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At least 109 records · Page 6

Market-based Policies for Non-Proliferation

Access to weapons-useable fissile material—highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium—is the primary technical barrier to nuclear weapons development. Nuclear non-proliferation policy is largely concerned with the secure distribution and use of these materials and the technologies that produce them. To the extent that both materials and technologies are traded in markets, the problem may be viewed as one of regulating markets to give an acceptable set of allocative outcomes. While a laissez-faire approach to these markets was rejected long ago, most current policy is based on prescribed or proscribed behavior rather than market incentives. “Market-based” non-proliferation policies would act through incentives in the nuclear materials and technology markets rather than by prescribing outcomes or behavior. Possible polices of this sort include subsidized enrichment services, credits to impute value to spent nuclear fuel, and new markets for special scarce nuclear materials. While market-based policies will not replace command-and-control policies entirely, they could lead to efficient regulation which suffices for most market participants, reserving special, more discriminatory instruments for the few hard cases.

nulcear fuel markets, nonproliferation, SWU↗

Towards A Theory of Autonomous Reconstitution of Compromised Cyber-Systems

The ability to maintain mission-critical operations in cyber-systems in the face of disruptions is critical. Faults in cyber systems can come from accidental sources (e.g., natural failure of a component) or deliberate sources (e.g., an intelligent adversary). Natural and intentional manipulation of data, computing, or coordination are the most impactful ways that an attacker can prevent an infrastructure from realizing its mission goals. Under these conditions, the ability to reconstitute critical infrastructure becomes important. Specifically, the question is: Given an intelligent adversary, how can cyber systems respond to keep critical infrastructure operational? In cyber systems, the distributed nature of the system poses serious difficulties in maintaining operations, in part due to the fact that a centralized command and control apparatus is unlikely to provide a robust framework for resilience. Resilience in cyber-systems, in general, has several components, and requires the ability to anticipate and withstand attacks or faults, as well as recover from faults and evolve the system to improve future resilience. The recovery effort (and any subsequent evolution) may require significant reconfiguration of the system (at all levels – hardware, software, services, permissions, etc.) if the system is to be made resilient to further attack or faults. This is especially important in the case of ongoing attacks, where reconfiguration decisions must be taken with care to avoid further compromising the system while maintaining continuity of operations. Collectively, we will label this recovery and evolution process as “reconstitution”. Currently, reconstitution is performed manually, generally after-the-fact, and usually consists of either standing up redundant systems, check-points (rolling back the configuration to a “clean” state), or re-creating the system using “gold-standard” copies. For enterprise systems, such reconstitution may be performed either directly on hardware, or using virtual machines. A significant challenge within this context is the ability to verify that the reconstitution is performed in a manner that renders the cyber-system resilient to ongoing and future attacks or faults. Fundamentally, the need is to determine optimal configuration of the cyber system when a fault is determined to be present. While existing theories for fault tolerance (for example, Byzantine fault tolerance) can guarantee resilience under certain conditions, in practice, these theories can break down in the face of an intelligent adversary. Further, it is difficult, in a dynamically evolving environment, to determine whether the necessary conditions for resilience have been met, resulting in difficulties in achieving resilient operation. In addition, existing theories do not sufficiently take into account the cost for attack and defense (the adversary is generally assumed to have infinite resources and time), hierarchy of importance (all network resources are assumed to be equally important), and the dynamic nature of some attacks (i.e., as the attack evolves, can resilience be maintained?). Alternative approaches to resilience based on a centralized command and control structure suffer from a single-point-failure. This paper presents preliminary research towards concepts for effective autonomous reconstitution of compromised cyber systems. We describe a mathematical framework as a first step towards a theoretical basis for autonomous reconstitution in dynamic cyber-system environments. We then propose formulating autonomous reconstitution as an optimization problem and describe some of the challenges associated with this formulation. This is followed by a brief discussion on potential solutions to these challenges.

asymmetric resilience↗

Method and apparatus for controlling a powertrain system including a multi-mode transmission

A powertrain including an engine and torque machines is configured to transfer torque through a multi-mode transmission to an output member. A method for controlling the powertrain includes employing a closed-loop speed control system to control torque commands for the torque machines in response to a desired input speed. Upon approaching a power limit of a power storage device transferring power to the torque machines, power limited torque commands are determined for the torque machines in response to the power limit and the closed-loop speed control system is employed to determine an engine torque command in response to the desired input speed and the power limited torque commands for the torque machines.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

Impact of Active Control on Passive Safety Response Characteristics of Sodium-cooled Fast Reactors: I - Theoretical background

Here, the interaction of the active control system with passive safety behavior is investigated for sodium-cooled fast reactors. A claim often made of advanced reactors is that they are passively safe against unprotected upset events. In practice, such upset events are not analyzed in the context of the plant control system, but rather the analyses are performed without considering the normally programmed response of the control system (open-loop approach). This represents an oversimplification of the safety case. The issue of passive safety override arises since the control system commands actuators whose motions have safety consequences. Depending on the upset involving the control system ( operator error, active control system failure, or inadvertent control system override), an actuator does not necessarily go in the same direction as needed for safety. So neglecting to account for control system action during an unprotected upset is nonconservative from a safety standpoint. It is important then, during the design of the plant, to consider the potential for the control system to work against the inherent and safe regulating effects of purposefully engineered temperature feedbacks.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

sUAS Support for Mars 2020

The release of airborne radioactive material presents a health risk hazard to many individuals, including emergency responders and the public. Characterizing the unknown radioactive dangers produced during such incidents is essential. An advantage to utilizing unmanned aerial systems in this effort is the reduction of risk to personnel otherwise tasked with characterization, as well as more quickly obtaining data points during cloud immersion. By pairing a continuous air monitor (CAM) and detector with a drone, quantification of unknown material in the plume can be determined, and thus the extent of dose to people in the area can be estimated. A small, low-flow air sampler with a Geiger-Mueller counter may be characterized using experimental measurements of point sources representing a cloud of material and modelled using the Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport Code (MCNP), a software package for simulating nuclear processes, to find the usefulness and advantages of the system for detection of nuclides of concern in various nuclear plume scenarios. The flying time of small-unmanned aircraft systems (sUASs) is limited; thus, the minimum detectable activity and concentration rates possible must be determined over the system’s window of operation. While the activity concentrations corresponding to external and internal doses of concern can be detected with certainty for 90 Sr and 137 Cs in a plume, those corresponding to 238 Pu are more difficult to detect. The central principle of employing the sUAS is that the cockpit does not have an operator onboard the aircraft; therefore, control of the aircraft must take place by other means. With a sUAS, command and control can be separated into three distinct methods: (1) ground control or remote piloting, (2) semi-autonomous control, and (3) autonomous control. The isotope 238 Pu is used in the space industry, providing long-lived heat generation for fuel in outer space (NASA 2014). Due to the inherent risks with rocket launches to get objects into space, monitoring for release of these hazardous substances is a major undertaking. The current means is through employment of environmental CAMs. It is conceivable, however, that drone monitoring for release of 238 Pu in the event of a space launch mishap would give a greater chance of detection of plutonium particulate, because the particulate’s diffusion in air upon settling to the ground would make the probability of collecting a particle on a filter in a CAM very low.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Losing Control of Your Linear Network? Try Resilience Theory

Resilience of cyber-physical networks to unexpected failures is a critical need widely recognized across domains. For instance, power grids, telecommunication networks, transportation infrastructures, and water treatment systems have all been subject to disruptive malfunctions and catastrophic cyberattacks. Following such adverse events, we investigate scenarios where a node of a linear network suffers a loss of control authority over some of its actuators. These actuators are not following the controller's commands and are instead producing undesirable outputs. The repercussions of such a loss of control can propagate and destabilize the whole network despite the malfunction occurring at a single node. To assess system vulnerability, we establish resilience conditions for networks with a subsystem enduring a loss of control authority over some of its actuators. Furthermore, we quantify the destabilizing impact on the overall network when such a malfunction perturbs a nonresilient subsystem. We illustrate our resilience conditions on two academic examples, on an islanded microgrid and on the linearized IEEE 39-bus system.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Sensing Electrical Networks Securely & Economically (SENSE)

The growing adoption of distributed energy resources (DERs) like battery energy storage systems and roof top solar/PV and the rapid penetration of electric vehicles (EVs), the electric grid is undergoing a major transformation with elevated stress on legacy grid assets. Despite a lot of expenditure to address these challenges, both in dollars and manpower, utilities have not been able to receive the value that was promised. The gains have been most visible at the transmission and substation level, especially where the main objective was improving operational and economic efficiency for the utility. Improving visibility and control at a few select points enhances the existing and established paradigm of centralized command and control. With changing load patterns, load types and the overall transition to an “active grid”, the centralized control and coordination paradigm gets challenged. To address the challenges, a new architecture and mechanism is needed, one that supports decentralized control and decision making, extracting value streams at the grid edge, particularly as the changes are fueled by transitions occurring in the distribution system. To address this, a communications and data processing platform, “GAMMA” was developed and demonstrated through the project. At the heart of the platform, are distributed, intelligent edge nodes with sensing and compute capabilities, that can record and analyze information locally. They are embedded in sensors and actuators specific to different distribution system applications. Phase 1 of the project focused on developing novel sensor technology that can be used for monitoring utility pole top distribution transformers. The sensors were designed with the objective of being low-cost, communicating with the GAMMA cloud using novel “delay-tolerant” networking using Bluetooth and a secure mobile application. They were non-intrusive in nature so that they can be installed quickly in the field, resulting in overall low cost of deployment and operations. Following the successful completion of Phase 1, the team manufactured 100 units for a field demonstration in Phase 2. The field demonstration was carried out on two real feeder systems with the local utility partner. In total, 100 sensors were installed and operated over a period of 6 months in the state of Georgia. The platform is operational end to end, with the cloud infrastructure deployed on a distributed, serverless environment that can serve multiple data streams, an analytics engine and a portal to securely view the data from multiple assets. The data collected through the GAMMA Mobile Phone app showcased the viability of the novel delay tolerant networking architecture, and the data processing algorithms developed through the course of the project, were successful in extracting important information about the overall network, improving the utility’s visibility and situational awareness in the distribution feeder.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Telerobotic Control of Dexterous Dual-Arm Robots for D and D Operations - 18622

Robotic systems hold the potential to significantly reduce exposure of workers to hazardous environments such as in the deactivation and decommissioning (D and D) of nuclear facilities. Our goal is to enable an operator with minimal training to easily control a remote dual-arm robot to perform demolition tasks with hand tools. We propose a system that combines semi-autonomous coordination of the robot's arms with an intuitive operator interface based on virtual reality (VR) technology. A limb coordination system enables independent control of the robot arms, as well as coupled motion required to hold and manipulate rigid bodies such as reciprocating saws, angle grinders and crow bars. Using a VR head mounted display and stereo video from the robot for situational awareness and tracked VR hand controllers to command robot arm movement, an operator will be able to walk up to the control console, pick up the controllers, engage the manipulators, fly the grippers, grasp a tool with one or both robot arms and easily move them in unison to perform tasks. We present preliminary results using simulation and a physical dual-arm platform based on the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory's Modular Prosthetic Limb, an anthropomorphic device that provides hyper-dexterous human-like manipulation capabilities. Anticipated benefits of the robotic system for D and D operations include improved situational awareness, increased mission complexity, and reduced operator training time, workload, and task execution times. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Enhanced INL Power Grid Test Bed Infrastructure – Phase I

Idaho National Laboratory (INL), a Department of Energy (DOE) laboratory, owns, operates, and maintains transmission and distribution power grid infrastructure to support the INL multi program mission. Sections of this power infrastructure, known as the INL Power Grid Test Bed, have been and are being used by government and industry to develop, demonstrate, and validate technologies for the modern grid, including smart grid, on a full scale utility test bed. INL’s power grid includes 61 miles of 140 MW, 138 kV rated electrical power transmission supplying seven main substations, each feeding a separate facility complex (or ‘city’) within the INL’s 890 square mile Site. This power grid is fed by three commercial utilities into the INL’s main control substation, but is operated independently from the commercial utility through its primary substation and command and control center. Within the INL complex, one of the seven complexes, the Critical Infrastructure Test Range Complex (CITRC), has been designated as the INL complex for supporting critical infrastructure research and testing. This complex includes its own substation and 13.8kV distribution network, all configurable and controlled by the INL research and development programs. Through investment partnership with the DOE Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (DOE OE), INL is enhancing its existing distribution infrastructure to expand the types of testing that can be conducted and increase flexibility for testing configurations. The enhancement of the INL Power Grid Test Bed will enable development and full scale testing of smart-grid-related technologies and smart devices including testing interoperability, operational performance, reliability, and resiliency contribution at multiple distribution voltage classes, specifically 15kV, 25kV, and 35kV. The expected time frame for completion of the Phase I portion of the enhancement would be 4th quarter fiscal year (FY) 2015.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Combining Droop Curve Concepts with Control Systems for Wind Turbine Active Power Control: Preprint

Wind energy is becoming a larger portion of the global energy portfolio and wind penetration has increased dramatically in certain regions of the world. This increasing wind penetration has driven the need for wind turbines to provide active power control (APC) services to the local utility grid, as wind turbines do not intrinsically provide frequency regulation services that are common withtraditional generators. It is common for large scale wind turbines to be decoupled from the utility grid via power electronics, which allows the turbine to synthesize APC commands via control of the generator torque and blade pitch commands. Consequently, the APC services provided by a wind turbine can be more flexible than those provided by conventional generators. This paper focuses on thedevelopment and implementation of both static and dynamic droop curves to measure grid frequency and output delta power reference signals to a novel power set point tracking control system. The combined droop curve and power tracking controller is simulated and comparisons are made between simulations using various droop curve parameters and stochastic wind conditions. The tradeoffs involvedwith aggressive response to frequency events are analyzed. At the turbine level, simulations are performed to analyze induced structural loads. At the grid level, simulations test a wind plant's response to a dip in grid frequency.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

System and method for islanding detection and prevention in distributed generation

Various examples are directed to systems and methods for detecting an islanding condition at an inverter configured to couple a distributed generation system to an electrical grid network. A controller may determine a command frequency and a command frequency variation. The controller may determine that the command frequency variation indicates a potential islanding condition and send to the inverter an instruction to disconnect the distributed generation system from the electrical grid network. When the distributed generation system is disconnected from the electrical grid network, the controller may determine whether the grid network is valid.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

HIL Testbed and Motion Control Strategy for the Hybrid Hydraulic-Electric Architecture (HHEA)

The Hybrid Hydraulic-Electric Architecture (HHEA) was proposed in recent years to increase system efficiency of high power mobile machines and to reap the benefits of electrification without the need for large electric machines. It uses a set of common pressure rails to provide the majority of power hydraulically and small electric motors to modulate that power for precise control. This paper presents the development of a Hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) test-bed for testing motion control strategies for the HHEA. Precise motion control is important for off-road vehicles whose utility requires the machine being dexterous and performing tasks exactly as commanded. Motion control for the HHEA is challenging due to its intrinsic use of discrete pressure rail switches to minimize system efficiency or to keep the system within the torque capabilities of the electric motor. The motion control strategy utilizes two different controllers: a nominal passivity based back-stepping controller used in between pressure rail switches and a transition controller used to handle the event of a pressure rail switch. In this paper, the performance of the nominal control under various nominal and rail switching scenarios is experimentally evaluated on the HIL testbed.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

An Evaluation of Machine Learning Methods to Detect Malicious SCADA Communications

Critical infrastructure Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems were designed to operate on closed, proprietary networks where a malicious insider posed the greatest threat potential. The centralization of control and the movement towards open systems and standards has improved the efficiency of industrial control, but has also exposed legacy SCADA systems to security threats that they were not designed to mitigate. This work explores the viability of machine learning methods in detecting the new threat scenarios of command and data injection. Similar to network intrusion detection systems in the cyber security domain, the command and control communications in a critical infrastructure setting are monitored, and vetted against examples of benign and malicious command traffic, in order to identify potential attack events. Multiple learning methods are evaluated using a dataset of Remote Terminal Unit communications, which included both normal operations and instances of command and data injection attack scenarios.

critical infrastructure protection↗

Apparatus and method for data communication in an energy distribution network

A system for communicating information on an energy distribution network is disclosed. In one embodiment, the system includes a local supervisor on a communication network, wherein the local supervisor can collect data from one or more energy generation/monitoring devices. The system also includes a command center on the communication network, wherein the command center can generate one or more commands for controlling the one or more energy generation devices. The local supervisor can periodically transmit a data signal indicative of the data to the command center via a first channel of the communication network at a first interval. The local supervisor can also periodically transmit a request for a command to the command center via a second channel of the communication network at a second interval shorter than the first interval. This channel configuration provides effective data communication without a significant increase in the use of network resources.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Nonlinear burn control in ITER using adaptive allocation of actuators with uncertain dynamics

Abstract ITER will be the first tokamak to sustain a fusion-producing, or burning, plasma. If the plasma temperature were to inadvertently rise in this burning regime, the positive correlation between temperature and the fusion reaction rate would establish a destabilizing positive feedback loop. Careful regulation of the plasma’s temperature and density, or burn control, is required to prevent these potentially reactor-damaging thermal excursions, neutralize disturbances and improve performance. In this work, a Lyapunov-based burn controller is designed using a full zero-dimensional nonlinear model. An adaptive estimator manages destabilizing uncertainties in the plasma confinement properties and the particle recycling conditions (caused by plasma–wall interactions). The controller regulates the plasma density with requests for deuterium and tritium particle injections. In ITER-like plasmas, the fusion-born alpha particles will primarily heat the plasma electrons, resulting in different electron and ion temperatures in the core. By considering separate response models for the electron and ion energies, the proposed controller can independently regulate the electron and ion temperatures by requesting that different amounts of auxiliary power be delivered to the electrons and ions. These two commands for a specific control effort (electron and ion heating) are sent to an actuator allocation module that optimally maps them to the heating actuators available to ITER: an electron cyclotron heating system (20 MW), an ion cyclotron heating system (20 MW), and two neutral beam injectors (16.5 MW each). Two different actuator allocators are presented in this work. The first actuator allocator finds the optimal mapping by solving a convex quadratic program that includes actuator saturation and rate limits. It is nonadaptive and assumes that the mapping between the commanded control efforts and the allocated actuators (i.e. the effector model) contains no uncertainties. The second actuator allocation module has an adaptive estimator to handle uncertainties in the effector model. This uncertainty includes actuator efficiencies, the fractions of neutral beam heating that are deposited into the plasma electrons and ions, and the tritium concentration of the fueling pellets. Furthermore, the adaptive allocator considers actuator dynamics (actuation lag) that contain uncertainty. This adaptive allocation algorithm is more computationally efficient than the aforementioned nonadaptive allocator because it is computed using dynamic update laws so that finding the solution to a static optimization problem is not required at every time step. A simulation study assesses the performance of the proposed adaptive burn controller augmented with each of the actuator allocation modules.

Physics↗

Simultaneous Independent Control of Tool Axial Force and Temperature in Friction Stir Processing

Maintaining consistent tool depth relative to the part surface is a critical requirement for many Friction stir processing (FSP) applications. Force control is often used with the goal of obtaining a constant weld depth. When force control is used, if weld temperature decreases, flow stress increases and the tool is pushed up. If weld temperature increases, flow stress decreases and the tool dives. These variations in tool depth and weld temperature cause various types of weld defects. Robust temperature control for FSP maintains a commanded temperature through control of the spindle axis only. Robust temperature control and force control are completely decoupled in control logic and machine motion. This results in stable temperature, force and tool depth despite the presence of geometric and thermal disturbances. Performance of this control method is presented for various weld paths and alloy systems.

force control↗

Rotating switching strategy for power converters

Systems and methods for operating a power converter with a plurality of inverter blocks with silicon carbide MOSFETs are provided. A DC to AC converter can include a plurality of inverter blocks. Each inverter block can include a plurality of switching devices. A control method can include identifying one of a plurality of switching patterns for operation of the inverter block for each inverter block. Each switching pattern can include a plurality of switching commands. The control method can further include controlling each inverter block based on the identified switching pattern for the inverter block. The control method can further include rotating the switching patterns among the plurality of inverter blocks.

Dong, Dong↗

A Section 106 Evaluation of Building CP-1, Area 6, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

On December 17, 2015, the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) vacated Building CP-1 (Building 06-CP-1) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada. Starting in 1951, nearly all nuclear tests during the Cold War were controlled from this building on the facility, known as the Nevada Test Site for most of its years of operation. The test site was renamed the NNSS in 2010. CP-1 was the command and control center where decisions about NNSS activities were sought and made; where authorization for movements about the areas forward (north) of Mercury base camp were coordinated, granted or declined, and monitored; and where problems and emergencies in the forward areas were communicated and relayed to the appropriate agencies for solution. Some of the testing duties for the Control Point included the timing and firing of nuclear tests, air operations, security, communications, weather monitoring, and radiation safety. During tests, communications were maintained through various channels to receive and pass instructions or information to the numerous testing operations, to Washington, D.C., the national laboratories, and overhead aircraft monitoring the tests. At one time, the Security Control Center, a Class A Weather Station, and the Radiation Safety Headquarters were located in CP-1, which also contained a cafeteria, a dining area, and bunk rooms. This survey was prompted by recognition that closure of the building in place creates a situation where CP-1 is vulnerable to decay in its present and unused condition. Activities at CP-1 have been reduced gradually over time since the end of nuclear testing in 1992. The Area of Potential Effects (APE) was determined by NNSA/NFO to be a two-acre area historically considered the space directly associated with CP-1 and available to CP-1 personnel for use. The APE is bounded on the south by an unnamed main paved road into the guarded Control Point area, on the west by the edge of the parking lot for adjacent Building CP-9, on the east by the edge of the bladed cut-and-fill terrace for CP-1, and on the north by a barbed wire security fence (Figure 2). All of this lot is either bladed or covered with asphalt. Contained within the lot are eight Accessary Resources (AR) which are much more closely aligned with CP-1 than with adjacent buildings. AR are defined by the Nevada State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) (2013) as “…related but subordinate to the principal building. Accessory resources would not exist were it not for the principal resource.” The Visual APE was determined by NNSA/NFO to be the same as the APE used for intensive survey because no exterior modifications to the resource are anticipated. The APE is located in Section 34 T11S R53E MDBM (projected) within the NNSS base called the Control Point in Area 6. It is on the 1986 Yucca Lake USGS 7.5 min. series topographic quadrangle. The Desert Research Institute (DRI) surveyed the APE with the assistance of National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), resulting in recordation and evaluation of CP-1 (SHPO Resource Number B14490) and eight accessory resources (AR1-AR8). This recording of CP-1 was done in three sessions. Copies of the building form and report are on file at Nevada Cultural Resources Information System (NVCRIS), DRI, and with the NNSA/NFO, Las Vegas, Nevada. Control Point refers to the support facilities of which Building CP-1, with its 126 rooms, is the most important part (Campbell et al. 1983:165). CP-1 refers to the entire building but it also is the designation for the first phase of construction, i.e. the original building. There were three major subsequent phases of additions to the building. The first two were called CP-1A (the east wing) and CP-1B (the west wing with the new War Room). A final phase filled in the hyphen between CP-1 and CP-1B with a Field Office. For convenience this last phase is called CP-1C in this report. Hence, CP-1 can refer either the entire building or to the first phase of the building exclusive of additions. The context makes clear which of the two meanings is intended in the various sections of this report. There were also two minor expansions consisting of a small battery room and a shelter for an emergency exit.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗