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At least 109 records · Page 6

A PROVEN APPROACH FOR EFFECTIVE COMPUTER SECURITY SELF-ASSESSMENTS AT NUCLEAR FACILITIES

A proven method for conducting cybersecurity self-assessments at nuclear power plants is now available for international use. This method was originally developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, under the sponsorship of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for use at U.S. nuclear power plants. The “Method,” described in NUREG/CR-6847 “Cyber Security Self-Assessment Method for U.S. Nuclear Power Plants,” was originally a limited release document that was withheld from public disclosure but is now publicly available. The Method provides a systematic, phased, and risk-informed approach to help decision makers and security specialists understand their relative cybersecurity posture. Completed Method assessments may be used to support or validate selection of computer security controls to mitigate cyber threats as well as demonstrate compliance with regulations or statutes enacted by competent authorities. The Method assesses the cybersecurity posture of key systems at a nuclear facility with a focus on protection of design base functions. It considers both physical and digital elements of system vulnerabilities and the resulting potential consequences from exploitation. It is well-suited for addressing blended cyberattacks. A semi-quantitative analytical approach is used in the evaluation of potential vulnerabilities, consequences, and risks and provides a technical basis for the selection of security controls to mitigate cyberattacks. The Method’s application at U.S. nuclear power plants has been very encouraging. The only nuclear plant in the United States that did not have adverse findings during its initial NRC computer security inspection prepared for inspection through the diligent application of this self-assessment method and the implementation of recommendations that came out of that self-assessment. Nuclear facilities around the world might find application of the Method extremely helpful for making cost-effective, risk-based decisions regarding computer security and for preparing to pass computer security inspections by their competent authorities.

Cyber security, Nuclear security, Self-assessment↗

The CYBER security – Competency Health and Maturity Progression (CYBER-CHAMP) model: Extending the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) Framework Across Organizational Security

Problem Statement: There is a pervasive talent deficit in the cybersecurity industry that prevents employers from being able to fill their open positions efficiently. A holistic approach to security is required to ensure organizations have adequate prevention and response capabilities in case of a cyberattack. Specifically, industrial control systems (ICS’s) and their operational technology (OT) components have become a constant target for cyberattacks. Research Questions: It is proposed that the NICE Framework should be extended in the following areas: 1) Include guidance regarding the job roles and competencies for both IT and OT professionals. 2) Offer step-by-step solutions, based on the work role mappings from the NICE Framework, to increase cybersecurity through employee training and education. 3) Provide a streamlined, lifecycle approach to building a cybersecurity program. Contribution: The CYBER security – Competency Health and Maturity Progression (CYBER-CHAMP©) model provides a customized solution for businesses to understand their education gaps in organizational security and target areas for improvement. Rationale: The Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity v1.1 addresses ICS but does not offer a measurement of cybersecurity maturity or clear methods to ascertain an organization’s current risk profile. In Phases 1 and 5 of the model, measurements are provided to help an organization build their current and target risk profiles. The NICE framework provides a structure for planning an IT cybersecurity workforce, but the OT aspects of cybersecurity are only briefly discussed. The model uses Phases 2-3 to examine the competencies of an organization’s workforce, which includes both IT and OT roles. Current frameworks do not offer next steps to increase an organization’s cybersecurity. During Phase 4, employees’ roles are mapped to training, education, and/or certifications from common vendors. Investigative Approach: The model provides measurements and metrics for both an organization’s status and continual improvement. This improvement methodology includes guidance for creating an overall strategic plan for security improvement via products designed to increase an organization’s operational readiness through workforce competency health. Lessons Learned: Depending on who was participating, there were contradicting answers given in Phase 1 due to different security cultures in the organization. This revelation has influenced the steps listed in the User’s Guide, where Phase 1’s first recommended step is to assemble a team that champions the facilitation and implementation of the model in the organization. During Phase 2, the discovery was made that organizations may be missing roles that are necessary to perform critical cybersecurity functions. By understanding the functional roles and competencies needed, they can contract or hire cybersecurity help to fill these gaps. Implications: Using the model, organizations can discuss quantitative measures for improvement as a business case for advancing their security program. Future research can validate and extend the present theory and model to a variety of environments. It is of interest to investigate additional security roles and knowledge domains that are used to build standardized cybersecurity curriculum.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Attacking the IEC-61131 Logic Engine in Programmable Logic Controllers in Industrial Control Systems

In industrial control systems (ICS), programmable logic controllers (PLCs) directly monitor and control a physical process such as nuclear power plants, gas pipelines, and water treatment. They are equipped with a control logic written in IEC-61131 languages (e.g., ladder logic and structured text) that defines how a PLC should control a physical process. A PLC's control logic is a usual target of a cyberattack to sabotage a physical process. For instance, Stuxnet targets a control logic of a Siemens S7-300 PLC to damage a nuclear facility's centrifuges. The existing attacks in the literature generally focus only on injecting malicious control logic into a PLC. This paper presents a new dimension of control logic attacks that target the control logic engine (responsible for running a control logic) of a PLC. It demonstrates that a cyberattack can disable the control logic engine successfully by exploiting inherent PLC features such as program mode and starting/stopping engine. We develop two novel case studies on control logic engine attacks by employing the MITRE ATT\&CK knowledge base on the real-world PLCs used in industry settings, i.e., 1) Schweitzer Engineering Laboratory (SEL)'s Real-Time Automation Controller (SEL-3505 RTAC) equipped with security features such as encrypted traffic and device-level access control, and 2) traditional PLCs, i.e., Schneider Electric's Modicon M221, Allen-Bradley's MicroLogix 1400 and 1100 that do not have security features. The case studies present the internals of the logic engine attacks and facilitate the ICS research community and industry to understand the attack vectors on the control logic engine. We evaluate the effectiveness of the control engine attacks on a power substation, a 4-floor elevator, and a conveyor belt to demonstrate their real-world impact of halting a physical process.

Ali qasim, Syed↗

Cybersecurity for Electric Vehicle Fast-Charging Infrastructure: Preprint

The integration of electric vehicles (EVs) into electric grid operations can potentially leave the grid vulnerable to cyberattacks from both legacy and new equipment and protocols, including extreme fast-charging infrastructure. This paper introduces a co-simulation platform to perform cyber vulnerability analysis of EV charging infrastructure and its dependencies on communications and control systems. Grid impact scenarios through linkages to power system simulation tools such as OpenDSS and vehicle infrastructure-specific attack paths are discussed. An adaptive platform that assists with predicting and solving evolving cybersecurity challenges is demonstrated with a cyber-energy emulation that accelerates the analysis of cyberattacks and system behavior.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Cybersecurity for Fast Charging EV Infrastructure

The integration of electric vehicles (EVs) into electric grid operations can potentially leave the grid vulnerable to cyberattacks from both legacy and new equipment and protocols, including extreme fast-charging infrastructure. This paper introduces a co-simulation platform to perform cyber vulnerability analysis of EV charging infrastructure and its dependencies on communications and control systems. Grid impact scenarios through linkages to power system simulation tools such as OpenDSS and vehicle infrastructure-specific attack paths are discussed. An adaptive platform that assists with predicting and solving evolving cybersecurity challenges is demonstrated with a cyber-energy emulation that accelerates the analysis of cyberattacks and system behavior.

ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS,POWER TRANSMISSION AND↗

EVSE Cybersecurity and Resilience

Consequence-driven Cybersecurity Analysis for Extreme Fast Charging Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Electric vehicle (EV) development and associated charging infrastructure are expected to advance rapidly. Thirty percent of all global vehicle sales may be EVs and hybrid EVs by 2025, and they will rely on increasingly sophisticated strategies for grid integration. Next-generation EV charging infrastructure is expected to include interconnected renewable resources, such as photovoltaic (PV) arrays and battery storage systems, along with grid-edge devices. Although distributed energy resources (DERs) are useful in several ways, such as peak shaving at high demand times and backup supply for added resilience, the integration of vehicle charging and DERs could create more avenues for cyberattack. Physical and/or remote access to EV charging station components, including charge ports, power electronics, controllers, and local generation (e.g., PV and energy storage) could be paths to cause power fluctuations, leading to altered operations at the charging station, escalated privileges to administrative systems, exfiltration of financial information (including personally identifiable information), and reduced grid stability. One compromised EV supply equipment component can open the door to a variety of exploitable vulnerabilities. Cloud computing and mobile application control have the potential to expand the threat surface to non-repudiation and firmware integrity challenges. Vendor clouds have access to hundreds of chargers, and if compromised, can scale the attack surface exponentially. The high power and voltage levels of xFC infrastructure (e.g., 400 kW at 1000- V DC) increase the hazards and ability to impact the grid and vehicles more than lower-power charging systems. Legacy communications systems and protocols could also put EV infrastructure at risk of cyberattacks requiring a robust patch management process. Communications networks link EVs and chargers to several stakeholders - including charging station operators, grid operators, vendors/manufacturers, and aggregators - who have both physical and network access to share information for control, monitoring, and analytics. Information in these networks that is vulnerable to compromise includes the state of charge, charging duration, payment information, electricity price, and load control. Analyzing and prioritizing these interconnections risks could help address cybersecurity related to data leakage and manipulation.

charging↗

Cybersecurity concerns for the energy sector in the maritime domain

The world has seen a number of high-profile maritime disasters in recent months and years, and has felt the impact of them. At the same time, the world has also seen a number of high-profile cyberattacks. It has felt their impact, as well. And, likely no sector has been more affected by the maritime and cyber incidents than the energy sector, as fuel prices often spike or trough, and access to energy resources can become an instant source of concern, tension, or even conflict. As energy sectors—in all their forms—continue to rely on the maritime domain or even increase that reliance, they must be mindful that traditional maritime threats—like piracy, theft, and weather events—are not the only threats they face today. Maritime cybersecurity concerns are among the most potentially disruptive to energy-sector interests and, yet, are among the least understood and least addressed. This paper identifies nine areas in which the energy sector faces harmful cyber vulnerabilities in the maritime domain, to provide enough insight and examples to allow for action to be taken to reduce the risk of harm from these different vulnerabilities. The paper develops the example of offshore wind energy to model how to assess cyber considerations more fully. Ultimately, it concludes with a series of recommendations that offer policymakers, energy-sector actors, and security and law-enforcement professionals steps to minimize the exposure of the maritime energy sector to harmful cyberattacks.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment Cybersecurity Through Emulation

As the grid evolves, it is paramount to understand the risks that cyberattacks pose before assets are deployed. Leveraging the ARIES Cyber Range, NREL has created a platform to conduct analysis of EV charging protocol cybersecurity to understand the risks and impacts that cyberattacks may pose to critical infrastructure.

bug bounty prize↗

Employing a Hardware-in-the-Loop Approach to Realize a Fully Homomorphic Controller for a Small Modular Advanced High Temperature Reactor

This paper addresses the cybersecurity challenges of advanced nuclear reactors by integrating fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) into their control systems, enabling encrypted processing of control signals without compromising functionality. Advanced nuclear reactors, including Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) and microreactors, aim to achieve autonomous and remote operations, reducing costs and enhancing competitiveness. However, these advancements expand the attack surface for cyberattacks, particularly in autonomous and remote operation scenarios. Cyberattacks can exploit vulnerabilities to manipulate physical processes, causing shutdowns, asset damage, or public harm. Such attacks begin with passive reconnaissance, where adversaries intercept communications or observe behaviors to gather information, which is then leveraged to execute cyber-physical attacks by injecting malicious commands. Nuclear power must adopt cybersecurity protection measures to secure the integrity and availability of their digital control systems. This paper demonstrates the application of FHE to secure operations by enabling encrypted processing of sensitive signals and parameters -- ensuring privacy without exposing data. FHE supports secure mathematical operations on encrypted data without requiring decryption. Using a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) approach, this paper implements an FHE-integrated controller on a BeagleBone Black (BBB) controlling a simulation of the Small Modular Advanced High Temperature Reactor (SmAHTR). By doing so, the encrypted controller protects the integrity of critical set points and control signals during transmission and processing. Thus, FHE-integrated controllers enhance secure operations of advanced nuclear reactors while maintaining functionality.

control systems↗

Data recovery via covert cognizance for unattended operational resilience

One of the important premises of unattended operation, a highly promoted characteristic of fission batteries and advanced microreactors, is the ability to automate the analysis of sensors data used in support of operational monitoring and control. Here, to meet this vision, this work proposes a new monitoring and data recovery paradigm to ensure resilience against data corruption which may be the result of malicious intrusion into the reactor operational network. This is paramount to ensure 100% availability under contingency scenarios such as cyberattacks. In support of this vision, earlier work has presented the concept of covert cognizance and demonstrated its mathematical ability to identify and embed cognizance parameters under the noise-dominated null space of the sensors data. This work extends this concept and applies it in real-time to demonstrate three key characteristics: zero-impact, zero-observability, and data recovery, where the first characteristic is to ensure no impact on operation, the second is immunity to discovery by pattern recognition techniques, and the third is to allow recovery of corrupt or falsified data. Recognizing that fission batteries are designed to operate under steady state most of the time, we elect to employ a small modular reactor model under transient operational conditions to demonstrate the operational resilience enabled by the covert cognizance paradigm. Specifically, the PI controller is augmented with the covert cognizance modules to develop self-awareness and enable automatic data recovery. The developed modules are expected to be equally applicable to a wide range of advanced reactor technologies relying on full or partial unattended control.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Time Sequence Machine Learning-Based Data Intrusion Detection for Smart Voltage Source Converter-Enabled Power Grid

Smart inverters of distributed energy resources can enable cloud computing, condition monitoring, result visualization, remote control, and peer-to-peer energy trading in advanced power systems. However, the advent of data injection attacks in the communication architecture can alter measurement characteristics of power grids and have devastating consequences. In this article, we propose a time sequence machine learning-based anomaly detection methodology for detecting cyber intrusion into control signal setpoints and dc voltage signal measurement bias of the voltage source converter (VSC) in wind generators. We first investigated the effects of four types of denial of service, tampering signal, and stealthy-type data intrusion attacks on smart VSCs and overall wind farms. We then proposed a novel time sequence machine learning-based intrusion detection framework that can be implemented to detect different cyberattacks in the VSCs. The performance of the proposed framework has been compared with that of autoencoder and clustering-based intrusion detection framework. The proposed framework was validated by using the IEEE 39 bus power system in the presence of four wind farms in different locations. Using several metrics for intrusion detection performance, we validated the effectiveness of the proposed framework.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Advanced Research on Integrated Energy Systems (ARIES) Cyber Range Overview and Threat-to-Consequence Demonstration

This presentation was presented at the Aggregation and Grid Security Workshop - held on June 17-18, 2025, at NREL in Golden, Colorado. The goal of the two-day workshop was to address the critical cybersecurity challenges for the future electric grid. The threat-to-consequence demonstration showcases NREL's capability to model, simulate, test, and evaluate cyberattacks targeting energy systems that coincide with natural hazards, as well as the ramifications for the energy grid as a whole.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Evidence-based Graph Adversary Mapping (EGRAM) [Poster]

Cybersecurity companies such as CrowdStrike, Dragos, Microsoft and Unit 42 categorize Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) using their own naming schemes. As a result, these APTs are mapped to different malware sources and campaigns, all from differing sources, leading to inconsistent mapping. Inconsistent mapping causes confusion and adds further obscurity around these groups, making it difficult to track and mitigate APT cyberattacks. The Evidence-based Graph Adversary Mapping (EGRAM) tool remediates the mapping challenge by collecting, updating and converting adversary data and their sources into a valid, codified STIX v2.1 bundle which is then stored in a Neo4j graph database. It utilizes graph traversal methods and centrality analysis to generate actionable information as a Structured Threat Intelligence Graph (STIG), based on user queries. EGRAM exists as Python code and a Jupyter Notebook that acts as a searchable, evidence-based, source of intelligence for APT groups’ artifacts and cyber campaigns.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Applying a Space-Based Security Recovery Scheme for Critical Homeland Security Cyberinfrastructure Utilizing the NASA Tracking and Data Relay (TDRS) Based Space Network

Protection of the national infrastructure is a high priority for cybersecurity of the homeland. Critical infrastructure such as the national power grid, commercial financial networks, and communications networks have been successfully invaded and re-invaded from foreign and domestic attackers. The ability to re-establish authentication and confidentiality of the network participants via secure channels that have not been compromised would be an important countermeasure to compromise of our critical network infrastructure. This paper describes a concept of operations by which the NASA Tracking and Data Relay (TDRS) constellation of spacecraft in conjunction with the White Sands Complex (WSC) Ground Station host a security recovery system for re-establishing secure network communications in the event of a national or regional cyberattack. Users would perform security and network restoral functions via a Broadcast Satellite Service (BSS) from the TDRS constellation. The BSS enrollment only requires that each network location have a receive antenna and satellite receiver. This would be no more complex than setting up a DIRECTTV-like receiver at each network location with separate network connectivity. A GEO BSS would allow a mass re-enrollment of network nodes (up to nationwide) simultaneously depending upon downlink characteristics. This paper details the spectrum requirements, link budget, notional assets and communications requirements for the scheme. It describes the architecture of such a system and the manner in which it leverages off of the existing secure infrastructure which is already in place and managed by the NASAGSFC Space Network Project.

Cybersecurity↗

Industrial IoT cross-layer forensic investigation

Cross-layer forensic investigation is addressed for Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) device attacks in Critical Infrastructure (CI) applications. The operational motivation for cross-layer investigation is provided by the desire to directly correlate bit-level network anomaly detection with physical layer (PHY) device connectivity and/or status (normal, defective, attacked, etc.) at the time of attack. The technical motivation for developing cross-layer techniques is motivated by (a) having considerable capability in place for Higher-Layer Digital Forensic Information exploitation—real-time network cyberattack and postattack analysis, (b) having considerably less capability in place for Lowest-Layer PHY Forensic Information exploitation—the PHY domain remains largely under exploited, and (c) considering cyber-physical integration as a means to jointly exploit higher-layer digital and lowest-layer PHY forensic information to maximize investigative benefit in IIoT cyber forensics. A delineation of higher-layer digital and lowest-layer PHY elements is provided for the standard network Open Systems Interconnection model and the specific Perdue Enterprise Reference Architecture commonly used in IIoT Industrial Control System/Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition applications. Finally, a forensics work summary is provided for each delineated area based on selected representative publications and provides the basis for presenting the envisioned cross-layer forensic investigation.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Microgrid's Role in Enhancing the Security and Flexibility of City Energy Systems

Smart cities depend on flexible and secure energy systems to ensure resilient power for critical infrastructure; however, recent weather-related events and cyberattacks have highlighted weaknesses in our energy systems, with the potential for widespread economic and security impacts. As stated by the Executive Office of the President, "the resilience of the US electric grid is a key part of the nation's defense against severe weather." To address the energy delivery security challenge, microgrids are rising as a viable solution that enhances the flexibility and resilience of the distribution grid and boosts the reliability of the local supply for the end-user. Traditionally, high capital investment has been a barrier to large-scale adoption of microgrid technology. Understanding the flexibility and resilience benefits of microgrids and accounting for the associated value streams can make the microgrid's proposition economically viable. In this chapter, microgrids' utility and their potential to serve as a flexible and resilient resource for the utility grid by providing capabilities such as peak shaving, demand response, and frequency regulation is presented. Moreover, other value streams, such as (1) their ability to island during a disaster and sustain critical loads which makes them a robust resilience solution for end-users, in the event of the utility grid outage and (2) microgrids also provide a flexible platform for integrating distributed energy resources in conjunction with storage and conventional generation technologies, strengthen microgrid's role in reducing the over-arching goal of emission reduction. Given the myriad of benefits associated with microgrids, we present strategies which can be employed for making microgrid itself resilient against physical and cyberthreats by employing hardware, software, and personnel training solutions to operate the microgrid before, during, and after a potential disaster. This chapter, thus, provides a holistic study of the microgrid as a resilience resource, for the utility grid, and a self-contained end-user for the end-user.

cyber-physical system↗

Resilient Hierarchical Networked Control Systems: Secure Controls for Critical Locations and at Edge

Integration of information and communication technology (ICT) offers new opportunities in improving the management and operation of critical infrastructures such as power systems as it allows connection of different sensors and control components via a communication network, leading to the so-called networked control systems (NCS). However, the use of open and pervasive ICT such as the Internet or wireless communication technologies comes at a price of making NCS vulnerable to cyber intrusions/attacks which may cause physical damage. Here, this chapter presents control algorithms to ensure resilient and safe operation of NCS under unknown cyberattacks. Specifically, a variant of dynamic watermarking strategies is presented by embedding encoding/decoding components of chaotic signals into the NCS for secure control for critical locations where the measurement/control signals are transmitted to/from the control center via a communication network. In addition, resilient cooperative control algorithms are discussed to ensure safe operation at edge of the NCS which consists of a large number of distributed controllable devices. Several numerical examples are provided to illustrate the proposed control strategies.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Microgrid Resilience: A Holistic and Context-Aware Resilience Metric

Microgrids present an effective solution for the coordinated deployment of various distributed energy resources and furthermore provide myriad additional benefits such as resilience, decreased carbon footprint, and reliability to energy consumers and the energy system as a whole. Boosting the resilience of distribution systems is another major benefit of microgrids. This is because they can also serve as a backup power source when the utility grid's operations are interrupted due to either high-probability low-impact events like a component failure or low-probability high-impact events - be it a natural disaster or a planned cyberattack. However, the degree to which any particular system can defend, adapt, and restore normal operation depends on various factors including the type and severity of events to which a microgrid is subjected. These factors, in turn, are dependent on the geographical location of the deployed microgrid as well as the cyber risk profile of the site where the microgrid is operating. Therefore, in this work, we attempt to capture this multi-dimensional interplay of various factors in quantifying the ability of the microgrid to be resilient in these varying aspects. This paper, thus, proposes a customized site-specific quantification of the resilience strength for the individual microgrid's capability to absorb, restore, and adapt to the changing circumstances for sustaining the critical load when a low-probability high-impact event occurs - termed as - context-aware resilience metric. We also present a case study to illustrate the key elements of our integrated analytical approach.

microgrid↗