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DOE OSTI2025

The Future of X-ray Irradiation: Addressing Supply Chain Risks and Opportunities (UUR Edition)

This study supports the Office of Radiological Security’s (ORS) mission of eliminating cesium irradiators by analyzing the supply chain for self-shielded X-ray irradiators (SSXIs), identifying potential risks, and proposing mitigation measures. The research focuses on the primary components of SSXIs, including X-ray tubes, controllers, generators, and coolers or chillers, and evaluates their vulnerabilities using a comprehensive risk matrix framework. The methodology includes subject matter expert (SME) interviews with relevant manufacturers and major stakeholders, a deep literature review, and a meta-analysis of maintenance reports provided by SSXI end users. Results show that while the SSXI market is small, it’s growing, and the highly global nature of the supply chain may create vulnerabilities for critical SSXI components (X-ray tubes are the most vulnerable, followed by generators and controllers). This research communicates necessary information to address concerns of current and future end users, especially those interested in transitioning away from radioactive sources, and informs future policy aimed at supporting the irradiation industry.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

DOE OSTI2021

BioSecure Digital Twin: Manufacturing Innovation and Cybersecurity Resilience

U.S. national security, prosperity, economy, and well-being require secure, flexible, and resilient Biopharmaceutical Manufacturing. The COVID-19 pandemic reaffirmed that the biomedical production value-chain is vulnerable to disruption and has been under attack from sophisticated nation-state adversaries. Current cyber defenses are inadequate, and the integrity of critical production systems and processes are inherently vulnerable to cyber-attacks, human error, and supply chain disruptions. The following chapter explores how a BioSecure Digital Twin will improve U.S. manufacturing resilience and preparedness to respond to these hazards by significantly improving monitoring, integrity, security, and agility of our manufacturing infrastructure and systems. The BioSecure Digital Twin combines a scalable manufacturing framework with a robust platform for monitoring and control to increase U.S. biopharma manufacturing resilience. Then, the chapter discusses some of the inherent vulnerabilities and challenges at the nexus of health and advanced manufacturing. Next, the chapter highlights that as the Pandemic evolves, we need agility and resilience to overcome significant obstacles. This section highlights an innovative application of Cyber Informed Engineering to developing and deploying a BioSecure Digital Twin to improve the resilience and security of the biopharma industrial supply chain and production processes. Finally, the chapter concludes with a process framework to complement the Digital Twin platform, called the Biopharma (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) OODA Loop Framework (BOLF), a four-step approach to decision-making outputs from the Digital Twin. The BOLF will help end users leverage twin technology by distilling the available information, focusing the data on context, and rapidly making the best decision while remaining cognizant of changes that can be made as more data becomes available.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2023

Evaluating and Countering the Insider Threat to the Radioactive Source Supply Chain

The modern supply chain is a global enterprise and little drove this home more than the global COVID-19 pandemic which sent economic shockwaves throughout the world. Many goods became scarce, as products were delayed, in limited supply, or simply not available. The suddenly diminished supply collided with still high demand and led to greatly increased costs. This was particularly true for the radioactive source supply chain. The pandemic introduced extensive delays for construction projects, slowed the transport of radiological materials to facilities, interrupted treatment deliveries, and impaired the mobility of contractors across the industry. All of these concerns not only adversely affected the economy, but also impacted the safety and security of radiological material, potentially raising national security concerns. The vulnerability of the supply chain, a critical element in an increasingly interconnected world, was exposed. One example that challenged the adaptive capacity of the overall supply chain is the Ever Given container ship, which became stuck in the Suez Canal in 2020. This accident immediately shut down shipments that accounted for 12% of global trade, with long-term impacts estimated to be much larger. Developing the ability to anticipate and react in real-time to sudden changes has quickly become a necessity, particularly in industries that deal with the transport of hazardous material. The reaction to these dramatic incidents was to largely focus attention and resources on protecting the supply chain from external threats. However, the threat to the radioactive material supply chain from insiders intimately involved in the process may be even greater and remains a blind spot that requires increased attention. Recent events revealed the blueprint for targeting and disrupting that supply chain, so the potential for a malicious insider—or a manipulated, unwitting insider—to take advantage of this vulnerability is elevated, creating security concerns for radiological industries. This paper examines and analyzes the potential insider threat to the radioactive source supply chain and recommends steps to take to counter this possibility.

Kinney, Justin↗

DOE OSTI2026

Critical review of lithium recovery from geothermal brines with implications for Smackover Formation, USA

The rapidly growing demand for lithium, a critical element for energy storage and national security technologies, has intensified concerns over the long-term availability and environmental impact of conventional lithium sources, such as hard-rock mining. To meet future demand, it is vital to explore unconventional resources that can provide sustainable domestic supplies. Geothermal brines, produced as a byproduct of geothermal energy generation, offer a promising alternative for lithium recovery by leveraging existing infrastructure and renewable energy production. In particular, the Smackover Formation, an extensive reservoir of high-salinity brines spanning Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama in the U.S. Gulf Coast, holds significant untapped lithium reserves. Co-producing geothermal energy and lithium from these brines aligns with sustainable extraction objectives while addressing resource scarcity. This review synthesizes current knowledge of lithium occurrence in the Smackover Formation and geothermal resources in the region, while also exploring how emerging tools such as machine learning can enhance resource targeting and co-production efficiency. Finally, we discuss key technical challenges and outline future research directions needed to advance lithium extraction from geothermal brines and secure a resilient domestic supply chain.

15 GEOTHERMAL ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2022

Enabling Sustainable Lithium-Ion Battery Manufacturing via Recycling

With millions of electric vehicles set to hit the road, challenges arise with both the access to a reliable supply of critical raw materials and management of spent Li-ion batteries that once powered those vehicles. From a circular economy perspective, it is critical to develop cost-effective and environmentally sustainable recycling technologies to manage end-of-life batteries and reintroduce the recovered materials into the supply chain to maintain a secure and healthy battery ecosystem. In this chapter, an overview of the current state of battery recycling is discussed by analyzing recycling’s benefits, key issues, and recycling strategies including pyrometallurgy, hydrometallurgy, and direct recycling. We also compare those recycling processes and highlight the direct recycling strategy by analyzing its benefits, working principles, and challenges. Direct recycling is still in the development stage and some recent advancements are discussed.

Bai, Yaocai↗

DOE OSTI2021

Electrification FY2020 Annual Progress Report

The Electric Drive Technologies (EDT) program’s mission is to conduct early-stage research and development on transportation electrification technologies that accelerate the development of cost-effective and compact electric traction drive systems that meet or exceed performance and reliability requirements of internal combustion engine (ICE)-based vehicles, thereby enabling electrification across all light-duty vehicle types.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Detonator Production Overview - Supply Chain Collaboration [Slides]

The outline for this presentation includes the history, World War II legacy, and current mission of Los Alamos National Laboratory; detonator manufacturing in the Nuclear Security Enterprise; manufacturing processes; and expanding the supply chain.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2024

Organizational Influence on Supply Chain for Digital Energy Infrastructure: Business Models, and Policy Landscape

Significant investment is driving the essential modernization and digitization of U.S. energy infrastructure, but the United States faces a key challenge in this grid transformation: our renewable and clean energy supply chains have limited capacity to source necessary digital assets through U.S. or allied sources. Batteries and their associated power electronic interfaces are key components to delivering clean and more resilient energy delivery, providing much-needed fast ramping, emergency discharge, generation, and operations support to the electric grid. These services have grown to be invaluable over the past 10 years and will soon be an irreplaceable component of energy delivery. While there have been significant strides to move supply chains for raw and critical materials to U.S. and allied nations, the control and power electronic industry has lagged, in part because of lower cost margins. For example, the United States now has growing capacity to manufacture solar photovoltaic (PV) panels, but 90% of the inverters—which are essential to the conversion of DC to AC for grid connection and controls—are made in or source parts from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). While a global supply chain is beneficial for many economic and supply diversification reasons, presence of foreign entities of concern (FEOC) in a dominant role in this supply chain brings additional concerns for national security of infrastructure. The BESS relationship and new clean energy have features that warrant discussions and additional focus on impact for technology security, given their critical role. This review considers the impact and solutions for complex business and policy landscapes in clean energy supply chain, and the benefit trade-offs, focusing on the Battery Energy Storage System case study, and its complex organizational relationships across both the US, Allied countries and Foreign Entities of Concern. While many examples in this paper are presented on PRC focused manufacture, this could apply to any potentially adversarial relationship

25 - ENERGY STORAGE↗

DOE OSTI2020

Deconstructing the Nuclear Supply Chain Cyber-Attack Surface

The nuclear supply chain cyber-attack surface is a large, complex network of interconnected stakeholders and activities. The global economy has widened and deepened the supply chain resulting in larger numbers of geographically dispersed locations and increased difficulty ensuring the authenticity and security of digital assets. Although the nuclear industry has made significant strides in securing facilities from cyber-attacks, the supply chain remains vulnerable. This paper provides further details on each of the elements in the Digital I&C System Supply Chain Cyber-Attack Surface, including supply chain lifecycle activities, key stakeholders, touchpoints, and attack types. Deconstructing this attack surface provides insights into supply chain threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. These insights will lead to improvements in cybersecurity supply chain risk analysis, development of new cybersecurity supply chain processes and tools, and enhancement of overall supply chain resilience.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2024

PRISTINE: An Emulation Platform for PCB-Level Hardware Trojans

Printed circuit Boards (PCBs) are becoming increasingly vulnerable to malicious design alteration, also known as Trojan attacks, due to a distributed business model that often involves various untrusted parties. Such attacks can be mounted at various stages in the PCB life cycle. The relative ease of alteration of PCB hardware even after fabrication (due to physical access to surface-mounted critical components and traces) makes them attractive for an adversary to manipulate their functional/physical behavior for malicious intent. There is a growing need to explore viable Trojan attacks in a PCB, analyze their functional and physical characteristics (e.g., impact on power or delay), and study the effectiveness of countermeasures against these attacks. While simulation-based approaches for PCB Trojan insertion are effective at creating a large population of possible Trojans, they fail to provide functional feasibility analysis with a realistic workload for a trigger circuit. Also, they cannot estimate a Trojan’s side-channel footprint due to the unavailability of physical models of diverse PCB components. To address these deficiencies, in this paper, we present PRISTINE, a PCB-level emulation system for any integrity or physical tampering issues, specifically, hardware Trojan insertion. The need for building such an emulation platform to resolve PCB trust issues in the supply chain is also surveyed and discussed. Both custom Hardware Hacking (HaHa) boards and multiple commercial PCBs are then used to test the ability of the proposed system to emulate various hardware Trojans specially designed to exploit board-specific hardware characteristics. Experimental results on emulated board-level Trojans show that a wide range of Trojans can be successfully activated, thus enabling the expected payload effects on both types of boards to be studied and quantified. The resulting data are further analyzed to create PCB-level Trojan benchmarks. In particular, a comparative evaluation of the experimental results is used to propose a risk level metric that quantifies the probability of detection and degree of payload impact of each Trojan on a given commercial PCB.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

DOE OSTI2024

BESSIE: Battery & Energy Storage Supply Chain Analysis, Mitigation Deployment, and Tools

Battery energy storage systems (BESS) and their associated power electronic interfaces are key components to delivering clean and more resilient energy, providing much-needed fast-ramping, emergency discharge, generation, and operations support to the electric grid. These services have grown to be invaluable over the past ten years and will soon be an irreplaceable element of energy delivery. The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) strives to address these challenges through a strategic approach to supply chain risk assessment and mitigation for BESS and related digital energy equipment through the BESSIE project under the Center for Securing Digital Energy Technology. Recognizing that decreasing dependence on a foreign supply chain will take significant time and investment, BESSIE’s focus is strategically addressing battery supply chain risks by pairing short-term steps to operate securely through today’s risks with long-term steps to shape the supply chain over the coming years.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

DOE OSTI2026

FY27 Annual LDRD Call for Proposals - external release

Proposals are now being accepted for the fiscal year 2027 (FY-27) Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) call, the FY-27 Annual LDRD Call for Proposals. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has renewed its research and development (R&D) portfolio to align with its strategy, and this call seeks high-quality proposals that address these renewed research priorities. The LDRD Office encourages proposals that offer the potential to achieve breakthroughs in the three science and technology (S&T) strategic initiatives: • Unleashing America’s Energy Abundance: Enabling the Quadrupling of Nuclear Power by 2050; • Securing America’s Future by Developing Domestic Supply Chains for Critical and Strategic Minerals and Materials (CSMM); and • Delivering Critical National Security Technology. Proposals that support INL’s four strategic thrust areas are also encouraged: • Enabling Future Fusion Energy Systems; • Delivering Small Nuclear Reactor Technology for Space Exploration and Defense Missions; • Accelerating Technologies for Hybrid Energy and Nuclear Applications; and • Securing America’s Energy Future Through Artificial Intelligence (AI).

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

NASA NTRS2011

Harnessing the Risk-Related Data Supply Chain: An Information Architecture Approach to Enriching Human System Research and Operations Knowledge

An Information Architecture facilitates the understanding and, hence, harnessing of the human system risk-related data supply chain which enhances the ability to securely collect, integrate, and share data assets that improve human system research and operations. By mapping the risk-related data flow from raw data to useable information and knowledge (think of it as a data supply chain), the Human Research Program (HRP) and Space Life Science Directorate (SLSD) are building an information architecture plan to leverage their existing, and often shared, IT infrastructure.

Buquo, Lynn E.↗

DOE OSTI2022

PURE Biomanufacturing: Secure, Pandemic-Adaptive Biomanufacturing

Biopharmaceutical production systems and processes are vulnerable to cyberattacks from sophisticated adversaries. Consequently, it is imperative to start building biopharmaceutical manufacturing systems that offer verifiable formalism and transform the current state of security across all production stages.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2022

Caribbean Energy Sector Cybersecurity Forum: Modernizing and Securing the Grid

This presentation on Modernizing and Securing the Grid brought together regional and NREL cybersecurity expertise for USAID's Caribbean Energy Sector Cybersecurity Forum. The presentation's overall purpose was to provide a deep dive into the changes underway in the electric grid, including the greater integration of renewables and distributed energy resources. The presentation also reviewed best practices for building cybersecurity into modern energy systems, including in the areas of vendor assessment and supply chain cybersecurity.

Caribbean↗

DOE OSTI2025

Securing Grid Communications Infrastructure: Addressing Gaps Beyond NERC CIP Facility Perimeters

The North American electric grid relies on a complex communications infrastructure that extends beyond facility perimeters traditionally covered by NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) standards. While CIP requirements have significantly strengthened cybersecurity within Electronic Security Perimeters, many operational communications—such as those between control centers, substations, and third-party networks—fall outside current regulatory scope. As grid modernization introduces new technologies and connectivity models, these external pathways present evolving security challenges. This brief explores the nature of these challenges, including emerging attack vectors and supply chain considerations, and highlights how ongoing grid transformation increases exposure to sophisticated threats. It outlines practical strategies and policy options to complement existing standards, such as expanding secure communications practices, enhancing supply chain transparency, and fostering collaboration among federal, state, and industry stakeholders. Near-term actions like encryption, authentication, and contractual safeguards can help reduce risk while longer-term frameworks are developed to ensure resilient and secure grid operations.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2022

A Review of Technologies that can Provide a 'Root of Trust' for Operational Technologies

The supply chain attack pathway is being increasingly used by adversaries to bypass security controls and gain unauthorized access to sensitive networks and equipment (e.g., Critical Digital Assets). Cyber-attacks targeting supply chain generally aim to compromise the environments, products, or services of vendors and suppliers to inject, add, or substitute authentic software and hardware with malicious elements. These malicious elements are deemed to be authentic as they arise from the vendor or supplier (i.e., the supply chain). This research aims at providing a survey of technologies that have the potential to reduce exposure of sensitive networks and equipment to these attacks, thereby improving tamper resistance. The recent advances in the performance and capabilities of these technologies in recent years has increased their potential applications to reduce or mitigate exposure of the supply chain attack pathway. The focus being on providing an analysis of the benefits and disadvantages of smart cards, secure tokens, and elements to provide root of trust. This analysis provides evidence that these roots of trust can increase the technical capability of equipment and networks to authenticate changes to software and configuration thereby increasing resilience to some supply chain attacks, such as those related to logistics and ICT channels, but not development environment attacks.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Evolve CAPP Final Report

The Evolve Central Appalachia (Evolve CAPP) project is investigating the rare earth and critical mineral resource potential of the Central Appalachian basin, spanning Virginia, West Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee. This initiative aims to advance clean energy technologies, strengthen sustainable industries critical to national security, and foster economic growth through downstream value-added industries. Innovative policy incentives, stakeholder collaboration, and responsible sourcing practices are identified as pivotal to overcoming barriers. The project seeks to align environmental stewardship with economic imperatives. These efforts aim to position the Central Appalachian region as a leader in responsible critical mineral sourcing, contributing to a resilient, secure, and future-ready supply chain for critical minerals.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗