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At least 109 records · Page 6

A Satellite Mortality Study to Support Space Systems Lifetime Prediction

Estimating the operational lifetime of satellites and spacecraft is a complex process. Operational lifetime can differ from mission design lifetime for a variety of reasons. Unexpected mortality can occur due to human errors in design and fabrication, to human errors in launch and operations, to random anomalies of hardware and software or even satellite function degradation or technology change, leading to unrealized economic or mission return. This study focuses on data collection of public information using, for the first time, a large, publically available dataset, and preliminary analysis of satellite lifetimes, both operational lifetime and design lifetime. The objective of this study is the illustration of the relationship of design life to actual lifetime for some representative classes of satellites and spacecraft. First, a Weibull and Exponential lifetime analysis comparison is performed on the ratio of mission operating lifetime to design life, accounting for terminated and ongoing missions. Next a Kaplan-Meier survivor function, standard practice for clinical trials analysis, is estimated from operating lifetime. Bootstrap resampling is used to provide uncertainty estimates of selected survival probabilities. This study highlights the need for more detailed databases and engineering reliability models of satellite lifetime that include satellite systems and subsystems, operations procedures and environmental characteristics to support the design of complex, multi-generation, long-lived space systems in Earth orbit.

Fox, George↗

Report of the Panel on Human Factors

Human error in the operation of complex systems is the largest single cause of incidents, accidents, and the loss of lives and dollars. Therefore, it is understandable that the focus of human factors research and engineering is on increasing our understanding of the basic mechanisms of human error and on developing techniques for reducing or eliminating the various causes of human error.

Rouse, William B.↗

Human factors in aircraft incidents - Results of a 7-year study (Andre Allard Memorial Lecture)

It is pointed out that nearly all fatal aircraft accidents are preventable, and that most such accidents are due to human error. The present discussion is concerned with the results of a seven-year study of the data collected by the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). The Aviation Safety Reporting System was designed to stimulate as large a flow as possible of information regarding errors and operational problems in the conduct of air operations. It was implemented in April, 1976. In the following 7.5 years, 35,000 reports have been received from pilots, controllers, and the armed forces. Human errors are found in more than 80 percent of these reports. Attention is given to the types of events reported, possible causal factors in incidents, the relationship of incidents and accidents, and sources of error in the data. ASRS reports include sufficient detail to permit authorities to institute changes in the national aviation system designed to minimize the likelihood of human error, and to insulate the system against the effects of errors.

Billings, C. E.↗

P-203: Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) Training Course

Lesson 1 Objectives Review risk and reliability concepts and show how they relate to human error Review significant nuclear incidents and underlying human error Review standard terminology in HRA review brief history of HRA and different HRA methods

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Recommendations for reducing ambiguity in written procedures.

Previous studies in the nuclear weapons complex have shown that ambiguous work instructions (WIs) and operating procedures (OPs) can lead to human error, which is a major cause for concern. This report outlines some of the sources of ambiguity in written English and describes three recommendations for reducing ambiguity in WIs and OPs. The recommendations are based on commonly used research techniques in the fields of linguistics and cognitive psychology. The first recommendation is to gather empirical data that can be used to improve the recommended word lists that are provided to technical writers. The second recommendation is to have a review in which new WIs and OPs and checked for ambiguities and clarity. The third recommendation is to use self-paced reading time studies to identify any remaining ambiguities before the new WIs and OPs are put into use. If these three steps are followed for new WIs and OPs, the likelihood of human errors related to ambiguity could be greatly reduced.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

An Approach to Dynamic Human Reliability Analysis and Its Data Collection Framework

Human reliability analysis (HRA) is a method for evaluating human errors in a variety of complex systems such as nuclear power plants, military systems, aircraft, and chemical plants. Most HRA methods currently used by regulatory institutes or utilities are called static HRA and are carried out by simple worksheets or simple calculators. To date, there are many unsolved or intrinsic challenges in static HRA. For example, existing static HRA does not realistically model and evaluate human actions as they would be performed at actual systems. There is no method with HRA to objectively estimate the time required for human actions despite being essential to HRA processes. In addition, many HRA methods still rely on a dataset generated prior to the 1980s, from unrelated industry experience or simply from expert judgment. Accordingly, this study attempted to research how to overcome the challenges of existing HRA via dynamic risk assessment (a.k.a., simulation-based or computation-based risk assessment) techniques. First, this study developed a dynamic HRA method, named as PRocedure-based Investigation Method of EMRALD Risk Assessment – HRA (PRIMERA-HRA). The PRIMERA-HRA mainly concentrates on providing HRA analysts with specific guidelines on how to reasonably model human actions, assign human reliability data and evaluate output of simulation within a dynamic probabilistic risk assessment tool, called as Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD). Second, this study also developed a module for performance shaping factors (i.e., the key concept in HRA quantification) applicable to dynamic HRA, then implemented it based on PRIMERA-HRA within the EMRALD tool. Third, this study developed an HRA data collection framework to support dynamic HRA, called as Simplified Human Error Experimental Program (SHEEP). Originally, the SHEEP study aimed to support static HRA and its data collection, but recently extended the scope to the new technologies such as dynamic HRA or HRA for advanced reactors. SHEEP focuses on the use of data collected from simplified simulators to complement—but not replace—data collection studies using full-scope simulators and actual operators. To date, many experiments were conducted under the SHEEP framework. Multiple analyses, such as human performance analysis, human error analysis, task complexity analysis, learning effect analysis and time distribution analysis, were also carried out using the collected data. Then, based on the major insights, an approach to inferring full-scope data based on simplified simulator data was proposed. The PRIMERA-HRA and SHEEP research are expected to evaluate human actions more realistically than existing static HRA, provide an opportunity to collect more HRA data with reasonable cost and labor, then contribute to enhance the quality of HRA.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

An Approach to Dynamic Human Reliability Analysis and Its Data Collection Framework

Human reliability analysis (HRA) is a method for evaluating human errors in a variety of complex systems such as nuclear power plants, military systems, aircraft, and chemical plants. Most HRA methods currently used by regulatory institutes or utilities are called static HRA and are carried out by simple worksheets or simple calculators. To date, there are many unsolved or intrinsic challenges in static HRA. For example, existing static HRA does not realistically model and evaluate human actions as they would be performed at actual systems. There is no method with HRA to objectively estimate the time required for human actions despite being essential to HRA processes. In addition, many HRA methods still rely on a dataset generated prior to the 1980s, from unrelated industry experience or simply from expert judgment. Accordingly, this study attempted to research how to overcome the challenges of existing HRA via dynamic risk assessment (a.k.a., simulation-based or computation-based risk assessment) techniques. First, this study developed a dynamic HRA method, named as PRocedure-based Investigation Method of EMRALD Risk Assessment – HRA (PRIMERA-HRA). The PRIMERA-HRA mainly concentrates on providing HRA analysts with specific guidelines on how to reasonably model human actions, assign human reliability data and evaluate output of simulation within a dynamic probabilistic risk assessment tool, called as Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD). Second, this study also developed a module for performance shaping factors (i.e., the key concept in HRA quantification) applicable to dynamic HRA, then implemented it based on PRIMERA-HRA within the EMRALD tool. Third, this study developed an HRA data collection framework to support dynamic HRA, called as Simplified Human Error Experimental Program (SHEEP). Originally, the SHEEP study aimed to support static HRA and its data collection, but recently extended the scope to the new technologies such as dynamic HRA or HRA for advanced reactors. SHEEP focuses on the use of data collected from simplified simulators to complement—but not replace—data collection studies using full-scope simulators and actual operators. To date, many experiments were conducted under the SHEEP framework. Multiple analyses, such as human performance analysis, human error analysis, task complexity analysis, learning effect analysis and time distribution analysis, were also carried out using the collected data. Then, based on the major insights, an approach to inferring full-scope data based on simplified simulator data was proposed. The PRIMERA-HRA and SHEEP research are expected to evaluate human actions more realistically than existing static HRA, provide an opportunity to collect more HRA data with reasonable cost and labor, then contribute to enhance the quality of HRA.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Tailoring a Human Reliability Analysis to Your Industry Needs

Companies at risk of accidents caused by human error that result in catastrophic consequences include: airline industry mishaps, medical malpractice, medication mistakes, aerospace failures, major oil spills, transportation mishaps, power production failures and manufacturing facility incidents. Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) is used to analyze the inherent risk of human behavior or actions introducing errors into the operation of a system or process. These assessments can be used to identify where errors are most likely to arise and the potential risks involved if they do occur. Using the basic concepts of HRA, an evolving group of methodologies are used to meet various industry needs. Determining which methodology or combination of techniques will provide a quality human reliability assessment is a key element to developing effective strategies for understanding and dealing with risks caused by human errors. There are a number of concerns and difficulties in "tailoring" a Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) for different industries. Although a variety of HRA methodologies are available to analyze human error events, determining the most appropriate tools to provide the most useful results can depend on industry specific cultures and requirements. Methodology selection may be based on a variety of factors that include: 1) how people act and react in different industries, 2) expectations based on industry standards, 3) factors that influence how the human errors could occur such as tasks, tools, environment, workplace, support, training and procedure, 4) type and availability of data, 5) how the industry views risk & reliability, and 6) types of emergencies, contingencies and routine tasks. Other considerations for methodology selection should be based on what information is needed from the assessment. If the principal concern is determination of the primary risk factors contributing to the potential human error, a more detailed analysis method may be employed versus a requirement to provide a numerical value as part of a probabilistic risk assessment. Industries involved with humans operating large equipment or transport systems (ex. railroads or airlines) would have more need to address the man machine interface than medical workers administering medications. Human error occurs in every industry; in most cases the consequences are relatively benign and occasionally beneficial. In cases where the results can have disastrous consequences, the use of Human Reliability techniques to identify and classify the risk of human errors allows a company more opportunities to mitigate or eliminate these types of risks and prevent costly tragedies.

DeMott, D. L.↗

Modeling Distributed Situation Awareness in Resilience-Based Design of Complex Engineered Systems

Human operators play a major role in the resilience of complex systems–while human error is one of the biggest contributors to hazardous events, operators additionally play a critical role in mitigating hazardous events. A key factor underlying this operator resilience is situation awareness–the ability of operators to understand their environment and each other to achieve desired system functions. In contrast to situation awareness-related accident models in the literature, which are largely conceptual in nature, this work proposes the use of a dynamic simulation framework to concretely model both the effects of situation awareness-related human errors and situation awareness-related hazard-mitigating properties using the distributed situation awareness theory. This work then presents specialized model constructs to enable agents’ individual perceptions of the system state and transactions with other agents (and thus distributed situation awareness) to be represented in simulation. To demonstrate this framework, it is then adapted to an aircraft taxiway case study, where it is used to model aircraft conflicts due to lack of vision and poor communications from the air traffic controller. This demonstration shows the potential of using simulation models to rigorously understand situation awareness-related human errors and thus inform the design of resilience.

Resilience Modeling↗

Modeling Distributed Situation Awareness in Resilience-based Design of Complex Systems

Human operators play a major role in the resilience of complex systems–while human error is one of the biggest contributors to hazardous events, operators additionally play a critical role in mitigating hazardous events. A key factor underlying this operator resilience is situation awareness–the ability of operators to understand their environment and each other to achieve desired system functions. In contrast to situation awareness-related accident models in the literature, which are largely conceptual in nature, this work proposes the use of a dynamic simulation framework to concretely model both the effects of situation awareness-related human errors and situation awareness-related hazard-mitigating properties using the distributed situation awareness theory. This work then presents specialized model constructs to enable agents’ individual perceptions of the system state and transactions with other agents (and thus distributed situation awareness) to be represented in simulation. To demonstrate this framework, it is then adapted to an aircraft taxiway case study, where it is used to model aircraft conflicts due to lack of vision and poor communications from the air traffic controller. This demonstration shows the potential of using simulation models to rigorously understand situation awareness-related human errors and thus inform the design of resilience.

Resilience Modeling↗

Understanding Risk Tolerance and Building an Effective Safety Culture

Estimates range from 65-90 percent of catastrophic mishaps are due to human error. NASA's human factors-related mishaps causes are estimated at approximately 75 percent. As much as we'd like to error-proof our work environment, even the most automated and complex technical endeavors require human interaction... and are vulnerable to human frailty. Industry and government are focusing not only on human factors integration into hazardous work environments, but also looking for practical approaches to cultivating a strong Safety Culture that diminishes risk. Industry and government organizations have recognized the value of monitoring leading indicators to identify potential risk vulnerabilities. NASA has adapted this approach to assess risk controls associated with hazardous, critical, and complex facilities. NASA's facility risk assessments integrate commercial loss control, OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration) Process Safety, API (American Petroleum Institute) Performance Indicator Standard, and NASA Operational Readiness Inspection concepts to identify risk control vulnerabilities.

Loyd, David↗

Intelligent Component Monitoring for Nuclear Power Plants

Reliability and economy are two major concerns for a nuclear power generation system. Next generation nuclear power reactors are being developed to be more reliable and economic. An effective and efficient surveillance system can generously contribute toward this goal. Recent progress in computer systems and computational tools has made it necessary and possible to upgrade current surveillance/monitoring strategy for better performance. For example, intelligent computing techniques can be applied to develop algorithm that help people better understand the information collected from sensors and thus reduce human error to a new low level. Incidents incurred from human error in nuclear industry are not rare and have been proven costly. The goal of this project is to develop and test an intelligent prognostics methodology for predicting aging effects impacting long-term performance of nuclear components and systems. The approach is particularly suitable for predicting the performance of nuclear reactor systems which have low failure probabilities (e.g., less than 10-6 year-). Such components and systems are often perceived as peripheral to the reactor and are left somewhat unattended. That is, even when inspected, if they are not perceived to be causing some immediate problem, they may not be paid due attention. Attention to such systems normally involves long term monitoring and possibly reasoning with multiple features and evidence, requirements that are not best suited for humans.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Time Distribution Analysis for Task Primitives to Support Dynamic Human Reliability Analysis

To support data collection for dynamic human reliability analysis (HRA), this study investigates time distributions for task primitives defined in the Goals, Operators, Methods, and Selection rules (GOMS)–Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) method and Human Reliability data EXtraction (HuREX). GOMS-HRA was developed to provide cognition-based time and human error probability (HEP) information for dynamic HRA calculations within the Human Unimodel for Nuclear Technology to Enhance Reliability (HUNTER) framework, while HuREX is a comprehensive HRA data collection method developed by the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI). In this paper, we examine time distributions by using experimental data collected from the Simplified Human Error Experimental Program (SHEEP) study, which proposes an HRA data collection framework to complement full-scope simulator research and gather input data for dynamic HRA by using simplified simulators such as the Rancor Microworld simulator. This paper investigates whether the time required for GOMS-HRA and HuREX task primitives fits 13 statistical distributions. Additionally, we compare and discuss the time distributions obtained from both student operators and professional operators. The result was that this study identified several time distributions for five GOMS-HRA and four HuREX task primitives. In the future, the results of this study are expected to provide objective reference data on the elapsed time for task primitives and aid in realistically simulating scenarios within dynamic HRA.

Dynamic Human Reliability Analysis↗

An Approach to Dependence Assessment in Human Reliability Analysis: Application of Lag and Linger Effects

Dependence assessment refers to an approach used in human reliability analysis (HRA) to adjust a human error probability (HEP) for the following action by considering the impact of the preceding action. It has been known to significantly affect the overall results of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA). If the dependence assessment is not adequate, the result could be unconvincing for explaining the operator failures in the context of PSA. To date, several methods and some recent research have identified suggestions for treating dependence issues in HRA; however, these are still exclusively based on the intrinsic approach of the Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP), an HRA method. THERP inevitably has a challenge with the subjectivity of expert evaluation as well as the requirement for PSA and HRA expertise with resource-intensive and time-consuming processes. This paper suggests an approach to dependence assessment that could not only minimize the influence of expert judgment, but also saves time to perform the analysis with reasonable manpower. It modifies existing HRA methods with considering lag and linger effects to apply dependence effects for them. Based on a representative HRA method, i.e., Standardized Plant Analysis Risk - HRA (SPAR-H), guidance for how to apply lag and linger effects for the HRA method is suggested. Then, an investigation is carried out to compare quantification results of the revised HRA method with that of the original approach based on experimental data.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Anatomy of an incident

A traditional view of incidents is that they are caused by shortcomings in human competence, attention, or attitude. It may be under the label of “loss of situational awareness,” procedure “violation,” or “poor” management. A different view is that human error is not the cause of failure, but a symptom of failure – trouble deeper inside the system. In this perspective, human error is not the conclusion, but rather the starting point of investigations. During an investigation, three types of information are gathered: physical, documentary, and human (recall/experience). Through the causal analysis process, apparent cause or apparent causes are identified as the most probable cause or causes of an incident or condition that management has the control to fix and for which effective recommendations for corrective actions can be generated. A causal analysis identifies relevant human performance factors. In the following presentation, the anatomy of a radiological incident is discussed, and one case study is presented. We analyzed the contributing factors that caused a radiological incident. When underlying conditions, decisions, actions, and inactions that contribute to the incident are identified. This includes weaknesses that may warrant improvements that tolerate error. Measures that reduce consequences or likelihood of recurrence are discussed.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Lost in Translation: the Case for Integrated Testing

The building of a spacecraft is complex and often involves multiple suppliers and companies that have their own designs and processes. Standards have been developed across the industries to reduce the chances for critical flight errors at the system level, but the spacecraft is still vulnerable to the introduction of critical errors during integration of these systems. Critical errors can occur at any time during the process and in many cases, human reliability analysis (HRA) identifies human error as a risk driver. Most programs have a test plan in place that is intended to catch these errors, but it is not uncommon for schedule and cost stress to result in less testing than initially planned. Therefore, integrated testing, or "testing as you fly," is essential as a final check on the design and assembly to catch any errors prior to the mission. This presentation will outline the unique benefits of integrated testing by catching critical flight errors that can otherwise go undetected, discuss HRA methods that are used to identify opportunities for human error, lessons learned and challenges over ownership of testing will be discussed.

Young, Aaron↗

Integrating Human Performance and Technology

Human error is a significant factor in the cause and/or complication of events that occur in the commercial nuclear industry. In recent years, great gains have been made using Human Performance (HU) tools focused on targeting individual behaviors. However, the cost of improving HU is growing and resistance to add yet another HU tool certainly exists, particularly for those tools that increase the paperwork for operations. Improvements in HU that are the result of leveraging existing technology, such as hand-held mobile technologies, have the potential to reduce human error in controlling system configurations, safety tag-outs, and other verifications. Operator rounds, valve line-up verifications, containment closure verifications, safety & equipment protection, and system tagging can be supported by field-deployable wireless technologies. These devices can also support the availability of critical component data in the main control room and other locations. This research pilot project reviewing wireless hand-held technology is part of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program (LWRSP), a research and development (R&D) program sponsored by the U. S. Department of Energy (DOE). The project is being performed in close collaboration with industry R&D programs to provide the technical foundations for licensing, and managing the long-term, safe, and economical operation of current nuclear power plants. The LWRSP vision is to develop technologies and other solutions that can improve the reliability, sustain the safety, and extend the life of the current nuclear reactor fleet.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Toward a human-centered aircraft automation philosophy

The evolution of automation in civil aircraft is examined in order to discern trends in the respective roles and functions of automation technology and the humans who operate these aircraft. The effects of advances in automation technology on crew reaction is considered and it appears that, though automation may well have decreased the frequency of certain types of human errors in flight, it may also have enabled new categories of human errors, some perhaps less obvious and therefore more serious than those it has alleviated. It is suggested that automation could be designed to keep the pilot closer to the control of the vehicle, while providing an array of information management and aiding functions designed to provide the pilot with data regarding flight replanning, degraded system operation, and the operational status and limits of the aircraft, its systems, and the physical and operational environment. The automation would serve as the pilot's assistant, providing and calculating data, watching for the unexpected, and keeping track of resources and their rate of expenditure.

Billings, Charles E.↗