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Inside - Second Fragmentation of Fregat Upper Stage Debris - DAS v3.1 Release - Development of Experimental Hypervelocity Impact Capabilities with Non-Spherical Projectiles - Short-Term Satellite Breakup Risk Assessment Model Process - Two Recent Breakup Events Updated - Space Missions and Satellite Box Score
The NASA Orbital Debris Program Office has developed the Orbital Debris Engineering Model (ORDEM) primarily as a tool for spacecraft designers and other users to understand the long-term risk of collisions with orbital debris. The newest version, ORDEM 3.1, incorporates the latest and highest fidelity datasets available to build and validate representative orbital debris populations encompassing low Earth orbit (LEO) to geosynchronous orbit (GEO) altitudes for the years 2016-2050. ORDEM 3.1 models fluxes for object sizes > 10 μm within or transiting LEO and > 10 cm in GEO. The deterministic portion of the populations in ORDEM 3.1 is based on the U.S. Space Surveillance Network (SSN) catalog, which provides coverage down to approximately 10 cm in LEO and 1 m in GEO. Observational datasets from radar, in situ, and optical sources provide a foundation from which the model populations are statistically extrapolated to smaller sizes and orbit regions that are not well-covered by the SSN catalog, yet may pose the greatest threat to operational spacecraft. Objects in LEO ranging from approximately 5 mm to 10 cm are modeled using observational data from ground-based radar, namely the Haystack Ultrawideband Satellite Imaging Radar (HUSIR – formerly known as Haystack). The LEO population smaller than approximately 3 mm in size is characterized based on a reanalysis of in situ data from impacts to the windows and radiators of the U.S. Space Transportation System orbiter vehicle, i.e., the Space Shuttle. Data from impacts on the Hubble Space Telescope are also used to validate the sub-millimeter model populations in LEO. Debris in GEO with sizes ranging from 10 cm to 1 m is modeled using optical measurement data from the Michigan Orbital DEbris Survey Telescope (MODEST). Specific, major debris-producing events, including the Fengyun-1C, Iridium 33, and Cosmos 2251 debris clouds, and unique populations, such as sodium-potassium droplets, have been re-examined and are modeled and added to the ORDEM environment separately. The debris environment greater than 1 mm is forecast using NASA’s LEO-to- GEO ENvironment Debris model (LEGEND). Future explosions of intact objects and collisions involving objects greater than 10 cm are assessed statistically, and the NASA Standard Satellite Breakup Model is used to generate fragments from these events. Fragments smaller than 10 cm are further differentiated based on material density categories, i.e., high-, medium-, and low-density, to better characterize the potential debris risk posed to spacecraft. The future projection of the sub-millimeter environment is computed using a special small-particle degradation model where small particles are created from intact spacecraft and rocket bodies. This work discusses the development, features, and capabilities of the ORDEM 3.1 model; the ne new data analyses used to build the model populations; and sample verification and validation results.
In order to assist the Cassini project in evaluating risks of collisions with particulate matter in the rotational equatorial plane, available Pioneer 11 and Voyager energetic charged particle data were reinvestigated to constrain the column mass density of absorbing material within several radial ranges. Within the orbit of Mimas, CRAND proton phase space densities maximize near 2.67 R sub s and exhibit secondary maximum at 2.43 R sub s. From the condition that sources must exceed losses near these maxima and using available theoretical models for CRAND proton production rates, upper bounds on the column mass density at these two radial locations are calculated. Detailed fits of radial diffusion models to the observed flux maxima yield somewhat more restrictive upper limits. The upper limits compare to a lower limit on the column mass density, estimated from previous model calculations by Van Allen. Aside from continuous rings, longitudinally limited, low optical depth clouds of particulates may exist in orbit with several of the inner satellites including Mimas and Enceladus. A brief review of Voyager energetic particle microsignatures that suggest the presence of material co-orbiting with these two satellites is presented. Finally, Pioneer 11 and Voyager measurements of low energy electron fluxes exhibit minima near the location of the tenuous E Ring centered on approx. 4 R sub s. Pioneer 11 pitch angle distributions appear to support the possibility that direct absorption by Ring E particulates produced the observed flux decreases.
The 1210 ASRS runway transgression reports are studied and expanded to yield descriptive statistics. Additionally, a one of three subset was studied in detail for purposes of evaluating the causes, risks, and consequences behind trangression events. Occurrences are subdivided by enabling factor and flight phase designations. It is concluded that a larger risk of collision is associated with controller enabled departure transgressions over all other categories. The influence of this type is especially evident during the period following the air traffic controllers' strike of 1981. Causal analysis indicates that, coincidentally, controller enabled departure transgressions also, show the strongest correlations between causal factors. It shows that departure errors occur more often when visibility is reduced, and when multiple takeoff runways or intersection takeoffs are employed. In general, runway transgressions attributable to both pilot and controller errors arise from three problem areas: information transfer, awareness, and spatial judgement. Enhanced awareness by controllers will probably reduce controller enabled incidents.
The current Lower Earth Orbit (LEO) environment has become overly crowded with space debris. An evaluation of types of debris is presented in order to determine which debris poses the greatest threat to operation in space, and would therefore provide a feasible target for removal. A target meeting these functional requirements was found in the Cosmos C-1B Rocket Body. These launchers are spent space transporters which constitute a very grave risk of collision and fragmentation in LEO. The motion and physical characteristics of these rocket bodies have determined the most feasible method of removal. The proposed Orbital Debris Collector (ODC) device is designed to attach to the Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle (OMV), which provides all propulsion, tracking, and power systems. The OMV/ODC combination, the Rocket Body Retrieval Vehicle (RBRV), will match orbits with the rocket body, use a spin table to match the rotational motion of the debris, capture it, despin it, and remove it from orbit by allowing it to fall into the Earth's atmosphere. A disposal analysis is presented to show how the debris will be deorbited into the Earth's atmosphere. The conceptual means of operation of a sample mission is described.
Orbital debris is defined as any human-made object in orbit about the Earth that no longer serves a useful purpose. Beginning in 1957 with the launch of Sputnik 1, there have been more than 4,700 launches, with each launch increasing the potential for impacts from orbital debris. Almost 55 years later there are over 16,000 catalogued objects in orbit over 10 cm in size. Agencies world-wide have realized this is a growing issue for all users of the space environment. To address the orbital debris issue, the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) was established to collaborate on monitoring, characterizing, and modeling orbital debris, as well as formulating policies and procedures to help control the risk of collisions and population growth. One area of fundamental interest is measurements of the space debris environment. NASA has been utilizing radar and optical measurements to survey the different orbital regimes of space debris for over 25 years, as well as using returned surfaces to aid in determining the flux and size of debris that are too small to detect with ground-based sensors. This paper will concentrate on the optical techniques used by NASA to observe the space debris environment, specifically in the Geosynchronous earth Orbit (GEO) region where radar capability is severely limited.
This paper documents a study that drove the development of a mathematical expression in the detect-and-avoid (DAA) minimum operational performance standards (MOPS) for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). This equation describes the conditions under which vertical maneuver guidance should be provided during recovery of DAA well clear separation with a non-cooperative VFR aircraft. Although the original hypothesis was that vertical maneuvers for DAA well clear recovery should only be offered when sensor vertical rate errors are small, this paper suggests that UAS climb and descent performance should be considered-in addition to sensor errors for vertical position and vertical rate-when determining whether to offer vertical guidance. A fast-time simulation study involving 108,000 encounters between a UAS and a non-cooperative visual-flight-rules aircraft was conducted. Results are presented showing that, when vertical maneuver guidance for DAA well clear recovery was suppressed, the minimum vertical separation increased by roughly 50 feet (or horizontal separation by 500 to 800 feet). However, the percentage of encounters that had a risk of collision when performing vertical well clear recovery maneuvers was reduced as UAS vertical rate performance increased and sensor vertical rate errors decreased. A class of encounter is identified for which vertical-rate error had a large effect on the efficacy of horizontal maneuvers due to the difficulty of making the correct left/right turn decision: crossing conflict with intruder changing altitude. Overall, these results support logic that would allow vertical maneuvers when UAS vertical performance is sufficient to avoid the intruder, based on the intruder's estimated vertical position and vertical rate, as well as the vertical rate error of the UAS' sensor.
In June 2015, the construction of the Meter Class Autonomous Telescope was completed and MCAT saw the light of the stars for the first time. In 2017, MCAT was newly dedicated as the Eugene Stansbery-MCAT telescope by NASA's Orbital Debris Program Office (ODPO), in honor of his inspiration and dedication to this newest optical member of the NASA ODPO. Since that time, MCAT has viewed the skies with one engineering camera and two scientific cameras, and the ODPO optical team has begun the process of vetting the entire system. The full system vetting includes verification and validation of: (1) the hardware comprising the system (e.g. the telescopes and its instruments, the dome, weather systems, all-sky camera, FLIR cloud infrared camera, etc.), (2) the custom-written Observatory Control System (OCS) master software designed to autonomously control this complex system of instruments, each with its own control software, and (3) the custom written Orbital Debris Processing software for post-processing the data. ES-MCAT is now capable of autonomous observing to include Geosynchronous survey, TLE (Two-line element) tracking of individual catalogued debris at all orbital regimes (Low-Earth Orbit all the way to Geosynchronous (GEO) orbit), tracking at specified non-sidereal rates, as well as sidereal rates for proper calibration with standard stars. Ultimately, the data will be used for validation of NASA's Orbital Debris Engineering Model, ORDEM, which aids in engineering designs of spacecraft that require knowledge of the orbital debris environment and long-term risks for collisions with Resident Space Objects (RSOs).
Prognostics is the science of predicting the failure(s) of a component or a system and understanding how the performance will change in the event of a failure or degradation mechanism. With accurate predictions of possible failures, autonomous mitigative actions can be taken to correct/repair any issues or alert human operators of a failure threshold exceedance requiring condition-based maintenance. Although there is extensive research on failure predictions for a component or a system, there are significantly more opportunities to foray into failure predictions and prognostics for a system of systems such as an airspace consisting of multiple aircraft, a fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles, and a swarm of intelligent satellite systems. Failure prediction and mitigation are particularly important in autonomous systems such as satellite swarm systems that need effective resource management and minimal human interactions. Based on NASA's decadal survey, there is a clear need to prioritize the development of satellite swarm technology for studies of space physics and Earth science. The science community will propose future missions that return in-situ measurements from a 3-D (three-dimensional) volume of space, with relative spacecraft motion and inter-satellite baselines controlled according to the mission objectives. For such multi-spacecraft missions, it is required that ground operations resources do not scale with the number of satellites, thus compromising the swarm or leading to inefficiencies in resource allocation. Swarms of tens or hundreds of small satellites will require autonomy in attitude control, navigation and failure. Although significant research has been conducted in the areas of autonomous formation flying algorithms, less attention has been given to the development of resilient systems robust to failures.The focus of this research paper is the integration of model-based prognostics into the swarm dynamics control and decision-making algorithms. We simulate swarm management strategies for a subsystem failure to demonstrate the importance of failure predictions by comparing two cases: (i) no health information is provided to the system and utilized in the decision-making process and (2) system health information is obtained using prognostics and employed by the control system. One example scenario presented is for the GPS (Global Positioning System) system of an individual satellite to perform off-nominally due to increasing estimated error. In this scenario, the keep-out zone for that satellite would become more conservative, thereby decreasing the risk of collision. This is achieved via tuning the individual artificial repulsive functions assigned to each satellite.This paper is structured as follows. First we provide an overview of current swarm technology development, where we specifically use the term swarm to define multiple satellites flying in formation in similar orbits, with cross-link communication and station-keeping capabilities. Second, we give an introduction to the Swarm Orbital Dynamics Advisor (SODA), a tool that accepts high-level configuration commands and provides the orbital maneuvers required to achieve the prescribed formation configuration. Third, we provide the details of the model-based prognostics algorithm implementation in SODA. Finally, we present different case studies for potential component/subsystem failures and the swarm responses based with and without failure prediction information.
On December 3, 2014 the Hayabusa2 Spacecraft was launched by JAXA to investigate and return samples from carbonaceous Asteroid (162173) Ryugu. The spacecraft's payload contains several remote sensing instruments that are designed to characterize the asteroid's surface and to help identify scientifically interesting locations from which samples can be obtained safely. The data collected by these instruments will also help place any obtained samples in context with respect to the global characteristics of Ryugu. In addition to the suite of remote sensing instruments and the sampling device, Hayabusa2 also includes a small carry-on impactor (SCI) payload experiment, which is designed to impact the surface of the asteroid and excavate fresh material for subsequent collection. The SCI consists of a 30 cm diameter 2 kg copper disk that is accelerated by an explosive charge into the surface of Ryugu at approximately 2 km/s. The resultant crater formed during this experiment is estimated to be approximately between 2 - 10 meters in diameter with an ejecta blanket extending to 10 - 100 meters on the asteroid. Hayabusa2 will not be able to observe the impact experiment directly due to considerations of spacecraft safety since there is some risk of collisions with debris from the explosion and ejecta from the crater. However, prior to moving safely away, the spacecraft will deploy a small imaging system called Deployable Camera 3 (DCAM3). DCAM3 will detach from Hayabusa2 just before the detonation of the SCI and will image the moment of impact, crater formation, and ejecta propagation. These data will be transmitted to Hayabusa2 and will help constrain the near-surface properties of Ryugu and also impact scaling laws for small bodies in low gravity environments. These data could also be useful for gaining insights into determining asteroid physical properties from higher velocity impact events (e.g., DART and HERA data of Didymos).
Inside - New NASA Orbital Debris Engineering Model ORDEM 3.1 - Composite Material Char Rate and Strength Retention Study at University of Texas Austin - Conference and Meeting Reports - Space Missions and Satellite Box Score
The management of waste generated onboard spacecraft during future long-duration, deep-space missions will require different solutions from those currently implemented on the International Space Station, which consist exclusively of collecting, storing, and returning the waste to Earth. Alternative options for managing spacecraft waste are to process it for recycling and recovering resources, and to jettison it overboard. The waste generated during a deep-space mission is derived mainly from spacecraft logistics supplies, food and beverage residues, personal or scientific items used by the crew, and unused spare components. Uncontained and unprocessed trash is a health hazard and a habitat volume liability, which makes onboard long-term storage a nonviable option. Jettison of solid, processed waste appear, on the other hand, to be an effective solution for crewed deep-space missions, leading not only to volume reduction and habitat safening, but also to considerable mass savings in the spacecraft’s propulsion system. However, the disposal of trash overboard also creates a navigation hazard for spacecraft and the risk of collisions with planetary bodies. This paper investigates alternative jettison design concepts for L2 libration orbit, Mars conjunction-class, and Mars opposition-class missions.
The number of objects in space has been increasing rapidly, and the risk of collision has grown as well. Many spacecraft operators are now receiving multiple collision warnings a day. Despite this, systems to manage space traffic have been limited: there are no broadly agreed upon guidelines or rules governing the response to predicted potential collisions. Instead, spacecraft operators generally determine whether, when, and how to respond to these warnings on a manual and ad hoc basis. Coordination between operators, if it occurs, often requires repeated communication and negotiation. Some space actors have suggested that the space community should develop right of way rules, similar to those in the ground, sea, and air domains, to guide collision response decisions. However, it is unclear whether such rules would be effective, and it’s unknown whether such rules would have an equitable impact across various spacecraft operators. To address these issues, we developed the Virtual Environment for Space Traffic Analysis (VESTA), a software tool that was used to simulate the space environment with a recent catalog of objects obtained from the U.S. Space-Track.org system. We implemented multiple potential right of way rules within this model. The analysis confirmed that the choice of right of way rule makes a meaningful difference in terms of both efficiency and distributional effects in terms of collision avoidance maneuvers. For example, our analysis shows that rules in which the less massive satellite is required to maneuver results in a more equitable distribution of maneuver responsibility among space actors and also requires less fuel mass, compared to a rule in which the more massive satellite maneuvers.
Classic risk management theory requires the assessment of both likelihood and consequence of deleterious events. Satellite conjunction risk assessment has produced a highly-developed theory for assessing collision likelihood but holds a completely static solution for collision consequence, treating all potential collisions as essentially equally worrisome. This may be true for the survival of the protected asset, but the amount of debris produced by the potential collision, and therefore the degree to which the orbital corridor may be compromised, can vary greatly among satellite conjunctions. This study leverages present work on satellite collision modeling to develop a method by which it can be estimated, to a particular confidence level, whether a particular collision is likely to produce a relatively large or relatively small amount of resultant debris and how this datum might alter conjunction remediation decisions. The more general question of orbital corridor protection is also addressed, and a preliminary framework presented by which both collision likelihood and consequence can be jointly considered in the risk assessment process.
Satellite conjunction assessment is perhaps the fastest growing area in space situational awareness and protection with military, civil and commercial satellite owner-operators embracing more and more sophisticated processes to avoid the avoidable - namely collisions between high value space assets and orbital debris. NASA and Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales (CNES) have collaborated to offer an introductory short course on all the major aspects of the conjunctions assessment problem. This half-day course will cover satellite conjunction dynamics and theory. Joint Space Operations Center (JsPOC) conjunction data products, major risk assessment parameters and plots, conjunction remediation decision support, and present and future challenges. This briefing represents the NASA portion of the course.
Regulations that establish operational and performance requirements for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) are being developed by a consortium of government, industry and academic institutions. Those requirements will apply to detect-and-avoid (DAA) systems and other equipment necessary to integrate UAS with the National Airspace System (NAS) and are determined according to their contribution to the overall level of safety required to operate in the airspace. Several key gaps must be addressed in order to link equipment requirements to an airspace level of safety. Foremost among these is the calculation of the relative effectiveness of a particular system to mitigate violations of a separation standard with other aircraft, which is known as the systems risk ratio. The risk ratio is calculated as the probability of mid-air collision with a DAA system divided by the probability of mid-air collision without a DAA system. The risk ratio of a DAA system, in combination with the risk ratios of other collision avoidance mitigations, will determine the overall safety of the airspace measured in terms of the number of mid-air collisions per flight hour. Defining the required risk ratio that the DAA system needs to ensure the safety of the airspace requires an evaluation of the current airspace and a simulated evaluation that incorporates UAS aerodynamic performance and the mission characteristics of future UAS operations that are projected to be conducted in areas that interact with current operations. These evaluations will produce the frequency of encounters that currently exist in the airspace and those that could be generated with the introduction of UAS. Together, the frequency of encounters, an evaluation of unmitigated risk of collision, and a desired level of safety of the airspace will yield a required risk ratio of the DAA system. This study will focus on evaluating the encounter rates between aircraft based on historical radar data and encounter rates that could occur based on simulated UAS missions.
To date, satellite conjunction assessment (CA) risk analysis has largely embraced the probability of collision (Pc) as the omnibus metric to evaluate collision likelihood, and its use in such assessments has mostly been straightforward: at the point at which a conjunction mitigation decision is required, the calculated Pc is compared to a threshold; and if the calculated Pc exceeds that threshold, then a mitigation action is warranted. With only minor variation, this approach is employed by major CA risk assessment centers (e.g., NASA, EUSST, CNES, JAXA) and is advanced as the preferred method in the published CA best practices handbooks. Despite this near unanimity of operational practice, there is a major strain of secondary literature critical of the Pc and willing to propose alternatives. Alfano (2005) pointed out the ability of the Pc to underrepresent the risk in certain situations and counselled a maximum Pc construct. Carpenter (2017, 2019) reiterated this criticism and proposed using instead a confidence interval on the miss distance. Balch et al. (2019) identified what they argued was a defect in the entire Bayesian Pc construct and believed that the use of a more conservative methodology based on covariance ellipsoid overlap was necessary. Delande (2022) introduced the framework of collision “plausibility” to the risk assessment process and sketched out how this might be used operationally. Elkantassi (2022) published a full development of the miss distance confidence interval approach and applied it to several worked examples. While these different approaches to collision risk assessment do differ in their details, they all converge on two central points: first, the Pc’s failure to give an adequate expression of the risk in dilution region situations is a fatal flaw; and second, a conjunction should be presumed risky and in need of mitigation until the evidence of the situation can establish otherwise. These criticisms, if correct, would counsel a number of modifications to current CA operational practice; as such, they force a re-examination of fundamental aspects of the CA problem, including the following: 1. Is the CA risk assessment a probability problem, a statistics problem, or something else? 2. If it is a statistics problem, does it lend itself naturally to a hypothesis test construction? 3. If it can be construed as a hypothesis test, what form should the null hypothesis take, to wit: what constraints exist on the choice of the null hypothesis, what selections are in best alignment with all of the attendant parameters of the problem, and what is implied philosophically by different choices? 4. What are the implications of using the different proposed risk assessment parameters for CA? This question should be answered both in determining how frequently the dilution region situation cited by the critics of the Pc actually appears in an operationally significant manner and the missed detection and false alarm rates of all of the proposed risk assessment metrics, compared both to the Pc and to each other. This paper explores and offers preliminary answers to the above questions, presenting a researched treatment of the philosophical nature of the CA problem and the null hypothesis choice that achieves the greatest consistency with all of the different aspects of operational CA conduct. It then profiles all of the different proposed risk assessment metrics enumerated in the earlier paragraph against an extremely large database of conjunction events at both the 550km and 700km altitudes. The combination of the philosophical exploration of the CA problem and the results of the profiling activity articulates what a risk assessment metric will need to demonstrate, in terms of both innate construction and performance, in order to be a true competitor to the Pc.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) recognizes the risk of on-orbit collisions from other satellites and debris objects and has instituted a process to identify and react to close approaches. The charter of the NASA Robotic Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA) task is to protect NASA robotic (unmanned) assets from threats posed by other space objects. Monitoring for potential collisions requires formulating close-approach predictions a week or more in the future to determine analyze, and respond to orbital conjunction events of interest. These predictions require propagation of the latest state vector and covariance assuming a predicted atmospheric density and ballistic coefficient. Any differences between the predicted drag used for propagation and the actual drag experienced by the space objects can potentially affect the conjunction event. Therefore, the space environment itself, in particular how space weather impacts atmospheric drag, is an essential element to understand in order effectively to assess the risk of conjunction events. The focus of this research is to develop a better understanding of the impact of space weather on conjunction assessment activities: both accurately determining the current risk and assessing how that risk may change under dynamic space weather conditions. We are engaged in a data-- ]mining exercise to corroborate whether or not observed changes in a conjunction event's dynamics appear consistent with space weather changes and are interested in developing a framework to respond appropriately to uncertainty in predicted space weather. In particular, we use historical conjunction event data products to search for dynamical effects on satellite orbits from changing atmospheric drag. Increased drag is expected to lower the satellite specific energy and will result in the satellite's being 'later' than expected, which can affect satellite conjunctions in a number of ways depending on the two satellites' orbits and the geometry of the conjunction. These satellite time offsets can form the basis of a new technique under development to determine whether space weather perturbations, such as coronal mass ejections, are likely to increase, decrease, or have a neutral effect on the collision risk due to a particular close approach.