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DOE OSTI2022

Advanced Reactor Control and Operations (ARCO): A University Research Facility for Developing Optimized Digital Control Rooms

The Advanced Reactor Control and Operations (ARCO) facility was constructed in January 2018 to serve as a test bed for advanced reactor control rooms and operator support systems. Since then, it has supported human-machine interface user experience research, fault detection and mitigation technology development, control room concept of operations development, and remote operations research. ARCO serves as the control room for the Compact Integral Effects Test (CIET) facility, which replicates the primary-side flow paths and thermal-hydraulic behavior of a fluoride-salt-cooled high-temperature reactor (FHR) using simulant fluids and scaling principles. New reactor designs feature different operating conditions and scenarios than those in existing reactors. ARCO supports the research and development of digital tools for operator communications, intuitive real-time data analysis, online health monitoring and prognostics, and control room cybersecurity. By integrating these different technologies, ARCO acts as a prototypical control system to iteratively develop methods and tools of operation in advanced small modular nuclear reactors. This paper describes the features of and challenges to operating advanced small modular reactors underlying the design basis for ARCO and its operator support systems.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2025

EV Charging Infrastructure Energization An Overview of Approaches for Simplifying and Accelerating Timelines to Processing EV Charging Load Service Requests

The United States has seen significant growth in electric vehicle (EV) adoption, leading to increased demand for EV charging infrastructure. Over the past decade, EV charging infrastructure site developers, site hosts, and electric distribution utilities have navigated the process to integrate chargers onto the electric grid. Site developers and site hosts have raised the alarm that the integration process for high-powered EV charging projects does not meet the needs of the EV market for timeliness or cost. High-powered charging stations typically require a load service request or an agreement with the local utility to connect to the grid. The process of energizing a new high-powered charging site can be complex and time-consuming, often taking up to 2 years. This timeline is the result of current utility energization processes having been designed for construction projects that take longer to build (i.e., buildings). The specific challenges stem from various factors, including compartmentalization in application processes, the integration of EV charging process approvals with other distributed energy resources (DERs), and the need to ensure grid reliability. The energization process needs to evolve to meet the growing demand for high-powered EV charging. This white paper compiles information gathered through various conversations with key stakeholders, including utilities, utility regulators, EV charging operators, site developers, and authorities having jurisdiction (AHJ) as well as through an extensive literature review. This document identifies the challenges and provides potential solutions to streamline the process of connecting EV charging infrastructure to the power grid in the United States, serving as a starting point for future conversations around these solutions. The solutions noted in this white paper require collaborative efforts among utilities, regulators, and EV charging infrastructure developers to streamline the grid connection process for EV charging infrastructure. They are broadly organized into four areas: 1. Increase data access and transparency: Develop automated load service request tools, integrate hosting capacity and load service request analyses, incorporate EV adoption forecasts, and provide transparency on the processing queue. 2. Improve energization processes and timing: Create fast-track options based on prescreening criteria, provide flexibility or phased approvals in the load service request/interconnection process, build internal knowledge within utilities about EV charging technologies, and provide standardized workforce training. 3. Promote economic efficiency: Right size distribution components to accurately reflect the load requirements of EV charging infrastructure, make proactive investments in grid infrastructure based on EV adoption forecasts and growth projections, and consider energy equity and environmental justice factors such as equitable access to EV charging when planning infrastructure. 4. Improve grid reliability and resilience: Use load management/power control systems (PCS) at EV charging stations, adopt and implement harmonized standards for communication protocols and information models between the EV charging and grid control infrastructure, and address cybersecurity considerations by implementing robust security measures and standards for EV charging infrastructure—with particular emphasis on clarifying the security requirements for the interface to the grid. The objective of the solutions proposed in this white paper is to accelerate the timeline and decrease costs associated with connecting EV charging infrastructure to the grid. Electric utilities, utility regulators, EV charging infrastructure developers, and site hosts will first need to understand which solutions are available in their service territory, and if warranted, which combination of solutions would support their specific needs. Through the successful implementations of solutions at scale detailed here, industry will demonstrate a new and innovative ecosystem where timely deployment and energization of EV charging infrastructure with greater grid resiliency and reliability is a reality.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2021

Review of Intrusion Detection Methods and Tools for Distributed Energy Resources

Recent trends in the growth of distributed energy resources (DER) in the electric grid and newfound malware frameworks that target internet of things (IoT) devices is driving an urgent need for more reliable and effective methods for intrusion detection and prevention. Cybersecurity intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are responsible for detecting threats by monitoring and analyzing network data, which can originate either from networking equipment or end-devices. Creating intrusion detection systems for PV/DER networks is a challenging undertaking because of the diversity of the attack types and intermittency and variability in the data. Distinguishing malicious events from other sources of anomalies or system faults is particularly difficult. New approaches are needed that not only sense anomalies in the power system but also determine causational factors for the detected events. In this report, a range of IDS approaches were summarized along with their pros and cons. Using the review of IDS approaches and subsequent gap analysis for application to DER systems, a preliminary hybrid IDS approach to protect PV/DER communications is formed in the conclusion of this report to inform ongoing and future research regarding the cybersecurity and resilience enhancement of DER systems.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2022

Securing Inverter Communication: Proactive Intrusion Detection and Mitigation System to Tap, Analyze, and Act

The electric grid has undergone rapid, revolutionary changes in recent years; from the addition of advanced smart technologies to the growing penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs) to increased interconnectivity and communications. However, these added communications, access interfaces, and third-party software to enable autonomous control schemes and interconnectivity also expand the attack surface of the grid. To address the gap of DER cybersecurity and secure the grid-edge to motivate a holistic, defense-in-depth approach, a proactive intrusion detection and mitigation system (PIDMS) device was developed to secure PV smart inverter communications. The PIDMS was developed as a distributed, flexible bump-in-the-wire (BITW) solution for protecting PV smart inverter communications. Both cyber (network traffic) and physical (power system measurements) are processed using network intrusion monitoring tools and custom machinelearning algorithms for deep packet analysis and cyber-physical event correlation. The PIDMS not only detects abnormal events but also deploys mitigations to limit or eliminate system impact; the PIDMS communicates with peer PIDMSs at different locations using the MQTT protocol for increased situational awareness and alerting. The details of the PIDMS methodology and prototype development are detailed in this report as well as the evaluation results within a cyber-physical emulation environment and subsequent industry feedback.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2025

Real-time evaluation of cybersecurity threats to DER inverter grid-support functions

In this project we aim to contribute to the understanding of the type and severity of potential cybersecurity attacks to the grid-support functionalities of DER systems interconnected to the AC distribution grid via inverters. Our preliminary work focused on developing a small-scale testbed allowing to study cybersecurity threats to an isolated photovoltaic-battery system using a real-time simulator (Typhoon HIL602+) with a real DNP3 communication connection over TCP/IP, allowing for safe and efficient monitoring and manipulation of data traffic between the simulated hardware and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system. In this project we propose to expand upon this development by utilizing a) a recently acquired NovaCor RTDS (Real Rime digital Simulator) to emulate the DER-inverter-grid topology including main grid-support functions as defined by IEEE Std. 1547-2018, and b) an industrial control and automation device to enable realistic evaluation of control functions and utilization of communication protocols for real-time data transmission.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2024

Integrating a Microgrid Controller with a Local OpenADR Server

When military microgrids isolate themselves from the main electrical grid, they must locally balance electricity supply and demand. Since local generation may be limited, the current strategy is to shed all but the most critical loads by tripping smart circuit breakers, which must then be reset manually (e.g., ESTCP project EW-201350). This strategy is typically applied at the building level, meaning that entire buildings housing mission critical activities must be excluded from any load management, while those considered non-critical may lose service entirely. The remotely controlled switchgear needed to manage load in this way is very expensive ($\$30,000$-$\$50,000$ per building). While effective at shedding load, this strategy disrupts installation operation and risks damaging equipment during both disconnection and re-energization. With the goals of lowering costs, protecting equipment, and enhancing the agility of DoD microgrids, this report demonstrates the use of cybersecure automated demand response (ADR) technology to manage microgrid loads during grid-independent (a.k.a. "islanded") operation. This automated approach achieves load shedding and shifting through communication signals sent to equipment controllers rather than by cutting off the flow of electricity within the microgrid itself. Because it operates only on the base network, with no connection to external entities, this strategy avoids the main cybersecurity concern raised by past applications of ADR on military bases.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2022

A Cybersecurity Threat Profile for a Connected Lighting System

In this paper we analyze a threat profile performed on a fault-detection use case for streetlights. A threat profile establishes security requirements, justifies security measures, yields actionable controls, and effectively communicates risk to stakeholders. This effort provides critical information for making threat-based decisions to increase security at a reasonable cost, and can effectively be used by development teams, software architects, and managers to make cybersecurity a part of their ongoing culture of awareness, training, and prevention. This leads to more secure systems and better-understood security. On-premise, cloud, and hybrid architectures with different authentication mechanisms were modeled and later categorized using the Microsoft STRIDE framework. An analysis of the recommended controls for each threat was performed to determine which controls could and should be put in place by manufacturers or third-party suppliers, and which controls need to be left up the end-user to implement.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2025

Security of DERs and Grid Edge Technologies [Slides]

Distributed energy resources (DERs) offer significant value for incorporating diverse generation technologies and improving reliability. They also present a new set of cybersecurity challenges. The move of generation to the grid edge can also mean more distributed control systems and expanded communication networks, resulting in an increase in attack surface. This presentation will discuss definitions and essential terms related to DERs; developments and deployment trends for DERs; recent cyber attacks on operational technology and industrial systems; cyber risk arising from distributed grid resources; and ways in which standards may help mitigate some of these risks.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2024

Modeling Grid Data Flows for Transmission and Distribution Operations: Review, Design, Next Steps

Operational scenarios of the power grids grow multifold to accommodate the diverse needs of both the utilities and end consumers, and the various other stakeholders in-between. To comprehensively model and apply analytics to support objectives and business functions of grid sectors, a reliable approach to characterize and design data flows is crucial. The flows bridge business functions with communications protocols, stakeholders such as the grid actors, and data interfaces comprising different data objects. Additionally, constraints applied to the flow such as cybersecurity, trust, privacy, and ownership among others intersect these entities, requiring the delineation of their interactions under different scenarios. This paper aims to not only highlight relevant research in the space of grid data flows, but also proposes, for the transmission-distribution sector, a novel modeling approach that marries the aforementioned entities: objectives, business functions, data interfaces, communication protocols, data stakeholders, and flow constraints. It elaborates on the design philosophy and the significance of each entity within the model and applies it to an example function of fault location, isolation and service restoration (FLISR). Finally, the next steps to extend the application of this data flow model for other practical operational scenarios are discussed.

Sundararajan, Aditya [ORNL] (ORCID:000000033577854↗

DOE OSTI2022

Cybersecurity for Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure

As the U.S. electrifies the transportation sector, cyberattacks targeting vehicle charging could impact several critical infrastructure sectors including power systems, manufacturing, medical services, and agriculture. This is a growing area of concern as charging stations increase power delivery capabilities and must communicate to authorize charging, sequence the charging process, and manage load (grid operators, vehicles, OEM vendors, charging network operators, etc.). The research challenges are numerous and complicated because there are many end users, stakeholders, and software and equipment vendors interests involved. Poorly implemented electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE), electric vehicle (EV), or grid operator communication systems could be a significant risk to EV adoption because the political, social, and financial impact of cyberattacks — or public perception of such — would ripple across the industry and produce lasting effects. Unfortunately, there is currently no comprehensive EVSE cybersecurity approach and limited best practices have been adopted by the EV/EVSE industry. There is an incomplete industry understanding of the attack surface, interconnected assets, and unsecured inter faces. Comprehensive cybersecurity recommendations founded on sound research are necessary to secure EV charging infrastructure. This project provided the power, security, and automotive industry with a strong technical basis for securing this infrastructure by developing threat models, determining technology gaps, and identifying or developing effective countermeasures. Specifically, the team created a cybersecurity threat model and performed a technical risk assessment of EVSE assets across multiple manufacturers and vendors, so that automotive, charging, and utility stakeholders could better protect customers, vehicles, and power systems in the face of new cyber threats.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2020

A Novel Architecture for Attack-Resilient Wide-Area Protection and Control System in Smart Grid

Wide-area protection and control (WAPAC) systems are widely applied in the energy management system (EMS) that rely on a wide-area communication network to maintain system stability, security, and reliability. As technology and grid infrastructure evolve to develop more advanced WAPAC applications, however, so do the attack surfaces in the grid infrastructure. This paper presents an attack-resilient system (ARS) for the WAPAC cybersecurity by seamlessly integrating the network intrusion detection system (NIDS) with intrusion mitigation and prevention system (IMPS). In particular, the proposed NIDS utilizes signature and behavior-based rules to detect attack reconnaissance, communication failure, and data integrity attacks. Further, the proposed IMPS applies state transition-based mitigation and prevention strategies to quickly restore the normal grid operation after cyberattacks. As a proof of concept, we validate the proposed generic architecture of ARS by performing experimental case study for wide-area protection scheme (WAPS), one of the critical WAPAC applications, and evaluate the proposed NIDS and IMPS components of ARS in a cyber-physical testbed environment. Our experimental results reveal a promising performance in detecting and mitigating different classes of cyberattacks while supporting an alert visualization dashboard to provide an accurate situational awareness in real-time.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2024

Cybersecurity Assessment in DER-rich Distribution Operations: Criticality Levels and Impact Analysis

The integration of distributed energy resources (DERs) in distribution networks has become a pivotal strategy for achieving decarbonization, enhancing grid resilience, and optimizing grid efficiency. Remote monitoring and control op- erations of such resources rely on a network of sensors and communication infrastructure, exposing the system to potential cyber threats. Therefore, as the deployment of DERs increases, ensuring secure monitoring and control becomes an imperative challenge. This paper utilizes real-time feeder models, which are instrumental in developing cybersecurity testbeds tailored for hardware-in-loop (HIL) systems. These models enable users to simulate cyber attacks in a real-world environment and analyze the power distribution operations during vulnerabilities. Furthermore, we discuss several practical sets of grid parameters to identify critical levels of DERs and evaluate various scenarios that simulate cyber threats on sensitive DERs. The modified IEEE 123-bus model is used as the test case for demonstrating the proposed scenarios. The findings from this study provide valuable insights into the vulnerabilities and potential consequences of cyber attacks on DERs, allowing for better mitigation strategies and improved cyber resilience in future distribution networks.

Maharjan, Manisha↗

DOE OSTI2021

Cybersecurity for Fast Charging EV Infrastructure

The integration of electric vehicles (EVs) into electric grid operations can potentially leave the grid vulnerable to cyberattacks from both legacy and new equipment and protocols, including extreme fast-charging infrastructure. This paper introduces a co-simulation platform to perform cyber vulnerability analysis of EV charging infrastructure and its dependencies on communications and control systems. Grid impact scenarios through linkages to power system simulation tools such as OpenDSS and vehicle infrastructure-specific attack paths are discussed. An adaptive platform that assists with predicting and solving evolving cybersecurity challenges is demonstrated with a cyber-energy emulation that accelerates the analysis of cyberattacks and system behavior.

ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS,POWER TRANSMISSION AND↗

DOE OSTI2025

Employing a Hardware-in-the-Loop Approach to Realize a Fully Homomorphic Controller for a Small Modular Advanced High Temperature Reactor

This paper addresses the cybersecurity challenges of advanced nuclear reactors by integrating fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) into their control systems, enabling encrypted processing of control signals without compromising functionality. Advanced nuclear reactors, including Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) and microreactors, aim to achieve autonomous and remote operations, reducing costs and enhancing competitiveness. However, these advancements expand the attack surface for cyberattacks, particularly in autonomous and remote operation scenarios. Cyberattacks can exploit vulnerabilities to manipulate physical processes, causing shutdowns, asset damage, or public harm. Such attacks begin with passive reconnaissance, where adversaries intercept communications or observe behaviors to gather information, which is then leveraged to execute cyber-physical attacks by injecting malicious commands. Nuclear power must adopt cybersecurity protection measures to secure the integrity and availability of their digital control systems. This paper demonstrates the application of FHE to secure operations by enabling encrypted processing of sensitive signals and parameters -- ensuring privacy without exposing data. FHE supports secure mathematical operations on encrypted data without requiring decryption. Using a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) approach, this paper implements an FHE-integrated controller on a BeagleBone Black (BBB) controlling a simulation of the Small Modular Advanced High Temperature Reactor (SmAHTR). By doing so, the encrypted controller protects the integrity of critical set points and control signals during transmission and processing. Thus, FHE-integrated controllers enhance secure operations of advanced nuclear reactors while maintaining functionality.

control systems↗

DOE OSTI2021

Cybersecurity for Electric Vehicle Fast-Charging Infrastructure

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

DOE OSTI2021

Cybersecurity for Electric Vehicle Fast-Charging Infrastructure: Preprint

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

DOE OSTI2020

RADIANCE Cybersecurity Plan: Generic Version

Under its Grid Modernization Initiative, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), in collaboration with energy industry stakeholders developed a multi-year research plan to support modernizing the electric grid. One of the foundational projects for accelerating modernization efforts is information and communications technology interoperability. A key element of this project has been the development of a methodology for engaging ecosystems related to grid integration to create roadmaps that advance the ease of integration of related smart technology. This document is the product of activities undertaken in 2017 through 2019. It provides a Cybersecurity Plan describing the technology to be adopted in the project with details as per the GMLC Call document.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2023

Demonstrating the Transient System Impact of Cyber-Physical Events Through Scalable Transmission and Distribution (T&D) Co-Simulation

Modern power systems become more vulnerable to cyber threats due to their growing interconnectivity, interdependence, and complexity. Widespread deployment of distributed energy resources (DERs) further expands the threat landscape to the grid edge, where fewer cybersecurity protections exist. In this article, a systematic cyber-physical events demonstration, enabled by an integrated transmission, distribution, and communication co-simulation framework, is performed. It analyzes cyber risks to power grid under DER-enabled automatic generation control from different angles. Unlike existing works, the simulation captures millisecond-to-minutes frequency and voltage transient dynamics at a cross-region system scale.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗