Results for “human errors.” — Page 6

NASA NTRS2017

Accounting for the Speed-Accuracy Trade-Off in Quantifying Human-In-The-Loop Error Probabilities

Human-in-the-loop (HITL) simulations cannot collect enough data from human operators to validate estimates of error probabilities for task components. Error rates for tasks have been estimated by using laboratory data for error rates depending on variables such as the cognitive complexity of the task. The limited channel capacity of human operators compels error rates to be strongly related to the time available for the task, the speed-accuracy trade-off. HITL simulations can provide valuable data on the time available for the operator's tasks. We propose that the response times be used in conjunction with measured speed-accuracy curves to estimate the operator error rates contributing to mission failure. Such analyses should be especially important in the estimation of error rates in off-nominal situations.

probability↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Can Resilience Assessments Inform Early Design Human Factors Decision-making?

There is a growing call among researchers for tighter coupling between human factors and human reliability assessments. In this research, we explore if early design stage resilience assessments can help bridge some of the gaps between human factors and human reliability assessments. Resilience in systems is their ability to recover reasonably and operate within acceptable bounds during failures and unexpected events. The fmdtools toolkit allows designers to assess the resilience of a system by modeling the human error and machine-related failure propagation in both nominal and faulty scenarios during the early design stages. As a result, the fmdtools toolkit has a low-fidelity dynamic human reliability assessment component built into it. In this paper, we study if the results from the fmdtools simulations can help inform and prioritize human factors design decision-making, resulting in tighter coupling between human factors and human reliability assessments during the design process. Specifically, we explore the results from a rover design example to understand the types of information that can help guide human factor-related decision-making.

Resilience-based Design↗

NASA NTRS2013

HRA Aerospace Challenges

Compared to equipment designed to perform the same function over and over, humans are just not as reliable. Computers and machines perform the same action in the same way repeatedly getting the same result, unless equipment fails or a human interferes. Humans who are supposed to perform the same actions repeatedly often perform them incorrectly due to a variety of issues including: stress, fatigue, illness, lack of training, distraction, acting at the wrong time, not acting when they should, not following procedures, misinterpreting information or inattention to detail. Why not use robots and automatic controls exclusively if human error is so common? In an emergency or off normal situation that the computer, robotic element, or automatic control system is not designed to respond to, the result is failure unless a human can intervene. The human in the loop may be more likely to cause an error, but is also more likely to catch the error and correct it. When it comes to unexpected situations, or performing multiple tasks outside the defined mission parameters, humans are the only viable alternative. Human Reliability Assessments (HRA) identifies ways to improve human performance and reliability and can lead to improvements in systems designed to interact with humans. Understanding the context of the situation that can lead to human errors, which include taking the wrong action, no action or making bad decisions provides additional information to mitigate risks. With improved human reliability comes reduced risk for the overall operation or project.

DeMott, Diana↗

NASA NTRS2016

Why Do People Make Mistakes?

Multitasking is endemic in modern life and work: drivers talk on cell phones, office workers type while answering phone calls, students do homework while text messaging, nurses prepare injections while responding to doctors calls, and air traffic controllers direct aircraft in one sector while handling additional traffic in another. Whether in daily life or at work, we are constantly bombarded with multiple, concurrent interruptions and demands and we have all somehow come to believe in the myth that we can, and in fact are expected to, easily address them all - without any repercussions. However, accumulating scientific evidence is now suggesting that multitasking increases the probability of human error. This talk presents a set of NASA studies that characterize concurrent demands in one work domain, routine airline cockpit operations, in order to illustrate the ways operational task demands together with the proclivity to manage them all concurrently make human performance in this and in any domain vulnerable to potentially serious errors and to accidents.

multitasking↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Establishing Trust in NASA’s Artemis Campaign Computer-Human Interface (CHI) Implementation

The NASA Artemis program will return humans to the Moon. This time, with the help of commercial and international partners, the program's objective is a permanent moon base. The moon base infrastructure, including an orbiting moon station and moon surface assets, will be developed for astronauts to stay for the long haul to learn to live and work on another planet in preparation for an eventual Humans-to-Mars mission. As the roundtrip communication delays increase in deep space exploration, the crew will need more onboard systems autonomy and functionality to maintain and control the vehicle or habitat. These mission constraints will change the current Earth-based spacecraft to ground control support approach that will demand more safe, efficient, and effective Computer-Human Interface (CHI) control. For Artemis, CHI is defined as the elements that the crew interfaces with: audio, video, lighting, and crew controls subsystems. Understanding how CHI will need to evolve to support deep space missions will be critical for the Artemis program--especially crew controls, which is the focus of this paper. How does NASA ensure crew controls are reliable enough to control complex systems and prevent a catastrophic event due to human error--especially when the astronauts could be physiologically and/or psychologically impaired? NASA's approach to mitigating catastrophic hazards in human spaceflight system development such as crew controls, is through a holistic system engineering and Human System Integration methodology that focuses on incorporating NASA's Human-Rating Requirements-that ensures human performance characteristics to control/safely recover the crew from hazardous situations within the human interface design are considered. This paper discusses, at a high level, CHI for the Artemis program. Next, a discussion of what it means to human-rate a space system crew controls and how trust in the human-computer interface begins with the NASA human rating requirements. Finally, a discussion on how systems engineering and the human system integration process ensures that crew control implementation incorporates the NASA human-rating requirements.

artemis↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Establishing Trust in NASA’s Artemis Campaign Computer-Human Interface (CHI) Implementation

The NASA Artemis program will return humans to the Moon. This time, with the help of commercial and international partners, the program's objective is a permanent moon base. The moon base infrastructure, including an orbiting moon station and moon surface assets, will be developed for astronauts to stay for the long haul to learn to live and work on another planet in preparation for an eventual Humans-to-Mars mission. As the roundtrip communication delays increase in deep space exploration, the crew will need more onboard systems autonomy and functionality to maintain and control the vehicle or habitat. These mission constraints will change the current Earth-based spacecraft to ground control support approach that will demand more safe, efficient, and effective Computer-Human Interface (CHI) control. For Artemis, CHI is defined as the elements that the crew interfaces with: audio, video, lighting, and crew controls subsystems. Understanding how CHI will need to evolve to support deep space missions will be critical for the Artemis program--especially crew controls, which is the focus of this paper. How does NASA ensure crew controls are reliable enough to control complex systems and prevent a catastrophic event due to human error--especially when the astronauts could be physiologically and/or psychologically impaired? NASA's approach to mitigating catastrophic hazards in human spaceflight system development such as crew controls, is through a holistic system engineering and Human System Integration methodology that focuses on incorporating NASA's Human-Rating Requirements-that ensures human performance characteristics to control/safely recover the crew from hazardous situations within the human interface design are considered. This paper discusses, at a high level, CHI for the Artemis program. Next, a discussion of what it means to human-rate a space system crew controls and how trust in the human-computer interface begins with the NASA human rating requirements. Finally, a discussion on how systems engineering and the human system integration process ensures that crew control implementation incorporates the NASA human-rating requirements.

artemis↗

NASA NTRS1994

Advanced automated glass cockpit certification: Being wary of human factors

This paper presents some facets of the French experience with human factors in the process of certification of advanced automated cockpits. Three types of difficulties are described: first, the difficulties concerning the hotly debated concept of human error and its non-linear relationship to risk of accident; a typology of errors to be taken into account in the certification process is put forward to respond to this issue. Next, the difficulties connected to the basically gradual and evolving nature of pilot expertise on a given type of aircraft, which contrasts with the immediate and definitive style of certifying systems. The last difficulties to be considered are those related to the goals of certification itself on these new aircraft and the status of findings from human factor analyses (in particular, what should be done with disappointing results, how much can the changes induced by human factors investigation economically affect aircraft design, how many errors do we need to accumulate before we revise the system, what should be remedied when human factor problems are discovered at the certification stage: the machine? pilot training? the rules? or everything?). The growth of advanced-automated glass cockpits has forced the international aeronautical community to pay more attention to human factors during the design phase, the certification phase and pilot training. The recent creation of a human factor desk at the DGAC-SFACT (Official French services) is a direct consequence of this. The paper is divided into three parts. Part one debates human error and its relationship with system design and accident risk. Part two describes difficulties connected to the basically gradual and evolving nature of pilot expertise on a given type of aircraft, which contrasts with the immediate and definitive style of certifying systems. Part three focuses on concrete outcomes of human factors for certification purposes.

Amalberti, Rene↗

NASA NTRS1990

National plan to enhance aviation safety through human factors improvements

The purpose of this section of the plan is to establish a development and implementation strategy plan for improving safety and efficiency in the Air Traffic Control (ATC) system. These improvements will be achieved through the proper applications of human factors considerations to the present and future systems. The program will have four basic goals: (1) prepare for the future system through proper hiring and training; (2) develop a controller work station team concept (managing human errors); (3) understand and address the human factors implications of negative system results; and (4) define the proper division of responsibilities and interactions between the human and the machine in ATC systems. This plan addresses six program elements which together address the overall purpose. The six program elements are: (1) determine principles of human-centered automation that will enhance aviation safety and the efficiency of the air traffic controller; (2) provide new and/or enhanced methods and techniques to measure, assess, and improve human performance in the ATC environment; (3) determine system needs and methods for information transfer between and within controller teams and between controller teams and the cockpit; (4) determine how new controller work station technology can optimally be applied and integrated to enhance safety and efficiency; (5) assess training needs and develop improved techniques and strategies for selection, training, and evaluation of controllers; and (6) develop standards, methods, and procedures for the certification and validation of human engineering in the design, testing, and implementation of any hardware or software system element which affects information flow to or from the human.

Foushee, Clay↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Artemis Flight Plan Evolution

Current capabilities and processes are insufficient to confidently meet mission objectives given the complexity of humans on the ground and on-orbit working with different automated vehicles. This research aims to reduce risk of human error by providing a consolidated, human-digestible, source of information that can be used in pre-mission through mission execution by all team members involved in spaceflight.

Mission Control↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Psychophysiological Methods to Assess Pilot Productive Safety Behaviors

The NASA System-Wide Safety (SWS) Project is focused on developing new technologies and operational concepts for the aviation industry to meet the increasing global demand while maintaining the current ultra-safe system safety levels. To achieve this, the SWS Project is developing research priorities, including In-time System-wide Safety Assurance (ISSA) and In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS; Ellis et al., 2019). A critical component of the IASMS is the human as pilot and in other roles in aviation operations as demonstrated by SWS human factors research on rare occurrences of human error and the far more prevalent human safety producing behaviors (e.g., Hollnagel, 2016). The talk presented by Chad Stephens of NASA Langley Research Center and NASA SWS Project will describe the history of human factors research involving psychophysiological and biocybernetics methods supporting aviation safety conducted at NASA. Specific examples of recent NASA crew state monitoring research focused on a psychophysiological assessment method and system to enable Training for Attention Management will be demonstrated. Current SWS research including the SWS Operations and Technologies for Enabling Resilient In-Time Assurance (SOTERIA) flight simulation study and a data testbed created to enable study of Human Contributions to Safety (HC2S) will be presented. Ongoing collaborative research efforts with Boeing researchers will be highlighted and opportunities for further collaboration will be discussed.

psychophysiology↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Contribution of Pilots to Resilience in Normal Operations: A Survey Approach

Much of our knowledge about human performance in flight safety has come from the analysis of undesired events, whether accidents, incidents, or crew behaviors identified via flight exceedance monitoring or observational techniques. In recent years, there has been an acknowledgement that operational personnel are not merely sources of “human error”, but also make a unique human contribution to safe outcomes. In a few celebrated cases, this takes the form of “heroic saves”, but on many more occasions, operational personnel contribute to safety through everyday, often-unnoticed actions that turn potentially hazardous situations into non-events. An emerging approach to safety, frequently referred to as “Safety II,” proposes that the positive human contribution is an important and largely untapped source of safety information. Some airlines have successfully trained observers to identify and record the positive behaviors exhibited by the crew over the course of a flight. In other cases, flight crew are interviewed about good practices or positive behaviors. However, each of these methods are relatively limited in scale and resource intensive. A survey could provide a relatively low-cost approach to systematically gather this information on a larger scale. The primary purpose of the research was to develop and assess a surveys methodology for assessing crews' activities in normal flights and the operational perturbations encountered during normal operations. We hope that such a survey could be both a research tool as well as a safety management aid for the aviation industry. We collected responses concerning revenue flights from two groups of airline pilots (N = 25 & N= 65). The results indicated that relatively few flights proceeded exactly as in the original flight plan. Pilots routinely anticipated and adapted to changing circumstances. We will review the challenges encountered in developing the survey and summarize preliminary findings from two administrations of the survey to airline pilots.

human contribution safety↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Contribution of Pilots to Resilience in Normal Operations. Part II: A closer look at briefings: Anticipation and Monitoring Also Known as Planning and Coordination

Much of our knowledge about human performance in flight safety has come from the analysis of undesired events, whether accidents, incidents, or crew behaviors identified via flight exceedance monitoring or observational techniques. In recent years, there has been an acknowledgement that operational personnel are not merely sources of “human error”, but also make a unique human contribution to safe outcomes. In a few celebrated cases, this takes the form of “heroic saves”, but on many more occasions, operational personnel contribute to safety through everyday, often-unnoticed actions that turn potentially hazardous situations into non-events. An emerging approach to safety, frequently referred to as “Safety II,” proposes that the positive human contribution is an important and largely untapped source of safety information. Some airlines have successfully trained observers to identify and record the positive behaviors exhibited by the crew over the course of a flight. In other cases, flight crew are interviewed about good practices or positive behaviors. However, each of these methods are relatively limited in scale and resource intensive. A survey could provide a relatively low-cost approach to systematically gather this information on a larger scale. The primary purpose of the research was to develop and assess a surveys methodology for assessing crews' activities in normal flights and the operational perturbations encountered during normal operations. We hope that such a survey could be both a research tool as well as a safety management aid for the aviation industry. We collected responses concerning revenue flights from two groups of airline pilots (N = 25 & N= 65). The results indicated that relatively few flights proceeded exactly as in the original flight plan. Pilots routinely anticipated and adapted to changing circumstances. We will review the challenges encountered in developing the survey and summarize preliminary findings from two administrations of the survey to airline pilots.

human contribution safety↗

NASA NTRS2004

Performance Effects of Display Incogruity in a Digital and Analog Clock Reading Task

In an era of increasing automation, it is important to design displays and input devices that minimize human error. In this context, information concerning the human response to the detection of incongruous information is important. Such incongruous information can be operationalized as unexpected (perhaps erroneous) information on which a decision by the human or operation by an automated system is based. In the aviation environment, decision making when faced with inadequate, incomplete, or incongruous information may occur in a failure scenario. An additional challenge facing the human operator in automated environments is maintaining alertness or vigilance. The vigilance issue is of particular concern as a factor that may interact with performance when faced with inadequate, incomplete, or incongruous information. From the literature on eye-scan behavior we know that the time spent looking at a particular display or indicator is a function of the type of information one is trying to discern from the display. For example, quick glances are all it takes for confirming that an indicator is in a normal position or range, whereas a continuous look of several seconds may be required for confirmation that a complex control input is having the desired effect. Important to consider is that while an extended look takes place, visual input from other sources may be missed. Much like an extended look, the interpretation of incongruous information may require extra time. The present experiment was designed to explore the performance consequences of a decision making task when incongruous information was presented. For this experiment a display incongruity was created on a subset of trials of a clock reading laboratory task. Display incongruity was made possible through presentation of 'impossible' times (e.g. 1:65 or 11:90). Subjects made 'same' 'different' decisions and keyboard responses to pairings of Analog-Analog (AA), Digital-Digital (DD), and Analog- Digital (AD), display combinations. For trials during which display incongruities were not presented, based on prior research comparing digital and analog clock displays, it would be expected that the Digital-Digital condition would result in the shortest response times and the Analog-Analog and Analog-Digital conditions would have longer response times. The performance consequence expected on trials with incongruous times would be very long response times.

J. Raymond Comstock, Jr.↗

NASA NTRS2006

An Efficient Approach for the Reliability Analysis of Phased-Mission Systems with Dependent Failures

We consider the reliability analysis of phased-mission systems with common-cause failures in this paper. Phased-mission systems (PMS) are systems supporting missions characterized by multiple, consecutive, and nonoverlapping phases of operation. System components may be subject to different stresses as well as different reliability requirements throughout the course of the mission. As a result, component behavior and relationships may need to be modeled differently from phase to phase when performing a system-level reliability analysis. This consideration poses unique challenges to existing analysis methods. The challenges increase when common-cause failures (CCF) are incorporated in the model. CCF are multiple dependent component failures within a system that are a direct result of a shared root cause, such as sabotage, flood, earthquake, power outage, or human errors. It has been shown by many reliability studies that CCF tend to increase a system's joint failure probabilities and thus contribute significantly to the overall unreliability of systems subject to CCF.We propose a separable phase-modular approach to the reliability analysis of phased-mission systems with dependent common-cause failures as one way to meet the above challenges in an efficient and elegant manner. Our methodology is twofold: first, we separate the effects of CCF from the PMS analysis using the total probability theorem and the common-cause event space developed based on the elementary common-causes; next, we apply an efficient phase-modular approach to analyze the reliability of the PMS. The phase-modular approach employs both combinatorial binary decision diagram and Markov-chain solution methods as appropriate. We provide an example of a reliability analysis of a PMS with both static and dynamic phases as well as CCF as an illustration of our proposed approach. The example is based on information extracted from a Mars orbiter project. The reliability model for this orbiter considers the various phases of Launch, Cruise, Mars Orbit Insertion, and Orbit. Some of the CCF for the orbiter in this mission include environmental effects, such as micrometeoroids, human operator errors, and software errors.

reliability analysis↗

NASA NTRS1984

Preparing for the unexpected - A psychologist's case for improved training

In the procedures designed to minimize human errors that lead to aircraft incidents, the improved human factor engineering and automation approaches must be supplemented by new training methods. Changes are suggested in the preprogrammed training principles which are currently based almost exclusively on the procedures-oriented environment, with insufficient training for cognitive processing and awareness. Use of the Line-Oriented Flight Training procedure, in which a training simulator is supplemented by a highly structured script or scenario to simulate the total line operational environment for the purpose of simultaneously training the entire flight crew, offers one way of providing pilots and other crewmembers with the experience of dealing with unexpected or stressful events. Of primary importance is maximal coordination between the aircraft captain and other crewmembers during the flight, which puts emphasis on the importance of teamwork and personal relations among all other crewmembers. The current FARs governing training and proficiency will have to be modified to accommodate new training appoaches.

Foushee, H. C.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Helicopter human factors

The state-of-the-art helicopter and its pilot are examined using the tools of human-factors analysis. The significant role of human error in helicopter accidents is discussed; the history of human-factors research on helicopters is briefly traced; the typical flight tasks are described; and the noise, vibration, and temperature conditions typical of modern military helicopters are characterized. Also considered are helicopter controls, cockpit instruments and displays, and the impact of cockpit design on pilot workload. Particular attention is given to possible advanced-technology improvements, such as control stabilization and augmentation, FBW and fly-by-light systems, multifunction displays, night-vision goggles, pilot night-vision systems, night-vision displays with superimposed symbols, target acquisition and designation systems, and aural displays. Diagrams, drawings, and photographs are provided.

Hart, Sandra G.↗

NASA NTRS2013

Psychophysiology of Spaceflight and Aviation

In space, the absence of gravity alone causes unique physiological stress. Significant biomedical changes, across multiple organ systems, such as body fluid redistribution, diminished musculoskeletal strength, changes in cardiac function and sensorimotor control have been reported. The time course of development of these disorders and severity of symptoms experienced by individuals varies widely. Space motion sickness (SMS) is an example of maladaptation to microgravity, which occurs early in the mission and can have profound effects on physical health and crew performance. Disturbances in sleep quality, perception, emotional equilibrium and mood have also been reported, with impact to health and performance varying widely across individuals. And lastly, post-flight orthostatic intolerance, low blood pressure experienced after returning to Earth, is also of serious concern. Both the Russian and American space programs have a varied list of human errors and mistakes, which adversely impacted mission goals. Continued probability of human exposure to microgravity for extended time periods provides a rationale for the study of the effects of stress. The primary focus of this research group is directed toward examining individual differences in: (a) prediction of susceptibility to these disorders, (b) assessment of symptom severity, (c) evaluation of the effectiveness of countermeasures, and (d) developing and testing a physiological training method, Autogenic-Feedback Training Exercise (AFTE) as a countermeasure with multiple applications. The present paper reports on the results of a series of human flight experiments with AFTE aboard the Space Shuttle and Mir Space Station, and during emergency flight scenarios on Earth.

Cowings, Patricia↗

NASA NTRS1986

At least some errors are randomly generated (Freud was wrong)

An experiment was carried out to expose something about human error generating mechanisms. In the context of the experiment, an error was made when a subject pressed the wrong key on a computer keyboard or pressed no key at all in the time allotted. These might be considered, respectively, errors of substitution and errors of omission. Each of seven subjects saw a sequence of three digital numbers, made an easily learned binary judgement about each, and was to press the appropriate one of two keys. Each session consisted of 1,000 presentations of randomly permuted, fixed numbers broken into 10 blocks of 100. One of two keys should have been pressed within one second of the onset of each stimulus. These data were subjected to statistical analyses in order to probe the nature of the error generating mechanisms. Goodness of fit tests for a Poisson distribution for the number of errors per 50 trial interval and for an exponential distribution of the length of the intervals between errors were carried out. There is evidence for an endogenous mechanism that may best be described as a random error generator. Furthermore, an item analysis of the number of errors produced per stimulus suggests the existence of a second mechanism operating on task driven factors producing exogenous errors. Some errors, at least, are the result of constant probability generating mechanisms with error rate idiosyncratically determined for each subject.

Sellen, A. J.↗