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NASA NTRS2020

Continued Discussion of Failure Mode Modeling and Overall Component Reliability: Are the Data Missing or Censored?

This paper is the continuation of a paper presented at the 13th Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management Conference, in which a methodology of modeling failure modes of complex components was presented; see Paulos and Smith (2016). This methodology is not particularly helpful in the space industry where there is a lack of failure data, but is more helpful in industries that see a lot of component repairs and improvements, such as in the aircraft or automotive industries. The previous paper demonstrated how the typical approach of treating failure modes as being exponential in nature may yield optimistic predictions when estimating how improvements to components will perform in the future. It is more accurate to model the failure modes as a race in time; unfortunately, this does not give a closed-form solution. This paper uses simulation to solve for the model of the world, and the results compared to the standard methodology of treating the failure modes as being exponential random failures. The standard method is shown to have optimistic predictions, which will lead to prediction errors when failure modes are removed or “fixed.” The failure mode methodology presented in the first paper treated the data as being censored when the test stopped. In this paper, we will compare the results from treating the data as both censored and missing.

Smith, Curtis↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lander Lighting Solution to Reduce Pilot & Autonomous Approach Errors

The south pole lighting environment will have harsh low inclination sunlight, making overhead judgement of surface features difficult. Autonomous solutions are great, however, the need for visual monitoring and independent go/no-go decisions remain. Our project proposes that lunar landing systems will be better served by including a powerful landing light system that improves visibility of surfaces from overhead by illuminating the ground at critical distances for the crew to make last minute decisions regarding an approach. The project utilized computer-based optical modeling software to predict requirements for a potential landing light system. The analysis based the lamp prediction from commercially available LED chip sets and lamp optics. The goal was to illustrate a method to raise the surface contrast of a landing site within an acceptable contrast threshold for most camera systems and human observers to recognize hazards that would not be noticed with low inclination sunlight alone. The Apollo lunar landings benefitted from overhead sun or dark conditions. The surface lighting at the Lunar South Pole is a harsh environment where surfaces are lit from a low inclination angle by the sun (from the side). This change in lighting condition precipitates a need for updated lunar landing systems that facilitate improved recognition of landing sites, and thereby increase pilot awareness of landing hazards. The reliance on LIDAR and other autonomous mechanisms alone is risky given the known usage of visual monitoring for operator concurrence on current spacecraft programs and present-day autonomous land-based vehicles. Visual monitoring via cameras or windows requires the surface contrast to be within 3 orders of magnitude for reasonable recognition of objects. Artificial overhead illumination, when sufficiently sized, provides a means to even out contrast problems created by low inclination sunlight, potentially reducing piloting errors. Current vehicle requirements do not specify this type of guidance for the purpose of increasing mission success. An optical ray-trace simulation model was developed in Zemax Optics Studio to predict the best combination of LED power, LED optics, lamp quantity, and lamp location to raise the surface contrast to within 2 orders of magnitude from 3 orders required to further increased visibility and reduce risk. The project considered the following design constraints: potential base diameter of lander, approach distance(s) for a go-no-go decision point (200 meter), solar inclination angle (2-7), lunar surface reflectance (10%), LED chip sets, LED focusing optics, LED power, lamp quantity, lamp locations, and illumination diameter of lunar surface landing zone. The results can be used to establish minimum design constraints for vehicle landing light systems. With a solar inclination angle ranging from 2-7 degrees, the horizontal illumination of the lunar surface is attenuated by about 10% when compared to overhead illumination from the Sun. This modifies the sun's maximum of 130,000 lux to 13,000 lux horizontal illuminance. The artificial lighting system was designed to provide an 18-meter-wide illumination zone, to create viewing clearances around a 6-meter-wide lander. The system provides an average illuminance of 300 lux, meeting the 2 orders of magnitude criteria. The solution utilized modern Chip On Board LEDs, that each utilized 17 watts, with focusing Total Internal Reflection (TIR) lenses. A lighting system of 300 LEDs was arrayed along the "bottom" of a “lander”. With 17 watts per LED, the system is estimated to require 5100 watts. This is a large amount of power, but it would only be needed during critical phases during the landing. LED lighting systems can be dimmed, and it is assumed that as the lander arrives closer to the landing site, the lighting system power can be adjusted as needed to produce the necessary surface illuminance. The designed reduction of contrast improves reliability of safety assessments using real time visible light camera systems and out the window viewing by the crew.

T A Clark↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Decision Support System for Extravehicular Operations Under Significant Communication Latency

Within the next few decades, humanity hopes to perform extravehicular activities (EVAs) on the surface of Mars; however, several technical and operational challenges must first be overcome. Foremost among these challenges is managing a significant two-way communication latency between Earth and Mars. Current and historical paradigms of EVA operations have required near-real-time communication between the crewmember(s) performing an EVA and an Earth-based mission control. Next-generation operational paradigms for supporting deep space exploration will necessitate a distributed decision authority system, including delayed Earth-based mission control, the on-planet extravehicular crewmember(s), and intermediate mission support from intravehicular crewmember(s) within real-time communication range. This latter group is of particular interest: they must provide operations support without the plentiful resources available to mission control on Earth. For this purpose, NASA is developing the Personalized EVA Informatics and Decision Support (PersEIDS) software platform. PersEIDS is designed to bolster operator situational awareness and offload operator workload by automating the tracking and projection of consumables usage over an EVA timeline, providing real-time probabilistic safety assessments of an EVA timeline given consumables constraints, and recommending alternative EVA timeline(s) when the active timeline is not expected to be completed under consumables limits. The PersEIDS concept of operations, use cases, and models will be presented. A limited version of PersEIDS was demonstrated during a three-day-long study where each day a roughly four-hour-long simulated Martian EVA was performed in virtual reality at the NASA Johnson Space Center. The first day was a control trial without PersEIDS support; the second and third days represented different levels of decision support provided by PersEIDS to the intravehicular crewmember acting as mission control. With PersEIDS support, the IV crewmember was able to manage the mission to completion faster and with more remaining consumables; however, additional testing is required to understand confounding factors, e.g. training bias.

Mars↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Decision Support System for Extravehicular Operations Under Significant Communication Latency

Humanity hopes to perform extravehicular activities (EVAs) on the surface of Mars; however, several technical and operational challenges must first be overcome. Foremost among these challenges is managing a significant communication latency between Earth and Mars. Current and historical paradigms of EVA operations have required near-real-time communication between the crewmember(s) and Earth-based mission control. Nextgeneration operational paradigms for supporting deep space exploration will necessitate a distributed decision authority system, including delayed Earth-based mission control, the onplanet extravehicular crewmember(s), and intermediate mission support from intravehicular (IV) crewmember(s) within real-time communication range. This latter group is of particular interest: they must provide operations support without the plentiful resources available to mission control on Earth. Thus, NASA is developing the Personalized EVA Informatics and Decision Support (PersEIDS) software platform. PersEIDS is designed to bolster operator situational awareness and offload operator workload by automatically tracking and projecting consumables usage over an EVA timeline, providing real-time probabilistic safety assessments and recommending alternative EVA timeline(s) when the active timeline is not expected to be completed under consumables limits. The PersEIDS concept of operations, use cases, and models will be presented. A limited version of PersEIDS was demonstrated during a three-day-long study where each day a roughly four-hour-long simulated Martian EVA was performed in virtual reality at the NASA Johnson Space Center. The first day was a control trial without PersEIDS support; the second and third days represented different levels of decision support provided by PersEIDS to the IV crewmember acting as mission control. With PersEIDS support, the IV crewmember was able to manage the mission to completion faster and with more remaining consumables; however, additional testing is required to understand confounding factors, e.g., training bias.

Mars↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

PersEIDS: A Biomedical Decision Support System for Extravehicular Operations Under Significant Communication Latency

Mars↗

NASA NTRS2023

The Planetary Protection Strategy of Mars Sample Return’s Earth Return Orbiter Mission

The Mars Sample Return campaign aims to use three flight missions and one ground element to safely bring rock cores, regolith and atmospheric samples from the surface of Mars to Earth to answer key questions about the geologic and climate history of Mars, including the potential for ancient life. Since its landing in Jezero Crater in 2021, the first mission, NASA’s Mars 2020, has collected a number of samples on the crater floor and on the delta using the Perseverance rover. Subsequent missions would recover the sealed sample tubes, launch them into Mars orbit, and transport them back to Earth. The ground element would be a high-containment facility that would isolate and protect the samples during initial sample characterization, which would include sample safety assessments and time-sensitive scientific investigations. These elements are currently in the planning and design stages of development, and represent an international effort of NASA, the European Space Agency (ESA), and many industry partners. The work presented here provides an overview of the planetary protection strategy of the third flight mission, the ESA-led Earth Return Orbiter (ERO), which hosts the NASA-provided Capture, Containment, and Return System (CCRS). ERO-CCRS would capture the container with up to 30 sealed tubes previously put in Martian orbit, contain them in redundant containers to ensure that no potentially hazardous Mars particles are released, and return them to Earth through an entry vehicle. Both NASA and ESA policies comply with the United Nations’ Outer Space Treaty by planning to protect Earth’s biosphere from any potential adverse effects from material returned from solar system bodies beyond the Earth-Moon system. In the conduct of Mars Sample Return, the two agencies have agreed to apply approaches consistent with their own planetary protection standards to the campaign elements each provides.

Mars Sample Return↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Planetary Protection Strategy of Mars Sample Return Earth Return Orbiter Mission

The Mars Sample Return campaign aims to use three flight missions and one ground element to safely bring rock cores, regolith and atmospheric samples from the surface of Mars to Earth to answer key questions about the geologic and climate history of Mars, including the potential for ancient life. Since its landing in Jezero Crater in 2021, the first mission, NASA’s Mars 2020, has collected a number of samples on the crater floor and on the delta using the Perseverance rover. Subsequent missions would recover the sealed sample tubes, launch them into Mars orbit, and transport them back to Earth. The ground element would be a high-containment facility that would isolate and protect the samples during initial sample characterization, which would include sample safety assessments and time-sensitive scientific investigations. These elements are currently in the planning and design stages of development, and represent an international effort of NASA, the European Space Agency (ESA), and many industry partners. The work presented here provides an overview of the Planetary Protection strategy of the third flight mission, the ESA-led Earth Return Orbiter (ERO), which hosts the NASA-provided Capture, Containment, and Return System (CCRS). ERO-CCRS would detect and capture the container with up to 30 sealed tubes previously put in Martian orbit, contain them in redundant containers to ensure that no potentially hazardous Mars particles are released, and return them to Earth through an entry vehicle. Both NASA and ESA policies comply with the United Nations’ Outer Space Treaty by planning to protect Earth’s biosphere from any potential adverse effects from material returned from solar system bodies beyond the Earth-Moon system. In the conduct of Mars Sample Return, the two agencies have mutually agreed to apply approaches consistent with their own planetary protection standards to the campaign elements they each provides.

mars sample return↗

NASA NTRS2024

The Planetary Protection Strategy of Mars Sample Return’s Earth Return Orbiter Mission

The Mars Sample Return campaign aims to use three flight missions and one ground element to safely bring rock cores, regolith and atmospheric samples from the surface of Mars to Earth to answer key questions about the geologic and climate history of Mars, including the potential for ancient life. Since its landing in Jezero Crater in 2021, the first mission, NASA’s Mars 2020, has collected a number of samples on the crater floor and on the delta using the Perseverance rover. Subsequent missions would recover the sealed sample tubes, launch them into Mars orbit, and transport them back to Earth. The ground element would be a high-containment facility that would isolate and protect the samples during initial sample characterization, which would include sample safety assessments and time-sensitive scientific investigations. These elements are currently in the planning and design stages of development, and represent an international effort of NASA, the European Space Agency (ESA), and many industry partners. The work presented here provides an overview of the planetary protection strategy of the third flight mission, the ESA-led Earth Return Orbiter, which hosts the NASA-provided Capture, Containment, and Return System. The orbiter would detect and capture the container with up to 30 sealed tubes previously put in Martian orbit, contain them in redundant containers to ensure that no potentially hazardous Mars particles are released, and return them to Earth through an entry vehicle. Both NASA and ESA policies comply with the United Nations’ Outer Space Treaty by planning to protect Earth’s biosphere from any potential adverse effects from material returned from solar system bodies beyond the Earth-Moon system. In the conduct of Mars Sample Return, the two agencies have mutually agreed to apply approaches consistent with their own planetary protection standards to the campaign elements they each provide.

Mars Sample Return↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA Engineering & Safety Center (NESC) Assessment – Recommendations on Use of Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) Parts for NASA Missions

This presentation is to provide an update on the NASA Engineering & Safety Center (NESC) Assessment of "Recommendations on Use of Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) Parts for NASA Missions". Phase I was a published report and Phase II is on-going. Phase I captured the current NASA center practices on using COTS parts while Phase II provides updated NESC recommendation of using COTS parts for NASA missions with different risk classifications.

EEE parts↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Development of a Safety Hazards Risk Assessment Tool for Uncrewed Aircraft System Traffic Management during Preflight Planning

Tremendous growth in the uncrewed and remotely piloted vehicle market is expected in low-altitude, uncontrolled airspace, resulting in potential decreases in safety without systems that support monitoring, assessing, and mitigating risk. At NASA, the System-Wide Safety (SWS) project has been developing a suite of data-driven tools to predict hazards so that the potential risks that these hazards pose can be mitigated. Services to predict various hazards have been developed, including battery capacity, proximity to static obstacles, population risks, global positioning system signal strength, radio frequency spectrum interference risk, and vertiport congestion. These services can monitor hazards along a flight path and if any risks posed by these hazards exceed a threshold, the uncrewed aircraft system (UAS) fleet manager can be alerted to mitigate the risk by modifying the flight path, changing the scheduled departure or arrival times, and/or diverting the vehicle to an alternate vertiport. These services were originally developed to monitor and assess risks during flight, but they have been adapted to assess hazard risks prior to departure so that a fleet manager can evaluate the potential risks for a fleet of UAS along their planned flight paths. These services have been integrated into a prototype tool called the Supplemental Data Service Provider-Consolidated Dashboard (SDSP-CD), developed at NASA Ames Research Center. The tool consists of a dashboard which provides a comprehensive overview for a number of risks and a map display that shows the details of the hazards along each flight’s path. Based on the findings from three previous studies, the SDSP-CD has been updated with new design elements and functions. In this paper, we describe lessons learned from the previous studies, changes made to the interface, and the feedback received during a follow-up usability study. Overall, participants reported that there is a substantial benefit of having a fleet manager use a consolidated dashboard to assess hazards for the vehicles in their fleet and to provide situational awareness to potential risks so that they can be mitigated prior to flight. Once the SDSP-CD matures, it will need to be integrated into flight and mission planning tools. Some initial thoughts on how this integration should be accomplished are shared in this paper. Finally, the functional differences between preflight vs. in-flight risk assessment and the differences in fleet manager vs. UAS pilot roles that may require different information and user interactions are discussed.

preflight↗

NASA NTRS2014

A Framework for Assessment of Aviation Safety Technology Portfolios

The programs within NASA's Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) conduct research and development to improve the national air transportation system so that Americans can travel as safely as possible. NASA aviation safety systems analysis personnel support various levels of ARMD management in their fulfillment of system analysis and technology prioritization as defined in the agency's program and project requirements. This paper provides a framework for the assessment of aviation safety research and technology portfolios that includes metrics such as projected impact on current and future safety, technical development risk and implementation risk. The paper also contains methods for presenting portfolio analysis and aviation safety Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) output results to management using bubble charts and quantitative decision analysis techniques.

Jones, Sharon M.↗

NASA NTRS2011

L-Band Digital Aeronautical Communications System Engineering - Initial Safety and Security Risk Assessment and Mitigation

This document is being provided as part of ITT's NASA Glenn Research Center Aerospace Communication Systems Technical Support (ACSTS) contract NNC05CA85C, Task 7: "New ATM Requirements--Future Communications, C-Band and L-Band Communications Standard Development." ITT has completed a safety hazard analysis providing a preliminary safety assessment for the proposed L-band (960 to 1164 MHz) terrestrial en route communications system. The assessment was performed following the guidelines outlined in the Federal Aviation Administration Safety Risk Management Guidance for System Acquisitions document. The safety analysis did not identify any hazards with an unacceptable risk, though a number of hazards with a medium risk were documented. This effort represents a preliminary safety hazard analysis and notes the triggers for risk reassessment. A detailed safety hazards analysis is recommended as a follow-on activity to assess particular components of the L-band communication system after the technology is chosen and system rollout timing is determined. The security risk analysis resulted in identifying main security threats to the proposed system as well as noting additional threats recommended for a future security analysis conducted at a later stage in the system development process. The document discusses various security controls, including those suggested in the COCR Version 2.0.

Zelkin, Natalie↗

NASA NTRS1980

Health and safety: Preliminary comparative assessment of the Satellite Power System (SPS) and other energy alternatives

Data readily available from the literature were used to make an initial comparison of the health and safety risks of a fission power system with fuel reprocessing; a combined-cycle coal power system with a low-Btu gasifier and open-cycle gas turbine; a central-station, terrestrial, solar photovoltaic power system; the satellite power system; and a first-generation fusion system. The assessment approach consists of the identification of health and safety issues in each phase of the energy cycle from raw material extraction through electrical generation, waste disposal, and system deactivation; quantitative or qualitative evaluation of impact severity; and the rating of each issue with regard to known or potential impact level and level of uncertainty.

Habegger, L. J.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Psychophysiological Methods to Assess Pilot Productive Safety Behaviors

The NASA System-Wide Safety (SWS) Project is focused on developing new technologies and operational concepts for the aviation industry to meet the increasing global demand while maintaining the current ultra-safe system safety levels. To achieve this, the SWS Project is developing research priorities, including In-time System-wide Safety Assurance (ISSA) and In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS; Ellis et al., 2019). A critical component of the IASMS is the human as pilot and in other roles in aviation operations as demonstrated by SWS human factors research on rare occurrences of human error and the far more prevalent human safety producing behaviors (e.g., Hollnagel, 2016). The talk presented by Chad Stephens of NASA Langley Research Center and NASA SWS Project will describe the history of human factors research involving psychophysiological and biocybernetics methods supporting aviation safety conducted at NASA. Specific examples of recent NASA crew state monitoring research focused on a psychophysiological assessment method and system to enable Training for Attention Management will be demonstrated. Current SWS research including the SWS Operations and Technologies for Enabling Resilient In-Time Assurance (SOTERIA) flight simulation study and a data testbed created to enable study of Human Contributions to Safety (HC2S) will be presented. Ongoing collaborative research efforts with Boeing researchers will be highlighted and opportunities for further collaboration will be discussed.

psychophysiology↗

NASA NTRS2020

Architecture and Information Requirements to Assess and Predict Flight Safety Risks During Highly Autonomous Urban Flight Operations

As aviation adopts new and increasingly complex operational paradigms, vehicle types, and technologies to broaden airspace capability and efficiency, maintaining a safe system will require recognition and timely mitigation of new safety issues as they emerge and before significant consequences occur. A shift toward a more predictive risk mitigation capability becomes critical to meet this challenge. In-time safety assurance comprises monitoring, assessment, and mitigation functions that proactively reduce risk in complex operational environments where the interplay of hazards may not be known (and therefore not accounted for) during design. These functions can also help to understand and predict emergent effects caused by the increased use of automation or autonomous functions that may exhibit unexpected non-deterministic behaviors. The envisioned monitoring and assessment functions can look for precursors, anomalies, and trends (PATs) by applying model-based and data-driven methods. Outputs would then drive downstream mitigation(s) if needed to reduce risk. These mitigations may be accomplished using traditional design revision processes or via operational (and sometimes automated) mechanisms. The latter refers to the ‘in-time’ aspect of the system concept. This report comprises architecture and information requirements and considerations toward enabling such a capability within the domain of low altitude highly autonomous urban flight operations. This domain may span, for example, public-use surveillance missions flown by small unmanned aircraft (e.g., infrastructure inspection, facility management, emergency response, law enforcement, and/or security) to transportation missions flown by larger aircraft that may carry passengers or deliver products. Caveat: Any stated requirements in this report should be considered initial requirements that are intended to drive research and development (R&D). These initial requirements are likely to evolve based on R&D findings, refinement of operational concepts, industry advances, and new industry or regulatory policies or standards related to safety assurance.

Young, Steven↗

NASA NTRS2008

Launch Services Safety Overview

NASA/KSC Launch Services Division Safety (SA-D) services include: (1) Assessing the safety of the launch vehicle (2) Assessing the safety of NASA ELV spacecraft (S/C) / launch vehicle (LV) interfaces (3) Assessing the safety of spacecraft processing to ensure resource protection of: - KSC facilities - KSC VAFB facilities - KSC controlled property - Other NASA assets (4) NASA personnel safety (5) Interfacing with payload organizations to review spacecraft for adequate safety implementation and compliance for integrated activities (6) Assisting in the integration of safety activities between the payload, launch vehicle, and processing facilities

Loftin, Charles E.↗

NASA NTRS1989

Space Station Freedom Safety Program

The renewed emphasis within NASA on the incorporation of firmly established safety design requirements and evolving new safety analysis techniques, including quantitative safety risk assessment methods, is discussed with particular reference to the Space Station Freedom Safety Program. The program provides for integration of the partial safety analysis performed by numerous NASA Centers and International Partners into a Programmatic Safety Assessment for each of the launch increments and the complete Space Station Freedom on orbit. Communication in the safety program will utilize state-of-the-art software and computers, which will provide broad accessibility to safety information among the NASA and International Partners.

Griggs, John G., III↗

NASA NTRS2010

Risk-Informed Safety Assurance and Probabilistic Assessment of Mission-Critical Software-Intensive Systems

This report validates and documents the detailed features and practical application of the framework for software intensive digital systems risk assessment and risk-informed safety assurance presented in the NASA PRA Procedures Guide for Managers and Practitioner. This framework, called herein the "Context-based Software Risk Model" (CSRM), enables the assessment of the contribution of software and software-intensive digital systems to overall system risk, in a manner which is entirely compatible and integrated with the format of a "standard" Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), as currently documented and applied for NASA missions and applications. The CSRM also provides a risk-informed path and criteria for conducting organized and systematic digital system and software testing so that, within this risk-informed paradigm, the achievement of a quantitatively defined level of safety and mission success assurance may be targeted and demonstrated. The framework is based on the concept of context-dependent software risk scenarios and on the modeling of such scenarios via the use of traditional PRA techniques - i.e., event trees and fault trees - in combination with more advanced modeling devices such as the Dynamic Flowgraph Methodology (DFM) or other dynamic logic-modeling representations. The scenarios can be synthesized and quantified in a conditional logic and probabilistic formulation. The application of the CSRM method documented in this report refers to the MiniAERCam system designed and developed by the NASA Johnson Space Center.

Guarro, Sergio B.↗