Zirconium analysis in microscopic spent nuclear fuel samples by resonance ionization mass spectrometry
A new zirconium resonance ionization scheme reveals shifting isotope ratios in spent nuclear fuel towards the fuel pellets edge.
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A new zirconium resonance ionization scheme reveals shifting isotope ratios in spent nuclear fuel towards the fuel pellets edge.
The US Department of Energy Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) program is performing research to determine the mechanical loading conditions applied to spent nuclear fuel (SNF) during normal conditions of transport to inform mechanical tests of SNF and close an important knowledge gap related to the practical disposition of SNF in the US. Researchers at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) have completed an extensive finite element study to characterize and estimate the potential mechanical loads on SNF during a hypothetical 30 cm drop of an SNF transportation package. This modeling study is validated with test data collected by the SFWST program during a physical test campaign that included one-third scale package drop tests and full-scale single fuel assembly drop tests. The test campaign was led by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and included international collaboration with Equipos Nucleares S.A, S.M.E (ENSA) and Bundesanstalt für Materialforschung und -prüfung (BAM). The key contribution of the modeling study is to go beyond the limitations of the limited number of physical tests to estimate the impact response to variations in impact angle, initial gap conditions, fuel assembly design, burnup and other parameters that affect the mechanical loads. The methodology of this study included a classic parametric study to calculate the impact response of highly detailed fuel assemblies over many combinations of parameters. Models of a 17x17 pressurized water reactor fuel assembly and a generic 10x10 boiling water reactor fuel assembly were both used in this study to cover the major fuel assembly types in the US inventory. Over 2,000 impact responses were calculated. The results of the parametric study were evaluated using traditional methods and basic statistics. The results were also used to construct a damage model using multiple nonlinear regression techniques to predict the mechanical loads over the full range of all input parameters. The damage model was found to work very well for all impact angle cases where the cask came to rest on its side. It was concluded that end drop cases where the cask remained vertical (instead of tipping over onto its side) were not sufficiently characterized by the current set of parametric study cases to include in the damage model, but it was not a priority to fully investigate that range because the highest mechanical loads were observed in the broader range of side impact cases. This modeling work provides sufficient insight into the mechanical loads on SNF during a hypothetical 30 cm package drop that, when considered along with the physical test data collected by the SNL-led team, the SFSWT program can consider the knowledge gap closed.
This report presents a review of publicly available documents providing validations of SCALE code system capabilities for depletion and shielding calculations. The validation studies primarily used information available in the Spent Fuel Isotopic Composition Database, the Shielding Integral Benchmark Archive and Database, and the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project Handbook. Validation results based on radiochemical assay data and shielding benchmark experiments relevant to spent nuclear fuel shielding applications are summarized in this report. The information summarized in this report supports pressurized water reactor and boiling water reactor spent fuel storage and transportation safety analyses.
Abstract Prediction and detection of the chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking (CISCC) in Type 304 stainless steel spent nuclear fuel canisters are vital for the lifetime extension of dry storage canisters. This paper conducts a critical review that focuses on the numerical modeling and simulation on the research progress of the CISCC. The numerical models emphasizing the residual stress, susceptible microstructure, and corrosive environment are summarized individually. Meanwhile, the simulation studies on the role of hydrogen-assisted cracking are reviewed. Finally, a multi-physical numerical model, which combines the different fields is proposed based on our recent investigation.
This report is Supplement 22 to Nuclear Power Plant Infrastructure Evaluations for Removal of Spent Nuclear Fuel (PNNL-35730) and contains the infrastructure evaluation for Duane Arnold.
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing over 300 types of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). To manage this large variety of fuel types, DOE plans to employ standardized canisters for the transportation, long-term storage, and eventual disposal of SNF. Idaho National Laboratory is currently supporting DOE’s SNF Packaging Demonstration Project, in which Fort Saint Vrain (FSV) fuel assemblies will be loaded into a DOE Standard Canister. This paper presents criticality calculations demonstrating that all four or five FSV fuel assemblies loaded into the DOE Standard Canister will remain subcritical in any expected normal or credible abnormal conditions. Previous criticality analyses were performed for one FSV fuel assembly and 12 Peach Bottom Core 2 fuel elements loaded into a DOE Standard Canister. This paper covers the criticality analysis performed for loading both four and five FSV fuel assemblies into a DOE Standard Canister. Various intact and degraded mode configurations were modeled in conducting the criticality calculations. This analysis encompassed three different configurations: (1) a single DOE Standard Canister loaded into a concrete storage overpack, (2) seven DOE Standard Canisters loaded into a concrete storage overpack, and (3) nine DOE Standard Canisters loaded into a concrete storage overpack. The overpack dimensions were varied for each of the three configurations, and transport, storage, and disposal scenarios were analyzed for each configuration. For transport scenarios, a pair of degradation cases was analyzed. In the first case, the fuel compacts became degraded and were removed from the fuel block, then deposited at the bottom of a horizontally placed canister, thereby simulating a drop event. The canister was considered to remain intact. In the second case, the spacing between horizontally placed canisters in a nine-canister overpack was reduced such that the canisters were piled on top of each other, simulating a drop event. For this case, no degradation of the canister internals or fuel was considered. For storage scenarios, the water moderator location in the system was varied to enable identification of the most reactive configurations. Dry and wet conditions were analyzed for the fuel materials, canister, and overpack. For disposal scenarios, two degradation cases were analyzed. In the first, the stainless-steel internals of the canister degraded to either hematite or goethite under both dry and wet conditions. In the second case, degraded FSV fuel formed a uranium-water slurry that filled the coolant/void holes. None of the cases presented exceeded the application specific upper subcritical limit.
This report is Supplement 21 to Nuclear Power Plant Infrastructure Evaluations for Removal of Spent Nuclear Fuel (PNNL-35730) and contains the infrastructure evaluation for Three Mile Island.
Remote Area Modular Monitoring (RAMM) for canister surface temperature measurement (TM), or RAMM-TM, is a novel remote monitoring device for detection of gas leakage based on surface temperature measurements of canisters containing spent nuclear fuel. Here we describe the development of RAMM-TM, as is the demonstration of its performance in detecting canister gas leakage from a small, simulated chloride-induced stress corrosion crack in experiments using a 1/4.5-scale model cask. Both helium and air gas leakage from a canister were detected within hours after the start of the leakage. The change in surface temperatures at the top and bottom of the canister (ΔTBT) during gas leakage (depressurization) triggered automatic alarms, providing a sound basis for early detection of gas leakage from the canister. This methodology would allow consequence management through the implementation of mitigatory actions to continue effective aging management and to reduce risks to public safety, health, and the environment.
Here we present the application of a novel analytical approach for high-speed evaluation of burn-up in spent nuclear fuel. This automated online separation–direct analysis method, which simultaneously measures the isotopic compositions and concentrations of Nd, Pu, and U using isotope dilution-inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry, enables the determination of burnup in as little as 4.5 h per sample with expanded uncertainties as low as 1.2% using as little as 1µg of fuel. We compare the determined burn-up values, sample requirements, and analysis times with an ultra-high precision, in-house developed, methodology which employs multiple analytical techniques to measure the isotopic compositions and concentrations of Nd, Pu, and U yielding burn-up values with expanded uncertainties as low as 0.49% at the 95% confidence level, the lowest reported to date.
Several experimental techniques were utilized to understand the corrosion and SCC performance of possible techniques for repairing cracks and pits in SS304 utilized for dry cask storage of spent nuclear fuel. The repairs examined included cold spray, FSW, soldering, and VFAW. The corrosion and SCC assessment techniques utilized for comparing repairs against the base material were 4-pt bending SCC testing in boiling MgCl 2 at stress levels between 0 MPa and 350 MPa, immersion testing in 40% RH brine solution meant to mimic a service-like environment, SSRT SCC testing in 40% RH brine solution. For FSW alone, scanning electrochemical cell microscopy and microelectrochemical syringe cell were utilized to understand the corrosion performance across the weld, in the retreating/advancing sides, and base material. Based on the results of this study, the FSW and cold spray repair techniques proved most viable for SCC repair in SS304 dry cask storage applications and continuing research is highly recommended to understand and quantify in further detail their SCC performance compared to unrepaired SS304. Additionally, solder and VFAW (patch or incline) would not be recommended based on the corrosion and SCC findings in this study.
We describe the use of the radionuclide 85 Kr, which is produced by nuclear fission and has a half-life of 10.76 years, to determine the age of spent nuclear fuel. The method is based on mass-spectrometric measurement of the relative abundance of fissiogenic Kr isotopes extracted from a fuel sample, and we show that it can be applied to micron-scale particles of spent fuel that are analogous to particles that have been released into the environment from various nuclear facilities in the past. 85 Kr chronometry is potentially valuable for identifying and attributing nuclear materials, grouping samples into collections of common origin that can be used to reconstruct the origin and irradiation history of the material, and verifying declared nuclear activities in the context of international monitoring programs.
We examine the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)’s collaborative process to locate, build, and operate one or more federal consolidated interim storage facilities (FCISFs) for commercial U.S. spent nuclear fuel—instead of continuing to store the material at over 70 nuclear reactor sites. Technocratic siting of nuclear facilities in the U.S., most of which did not involve meaningful public participation, was not successful. We consider increasing pressure to find at least one FCISF site, as well as the critical role of trust in engaging communities and reaching agreement—leading some observers to assert that DOE is in the “trust building business”, not the siting business. We present case studies with the following: (1) illustrating community engagement that led to a more satisfactory outcome than had been anticipated (Fernald); (2) a planned voluntary process that failed to produce an operating CISF (Office of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator); and (3) a site that demonstrates the ongoing need for negotiations to keep a site open and operational (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant). The essay concludes with the observation that a collaboration-based siting effort can succeed in the U.S., but that five main challenges—related to trust and requiring patience—will need to be addressed.
As part of the Accelerated Basin De-inventory (ABD) program, H Canyon plans to dissolve non-aluminum spent nuclear fuel (NASNF) in the 6.3D electrolytic dissolver. NASNF Campaign 1 plans to electrolytically dissolve 68 bundles of fuel assemblies from the Carolinas-Virginia Tube Reactor (CVTR), Heavy Water Components Test Reactor (HWCTR), and Experimental Boiling Water Reactor (EBWR). The fuel assemblies are intact Zircaloy or stainless steel (SS) clad UO 2 rods, tubes, and plates. The H Canyon electrolytic dissolver previously dissolved a variety of UO 2 core fuel types in SS, Zircaloy, Nichrome, or Incoloy cladding from 1969 to 1980. The objective of this study was to identify flowsheet conditions through literature review and laboratory experimentation to safely dissolve NASNF Campaign 1 bundles in the H Canyon electrolytic dissolver. Bench-scale electrolytic dissolution tests were performed to demonstrate a flowsheet for NASNF Campaign 1 bundles. The outer bundles are composed of SS or Al alloy, Al 6061-T6, and contain intact Zircaloy or SS clad UO 2 fuel assemblies. The key objectives of these tests were to determine bounding dissolver chemistries and the sparge requirement to ensure H 2 concentration remain less than 60 vol % of the lower flammability limit (LFL) during dissolution. The impact of HNO 3 concentration and the addition of fluoride on the dissolution efficiency of Zircaloy, 304L SS, Al 6061-T6, and Inconel 625 were examined. While SS, Al, and Inconel 625 readily dissolve utilizing electrolytic dissolution, Zircaloy disintegrated anodically; the surface of Zircaloy oxidized and the oxide layer spalled off and settled at the bottom of the dissolver as an insoluble material. The black flakes were identified as ZrO 2 and 85% of the Zr processed was converted to black ZrO 2 flakes when Zr was anodically disintegrated in 9.5 M HNO 3 .
This report compiles the set of published results on the welding residual stress (WRS) distributions across the thickness section at the welds in spent nuclear fuel (SNF) canisters before and after a repair is done. The WRS information for similar steel structures with thick (~ 12.7 mm (0.5 inch)) large plate construction are also compiled to provide a comprehensive set of information on: methods to quantify; modeling to estimate; and methods to reduce WRS.
The goal of the Augmented Monitoring and Condition Assessment Program (AMCAP) program is to provide a condition assessment of the storage containers for non-aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (NASNF) in L Basin and demonstrate continued safe storage of all NASNF pending retrieval for ultimate disposition. The storage configuration of NASNF is vulnerable to inside-out corrosion attack. The approach being used in AMCAP is to develop and deploy examination methods for remote, in-situ inspection of the bundle storage in VTS and for OSC storage in the OSC racks. A method for Visual Examination (VE) using video-recording cameras was readied as part of the full-scale mockup development, and was deployed in L Basin for the initial condition assessment work. This report describes the development and the deployment of the VE for inspection of selected bundles in L Basin. The first deployment of the VE system was for visually examining five spent fuel bundles. Bundles were chosen based on their vulnerability in terms of inner fuel contents, history, storage duration, storage configuration, and possibility of inside out corrosion due to galvanic coupling of fuel cladding with the aluminum bundle wall.
The United States Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy is applying knowledge and understanding in the areas of systems level engineering, analysis, and decision making to better inform the waste management pathways for U.S. spent nuclear fuel (SNF). Currently there are 93 operating and 23 shutdown commercial nuclear reactors in the United States. SNF at most of these locations is being stored in spent fuel pools, dry storage, or both [1, 2]. This paper initially goes over the basics of the agent-based simulation tool known as the Next Generation System Analysis Model (NGSAM) that has the capability to model interaction and movements of individual components or groups like casks, railcars etc. The next section covers some of the methods implemented in the Java Transportation Operations Model (JTOM) to facilitate the movement of assemblies, casks, railcars etc. and the various intermodal transfer options. This section also covers the current cask loading and intermodal transfer times implemented in NGSAM. The last section goes over the proposed values for intermodal transportation, and cask transfer/loading operations.
This paper summarized the efforts performed to understand decay heat estimation from existing spent nuclear fuel (SNF), under the auspices of the Working Party on Nuclear Criticality Safety (WPNCS) of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency. Needs for precise estimations are related to safety, cost, and optimization of SNF handling, storage, and repository. The physical origins of decay heat (a more correct denomination would be decay power) are then introduced, to identify its main contributors (fission products and actinides) and time-dependent evolution. Due to limited absolute prediction capabilities, experimental information is crucial; measurement facilities and methods are then presented, highlighting both their relevance and our need for maintaining the unique current full-scale facility and developing new ones. The third part of this report is dedicated to the computational aspect of the decay heat estimation: calculation methods, codes, and validation. Different approaches and implementations currently exist for these three aspects, directly impacting our capabilities to predict decay heat and to inform decision-makers. Finally, recommendations from the expert community are proposed, potentially guiding future experimental and computational developments. One of the most important outcomes of this work is the consensus among participants on the need to reduce biases and uncertainties for the estimated SNF decay heat. If it is agreed that uncertainties (being one standard deviation) are on average small (less than a few percent), they still substantially impact various applications when one needs to consider up to three standard deviations, thus covering more than 95% of cases. The second main finding is the need of new decay heat measurements and validation for cases corresponding to more modern fuel characteristics: higher initial enrichment, higher average burnup, as well as shorter and longer cooling time. Similar needs exist for fuel types without public experimental data, such as MOX, VVER, or CANDU fuels. A third outcome is related to SNF assemblies for which no direct validation can be performed, representing the vast majority of cases (due to the large number of SNF assemblies currently stored, or too short or too long cooling periods of interest). A few solutions are possible, depending on the application. For the final repository, systematic measurements of quantities related to decay heat can be performed, such as neutron or gamma emission. This would provide indications of the SNF decay heat at the time of encapsulation. For other applications (short- or long-term cooling), the community would benefit from applying consistent and accepted recommendations on calculation methods, for both decay heat and uncertainties. This would improve the understanding of the results and make comparisons easier.
This paper presents bounding pressure and flammability evaluations for DOE Standard Canister loaded with DOE-managed aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF). The objective of these evaluations is to gain confidence in the safety and feasibility of possible loading configurations for extended (>50 years) periods of dry storage, with particular focus on the dry storage canister pressures and potential for formation of a flammable atmosphere. The primary concern about the extended dry storage of ASNF is radiolytic gas generation. The aluminum cladding of these materials tends to corrode, and these corrosion products—typically aluminum oxides, such as boehmite, bayerite, or gibbsite—could carry water. This makes ASNF dry storage canisters difficult to dry. The gamma radiation field in dry storage environments could cause a radiolytic breakdown of residual water, forming chemical species such as molecular hydrogen (H2). The release of these species could increase the canister pressure and lead to the generation of a flammable canister atmosphere. The bounding evaluations presented within this study surmise conservative, but credible, conditions and processes. This includes the assumption of a full breakdown of a large quantity of free, physisorbed, and chemisorbed water (bound in a trihydrate, i.e., Al2O3 • 3H2O, layer). The considered dry storage configurations include a ~3 m (10 ft) long, ~46 cm (18 in) diameter (10 x 18) DOE Standard Canister loaded with 32 Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) ASNF elements, and a ~3 m (10 ft) long, ~61 cm (24 in) (10 x 24) diameter DOE Standard Canister loaded with 40 ATR ASNF elements. While the results of this study indicate the possibility of atmospheric hydrogen concentrations above the lower flammability limit, insufficient concentrations of oxygen will prevent the formation of flammable atmospheres. The maximum credible pressures remain well within the structural limits of the DOE Standard Canister.