Eris : fault injection and tracking framework for reliability analysis of open-source hardware.
Abstract not provided.
Nema, Shubham↗
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Eris: Fault Injection and Tracking Framework for Reliability Analysis of Open-Source Hardware.
Abstract not provided.
Nema, Shubham↗
Optimization of hardware redundancy in space computers.
Space digital computer design fulfilling requirements of efficiency, sophistication, weight and power, discussing reliability optimization and hardware redundancy
Deo, N.↗
Designing for Reliability and Robustness
Long duration spaceflight has a negative effect on the human body, and exercise countermeasures are used on-board the International Space Station (ISS) to minimize bone and muscle loss, combatting these effects. Given the importance of these hardware systems to the health of the crew, this equipment must continue to be readily available. Designing spaceflight exercise hardware to meet high reliability and availability standards has proven to be challenging throughout the time the crewmembers have been living on ISS beginning in 2000. Furthermore, restoring operational capability after a failure is clearly time-critical, but can be problematic given the challenges of troubleshooting the problem from 220 miles away. Several best-practices have been leveraged in seeking to maximize availability of these exercise systems, including designing for robustness, implementing diagnostic instrumentation, relying on user feedback, and providing ample maintenance and sparing. These factors have enhanced the reliability of hardware systems, and therefore have contributed to keeping the crewmembers healthy upon return to Earth. This paper will review the failure history for three spaceflight exercise countermeasure systems identifying lessons learned that can help improve future systems. Specifically, the Treadmill with Vibration Isolation and Stabilization System (TVIS), Cycle Ergometer with Vibration Isolation and Stabilization System (CEVIS), and the Advanced Resistive Exercise Device (ARED) will be reviewed, analyzed, and conclusions identified so as to provide guidance for improving future exercise hardware designs. These lessons learned, paired with thorough testing, offer a path towards reduced system down-time.
Svetlik, Randall G.↗
A Framework for Assessing the Reusability of Hardware (Reusable Rocket Engines)
Within the space flight community, reusability has taken center stage as the new buzzword. In order for reusable hardware to be competitive with its expendable counterpart, two major elements must be closely scrutinized. First, recovery and refurbishment costs must be lower than the development and acquisition costs. Additionally, the reliability for reused hardware must remain the same (or nearly the same) as "first use" hardware. Therefore, it is imperative that a systematic approach be established to enhance the development of reusable systems. However, before the decision can be made on whether it is more beneficial to reuse hardware or to replace it, the parameters that are needed to deem hardware worthy of reuse must be identified. For reusable hardware to be successful, the factors that must be considered are reliability (integrity, life, number of uses), operability (maintenance, accessibility), and cost (procurement, retrieval, refurbishment). These three factors are essential to the successful implementation of reusability while enabling the ability to meet performance goals. Past and present strategies and attempts at reuse within the space industry will be examined to identify important attributes of reusability that can be used to evaluate hardware when contemplating reusable versus expendable options. This paper will examine why reuse must be stated as an initial requirement rather than included as an afterthought in the final design. Late in the process, changes in the overall objective/purpose of components typically have adverse effects that potentially negate the benefits. A methodology for assessing the viability of reusing hardware will be presented by using the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) to validate the approach. Because reliability, operability, and costs are key drivers in making this critical decision, they will be used to assess requirements for reuse as applied to components of the SSME.
Childress-Thompson, Rhonda↗
A Framework for Assessing the Reusability of Hardware (Reusable Rocket Engines)
Within the space flight community, reusability has taken center stage as the new buzzword. In order for reusable hardware to be competitive with its expendable counterpart, two major elements must be closely scrutinized. First, recovery and refurbishment costs must be lower than the development and acquisition costs. Additionally, the reliability for reused hardware must remain the same (or nearly the same) as "first use" hardware. Therefore, it is imperative that a systematic approach be established to enhance the development of reusable systems. However, before the decision can be made on whether it is more beneficial to reuse hardware or to replace it, the parameters that are needed to deem hardware worthy of reuse must be identified. For reusable hardware to be successful, the factors that must be considered are reliability (integrity, life, number of uses), operability (maintenance, accessibility), and cost (procurement, retrieval, refurbishment). These three factors are essential to the successful implementation of reusability while enabling the ability to meet performance goals. Past and present strategies and attempts at reuse within the space industry will be examined to identify important attributes of reusability that can be used to evaluate hardware when contemplating reusable versus expendable options. This paper will examine why reuse must be stated as an initial requirement rather than included as an afterthought in the final design. Late in the process, changes in the overall objective/purpose of components typically have adverse effects that potentially negate the benefits. A methodology for assessing the viability of reusing hardware will be presented by using the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) to validate the approach. Because reliability, operability, and costs are key drivers in making this critical decision, they will be used to assess requirements for reuse as applied to components of the SSME.
Childress-Thompson, Rhonda↗
Gridtrust: Electricity Grid Root-of-Trust Decentralized Supply Chain Cyber-Security (Final Scientific/Technical Report)
GridTrust represents a departure from reliance on a single organization or a single person to multiple organizations and therefore multiple people across organizational structures. The motivating idea behind involving multiple organizations is the increase in security due to human factors. More specifically, the requirement that distinct people in different organizations sign off on a change or an update makes a cyberattack much less likely due to the inherent requirement that both organizations be penetrated and fooled. GridTrust focuses on the software update process as the primary exemplar for the research and development work. A novel hardware-based technology referred to as a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) provides a microchip Root-of-Trust (RoT), i.e., a starting point for verifying that the hardware being communicated with is the hardware the control center believes the hardware to be. As a result, staff at power grid control centers can ensure the accurate and reliable identification of hardware devices from the outset. The GridTrust protocol introduces two key innovations, as detailed in this report. Firstly, the utilization of a PUF as a root-of-trust in the initial phase of a software or firmware update. Secondly, the application of multiple cryptographic signatures from two or more organizations to the update binary. These signatures are verified before implementing the update on a power grid device in the field. In terms of GridTrust hardware design, this report outlines two main components. The first is the GridTrust Native Device, integrating PUF technology intrinsically into the hardware device itself. The second is the GridTrust Interfacing Device, which incorporates PUF technology and multiple cryptographic signatures. These signatures are cross-checked within a separate hardware positioned between the power grid control center and the legacy power grid device, functioning as an intermediary. While the GridTrust Interfacing Device offers the advantage of being applicable to existing power grid equipment, it may have reduced security if the intermediary component is targeted. On the other hand, the GridTrust Native Device boasts increased security due to protocol integration within a unified form factor. The effectiveness of GridTrust technology has been extensively demonstrated, with multiple external red-team attackers unable to breach GridTrust's security measures. This was observed both in controlled laboratory settings during Phase 1 of the project and in real-world conditions within a City of Marietta substation during Phase 2 of the project.
24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
Choosing reliability level for Shuttle-carried payloads
The paramount importance of high payload reliability is questioned in the light of payload recoverability in Spacelab and Space Shuttle experiments, and cost effectiveness through less stringent reliability requirements backed up by recovery and reflight of the experiment if necessary is considered. Ground rules and parameters for assessing reliability and recoverability in relation to mission cost effectiveness are advanced. Mission success probability (for one or several flights), experiment hardware cost, design reliability, cost of orbiting the experiment, support system reliability, and other relevant parameters are identified and discussed, and graphs of experimental total cost envelope are plotted. It is proposed that reliability and quality assurance standards be weighed against failure costs and penalties in the case of recoverable space systems.
Campbell, J. W.↗
Reliability and Geographic Trends of 50,000 Photovoltaic Systems in the USA: Preprint
This paper presents performance and reliability data from nearly 50,000 photovoltaic (PV) systems totaling 1.7 gigawatts installed capacity in the USA from 2009 to 2012 and their geographic trends. About 90% of the normal systems and about 85% of all systems, including systems with known issues, performed to within 10% or better of expected performance. Although considerable uncertainty may exist due to the nature of the data, hotter climates appear to exhibit some degradation not seen in the more moderate climates. Special causes of underperformance and their impacts are delineated by reliability category. Hardware-related issues are dominated by inverter problems (totaling less than 0.5%) and underperforming modules (totaling less than 0.1%). Furthermore, many reliability categories show a significant decrease in occurrence from year 1 to subsequent years, emphasizing the need for higher-quality installations but also the need for improved standards development. The probability of PV system damage because of hail is below 0.05%. Singular weather events can have a significant impact such as a single lightning strike to a transformer or the impact of a hurricane. However, grid outages are more likely to have a significant impact than PV system damage when extreme weather events occur.
14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
Orbiter Autoland reliability analysis
The Space Shuttle Orbiter is the only space reentry vehicle in which the crew is seated upright. This position presents some physiological effects requiring countermeasures to prevent a crewmember from becoming incapacitated. This also introduces a potential need for automated vehicle landing capability. Autoland is a primary procedure that was identified as a requirement for landing following and extended duration orbiter mission. This report documents the results of the reliability analysis performed on the hardware required for an automated landing. A reliability block diagram was used to evaluate system reliability. The analysis considers the manual and automated landing modes currently available on the Orbiter. (Autoland is presently a backup system only.) Results of this study indicate a +/- 36 percent probability of successfully extending a nominal mission to 30 days. Enough variations were evaluated to verify that the reliability could be altered with missions planning and procedures. If the crew is modeled as being fully capable after 30 days, the probability of a successful manual landing is comparable to that of Autoland because much of the hardware is used for both manual and automated landing modes. The analysis indicates that the reliability for the manual mode is limited by the hardware and depends greatly on crew capability. Crew capability for a successful landing after 30 days has not been determined yet.
Welch, D. Phillip↗
Lessons learned about spaceflight and cell biology experiments
Conducting cell biology experiments in microgravity can be among the most technically challenging events in a biologist's life. Conflicting events of spaceflight include waiting to get manifested, delays in manifest schedules, training astronauts to not shake your cultures and to add reagents slowly, as shaking or quick injection can activate signaling cascades and give you erroneous results. It is important to select good hardware that is reliable. Possible conflicting environments in flight include g-force and vibration of launch, exposure of cells to microgravity for extended periods until hardware is turned on, changes in cabin gases and cosmic radiation. One should have an on-board 1-g control centrifuge in order to eliminate environmental differences. Other obstacles include getting your funding in a timely manner (it is not uncommon for two to three years to pass between notification of grant approval for funding and actually getting funded). That said, it is important to note that microgravity research is worthwhile since all terrestrial life evolved in a gravity field and secrets of biological function may only be answered by removing the constant of gravity. Finally, spaceflight experiments are rewarding and worth your effort and patience.
manned↗
Southwest Wind Power R&D Test Site Development at the National Wind Technology Center (CRADA CRD-12-00472 Final Report)
Southwest Windpower, Inc. (SWWP) has been designing and distributing small wind turbines for more than 22 years and is the recognized global leader in the design, manufacturing and distribution of small wind systems (400-3000 watts). The company has been a pioneer in the development of wind technology and has built and shipped more than 170,000 wind turbines to over 120 countries worldwide. Headquartered in Flagstaff AZ, SWWP has sales representatives in over 88 countries. Applications for SWWP systems include residential homes, commercial properties, micro grids, remote cabins, telecom transmitters, offshore platforms, water pumping and sailboats. In addition, U.S. Department of Defense uses SWWP’s products in Forward Operating Bases (FOB’s), USGS uses them for remote monitoring of glacier movements and the CIA uses them to provide power seismic monitoring. Today, SWWP plans development of new technologies to address distributed energy market needs and become even more aggressive in international markets. This strategy includes extensive Research, Development, Demonstration & Deployment (RDD&D) activities to improve existing production line into more simple, reliable, and cost-effective wind turbine systems. Important part of such activities is the field testing of the new systems, which should provide: (i) validation of the reliable operation of hardware and software; (ii) validation of numerical models of the system and its components; (iii) field comparison of various control and optimization strategies; (iv) customized reliability testing; (v) customized monitoring and analysis testing; and (vi) IEC certification testing (vii) filed demonstration of system performance and reliability. Such field testing facility should encompass multiple towers and appropriate data acquisition systems. SWWP is exploring to move part of the engineering department to Colorado, and execute its RDD&D strategies in this new location. Partnership with NREL will provide great insights into SWWP’s RDD&D processes and more efficient commercialization by utilizing NWTC as the field testing site, and working close with NREL personnel. NWTC is ideally suited to strain the design. NREL is very experienced with customized and IEC testing. During this project, Southwest Windpower aims to improve the value proposition of distributed renewable energy, and make it a competitive choice in the energy markets. As of today, more then 170,000 small wind turbines, manufactured in the U.S., are installed in more then 180 countries. With the improved value proposition, Southwest Windpower wants to create and address new market needs, substantially increase its sales domestically and internationally, which should have positive impact on the creation of American jobs, competitiveness of U.S. economy, export or U.S. products, and the use of renewable energy.
17 WIND ENERGY↗
NASA product assurance in the 1990s
The objectives of NASA product assurance in the 1990s are identified. They are to provide for personnel safety, and safe and reliable operation of hardware and software during the lifetime of a program or mission. The NASA product assurance program, a multi-discipline effort that focuses on safety, reliability, maintainability, and quality assurance expertise to meet NASA operational requirements is described. This program supports NASA 's unmanned launch vehicles such as satellites and planetary probes, manned spacecraft (such as the Space Shuttle and Space Station Freedom), and ground support equipment.
Rodney, George A.↗
Minimum Control Requirements for Advanced Life Support Systems
Advanced control technologies are not necessary for the safe, reliable and continuous operation of Advanced Life Support (ALS) systems. ALS systems can and are adequately controlled by simple, reliable, low-level methodologies and algorithms. The automation provided by advanced control technologies is claimed to decrease system mass and necessary crew time by reducing buffer size and minimizing crew involvement. In truth, these approaches increase control system complexity without clearly demonstrating an increase in reliability across the ALS system. Unless these systems are as reliable as the hardware they control, there is no savings to be had. A baseline ALS system is presented with the minimal control system required for its continuous safe reliable operation. This baseline control system uses simple algorithms and scheduling methodologies and relies on human intervention only in the event of failure of the redundant backup equipment. This ALS system architecture is designed for reliable operation, with minimal components and minimal control system complexity. The fundamental design precept followed is "If it isn't there, it can't fail".
Boulange, Richard↗
Reliability Growth in Space Life Support Systems
A hardware system's failure rate often increases over time due to wear and aging, but not always. Some systems instead show reliability growth, a decreasing failure rate with time, due to effective failure analysis and remedial hardware upgrades. Reliability grows when failure causes are removed by improved design. A mathematical reliability growth model allows the reliability growth rate to be computed from the failure data. The space shuttle was extensively maintained, refurbished, and upgraded after each flight and it experienced significant reliability growth during its operational life. In contrast, the International Space Station (ISS) is much more difficult to maintain and upgrade and its failure rate has been constant over time. The ISS Carbon Dioxide Removal Assembly (CDRA) reliability has slightly decreased. Failures on ISS and with the ISS CDRA continue to be a challenge.
life support↗
Mass and Reliability Source (MaRS) Database
The Mass and Reliability Source (MaRS) Database consolidates components mass and reliability data for all Oribital Replacement Units (ORU) on the International Space Station (ISS) into a single database. It was created to help engineers develop a parametric model that relates hardware mass and reliability. MaRS supplies relevant failure data at the lowest possible component level while providing support for risk, reliability, and logistics analysis. Random-failure data is usually linked to the ORU assembly. MaRS uses this data to identify and display the lowest possible component failure level. As seen in Figure 1, the failure point is identified to the lowest level: Component 2.1. This is useful for efficient planning of spare supplies, supporting long duration crewed missions, allowing quicker trade studies, and streamlining diagnostic processes. MaRS is composed of information from various databases: MADS (operating hours), VMDB (indentured part lists), and ISS PART (failure data). This information is organized in Microsoft Excel and accessed through a program made in Microsoft Access (Figure 2). The focus of the Fall 2017 internship tour was to identify the components that were the root cause of failure from the given random-failure data, develop a taxonomy for the database, and attach material headings to the component list. Secondary objectives included verifying the integrity of the data in MaRS, eliminating any part discrepancies, and generating documentation for future reference. Due to the nature of the random-failure data, data mining had to be done manually without the assistance of an automated program to ensure positive identification.
Valdenegro, Wladimir↗
Memory Errors in Modern Systems: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly
Several recent publications have shown that hardware faults in the memory subsystem are commonplace. These faults are predicted to become more frequent in future systems that contain orders of magnitude more DRAM and SRAM than found in current memory subsystems. These memory subsystems will need to provide resilience techniques to tolerate these faults when deployed in high-performance computing systems and data centers containing tens of thousands of nodes. Therefore, it is critical to understand the efficacy of current hardware resilience techniques to determine whether they will be suitable for future systems. In this paper, we present a study of DRAM and SRAM faults and errors from the field. We use data from two leadership-class high-performance computer systems to analyze the reliability impact of hardware resilience schemes that are deployed in current systems. Our study has several key findings about the efficacy of many currently deployed reliability techniques such as DRAM ECC, DDR address/command parity, and SRAM ECC and parity. We also perform a methodological study, and find that counting errors instead of faults, a common practice among researchers and data center operators, can lead to incorrect conclusions about system reliability. Lastly, we use our data to project the needs of future large-scale systems. We find that SRAM faults are unlikely to pose a significantly larger reliability threat in the future, while DRAM faults will be a major concern and stronger DRAM resilience schemes will be needed to maintain acceptable failure rates similar to those found on today's systems.
97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
Recommendations on the Use of Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts for NASA Missions - Phase II
This assessment had two Phases. Phase I captured NASA Centers’ current practices for commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) parts 1 used in spaceflight systems and ground support equipment (available at https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/20205011579) [ref. 1]. The Phase II report provides guidance for selecting and using COTS parts in NASA missions. The approaches proposed in this report differ from current agency practices. This top-level executive summary touches on these new approaches for using COTS parts but does not provide the detailed information that is critical in understanding the rationale behind these new approaches. Readers will need to read the entire report to gain full understanding and effectively use the recommendations herein. NASA’s historical approach to selecting and applying parts has been to define certain parts, primarily specific classes of military specification (MIL-SPEC) parts, as “standard”, leaving all others, including COTS parts, as nonstandard. Standard parts typically are used without further testing (“use-as-is”). Nonstandard parts are subjected to initial screening and subsequent lot acceptance testing of representative samples from each procured lot per MIL-SPEC or similar requirements. Decades later, top-tier commercial part manufacturers have evolved significant manufacturing, statistical control, and technological improvements that can now provide parts as reliable or more reliable than MIL-SPEC parts, when used within their datasheet limits. Concurrently, the space science and exploration community’s needs demand technological advances unavailable with MIL-SPEC parts. This ongoing change necessitates using COTS parts for space missions. Properly selected COTS parts in appropriate applications can offer performance and supply availability advantages compared to MIL-SPEC parts. Their utility and demonstrated reliability result from large volumes and automated production and testing processes. However, careful review and a thorough understanding of their specifications (i.e., datasheet limitations) is needed, and verifying that manufacturer specifications and reliability meet space hardware application needs are necessary. This report recommends MIL-SPEC screening and non-radiation-related lot acceptance testing be reduced or eliminated in cases where evidence of sufficient quality and reliability exists for COTS parts. The extent of NASA's insight into COTS manufacturers and the amount and nature of the needed evidence will differ by mission and will likely be driven by a mission's resources and associated risk posture. To facilitate this goal, two new terminologies have been defined and described: “Industry Leading Parts Manufacturer (ILPM)” and “Established COTS parts.” An ILPM is a COTS manufacturer that produces high quality and reliable parts. Some parts produced by ILPMs, defined as Established COTS parts, do not need any additional MIL-SPEC or NASA screening and lot acceptance testing to be used in space applications. This report provides guidance for selecting, procuring, and applying COTS parts and for performing part-, board-, and system-level COTS parts verification. The recommendation to select Established COTS parts from ILPMs will assure those COTS parts will have comparable quality to corresponding MIL-SPEC parts. Selecting, applying, and verifying Established COTS parts from ILPMs requires a holistic team approach, engaging parts engineers, circuit designers, quality, reliability, and systems engineers, procurement specialists, radiation specialists, avionics leads, and program/project managers. A mission-specific approach tailored to a project’s Mission, Environment, Applications and Lifetime (MEAL) [ref. 2] requirements should be developed and approved by program/project managers. Any associated risks should be clearly identified, quantified, mitigated, and/or accepted. Different approaches are recommended according to program/project Risk Classes A, B, C, and D [ref. 3] and human-rated missions [ref. 4]: 1. Recommend Classes A and B and human-rated missions consider a “MIL-SPEC parts- based design” approach. ”MIL-SPEC parts-based design” approach is one in which most parts are MIL-SPEC parts and Established COTS parts from ILPMs are used only when an equivalent MIL-SPEC part does not meet functional or size, weight, and power (SWaP) or performance requirements, or is not available. 2. Recommend Classes D and Sub-D missions consider a “System of COTS” approach. “System of COTS” approach is one which most parts are Established COTS parts from ILPMs. 3. Recommend Class C missions determine which approach is the best for their projects; that is, use either a “MIL-SPEC parts-based design” approach, “System of COTS” approach, or a combined approach utilizing elements of both. This report intends to provide guidance in using COTS parts for NASA missions with risk classifications of A through D and human-rated missions; but it does not address the costs of using COTS parts. Costs of using COTS parts in different NASA mission classes can vary significantly even if the same parts are used in different risk postures, due to differing verification levels needed. The guidance does not distinguish between critical or non-critical systems, and a given project will need to apply the appropriate guidance based on their risk posture. The intended audience of this report are NASA personnel and commercial practitioners who support NASA’s spaceflight missions, including spaceflight program or project managers, parts engineers, parts manufacturers, radiation engineers, avionics engineers, system engineers, circuit design engineers, reliability engineers, safety and mission assurance (SMA) personnel, and parts procurement specialists. The NEPP Program will perform a pathfinder study to explore implementing the guidance in this NESC report. An ILPM verification process is not the same as conventional vendor qualification processes performed according to military standards and specifications. This NESC report intends to provide guidance in utilizing available parts data from ILPM manufacturers for parts assurance assessments needed for NASA missions. The report also captured the current practices from DoD and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in Section 10. Note each DoD and FAA report was provided by the corresponding agencies regarding their practices, which are independent from the NESC recommendations in the report.
Commercial-Off-The-Shelf↗