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97 records · Page 6

Risk-informed Physical Security Using Dynamic Force-on-Force Modelling Tools (ABSTRACT)

Physical security requirement of nuclear power plants (NPPs) in the US is regulated in a mainly prescriptive manner. This “one size fits all” approach may consequently overlook plant-specific characteristics which are beneficial for the inherent safety and security of the plant. Although a performance-based security measure has been promulgated in 10 CFR 73.55(r), current evaluation methods generally emphasize static and conservative assumptions on physical security uncertainties. This conservatism contributes to the overall operational and maintenance costs, which account to 70% of total operating expenditures for an NPP. This paper describes an ongoing work at the Idaho National Laboratory within the Light Water Reactor Sustainability pathway, which aims to optimize physical protection system with regards to system effectiveness and dollar costs. To achieve this goal, a risk-informed approach to physical security is proposed. This approach leverages the Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) tool to model facility infiltration and Force-on-Force (FoF) engagement in a dynamic manner. The dynamic FoF analysis was conducted by coupling human performance uncertainties modeled in EMRALD to existing commercial 3-dimensional FoF software, i.e. SCRIBE3D, AVERT and Simajin. Meanwhile, risk analysis was accomplished by coupling the attack outcomes to existing plant Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) model with FLEX strategy. This approach reduces the conservatisms in security modeling and further acknowledges the possibility for plant operators to mitigate the attack outcomes. A sabotage attack on a hypothetical NPP facility was devised to demonstrate the proposed methodology. Dynamic FoF rules were implemented in EMRALD coupled to SCRIBE3D. This dynamic evaluation revealed an additional 21% system effectiveness in protecting the target set relative to the static modelling approach. Furthermore, the conditional core damage probability could be reduced by up to 46% by crediting operator actions in mitigating the sabotage outcomes. We evaluated the relative importance of each component of the physical security posture included in the model and assessed tradeoffs between components to identify potential opportunities for cost reduction while maintaining a specific level of system effectiveness. Results of the cost analysis will be presented in the conference. This study is expected to help NPP operators in allocating resources optimally to satisfy the security requirements.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Potential impacts of Fukushima nuclear wastewater discharge on nutrient supply and greenhouse gas emissions of food systems

Seafood plays a critical role in promoting a nutritious and climate-friendly food system but faces challenges from marine contamination that pose food safety risks. Here, to address these challenges, we developed a Marine Pollution-induced Food System Risk Assessment and Response (MP-FSRAR) model to assess the impact of consumer perceptions of marine pollution risk events on nutrient supply and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Applying this model to the proposed Fukushima Nuclear Wastewater Discharge (FNWD) into the Pacific Ocean, we identified the potential variation in nutrient supply and GHG emissions resulting from changes in Chinese consumers' willingness to consume seafood under 12 scenarios. Our analysis revealed nutrient supply gaps in daily protein, minerals, vitamins, and fatty acids, ranging from 1.5 to 2.7 g/person, 2.5–4.5 mg/person, 5.6–10.3 mcg/person, and 0.08–0.14 g/person, respectively. Closing the protein gap in China would require an additional 3.2–15.8 billion kg yr -1 protein-rich foods, including aquatic, livestock, dairy, and pulses. Additional food supply would increase extra GHG emissions by 1–79 billion kg CO 2 e yr -1 , resulting in potential GHG emissions being transmitted to other countries through the trade chain. Furthermore, we found that the livestock-based food substitution pathway had 40 times higher GHG emissions than the plant-based one. Our MP-FSRAR model provides global stakeholders with new perspectives on the potential consequences of consumer perceptions of marine pollution risks and offers valuable insights for developing countermeasures to build a more resilient and low-carbon food system.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

NUCLEAR INCIDENT CAPABILITIES, KNOWLEDGE & ENABLER LEVERAGING

The detonation of a 10 Kiloton Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) is a serious scenario that the United States must be prepared to address. The likelihood of a single nuclear bomb exploding in a single city is greater today than at the height of the Cold War. Layered defenses against domestic nuclear terrorism indicate that our government continues to view the threat as credible. The risk of such an event is further evidenced by terrorists desire to acquire nuclear weapons. The act of nuclear terrorism, particularly an act directed against a large population center in the United States, will overwhelm the capabilities of many local and state governments to respond, and will seriously challenge existing federal response capabilities. A 10 Kiloton IND detonation would cause total infrastructure damage in a 3-mile radius and levels of radiation spanning out 3,000 square miles. In a densely populated urban area, the anticipated casualties would be in excess of several hundred thousand. Although there would be enormous loss of life, housing and infrastructure, an IND detonation is a recoverable event. We can reduce the risk of these high-consequence, nontraditional threats by enhancing our nuclear detection architecture and establishing well planned and rehearsed plans for coordinated response. It is also important for us to identify new and improved ways to foster collaboration regarding the response to the IND threat to ensure the demand and density of expertise required for such an event is postured and prepared to mobilize, integrate, and support a myriad of anticipated challenges. We must be prepared to manage the consequences of such an event in a deliberate manner and get beyond notions of total devastation by adopting planning assumptions around survivability and resiliency. Planning for such a scenario needs to be decisive in determining a response based on competencies and desired outcomes. It is time to synthesize known threats and plausible consequences into action. Much work needs to be accomplished to enhance nuclear preparedness and to substantially bolster and clarify the capacity to deploy competent resources. Until detailed plans are scripted, and personnel and other resources are postured, and exercised, IND specific planning remains an urgent need requiring attention and action. Although strategic guidance, policies, concepts of operations, roles, responsibilities, and plans governing the response and consequence management for the IND scenario exist, an ongoing integration challenge prevails regarding how best to get capable and competent surge capacity personnel (disaster reservists) and other resources engaged and readied in an up-front manner with pre-scripted assignments to augment the magnitude of anticipated demands of expertise. With the above in mind, Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) puts science to work to create and deploy practical, high-value, cost-effective nuclear solutions. As the Department of Energy's (DOE) applied research and development laboratory, SRNL supports Savannah River Site (SRS) operations, DOE, national initiatives, and other federal agencies, across the country and around the world. SRNL's parent at SRS also employs more than 8,000 personnel. The team is a great asset that seeks to continue their service in the interest of national security and stands ready to accomplish new missions. Overall, an integral part of the vision for SRNL's National and Homeland Security Directorate is the establishment of a National Security Center at SRNL, and development of state of the science capabilities (technologies and trained technical personnel) for responding to emergency events on local, regional, or national scales. This entails leveraging and posturing the skills, knowledge and experience base of SRS personnel to deliver an integrated capability to support local, state, and federal authorities through the development of pre-scripted requests for assistance, agreements, and plans. It also includes developing plans, training, exercises, recruitment strategies, and processes to establish a 1,000 plus person nuclear disaster workforce capable of providing surge capacity support that can be deployed in part or in all.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Quantitative Risk Analysis of High Safety Significant Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems in Nuclear Power Plants using IRADIC Technology

This report documents the activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during fiscal year (FY) 2021 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) Risk Assessment project. In FY-2019, the RISA Pathway initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. An integrated risk assessment technology for the DI&C systems (IRADIC technology) was proposed for this strategy, which aims to (1) provide a best-estimate risk-informed capability to quantitatively and accurately estimate the safety margin obtained from plant modernization, especially for the High Safety Significant Safety-related (HSSSR) DI&C systems, (2) develop an advanced risk assessment technology to support transition from analog to DI&C technologies for nuclear industry, (3) assure the long-term safety and reliability of vital HSSSR DI&C systems, (4) reduce uncertainty in costs and support integration of DI&C systems in the plant. To achieve these technical goals and deal with the expensive licensing justifications from regulatory insights, the IRADIC technology is instructive for nuclear vendors and utilities to effectively lower the costs associated with digital compliance and speed industry advances by: (1) defining an integrated risk-informed analysis process for DI&C upgrade, including hazard analysis, reliability analysis, and consequence analysis, (2) applying systematic and risk-informed tools to address common cause failures (CCFs) and quantify responding failure probabilities for DI&C technologies, particularly software CCFs, (3) evaluating the impact of digital failures at the individual level, system level, and plant level, (4) providing insights and suggestions on designs to manage the risks; thus, to support the development, licensing, and deployment of advanced DI&C technologies on nuclear power plant (NPPs). In this report, an approach for performing software CCF analysis, given limited data, is developed and demonstrated using a case study of a highly redundant digital reactor trip system. Consequence analysis is also performed based on different accident scenarios. Results indicate that plant modernization including the improvement of HSSSR DI&C systems will make great benefits to plant safety by providing more safety margins to accident management. In addition, a novel approach is proposed in this report for the quantification of software hazards when sufficient operational and testing data available. The method incorporates software development quality as well as strong analysis techniques to identify and link software defects to potential failure modes. The approach includes both semantic and test-based analysis to detect failures that can exist in different stages of the software development life cycle. This method is applied to an advanced human system interface relevant to reactor trip safety developed from the APR 1400 design.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Enhancing power plant safety through simulated cyber events - 341

There are gaps in understanding how a cyber-attack would manifest itself within power plants and what these events would look like within the control room from an operator's perspective. This is especially true for nuclear power plants where safety has much broader consequences than nonnuclear plants. The operating and emergency procedures that operators currently use are likely inadequate for targeted cyber-attacks. This research focuses on understanding how a cyber event would affect the operation of the plant, how an operator would perceive the event, and if the operator's actions would keep the plant in a safe condition. This research is part of Sandia's Laboratory Directed Research and Development program where a nuclear power plant cyber model of the control system digital architecture is coupled with a generic pressurized water reactor plant training simulator. Cyber event scenarios will be performed on the coupled system with plant operators. The scenarios simulate plant conditions that may exist during a cyber-attack, component failure, or insider sabotage, and provide an understanding of the displayed information and the actual plant conditions. These scenarios will determine if plant operators can 1) recognize that they are under cyber-attack and 2) take appropriate actions to keep the plant safe. This will also provide the opportunity to assess the operator cognitive workload during such events and identify where improvements might be made. Experiments with nuclear power plant operators will be carried out over FY 2018 and results of the research are expected by the end of FY 2018. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Framework for Modeling High-Impact, Low-Frequency Power Grid Events to Support Risk-Informed Decisions

Natural and man-made hazardous events resulting in loss of grid infrastructure assets challenge the electric power grid’s security and resilience. However, the planning and allocation of appropriate contingency resources for such events requires an understanding of their likelihood and the extent of their potential impact. Where these events are of low likelihood, a risk-informed perspective on planning can be problematic as there exists an insufficient statistical basis to directly estimate the probabilities and consequences of their occurrence. Since risk-informed decisions rely on such knowledge, a basis for modeling the risk associated with high-impact low frequency events (HILFs) is essential. Insights from such a model can inform where resources are most rationally and effectively expended. The present effort is focused on development of a HILF risk assessment framework. Such a framework is intended to provide the conceptual and overarching technical basis for the development of HILF risk models that can inform decision makers across numerous stakeholder sectors. The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) 2014 Standard TPL-001-4 considers severe events for transmission reliability planning, but does not address events of such severity that they have the potential to fail a substantial fraction of grid assets over a region, such as geomagnetic disturbances (GMD), extreme seismic events, and coordinated cyber-physical attacks. These are beyond current planning guidelines. As noted, the risks associated with such events cannot be statistically estimated based on historic experience; however, there does exist a stable of risk modeling techniques for rare events that have proven of value across a wide range of engineering application domains. There is an active and growing interest in evaluating the value of risk management techniques in the State transmission planning and emergency response communities, some of this interest in the context of grid modernization activities. The availability of a grid HILF risk model, integrated across multi-hazard domains which, when interrogated, can support transparent, defensible and effective decisions, is an attractive prospect among these communities. In this report, we document an integrated HILF risk framework intended to inform the development of risk models. These models would be based on the systematic and comprehensive (to within scope) characterization of hazards to the level of detail required for modeling risk, identification of the stressors associated with the hazards (i.e., the means of impacting grid and supporting infrastructure), characterization of the vulnerability of assets to these stressors and the probabilities of asset compromise, the grid’s dynamic response to the asset failures, and assessment of subsequent severities of consequence with respect to selected impact metrics, such as power outage duration and geographic reach. Specifically, the current framework is being developed to;1. Provide the conceptual and overarching technical paradigms for the development of risk models; 2. Identify the classes of models required to implement the framework - providing examples of existing models, and also identifying where modeling gaps exist; 3. Identify the types of data required, addressing circumstances under which data are sparse and the formal elicitation of informed judgment might be required; and 4. Identify means by which the resultant risk models might be interrogated to form the necessary basis for risk management.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Markets and Economic Requirements for Fission Batteries and Other Nuclear Systems

Fission Batteries (FBs) are nuclear reactors defined by five characteristics which enable large-scale deployment: cost competitive, standardized sizes for economic mass production, easy installation and removal, secure and safe unattended operation with high reliability. FBs are not defined by technology or power level. Technical and market considerations suggest that most FBs will produce 20 to 30 MWt. This proceedings reports on the outcomes of two workshops that were held in January 2021 to better define markets and economic challenges for FBs. Three major markets were identified. The largest market is the industrial and commercial heat market. There are about 4000 industrial users (excluding utilities) that require more than one megawatt of heat. The number of customers versus size of heat demand was determined. In a low-carbon world there is the potential for many additional customers—including expanded biofuels production and district heat. The second market is for non-grid electricity. This includes co-generation plants that produce heat and electricity for a single customer. The third market is the maritime market with ~100,000 ships worldwide. In the United States, natural gas is the low-cost energy option today and will remain so unless constraints or taxes impact its use. If restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions, the FB competition includes natural gas with carbon capture, biofuels, hydrogen and grid electricity. Natural gas with carbon capture is not economically viable on a small scale. Biofuels may be expensive but may be the economically preferred option for locations with small energy demands of a few megawatts. Hydrogen is a potential competitor with many of the characteristics of natural gas. Grid electricity is not a competitive source of heat. For FBs to be economically competitive, the price of delivered heat must be $20-50/MWh ($6-15/million BTU). The economically competitive range for non-grid electricity is estimated at $70-100/MWh. These electricity prices are competitive with the retail prices of electricity in many parts of the United States for the customer. FBs are not expected to be competitive selling wholesale electricity to the grid. To achieve the aforementioned cost targets for heat and electricity markets, FB designers must (1) maximize the power output within the constraints of a FB (e.g., truck transportability, passive decay heat removal), (2) drastically reduce the size of onsite staff, (3) adopt core designs with low fuel costs (enrichment and fabrication), and (4) develop a system design that is efficiently manufactured in factories. The business case depends upon more than being just a replacement for natural gas. The largest incentives for adoption of FBs is where they create new markets and new sources of revenue. An example is the paper and pulp industry that burns biomass wastes to provide heat and electricity to make paper. An external heat source could meet the demand for heat and electricity by the paper process and enable converting waste biomass into liquid biofuels rather than burning to provide heat. Other markets, such as data centers, are driven by special energy requirements such as extreme reliability. Most customers are not in the energy business but need heat and electricity to produce a product—a manufactured good, education, retail sales (shopping malls), marine transport or some other product. As a consequence, there will be large incentives to lease rather than own FBs. Leasing avoids the regulatory challenges that remain with the owner of the FB. Leasing creates large incentives for FP standardization of sizes and transportability to maintain the value of the FB at the end of the lease—similar to the leasing of jet engines and aircraft. The economic constraints combined with technical constraints suggest competitive FBs will likely have outputs exceeding 10 MWt. There appear to be little incentives for very long-lived reactor cores because such machines require much larger inventories of fuel. Maintenance requirements and the options to provide technology updates may favor shorter lifetimes (~5 years). The assessment is that there is the potential for FBs to be economically viable and play a major role in global decarbonization in three markets: heat, non-grid electricity and maritime applications.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗