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In order to maintain human and environmental health, Los Alamos National Laboratory follows state and federal environmental regulations, including compliance with permits, limits, and inspections. These regulations are in place to maintain radiation protection, waste management, and air and water quality.
The oxidation state of plutonium in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) environment has been a topic of interest since the initial compliance certification application. Plutonium (Pu) was initially expected to be present primarily as Pu(IV), but since the presence of Pu(III) could not be ruled out, it was also included in performance assessment (PA) calculations. The redox of the other variant actinides, uranium (U) and neptunium (Np), are also coupled to the plutonium redox. This led to a position in performance assessment calculations that is commonly referred to as “50/50”. In which half of the PA realizations assume solubility is dominated by the low oxidation state [U(IV), Np(IV), Pu(III)] and the other half assume solubility is dominated by the higher oxidation state [U(VI), Np(V), Pu(IV)]. Recently, a joint group of WIPP project participants from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and the Department of Energy’s Carlsbad Field Office (DOE-CBFO) agreed on a new path forward for the oxidation state model in PA which will decouple the redox active actinides and will instead consider their redox as a function of E h . This will take the current binary approach and turn it into a system with four possible redox states.
A preliminary performance assessment (PA) of single-shell tank Waste Management Area (WMA) A-AX located at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)'s Hanford Site in southeastern Washington is being conducted to satisfy the requirements of DOE Order 435.1 [1] as it relates to closure of the single-shell radioactive waste tanks in the WMA A-AX tank farms. A PA assesses the fate, transport, and impacts of radionuclides within a low-level radioactive waste disposal facility in its assumed closure configuration and the subsequent potential doses to humans over a 1,000-year compliance period and a 10,000-year performance evaluation period. The WMA A-AX preliminary PA evaluation is structured around the complementary use of process-level and system-level models to calculate the facility performance against established DOE Order 435.1 [1] performance objectives. Process-level models are those that represent a detailed phenomenological representation of processes of concern in the PA. Process models typically only represent one or a few of the components of the PA, such as groundwater flow and transport, and must be integrated with other modeling elements to perform PA calculations. System-level models are those that are abstracted from the process models, retaining the essential features of the process model, while allowing integration of all aspects of the PA in a single modeling framework. System-level models are often characterized by coarser numerical discretization, lower dimensionality, or other similar simplifications compared to the process-level model. Traditionally, a three-dimensional (3-D) process-level model is utilized primarily to evaluate the long-term impact on groundwater and the potential doses to individuals who consume contaminated groundwater. System-level models are also utilized to evaluate the groundwater pathway in PAs. These models typically have reduced dimensionality (1-D) and are conditioned utilizing flow fields (Darcy fluxes) and moisture content distributions that are abstracted from the process level models. The abstraction approach assures that the flow field in both models is consistent for a specific set of input parameters for flow, differing only in the discretization and dimensionality of the two models. The preliminary WMA A-AX PA incorporates a detailed representation of the geological system and hydraulic properties within the 3-D model STOMP{sup C} numerical code so that the effects of relevant features and processes on water flow and radionuclide transport in the subsurface can be evaluated. The complementary system-level model is developed utilizing the GoldSim{sup C} code to implement a simplified, 1-D equivalent model to represent the groundwater pathway. Contaminant transport through the vadose zone and unconfined aquifer for Tc-99 and I-129 were evaluated in each of the models. Adjustments to the saturated portion of the GoldSim{sup C} 1-D model were required to mimic the dispersion effect captured with the 3-D STOMP{sup C} model. Once this conditioning was conducted, highly similar results for the transport of Tc-99 and I-129 were achieved at the point of calculation, located 100 m downgradient from the WMA A-AX fenceline. These radionuclides represent elements that are regarded as primary dose drivers in the PA groundwater pathway analysis. The high degree of conformance between the two models suggests that the use of the equivalent 1-D system model is suitable for evaluating the full suite of radionuclides that will be released from the tank sources within WMA A-AX over the 1,000-year compliance period and over the 10,000-year evaluation period. (authors)
In support of the national goal for the preservation of the environment and the protection of human health and safety, NASA, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, and the Goldstone Deep Space Communications Complex have adopted the position that their operating installations shall maintain a high level of compliance in regard to regulations concerning environmental hazards. An investigation carried out by Engineering Science, Inc. focused on possible underground contamination that may have resulted from leaks and/or spills from storage facilities at the Goldstone Communications Complex. It also involved the cleanup of a non-hazardous waste dumpsite at the Mojave Base Site at the Goldstone complex. The report also includes details of the management duties and responsibilities needed to maintain compliance with environmental laws and regulations.
Electronic waste (e-waste) presents a mounting challenge to environmental sustainability due to its complex composition, which includes high-value rare earth elements, hazardous organic compounds, and non-recyclable plastics. Accurate and scalable material classification is essential for enabling efficient resource recovery and safe recycling practices. This study introduces a confidence-aware classification pipeline that combines mid-infrared hyperspectral imaging (HSI), spectral angle mapping (SAM), and iterative machine learning to perform pixel-level material identification across e-waste devices. A curated spectral library encompassing artificial materials (e.g., plastic iron oxide, galvanized metals), minerals (e.g., allanite, hematite), and organic compounds (e.g., benzanthracene, toluene) was used to generate pseudo-labels, each assigned a confidence score based on SAM-derived spectral similarity. High-confidence samples from seven consumer electronics—digital cameras, keyboards, laptop fans, modems, motherboards, TV remotes, and speakers—were iteratively expanded and classified using models such as Support Vector Machine (SVM), Random Forest, Gradient Boosting Classifier, Partial Least Squares Discriminant Analysis (PLSDA) and Logistic Regression. The best-performing classifiers achieved macro F1 scores approaching 1.0. Results revealed widespread plastic content (dominated by plastic iron oxide), the presence of rare earth-bearing minerals like cerium-containing allanite, and pervasive detection of hazardous organics such as benzanthracene. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) visualizations and confusion matrices confirmed high separability and robust classification performance. This methodology enables precise, non-destructive, and scalable classification of heterogeneous e-waste streams. It supports automated, hazard-aware sorting in recycling workflows, facilitating selective recovery of critical materials and compliance with circular economy goals. The confidence-aware framework provides a foundation for real-time deployment in industrial settings, offering significant implications for smart e-recycling infrastructure and policy-driven material stewardship.
This paper reports on the determination of performance metrics for the release of four contaminants (technetium, iodine, nitrate, and chromium) from a theoretical supplemental low-activity waste (LAW) inventory of grout in the Hanford Integrated Disposal Facility (IDF). The performance metric was defined as a retardation factor, R, that can be used to quantify a waste form's ability to retain one contaminant compared with an un-retarded species (e.g., sodium). By setting the target R value at the magnitude required to maintain concentrations of the contaminants below the drinking water standard at the point of compliance for the IDF, a bar for grout leach performance can be established for screening laboratory leach test data. The R can be converted to a corresponding laboratory-observed diffusivity value against which to assess leach test data. The individual performance metrics were determined through an iterative set of simulations using a variable saturation and transport flow model of a grout waste form inventory in the IDF to calculate the resulting concentration-based requirements at the point of compliance. (authors)
The United States (US), with its 50-year experience in developing deep geologic disposal for transuranic waste, spent nuclear fuel (SNF), and high-level radioactive waste (HLW), has much to share with other countries. Yet, other countries are better able to translate the US experience and corresponding policy decisions into solutions sensible for their country when they understand the compliance requirements in US laws and regulations. This paper presents past approaches in the generic and site-specific standards of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and implementing regulations of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) using the framework provided by (1) key questions of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, and (2) international consensus standards. Both the 1985 EPA generic standards, as updated in 1993 and applied at the operating Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in southern New Mexico for transuranic waste from atomic energy defense activities, and the EPA 2008 site-specific standards and implementing regulations, as applied at the proposed Yucca Mountain repository in southern Nevada for SNF and HLW, adopt the strategy of using quantitative, probabilistic analysis to assess performance and compliance.
This report presents results of experiments designed to update the microbial contribution to the +3 actinide biocolloid parameters for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) and provides a basis for biocolloid parameters to be recommended for the 2024 Compliance Recertification Application.
This environmental calculation file (ECF) documents the methodologies, assumptions, and results of predictive fate and transport simulations using the Plateau-to-River (P2R) model. This ECF supports the reevaluation of the representativeness of solid-waste radionuclide inventory and release rate from three solid waste sites included in the recently completed Hanford Site Composite Analysis (CA) (DOE-RL-2019-52, Composite Analysis for Low-Level Waste Disposal in the Hanford Site Central Plateau (FY 2020)). Specifically, this ECF supports the reevaluation of the representativeness of the base case inventory and radionuclide waste release rates from three solid waste sites (i.e., 218-E-12B, 218-W-3A and 218-W-3AE) and two radionuclides (carbon-14 [C-14] and technetium [Tc-99]). These three waste sites and two radionuclides were identified as being the most significant contributors to groundwater contamination and dose in the CA at time periods after the compliance period. The release rates and footprints of the releases from the vadose zone are implemented in the fate and transport modeling utilizing the HSS package.
CRA (Compliance Recertification Application)-2024 will update the oxidation state specific model used to calculate actinide solubility in the WIPP (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant). The pentavalent Np(V) ion is the most stable ion in solution within the An(V) series. This valence stability of Np(V) in aqueous solution makes Np a useful representative element for studying the aqueous complex chemistry of all An(V), but in the predicted WIPP scenario, this is the only TRU component that increases in the inventory with time as it is the main daughter product of 241 Am decay (alpha, n) so its relative importance increases throughout the 10,000-year performance period of the WIPP, it is only used to represent itself. This work is focused on confirming organic, borate and carbonate effects on solubility of Np(V) in WIPP simulated brines and 5 M NaCl and reassessing the predicted model speciation to strengthen the overall WIPP An(V) model.
The changing Government attitude toward contractor debarment and suspension is examined, with emphasis on the fact that the Government is more alert to fraud, waste, and abuse. Consideration is given to causes of debarment or suspension, procedures and due process hearings, settlement agreements, compliance programs, and recent related legislation. It is concluded that the change in the Government contracting environment in recent years should be sufficient incentive for contractors to monitor their operations more closely.
This report provides an update to a previously issued report on the bioassociation of the +3 actinide analog, neodymium, with Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) microbial isolates (LCO ACP-32, Biologically Influenced Transport of the +3 Actinide Oxidation State from the WIPP Environment, Using Neodymium as an Analog ). Results contribute to updates for the biocolloid parameters for the 2026 Compliance Recertification Application (CRA-2026).
The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), located in southeastern New Mexico, has been developed by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for the geologic (deep underground) disposal of defense-related transuranic (TRU) waste. Containment of TRU waste at the WIPP facility is derived from standards set forth in Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 191. The DOE assesses compliance with the containment standards according to the Certification Criteria in Title 40 CFR Part 194 by means of Performance Assessment (PA) calculations performed by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). WIPP PA calculations estimate the probability of radionuclide releases from the repository to the accessible environment for a regulatory period of 10,000 years after facility closure. The DOE Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) has initiated a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) action for a proposal to excavate and use additional transuranic (TRU) waste disposal panels at the WIPP facility. This report documents an analysis undertaken as part of an effort to evaluate the potential environmental consequences of the proposed action. Although not explicitly required for a NEPA analysis, evaluations of a dose indicator to hypothetical members of the public after final facility closure are presented in this report. The analysis is carried out in two stages: first, Performance Assessment (PA) calculations quantify the potential releases to the accessible environment over a 10,000-year post-closure period. Second, dose was evaluated for three hypothetical exposure pathways using the conservative radionuclide concentrations assumed to be released to the accessible environment.
This standard analysis report provides the estimates for the chemical (oxyanions and complexing agents) and cement components with a data collection cut-off date of December 31, 2023. These estimates will be included in a Performance Assessment Inventory Report developed for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) interim state repository configuration performance assessment (PA) for the 2026 Compliance Recertification Application (CRA).
Based on the rationale presented, post-closure nuclear criticality is improbable when room closure compacts containers disposing transuranic (TRU) waste emplaced at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), an operating repository in bedded salt in southeastern New Mexico. As described in the original WIPP certification, a qualitative estimate of the probability of post-closure criticality in TRU waste produced from atomic energy defense activities has been low either because remote-handled TRU waste canisters are neutronically isolated by the bedded salt or because the low fissile mass in an array of contact-handled TRU waste drums cannot be compacted sufficiently by room closure from salt creep. These situations are still valid for the majority of TRU waste that is disposed at WIPP without any disposal constraints, as updated herein. This report also qualitatively evaluates the probability of criticality after disposal of TRU waste in pipe overpack containers (POC) where every POC in a shipment may have the maximum 200 fissile gram equivalent of 239Pu content. The probability of criticality for a disposal room filled with POCs is estimated during four representative phases of repository evolution: (1) a large salt block falls onto POCs in the first 20 years, (2) salt creep closes a disposal room in the first 1000 years without brine seepage and subsequent gas generation, which permits maximum compaction, (3) some brine seepage occurs into the closed room, which initiates consumption of the fiberboard (cellulose) impact absorber in the POC in the second 1000 years, and (4) full brine inundation of a room and consumption of all fiberboard thereafter. Salt-block fall in the first phase does not greatly disrupt three tiers of POCs. The compacted spacing of POCs in the later three repository conditions is calculated through high-fidelity, geomechanical modeling. Criticality evaluation of compacted 200-g 239 Pu spheres at the compacted spacing shows that neither 12-inch nor 6-inch POCs are critical after the first 1000 years, the second 1000 years, or thereafter as the sea of reflector material changes to represent the three repository conditions. Specifically, fiberboard and iron isolates 239 Pu while dry, and brine reduces the reactivity when a room is partially and fully inundated. Because POC behavior bounds behavior of other standard TRU waste containers, post-closure criticality caused by room closure compacting containers is omitted in the performance assessments for the 2019 and 2026 WIPP compliance re-certification applications to the US Environmental Protection Agency.
This monitoring plan for Idaho National Laboratory’s Remote-Handled Low Level Waste Disposal Facility was developed to meet the requirements for monitoring low-level waste disposal facilities according to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1, “Radioactive Waste Management,” and the guidance provided in the associated technical standard “Disposal Authorization Statement and Tank Closure Documentation” (DOE-STD-5002-2017). The purpose of this monitoring plan is to document a monitoring strategy that includes (1) compliance monitoring activities to demonstrate compliance with regulatory standards/limits and (2) performance monitoring to build confidence the facility is performing as demonstrated in the facility performance assessment (PA) (DOE-ID 2018a), composite analysis (CA) (DOE ID 2012), and CA addendum (DOE-ID 2018b). The de minimus impact to the aquifer predicted by the PA suggests that aquifer compliance monitoring should be augmented with performance monitoring of the drainage course materials and sedimentary interbeds in the vadose zone beneath the facility to provide a more effective means of identifying performance deviations. The monitoring approach delineated in this document was informed by the systems evaluation of natural and engineered facility features presented in the PA, an assessment of aquifer baseline conditions (INL 2017d), the dose analysis conducted in support of the PA and CA, and monitoring data collected during the first four years of facility operations (baseline monitoring phase) (INL 2023b). This plan provides monitoring locations, sampling frequencies, and sampling methods; recommendations for data evaluation; and a description of the monitoring plan implementation. Collected data will be used to demonstrate facility compliance and to identify conditions that are not consistent with the key assumptions made by the PA and CA.
This chapter provides a description of the methods used for the sensitivity and uncertainty quantification analyses and identifies the parameters and assumptions found to be most important in the determination of compliance with PA performance objectives, development of WAC, establishment of individual DU inventory limits, and other regulatory decisions.
The Direct Feed Low Activity Waste (DF-LAW) activity will provide the initial feed to the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant at the Hanford Tank Farm facility. Feed preparation for DF-LAW will be carried out in multiple double shell waste tanks (DST) utilizing the Tank Side Cesium Removal (TSCR) process. Tank AP-106 will be an integral part of the TSCR process and hence key to the DFLAW activity. Prior to being utilized for this purpose, the Cs-137 concentration levels in the AP-106 supernate must be reduced significantly. The AP-106 re-purposing process manages normal waste tank addition procedures such that waste acceptance criteria objectives for Cs-137 removal are achieved. As this process was being developed, several concerns regarding tank integrity during and after repurposing of Tank AP-106, and the associated tanks (i.e., AP-102, AN-101, and AP-108), were addressed. The potential corrosion degradation mechanisms identified based on process knowledge included: general and pitting corrosion, caustic stress corrosion cracking, concentration cell corrosion, and microbiologically induced corrosion (MIC). A systematic approach was undertaken to assess the risk of corrosion during the AP-106 re-purposing process. The assessment considered the initial and present condition of the tank, the service history of the tank, the environmental conditions created in each tank during each stage of the process, process timing, and corrosion testing and modeling that approximated tank conditions. Based on this information, recommendations were provided to minimize the exposure of the tank to corrosive conditions. These recommendations included time limits for each stage of the process, staging of corrosion inhibitor solutions should process delays occur, and waste sampling with potential chemistry adjustments at defined steps in the process. Additionally, recommendations for post-process supernate chemistry adjustments and tank inspections were put forth. The greatest risk for this process occurs during the manipulation of large quantities of Columbia River water (i.e., greater than 450,000 gallons) within AP-106, the associated tanks and the supporting infrastructure (i.e., transfer line piping). This risk becomes more pronounced if there is a process upset and the tank walls remain exposed to a corrosive condition longer than intended. As long as the river water is blended into the supernate in a timely fashion, and the waste is adjusted appropriately with corrosion inhibitors, corrosion may be minimized and the final condition of the supernate in AP-106 and the associated tanks is expected to be in compliance with corrosion chemistry requirements. Contingency plans will be made to minimize the impact of a process upset. (authors)