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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 109 records · Page 6
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2010

NASA Spacecraft Fault Management Workshop Results

Fault Management is a critical aspect of deep-space missions. For the purposes of this paper, fault management is defined as the ability of a system to detect, isolate, and mitigate events that impact, or have the potential to impact, nominal mission operations. The fault management capabilities are commonly distributed across flight and ground subsystems, impacting hardware, software, and mission operations designs. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Discovery & New Frontiers (D&NF) Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays for 5 missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that 4 out of the 5 missions studied had significant overruns due to underestimating the complexity and support requirements for fault management. As a result of this and other recent experiences, the NASA Science Mission Directorate (SMD) Planetary Science Division (PSD) commissioned a workshop to bring together invited participants across government, industry, academia to assess the state of the art in fault management practice and research, identify current and potential issues, and make recommendations for addressing these issues. The workshop was held in New Orleans in April of 2008. The workshop concluded that fault management is not being limited by technology, but rather by a lack of emphasis and discipline in both the engineering and programmatic dimensions. Some of the areas cited in the findings include different, conflicting, and changing institutional goals and risk postures; unclear ownership of end-to-end fault management engineering; inadequate understanding of the impact of mission-level requirements on fault management complexity; and practices, processes, and tools that have not kept pace with the increasing complexity of mission requirements and spacecraft systems. This paper summarizes the findings and recommendations from that workshop, as well as opportunities identified for future investment in tools, processes, and products to facilitate the development of space flight fault management capabilities.

Newhouse, Marilyn↗
NASA NTRS1973

DOD/NASA system impact analysis (study 2.1). Volume 2: Study results

Results of the tug turnaround cost study and the space transportation system (STS) abort modes and effects study are presented for DOD/NASA system impact analysis. Cost estimates are given for tug turnabout; and vehicle description, abort assessment, and abort performance capability are given for the STS.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1976

Spacelab experiment computer study. Volume 1: Executive summary (presentation)

A quantitative cost for various Spacelab flight hardware configurations is provided along with varied software development options. A cost analysis of Spacelab computer hardware and software is presented. The cost study is discussed based on utilization of a central experiment computer with optional auxillary equipment. Groundrules and assumptions used in deriving the costing methods for all options in the Spacelab experiment study are presented. The groundrules and assumptions, are analysed and the options along with their cost considerations, are discussed. It is concluded that Spacelab program cost for software development and maintenance is independent of experimental hardware and software options, that distributed standard computer concept simplifies software integration without a significant increase in cost, and that decisions on flight computer hardware configurations should not be made until payload selection for a given mission and a detailed analysis of the mission requirements are completed.

Lewis, J. L.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Systems Engineering Using Heritage Spacecraft Technology: Lessons Learned from Discovery and New Frontiers Deep Space Missions

In the design and development of complex spacecraft missions, project teams frequently assume the use of advanced technology or heritage systems to enable a mission or reduce the overall mission risk and cost. As projects proceed through the development life cycle, increasingly detailed knowledge of the advanced or heritage systems and the system environment identifies unanticipated issues that result in cost overruns or schedule impacts. The Discovery & New Frontiers (D&NF) Program Office recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays resulting from advanced technology or heritage assumptions for 6 D&NF missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that the cost and schedule growth did not result from technical hurdles requiring significant technology development. Instead, systems engineering processes did not identify critical issues early enough in the design cycle to ensure project schedules and estimated costs address the inherent risks. In general, the overruns were traceable to: inadequate understanding of the heritage system s behavior within the proposed spacecraft design and mission environment; an insufficient level of experience with the heritage system; or an inadequate scoping of the system-wide impacts necessary to implement the heritage or advanced technology. This presentation summarizes the study s findings and offers suggestions for improving the project s ability to identify and manage the risks inherent in the technology and heritage design solution.

Barley, Bryan↗
NASA NTRS2010

Heritage Systems Engineering Lessons from NASA Deep Space Missions

In the design and development of complex spacecraft missions, project teams frequently assume the use of advanced technology systems or heritage systems to enable a mission or reduce the overall mission risk and cost. As projects proceed through the development life cycle, increasingly detailed knowledge of the advanced and heritage systems within the spacecraft and mission environment identifies unanticipated technical issues. Resolving these issues often results in cost overruns and schedule impacts. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Discovery & New Frontiers (D&NF) Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays for 5 missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that optimistic hardware/software inheritance and technology readiness assumptions caused cost and schedule growth for all five missions studied. The cost and schedule growth was not found to be the result of technical hurdles requiring significant technology development. The projects institutional inheritance and technology readiness processes appear to adequately assess technology viability and prevent technical issues from impacting the final mission success. However, the processes do not appear to identify critical issues early enough in the design cycle to ensure project schedules and estimated costs address the inherent risks. In general, the overruns were traceable to: an inadequate understanding of the heritage system s behavior within the proposed spacecraft design and mission environment; an insufficient level of development experience with the heritage system; or an inadequate scoping of the systemwide impacts necessary to implement an advanced technology for space flight applications. The paper summarizes the study s lessons learned in more detail and offers suggestions for improving the project s ability to identify and manage the technology and heritage risks inherent in the design solution.

Barley, Bryan↗
NASA NTRS2010

Heritage and Advanced Technology Systems Engineering Lessons Learned from NASA Deep Space Missions

In the design and development of complex spacecraft missions, project teams frequently assume the use of advanced technology systems or heritage systems to enable a mission or reduce the overall mission risk and cost. As projects proceed through the development life cycle, increasingly detailed knowledge of the advanced and heritage systems within the spacecraft and mission environment identifies unanticipated technical issues. Resolving these issues often results in cost overruns and schedule impacts. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Discovery & New Frontiers (D&NF) Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays for 5 missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that optimistic hardware/software inheritance and technology readiness assumptions caused cost and schedule growth for four of the five missions studied. The cost and schedule growth was not found to result from technical hurdles requiring significant technology development. The projects institutional inheritance and technology readiness processes appear to adequately assess technology viability and prevent technical issues from impacting the final mission success. However, the processes do not appear to identify critical issues early enough in the design cycle to ensure project schedules and estimated costs address the inherent risks. In general, the overruns were traceable to: an inadequate understanding of the heritage system s behavior within the proposed spacecraft design and mission environment; an insufficient level of development experience with the heritage system; or an inadequate scoping of the system-wide impacts necessary to implement an advanced technology for space flight applications. The paper summarizes the study's lessons learned in more detail and offers suggestions for improving the project's ability to identify and manage the technology and heritage risks inherent in the design solution.

Barley, Bryan↗
NASA NTRS1993

Cost and Reliability Study for a Large Array of Small Reflector Antennas for JPL/NASA Deep Space Network (DSN)

A study is performed to estimate the cost of an array of small aperture reflector antennas to be used instead or in conjunction with the current large reflector antennas of the JPL/NASA Deep Space Network (DSN), for servicing present and future NASA missions which involve smaller spacecraft with limited power and smaller, lower gain antennas. The advantages of the array configuration in terms of cost and reliability are studied. A probabilistic determination of the reliability and availability of the array as a function of the number of array elements and the availability of individual array elements is made. The impact of additional marginal elements on the operational availability of the array is studied. Parametric cost and reliability plots are presented and directions for further investigation are outlined.

Resch, G.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Rapid Cost Assessment of Space Mission Concepts Through Application of Complexity-Based Cost Indices

This slide presentation reviews the development of a rapid cost assessment models for evaluation of exploration missions through the application of complexity based cost indices. In Fall of 2004, NASA began developing 13 documents, known as "strategic roadmaps," intended to outline a strategy for space exploration over the next 30 years. The Third Strategic Roadmap, The Strategic Roadmap for Solar System Exploration, focused on strategy for robotic exploration of the Solar System. Development of the Strategic Roadmap for Solar System Exploration led to the investigation of a large variety of missions. However, the necessity of planning around scientific inquiry and budgetary constraints made it necessary for the roadmap development team to evaluate potential missions not only for scientific return but also cost. Performing detailed cost studies for each of the large number of missions was impractical given the time constraints involved and lack of detailed mission studies; so a method of rapid cost assessment was developed by us to allow preliminary analysis. It has been noted that there is a strong correlation between complexity and cost and schedule of planetary missions. While these correlations were made after missions had been built and flown (successfully or otherwise), it seemed likely that a similar approach could provide at least some relative cost ranking. Cost estimation relationships (CERs) have been developed based on subsystem design choices. These CERs required more detailed information than available, forcing the team to adopt a more high level approach. Costing by analogy has been developed for small satellites, however, planetary exploration missions provide such varying spacecraft requirements that there is a lack of adequately comparable missions that can be used for analogy.

cost estimation↗
NASA NTRS1993

Cost and reliability study for a large array of small reflector antennas for JPL/NASA Deep Space Network (DSN)

A study performed to estimate the cost of an array of small aperture reflector antennas to be used instead of or in conjunction with the current large reflector antennas of the JPL/NASA Deep Space Network (DSN) is described. The arrays are used for servicing present and future NASA missions that involve smaller spacecraft with limited power and smaller, lower-gain antennas. The advantages of the array configuration in terms of cost and reliability are discussed. A probabilistic determination of the reliability and availability of the array as a function of the number of array elements and the availability of individual array elements is made. The impact of additional marginal elements on the operational availability of the array is studied. Parametric cost and reliability plots are presented and directions for further investigation are outlined.

Jamnejad, Vahraz↗
NASA NTRS2011

Lessons Learned for Planning and Estimating Operations Support Requirements

Operations (phase E) costs are typically small compared to the spacecraft development and test costs. This, combined with the long lead time for realizing operations costs, can lead projects to focus on hardware development schedules and costs, de-emphasizing estimation of operations support requirements during proposal, early design, and replan cost exercises. The Discovery and New Frontiers (D&NF) programs comprise small, cost-capped missions supporting scientific exploration of the solar system. Even moderate yearly underestimates of the operations costs can present significant LCC impacts for deep space missions with long operational durations, and any LCC growth can directly impact the programs ability to fund new missions. The D&NF Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center recently studied cost overruns for 7 D&NF missions related to phase C/D development of operational capabilities and phase E mission operations. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential operations risks and controlling the associated impacts to operations development and execution costs. The study found that the drivers behind these overruns include overly optimistic assumptions regarding the savings resulting from the use of heritage technology, late development of operations requirements, inadequate planning for sustaining engineering and the special requirements of long duration missions (e.g., knowledge retention and hardware/software refresh), and delayed completion of ground system development work. This presentation summarizes the study and the results, providing a set of lessons NASA can use to improve early estimation and validation of operations costs.

Newhouse, Marilyn↗
NASA NTRS2019

Blind Validation Study of Parametric Cost Estimation Tool SEER-H for NASA Space Missions

One of the primary parametric cost modeling tools used by NASA and the aerospace industry to estimate the development and production cost of future spacecraft hardware is SEER-H by Galorath. To date, no independent validation of this tool for cost estimation of space missions has been reported in the literature. In the present validation study, cost estimators used SEER-H to estimate the cost of twelve different past NASA science missions. The estimators were prevented from knowing the actual cost of the missions in an effort to minimize cognitive biases. The point estimates of SEER-H had an average error of 23%, median error of -0.3%, and a standard deviation of 43%. Nine of the twelve mission's actual costs fell within the 80% confidence interval of SEER's probabilistic estimates. Several factors independent of SEER that may have affected the accuracy of the results have been identified and are discussed; these include: uncertainty in the technical data used for the estimates, the methods used to estimate uncertainty in spacecraft component mass and numbers of prototypes, and the experience of the estimators.

SEER-H↗
NASA NTRS1974

Room temperature stretch forming of scale space shuttle external tank dome gores. Volume 1: Technical

An account of activities and data gathered in the Room Temperature Stretch Forming of One-third Scale External Tank Bulkhead Gores for space shuttle study, and a tooling design and production cost study are reported. The following study phases are described: (1) the stretch forming of three approximately one-third scale external tank dome gores from single sheets of 2219-T37 aluminum alloy; (2) the designing of a full scale production die, including a determination of tooling requirements; and (3) the determination of cost per gore at the required production rates, including manufacturing, packaging, and shipping.

Blunck, R. D.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Planning and Estimation of Operations Support Requirements

Life Cycle Cost (LCC) estimates during the proposal and early design phases, as well as project replans during the development phase, are heavily focused on hardware development schedules and costs. Operations (phase E) costs are typically small compared to the spacecraft development and test costs. This, combined with the long lead time for realizing operations costs, can lead to de-emphasizing estimation of operations support requirements during proposal, early design, and replan cost exercises. The Discovery and New Frontiers (D&NF) programs comprise small, cost-capped missions supporting scientific exploration of the solar system. Any LCC growth can directly impact the programs' ability to fund new missions, and even moderate yearly underestimates of the operations costs can present significant LCC impacts for deep space missions with long operational durations. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) D&NF Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays for 5 missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that 4 out of the 5 missions studied had significant overruns at or after launch due to underestimation of the complexity and supporting requirements for operations activities; the fifth mission had not launched at the time of the mission. The drivers behind these overruns include overly optimistic assumptions regarding the savings resulting from the use of heritage technology, late development of operations requirements, inadequate planning for sustaining engineering and the special requirements of long duration missions (e.g., knowledge retention and hardware/software refresh), and delayed completion of ground system development work. This paper updates the D&NF LCC study, looking at the operations (phase E) cost drivers in more detail and extending the study to include 2 additional missions and identifies areas for increased emphasis by project management in order to improve the fidelity of operations estimates.

Newhouse, Marilyn E.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Cost Model Comparison: A Study of Internally and Commercially Developed Cost Models in Use by NASA

NASA makes use of numerous cost models to accurately estimate the cost of various components of a mission - hardware, software, mission/ground operations - during the different stages of a mission's lifecycle. The purpose of this project was to survey these models and determine in which respects they are similar and in which they are different. The initial survey included a study of the cost drivers for each model, the form of each model (linear/exponential/other CER, range/point output, capable of risk/sensitivity analysis), and for what types of missions and for what phases of a mission lifecycle each model is capable of estimating cost. The models taken into consideration consisted of both those that were developed by NASA and those that were commercially developed: GSECT, NAFCOM, SCAT, QuickCost, PRICE, and SEER. Once the initial survey was completed, the next step in the project was to compare the cost models' capabilities in terms of Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) elements. This final comparison was then portrayed in a visual manner with Venn diagrams. All of the materials produced in the process of this study were then posted on the Ground Segment Team (GST) Wiki.

cost models↗
NASA NTRS1995

Axisymmetric inlet minimum weight design method

An analytical method for determining the minimum weight design of an axisymmetric supersonic inlet has been developed. The goal of this method development project was to improve the ability to predict the weight of high-speed inlets in conceptual and preliminary design. The initial model was developed using information that was available from inlet conceptual design tools (e.g., the inlet internal and external geometries and pressure distributions). Stiffened shell construction was assumed. Mass properties were computed by analyzing a parametric cubic curve representation of the inlet geometry. Design loads and stresses were developed at analysis stations along the length of the inlet. The equivalent minimum structural thicknesses for both shell and frame structures required to support the maximum loads produced by various load conditions were then determined. Preliminary results indicated that inlet hammershock pressures produced the critical design load condition for a significant portion of the inlet. By improving the accuracy of inlet weight predictions, the method will improve the fidelity of propulsion and vehicle design studies and increase the accuracy of weight versus cost studies.

Nadell, Shari-Beth↗
NASA NTRS2005

The NASA Exploration Design Team; Blueprint for a New Design Paradigm

NASA has chosen JPL to deliver a NASA-wide rapid-response real-time collaborative design team to perform rapid execution of program, system, mission, and technology trade studies. This team will draw on the expertise of all NASA centers and external partners necessary. The NASA Exploration Design Team (NEDT) will be led by NASA Headquarters, with field centers and partners added according to the needs of each study. Through real-time distributed collaboration we will effectively bring all NASA field centers directly inside Headquarters. JPL's Team X pioneered the technique of real time collaborative design 8 years ago. Since its inception, Team X has performed over 600 mission studies and has reduced per-study cost by a factor of 5 and per-study duration by a factor of 10 compared to conventional design processes. The Team X concept has spread to other NASA centers, industry, academia, and international partners. In this paper, we discuss the extension of the JPL Team X process to the NASA-wide collaborative design team. We discuss the architecture for such a process and elaborate on the implementation challenges of this process. We further discuss our current ideas on how to address these challenges.

Team X↗
NASA NTRS2010

Improving Life-Cycle Cost Management of Spacecraft Missions

This presentation will explore the results of a recent NASA Life-Cycle Cost study and how project managers can use the findings and recommendations to improve planning and coordination early in the formulation cycle and avoid common pitfalls resulting in cost overruns. The typical NASA space science mission will exceed both the initial estimated and the confirmed life-cycle costs by the end of the mission. In a fixed-budget environment, these overruns translate to delays in starting or launching future missions, or in the worst case can lead to cancelled missions. Some of these overruns are due to issues outside the control of the project; others are due to the unpredictable problems (unknown unknowns) that can affect any development project. However, a recent study of life-cycle cost growth by the Discovery and New Frontiers Program Office identified a number of areas that are within the scope of project management to address. The study also found that the majority of the underlying causes for cost overruns are embedded in the project approach during the formulation and early design phases, but the actual impacts typically are not experienced until late in the project life cycle. Thus, project management focus in key areas such as integrated schedule development, management structure and contractor communications processes, heritage and technology assumptions, and operations planning, can be used to validate initial cost assumptions and set in place management processes to avoid the common pitfalls resulting in cost overruns.

Clardy, Dennon↗