about the productivity of the developers of scientific software. Members of the Interoperable Design of Extreme-scale Application Software project serve as catalysts to address these challenges through fostering software communities, incubating and curating methodologies and resources, and disseminating knowledge to advance developer productivity and software sustainability. This article discusses how these synergistic activities are advancing scientific discovery—mitigating technical risks by building a firmer foundation for reproducible, sustainable science at all scales of computing, from laptops to clusters to exascale and beyond.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
NASA NTRS1995

Workshop on Discovery Lessons-Learned

As part of the Discovery Program's continuous improvement effort, a Discovery Program Lessons-Learned workshop was designed to review how well the Discovery Program is moving toward its goal of providing low-cost research opportunities to the planetary science community while ensuring continued U.S. leadership in solar system exploration. The principal focus of the workshop was on the recently completed Announcement of Opportunity (AO) cycle, but the program direction and program management were also open to comment. The objective of the workshop was to identify both the strengths and weaknesses of the process up to this point, with the goal of improving the process for the next AO cycle. The process for initializing the workshop was to solicit comments from the communities involved in the program and to use the feedback as the basis for establishing the workshop agenda. The following four sessions were developed after reviewing and synthesizing both the formal feedback received and informal feedback obtained during discussions with various participants: (1) Science and Return on Investment; (2) Technology vs. Risk; Mission Success and Other Factors; (3) Cost; and (4) AO.AO Process Changes and Program Management.

Saunders, M.↗
NASA NTRS1995

The reusable launch vehicle technology program

Today's launch systems have major shortcomings that will increase in significance in the future, and thus are principal drivers for seeking major improvements in space transportation. They are too costly; insufficiently reliable, safe, and operable; and increasingly losing market share to international competition. For the United States to continue its leadership in the human exploration and wide ranging utilization of space, the first order of business must be to achieve low cost, reliable transportatin to Earth orbit. NASA's Access to Space Study, in 1993, recommended the development of a fully reusable single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO) rocket vehicle as an Agency goal. The goal of the Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) technology program is to mature the technologies essential for a next-generation reusable launch system capable of reliably serving National space transportation needs at substantially reduced costs. The primary objectives of the RLV technology program are to (1) mature the technologies required for the next-generation system, (2) demonstrate the capability to achieve low development and operational cost, and rapid launch turnaround times and (3) reduce business and technical risks to encourage significant private investment in the commercial development and operation of the next-generation system. Developing and demonstrating the technologies required for a Single Stage to Orbit (SSTO) rocket is a focus of the program becuase past studies indicate that it has the best potential for achieving the lowest space access cost while acting as an RLV technology driver (since it also encompasses the technology requirements of reusable rocket vehicles in general).

Cook, S.↗
NASA NTRS2012

NASA Human Health and Performance Strategy

In May 2007, what was then the Space Life Sciences Directorate, issued the 2007 Space Life Sciences Strategy for Human Space Exploration. In January 2012, leadership and key directorate personnel were once again brought together to assess the current and expected future environment against its 2007 Strategy and the Agency and Johnson Space Center goals and strategies. The result was a refined vision and mission, and revised goals, objectives, and strategies. One of the first changes implemented was to rename the directorate from Space Life Sciences to Human Health and Performance to better reflect our vision and mission. The most significant change in the directorate from 2007 to the present is the integration of the Human Research Program and Crew Health and Safety activities. Subsequently, the Human Health and Performance Directorate underwent a reorganization to achieve enhanced integration of research and development with operations to better support human spaceflight and International Space Station utilization. These changes also enable a more effective and efficient approach to human system risk mitigation. Since 2007, we have also made significant advances in external collaboration and implementation of new business models within the directorate and the Agency, and through two newly established virtual centers, the NASA Human Health and Performance Center and the Center of Excellence for Collaborative Innovation. Our 2012 Strategy builds upon these successes to address the Agency s increased emphasis on societal relevance and being a leader in research and development and innovative business and communications practices. The 2012 Human Health and Performance Vision is to lead the world in human health and performance innovations for life in space and on Earth. Our mission is to enable optimization of human health and performance throughout all phases of spaceflight. All HHPD functions are ultimately aimed at achieving this mission. Our activities enable mission success, optimizing human health and productivity in space before, during, and after the actual spaceflight experience of our crews, and include support for ground-based functions. Many of our spaceflight innovations also provide solutions for terrestrial challenges, thereby enhancing life on Earth. Our strategic goals are aimed at leading human exploration and ISS utilization, leading human health and performance internationally, excelling in management and advancement of innovations in health and human system integration, and expanding relevance to life on Earth and creating enduring support and enthusiasm for space exploration.

Davis, Jeffrey R.↗
NASA NTRS2012

NASA Human Health and Performance Strategy

In May 2007, what was then the Space Life Sciences Directorate, issued the 2007 Space Life Sciences Strategy for Human Space Exploration. In January 2012, leadership and key directorate personnel were once again brought together to assess the current and expected future environment against its 2007 Strategy and the Agency and Johnson Space Center goals and strategies. The result was a refined vision and mission, and revised goals, objectives, and strategies. One of the first changes implemented was to rename the directorate from Space Life Sciences to Human Health and Performance to better reflect our vision and mission. The most significant change in the directorate from 2007 to the present is the integration of the Human Research Program and Crew Health and Safety activities. Subsequently, the Human Health and Performance Directorate underwent a reorganization to achieve enhanced integration of research and development with operations to better support human spaceflight and International Space Station utilization. These changes also enable a more effective and efficient approach to human system risk mitigation. Since 2007, we have also made significant advances in external collaboration and implementation of new business models within the directorate and the Agency, and through two newly established virtual centers, the NASA Human Health and Performance Center and the Center of Excellence for Collaborative Innovation. Our 2012 Strategy builds upon these successes to address the Agency's increased emphasis on societal relevance and being a leader in research and development and innovative business and communications practices. The 2012 Human Health and Performance Vision is to lead the world in human health and performance innovations for life in space and on Earth. Our mission is to enable optimization of human health and performance throughout all phases of spaceflight. All HH&P functions are ultimately aimed at achieving this mission. Our activities enable mission success, optimizing human health and productivity in space before, during, and after the actual spaceflight experience of our crews, and include support for ground-­‐ based functions. Many of our spaceflight innovations also provide solutions for terrestrial challenges, thereby enhancing life on Earth. Our strategic goals are aimed at leading human exploration and ISS utilization, leading human health and performance internationally, excelling in management and advancement of innovations in health and human system integration, and expanding relevance to life on Earth and creating enduring support and enthusiasm for space exploration.

Davis, Jeffrey R.↗
NASA NTRS2018

NASA Additive Manufacturing Initiatives for Deep Space Human Exploration

Additive Manufacturing (AM) is being infused into aerospace industries at an accelerated pace. Reasons for this rapid adoption include: (1) Innovation Capability e.g. design features such as topology optimization, integrated fluid passages, and mesh structures; (2) Rapid Development and Optimization - ability to quickly iterate the design, development, and test cycle; (3) Affordability - reductions in part counts, cost, and schedule. NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) has taken a leadership role in application of AM technologies for deep space human exploration, leading the Agency's In Space Manufacturing (ISM) initiative and the application of AM for a broad variety of space propulsion systems. MSFC has championed the development of ISM capabilities since our first reduced-gravity aircraft experiment flew in 1999. Partnering with Made In Space, MSFC placed the first 3D Printer on ISS in 2014 and the second generation printer, the Additive Manufacturing Facility, in 2016. The next ISS technology demonstration will be the Refabricator, a recycler/basic printer scheduled to launch in late Fall 2018. Ground-based development is progressing in common use materials, metals 3D printing, printed electronics, and the new cornerstone of ISM, the FabLab. The latest developments in each area will be described. An overview of NASA's In Space Robotic Manufacturing and Assembly (IRMA) ground-based risk reduction projects will also be presented. MSFC has aggressively incorporated AM capabilities for design and development of space propulsion components. The capabilities have been rapidly matured and extensively exercised to produce and hot-fire test the Additive Manufacturing Demonstrator Engine, an in-space class prototype engine. This experience base has been extended to support Aerojet Rocketdyne in the application of AM to the RS-25, the Space Launch System Core Stage engine, and to small propulsion systems and thrusters for small satellites and cubesats. The latest developments will be described. In responding to a request from NASA's Commercial Crew Program for a consistent methodology for evaluation of AM processes and parts, MSFC began development of a draft standard for AM space flight hardware in late 2014. The draft was broadly disseminated for comments in mid-2015, and subsequently revised into two documents, a standard and a specification for AM space flight hardware, which were formally released by MSFC in October 2017. An overview of the key elements of these documents will be presented.

Clinton, Raymond↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Human Systems Integration (HSI) Framework and Training - Shifting the View of HSI for Better Implementation

The Implementation of Human Systems Integration (HSI) presents challenges within the acquisition community for two reasons. The first is that misconceptions of HSI still exist, with many Program Managers (PMs) and leadership uncertain of the value or where to begin. The second is due to an unbalanced approach to HSI in its own framework. These implementation challenges lead to barriers in the early prevention of mishaps. Understanding HSI practices and how they should be implemented in the Acquisition Product Life Cycle (PLC) has been a challenge across the government, leaving the value of HSI unknown and misunderstood with Program Managers. In the case for many acquisition programs, HSI is not implemented in early design, losing the perspective on human capabilities and limitations, creating impacts on human-centered design. Expectations in human performance are not clearly set and operations are baselined with no margin for changes in technology and processes that will affect system performance. The HSI framework addresses total system performance holistically using collaboration as the primary tool. The goal is to create a system with efficiencies while minimizing risk to the operators, maintainers, and support personnel, as well as any collateral personnel and systems. To accomplish this, HSI should be implemented as part of preemptive measures to minimize potential human error and mishaps during the operation phase. Investigative and assessment tools exist that consider events, issues, and other outside influences of a system that may not fall under the current construct of the HSI domains, leaving gaps in early HSI implementation and affecting the prevention of human errors and mishaps. This presentation will outline what NASA HSI is doing to support Early HSI implementation and Operational Performance shifts that affect human performance.

Anthony T Thomas↗
NASA NTRS2015

Why Don't They Just Give Us Money? Project Cost Estimating and Cost Reporting

Successful projects require an integrated approach to managing cost, schedule, and risk. This is especially true for complex, multi-year projects involving multiple organizations. To explore solutions and leverage valuable lessons learned, NASA's Virtual Project Management Challenge will kick off a three-part series examining some of the challenges faced by project and program managers when it comes to managing these important elements. In this first session of the series, we will look at cost management, with an emphasis on the critical roles of cost estimating and cost reporting. By taking a proactive approach to both of these activities, project managers can better control life cycle costs, maintain stakeholder confidence, and protect other current and future projects in the organization's portfolio. Speakers will be Doug Comstock, Director of NASA's Cost Analysis Division, Kristin Van Wychen, Senior Analyst in the GAO Acquisition and Sourcing Management Team, and Mary Beth Zimmerman, Branch Chief for NASA's Portfolio Analysis Branch, Strategic Investments Division. Moderator Ramien Pierre is from NASA's Academy for Program/Project and Engineering Leadership (APPEL).

Comstock, Douglas A.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Ensuring US National Aeronautics Test Capabilities

U.S. leadership in aeronautics depends on ready access to technologically advanced, efficient, and affordable aeronautics test capabilities. These systems include major wind tunnels and propulsion test facilities and flight test capabilities. The federal government owns the majority of the major aeronautics test capabilities in the United States, primarily through the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Department of Defense (DoD). However, changes in the Aerospace landscape, primarily the decrease in demand for testing over the last 20 years required an overarching strategy for management of these national assets. Therefore, NASA established the Aeronautics Test Program (ATP) as a two-pronged strategic initiative to: (1) retain and invest in NASA aeronautics test capabilities considered strategically important to the agency and the nation, and (2) establish a strong, high level partnership with the DoD. Test facility utilization is a critical factor for ATP because it relies on user occupancy fees to recover a substantial part of the operations costs for its facilities. Decreasing utilization is an indicator of excess capacity and in some cases low-risk redundancy (i.e., several facilities with basically the same capability and overall low utilization). However, low utilization does not necessarily translate to lack of strategic importance. Some facilities with relatively low utilization are nonetheless vitally important because of the unique nature of the capability and the foreseeable aeronautics testing needs. Unfortunately, since its inception, the customer base for ATP has continued to shrink. Utilization of ATP wind tunnels has declined by more than 50% from the FY 2006 levels. This significant decrease in customer usage is attributable to several factors, including the overall decline in new programs and projects in the aerospace sector; the impact of computational fluid dynamics (CFD) on the design, development, and research process; and the reductions in wind tunnel testing requirements within the largest consumer of ATP wind tunnel test time, the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD). Retirement of the Space Shuttle Program and recent perturbations of NASA's Constellation Program will exacerbate this downward trend. Therefore it is crucial that ATP periodically revisit and determine which of its test capabilities are strategically important, which qualify as low-risk redundancies that could be put in an inactive status or closed, and address the challenges associated with both sustainment and improvements to the test capabilities that must remain active. This presentation will provide an overview of the ATP vision, mission, and goals as well as the challenges and opportunities the program is facing both today and in the future. We will discuss the strategy ATP is taking over the next five years to address the National aeronautics test capability challenges and what the program will do to capitalize on its opportunities to ensure a ready, robust and relevant portfolio of National aeronautics test capabilities.

Marshall, Timothy J.↗