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Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control/Electrical Power Generation (EPD and C/EPG) FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control/Electrical Power Generation (EPD and C/EPG) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional analysis as required. The results of that comparison is documented for the Orbiter EPD and C/EPG hardware. The IOA product for the EPD and C/EPG analysis consisted of 263 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 42 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 211 FMEA and 47 CIL items.

Mccants, C. N.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the EPD and C/remote manipulator system FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C)/Remote Manipulator System (RMS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA analysis of the EPD and C/RMS hardware initially generated 345 failure mode worksheets and identified 117 Potential Critical Items (PCIs) before starting the assessment process. These analysis results were compared to the proposed NASA Post 51-L baseline of 132 FMEAs and 66 CIL items.

Robinson, W. W.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the orbital maneuvering system FMEA/CIL, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) hardware and Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter OMS hardware. The IOA analysis defined the OMS as being comprised of the following subsystems: helium pressurization, propellant storage and distribution, Orbital Maneuvering Engine, and EPD and C. The IOA product for the OMS analysis consisted of 284 hardware and 667 EPD and C failure mode worksheets that resulted in 160 hardware and 216 EPD and C potential critical items (PCIs) being identified. A comparison was made of the IOA product to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline which consisted of 101 hardware and 142 EPD and C CIL items.

Prust, Chet D.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the orbital maneuvering subsystem, volume 2

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) hardware and electrical power distribution and control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter OMS hardware and EPD and C systems. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets and contains the critical items list and the NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross reference and recommendations.

Haufler, W. A.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): FMEA/CIL assessment

The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL). Direction was given by the Orbiter and GFE Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis and assessment using the instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206. The IOA analysis featured a top-down approach to determine hardware failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, the analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL documentation. The assessment process compared the independently derived failure modes and criticality assignments to the proposed NASA post 51-L FMEA/CIL documentation. When possible, assessment issues were discussed and resolved with the NASA subsystem managers. Unresolved issues were elevated to the Orbiter and GFE Projects Office manager, Configuration Control Board (CCB), or Program Requirements Control Board (PRCB) for further resolution. The most important Orbiter assessment finding was the previously unknown stuck autopilot push-button criticality 1/1 failure mode. The worst case effect could cause loss of crew/vehicle when the microwave landing system is not active. It is concluded that NASA and Prime Contractor Post 51-L FMEA/CIL documentation assessed by IOA is believed to be technically accurate and complete. All CIL issues were resolved. No FMEA issues remain that have safety implications. Consideration should be given, however, to upgrading NSTS 22206 with definitive ground rules which more clearly spell out the limits of redundancy.

Hinsdale, L. W.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the reaction control system, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the aft and forward Reaction Control System (RCS) hardware, and Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter RCS hardware and EPD and C systems. The IOA product for the RCS analysis consisted of 208 hardware and 2064 EPD and C failure mode worksheets that resulted in 141 hardware and 449 EPD and C potential critical items (PCIs) being identified. A comparison was made of the IOA product to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. After comparison and discussions with the NASA subsystem manager, 96 hardware issues, 83 of which concern CIL items or PCIs, and 280 EPD and C issues, 158 of which concern CIL items or PCIs, and 280 EPD and C issues, 158 of which concern CIL items or PCIs, remain unresolved. Volume 1 contains the subsystem description, assessment results, and some of the IOA worksheets.

Prust, Chet D.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the reaction control system, volume 2

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the aft and forward Reaction Control System (RCS) hardware and Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter RCS hardware and EPD and C systems. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets.

Prust, Chet D.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the reaction control system, volume 3

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the aft and forward Reaction Control System (RCS) hardware and Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter RCS hardware and EPD and C systems. Volume 3 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets.

Prust, Chet D.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the reaction control system, volume 4

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the aft and forward Reaction Control System (RCS) hardware and Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter RCS hardware and EPD and C systems. Volume 4 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets and contains the potential critical items list.

Prust, Chet D.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the reaction control system, volume 5

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the aft and forward Reaction Control System (RCS) hardware and Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter RCS hardware and EPD and C systems. Volume 5 contains detailed analysis and superseded analysis worksheets and the NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross reference and recommendations.

Prust, Chet D.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): FMEA/CIL assessment

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. Direction was given by the Orbiter and GFE Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis and assessment using the instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206. The IOA analysis features a top-down approach to determine hardware failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, the anlaysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA and prime contractor FMEA/CIL documentation. The assessment process compares the independently derived failure modes and criticality assignments to the proposed NASA Post 51-L FMEA/CIL documentation. When possible, assessment issues are discussed and resolved with the NASA subsystem managers. The assessment results for each subsystem are summarized. The most important Orbiter assessment finding was the previously unknown stuck autopilot push-button criticality 1/1 failure mode, having a worst case effect of loss of crew/vehicle when a microwave landing system is not active.

Saiidi, Mo J.↗

Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) for the Space Shuttle solid rocket motor

The recertification of the Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) and Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) has included an extensive rewriting of the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL). The evolution of the groundrules and methodology used in the analysis is discussed and compared to standard FMEA techniques. Especially highlighted are aspects of the FMEA/CIL which are unique to the analysis of an SRM. The criticality category definitions are presented and the rationale for assigning criticality is presented. The various data required by the CIL and contribution of this data to the retention rationale is also presented. As an example, the FMEA and CIL for the SRM nozzle assembly is discussed in detail. This highlights some of the difficulties associated with the analysis of a system with the unique mission requirements of the Space Shuttle.

Russell, D. L.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): CIL issues resolution report, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. This report contains IOA assessment worksheets showing resolution of outstanding IOA CIL issues that were summarized in the IOA FMEA/CIL Assessment Interim Report, dated 9 March 1988. Each assessment worksheet has been updated with CIL issue resolution and rationale. The NASA and Prime Contractor post 51-L FMEA/CIL documentation assessed is believed to be technically accurate and complete. No assessment issues remain that has safety implications. Volume 1 contain worksheets for the following sybsystems: Landing and Deceleration Subsystem; Purge, Vent and Drain Subsystem; Active Thermal Control and Life Support Systems; Crew Equipment Subsystem; Instrumentation Subsystem; Data Processing Subsystem; Atmospheric Revitalization Pressure Control Subsystem; Hydraulics and Water Spray Boiler Subsystem; and Mechanical Actuation Subsystem.

Urbanowicz, Kenneth J.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): CIL issues resolution report, volume 2

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes And Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. This report contains IOA assessment worksheets showing resolution of outstanding IOA CIL issues that were summarized in the IOA FMEA/CIL Assessment Interim Report, dated 9 March 1988. Each assessment worksheet has been updated with CIL issue resolution and rationale. Volume 2 contains the worksheets for the following subsystems: Nose Wheel Steering Subsystem; Remote Manipulator Subsystem; Atmospheric Revitalization Subsystem; Extravehicular Mobility Unit Subsystem; Power Reactant Supply and Distribution Subsystem; Main Propulsion Subsystem; and Orbital Maneuvering Subsystem.

Source record↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) CIL issues resolution report, volume 3

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. This report contains IOA assessment workshets showing resolution of outstanding IOA CIL issues that were summarized in the IOA FMEA/CIL Assessment Interim Report, dated 9 March 1988. Each assessment worksheet has been updated with CIL issue rsolution and rationale. Volume 3 contains the worksheets for the Reaction Control Subsystem and the Communications and Tracking Subsystem.

Source record↗

System safety as applied to Skylab

Procedural and organizational guidelines used in accordance with NASA safety policy for the Skylab missions are outlined. The basic areas examined in the safety program for Skylab were the crew interface, extra-vehicular activity (EVA), energy sources, spacecraft interface, and hardware complexity. Fire prevention was a primary goal, with firefighting as backup. Studies of the vectorcardiogram and sleep monitoring experiments exemplify special efforts to prevent fire and shock. The final fire control study included material review, fire detection capability, and fire extinguishing capability. Contractors had major responsibility for system safety. Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) and equipment criticality categories are outlined. Redundancy was provided on systems that were critical to crew survival (category I). The five key checkpoints in Skylab hardware development are explained. Skylab rescue capability was demonstrated by preparations to rescue the Skylab 3 crew after their spacecraft developed attitude control problems.

Kleinknecht, K. S.↗

An Independent Evaluation of the FMEA/CIL Hazard Analysis Alternative Study

The present instruments of safety and reliability risk control for a majority of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) programs/projects consist of Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Hazard Analysis (HA), Critical Items List (CIL), and Hazard Report (HR). This extensive analytical approach was introduced in the early 1970's and was implemented for the Space Shuttle Program by NHB 5300.4 (1D-2. Since the Challenger accident in 1986, the process has been expanded considerably and resulted in introduction of similar and/or duplicated activities in the safety/reliability risk analysis. A study initiated in 1995, to search for an alternative to the current FMEA/CIL Hazard Analysis methodology generated a proposed method on April 30, 1996. The objective of this Summer Faculty Study was to participate in and conduct an independent evaluation of the proposed alternative to simplify the present safety and reliability risk control procedure.

Ray, Paul S.↗

Service Life Extension of the Propulsion System of Long-Term Manned Orbital Stations

One of the critical non-replaceable systems of a long-term manned orbital station is the propulsion system. Since the propulsion system operates beginning with the launch of station elements into orbit, its service life determines the service life of the station overall. Weighing almost a million pounds, the International Space Station (ISS) is about four times as large as the Russian space station Mir and about five times as large as the U.S. Skylab. Constructed over a span of more than a decade with the help of over 100 space flights, elements and modules of the ISS provide more research space than any spacecraft ever built. Originally envisaged for a service life of fifteen years, this Earth orbiting laboratory has been in orbit since 1998. Some elements that have been launched later in the assembly sequence were not yet built when the first elements were placed in orbit. Hence, some of the early modules that were launched at the inception of the program were already nearing the end of their design life when the ISS was finally ready and operational. To maximize the return on global investments on ISS, it is essential for the valuable research on ISS to continue as long as the station can be sustained safely in orbit. This paper describes the work performed to extend the service life of the ISS propulsion system. A system comprises of many components with varying failure rates. Reliability of a system is the probability that it will perform its intended function under encountered operating conditions, for a specified period of time. As we are interested in finding out how reliable a system would be in the future, reliability expressed as a function of time provides valuable insight. In a hypothetical bathtub shaped failure rate curve, the failure rate, defined as the number of failures per unit time that a currently healthy component will suffer in a given future time interval, decreases during infant-mortality period, stays nearly constant during the service life and increases at the end when the design service life ends and wear-out phase begins. However, the component failure rates do not remain constant over the entire cycle life. The failure rate depends on various factors such as design complexity, current age of the component, operating conditions, severity of environmental stress factors, etc. Development, qualification and acceptance test processes provide rigorous screening of components to weed out imperfections that might otherwise cause infant mortality failures. If sufficient samples are tested to failure, the failure time versus failure quantity can be analyzed statistically to develop a failure probability distribution function (PDF), a statistical model of the probability of failure versus time. Driven by cost and schedule constraints however, spacecraft components are generally not tested in large numbers. Uncertainties in failure rate and remaining life estimates increase when fewer units are tested. To account for this, spacecraft operators prefer to limit useful operations to a period shorter than the maximum demonstrated service life of the weakest component. Running each component to its failure to determine the maximum possible service life of a system can become overly expensive and impractical. Spacecraft operators therefore, specify the required service life and an acceptable factor of safety (FOS). The designers use these requirements to limit the life test duration. Midway through the design life, when benefits justify additional investments, supplementary life test may be performed to demonstrate the capability to safely extend the service life of the system. An innovative approach is required to evaluate the entire system, without having to go through an elaborate test program of propulsion system elements. Evaluating every component through a brute force test program would be a cost prohibitive and time consuming endeavor. ISS propulsion system components were designed and built decades ago. There are no representative ground test articles for some of the components. A 'test everything' approach would require manufacturing new test articles. The paper outlines some of the techniques used for selective testing, by way of cherry picking candidate components based on failure mode effects analysis, system level impacts, hazard analysis, etc. The type of testing required for extending the service life depends on the design and criticality of the component, failure modes and failure mechanisms, life cycle margin provided by the original certification, operational and environmental stresses encountered, etc. When specific failure mechanism being considered and the underlying relationship of that mode to the stresses provided in the test can be correlated by supporting analysis, time and effort required for conducting life extension testing can be significantly reduced. Exposure to corrosive propellants over long periods of time, for instance, lead to specific failure mechanisms in several components used in the propulsion system. Using Arrhenius model, which is tied to chemically dependent failure mechanisms such as corrosion or chemical reactions, it is possible to subject carefully selected test articles to accelerated life test. Arrhenius model reflects the proportional relationship between time to failure of a component and the exponential of the inverse of absolute temperature acting on the component. The acceleration factor is used to perform tests at higher stresses that allow direct correlation between the times to failure at a high test temperature to the temperatures to be expected in actual use. As long as the temperatures are such that new failure mechanisms are not introduced, this becomes a very useful method for testing to failure a relatively small sample of items for a much shorter amount of time. In this article, based on the example of the propulsion system of the first ISS module Zarya, theoretical approaches and practical activities of extending the service life of the propulsion system are reviewed with the goal of determining the maximum duration of its safe operation.

Kamath, Ulhas↗