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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 109 records · Page 6

Estimating the Reliability of Electronic Parts in High Radiation Fields

Radiation effects on materials and electronic parts constrain the lifetime of flight systems visiting Europa. Understanding mission lifetime limits is critical to the design and planning of such a mission. Therefore, the operational aspects of radiation dose are a mission success issue. To predict and manage mission lifetime in a high radiation environment, system engineers need capable tools to trade radiation design choices against system design and reliability, and science achievements. Conventional tools and approaches provided past missions with conservative designs without the ability to predict their lifetime beyond the baseline mission.This paper describes a more systematic approach to understanding spacecraft design margin, allowing better prediction of spacecraft lifetime. This is possible because of newly available electronic parts radiation effects statistics and an enhanced spacecraft system reliability methodology. This new approach can be used in conjunction with traditional approaches for mission design. This paper describes the fundamentals of the new methodology.

radiation↗

Spacelab life sciences 2 post mission report

Jay C. Buckey, M.D., Assistant Professor of Medicine at The University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center at Dallas served as an alternate payload specialist astronaut for the Spacelab Life Sciences 2 Space Shuttle Mission from January 1992 through December 1993. This report summarizes his opinions on the mission and offers suggestions in the areas of selection, training, simulations, baseline data collection and mission operations. The report recognizes the contributions of the commander, payload commander and mission management team to the success of the mission. Dr. Buckey's main accomplishments during the mission are listed.

Buckey, Jay C.↗

STS-55 Mission Overview, Preflight Briefing from JSC

Gary Cohen, Lead Flight Director, gives an overview of the STS-55 Columbia mission activities, objectives, payload, crew, and Spacelab operations. Dr. H. Dodeck, D-2 Mission Manager, discusses Germany's contributions to the mission and describes the German aeronautics facilities. They then answer questions from the press.

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A Reliable Service-Oriented Architecture for NASA's Mars Exploration Rover Mission

The Collaborative Information Portal (CIP) was enterprise software developed jointly by the NASA Ames Research Center and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) for NASA's highly successful Mars Exploration Rover (MER) mission. Both MER and CIP have performed far beyond their original expectations. Mission managers and engineers ran CIP inside the mission control room at JPL, and the scientists ran CIP in their laboratories, homes, and offices. All the users connected securely over the Internet. Since the mission ran on Mars time, CIP displayed the current time in various Mars and Earth time zones, and it presented staffing and event schedules with Martian time scales. Users could send and receive broadcast messages, and they could view and download data and image files generated by the rovers' instruments. CIP had a three-tiered, service-oriented architecture (SOA) based on industry standards, including J2EE and web services, and it integrated commercial off-the-shelf software. A user's interactions with the graphical interface of the CIP client application generated web services requests to the CIP middleware. The middleware accessed the back-end data repositories if necessary and returned results for these requests. The client application could make multiple service requests for a single user action and then present a composition of the results. This happened transparently, and many users did not even realize that they were connecting to a server. CIP performed well and was extremely reliable; it attained better than 99% uptime during the course of the mission. In this paper, we present overviews of the MER mission and of CIP. We show how CIP helped to fulfill some of the mission needs and how people used it. We discuss the criteria for choosing its architecture, and we describe how the developers made the software so reliable. CIP's reliability did not come about by chance, but was the result of several key design decisions. We conclude with some of the important lessons we learned form developing, deploying, and supporting the software.

Mak, Ronald↗

STS-114: Discovery Post MMT Briefing

Wayne Hale, Space Shuttle Deputy Program Manager, discusses the topics covered at the Mission Management Team (MMT) meeting. The topics include: 1) Wing leading edge reinforced carbon-carbon clearance; 2) Protruding blanket on the side of the Space Shuttle Discovery Orbiter; 3) Control Moment Gyroscope (CMG) replacement; 4) Transfer items; and 5) EVA procedures. Questions from the news media about the possibility of a CMG failure, Space Shuttle re-entry, gap fillers, and dangers during the EVA to repair the Space Shuttle Discovery are answered.

Source record↗

Environmental Conditions for Space Flight Hardware: A Survey

Interest in generalization of the physical environment experienced by NASA hardware from the natural Earth environment (on the launch pad), man-made environment on Earth (storage acceptance an d qualification testing), the launch environment, and the space environment, is ed to find commonality among our hardware in an effort to reduce cost and complexity. NASA is entering a period of increase in its number of planetary missions and it is important to understand how our qualification requirements will evolve with and track these new environments. Environmental conditions are described for NASA projects in several ways for the different periods of the mission life cycle. At the beginning, the mission manager defines survivability requirements based on the mission length, orbit, launch date, launch vehicle, and other factors . such as the use of reactor engines. Margins are then applied to these values (temperature extremes, vibration extremes, radiation tolerances, etc,) and a new set of conditions is generalized for design requirements. Mission assurance documents will then assign an additional margin for reliability, and a third set of values is provided for during testing. A fourth set of environmental condition values may evolve intermittently from heritage hardware that has been tested to a level beyond the actual mission requirement. These various sets of environment figures can make it quite confusing and difficult to capture common hardware environmental requirements. Environmental requirement information can be found in a wide variety of places. The most obvious is with the individual projects. We can easily get answers to questions about temperature extremes being used and radiation tolerance goals, but it is more difficult to map the answers to the process that created these requirements: for design, for qualification, and for actual environment with no margin applied. Not everyone assigned to a NASA project may have that kind of insight, as many have only the environmental requirement numbers needed to do their jobs but do not necessarily have a programmatic-level understanding of how all of the environmental requirements fit together.

Plante, Jeannette↗

Development and Implementation of Real-Time Information Delivery Systems for Emergency Management

The disaster management community has an on-going need for real-time data and information, especially during catastrophic events. Currently, twin engine or jet aircraft with limited altitude and duration capabilities collect much of the data. Flight safety is also an issue. Clearly, much of the needed data could be delivered via over-the-horizon transfer through a uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAV) platform to mission managers at various locations on the ground. In fact, because of the ability to stay aloft for long periods of time, and to fly above dangerous situations, UAV's are ideally suited for disaster missions. There are numerous situations that can be considered disastrous for the human population. Some, such as fire or flood, can continue over a period of days. Disaster management officials rely on data from the site to respond in an optimum way with warnings, evacuations, rescue, relief, and to the extent possible, damage control. Although different types of disasters call for different types of response, most situations can be improved by having visual images and other remotely sensed data available. "Disaster Management" is actually made up of a number of activities, including: - Disaster Prevention and Mitigation - Emergency Response Planning - Disaster Management (real-time deployment of resources, during an event) - Disaster / Risk Modeling All of these activities could benefit from real-time information, but a major focus for UAV-based technology is in real-time deployment of resources (i.e., emergency response teams), based on changing conditions at the location of the event. With all these potential benefits, it is desirable to demonstrate to user agencies the ability to perform disaster management missions as described. The following demonstration project is the first in a program designed to prove the feasibility of supporting disaster missions with UAV technology and suitable communications packages on-board. A several-year program is envisioned, in which a broad range of disaster-related activities are demonstrated to the appropriate user communities.

Wegener, Steve↗

A Vehicle Management End-to-End Testing and Analysis Platform for Validation of Mission and Fault Management Algorithms to Reduce Risk for NASA's Space Launch System

The engineering development of the new Space Launch System (SLS) launch vehicle requires cross discipline teams with extensive knowledge of launch vehicle subsystems, information theory, and autonomous algorithms dealing with all operations from pre-launch through on orbit operations. The characteristics of these spacecraft systems must be matched with the autonomous algorithm monitoring and mitigation capabilities for accurate control and response to abnormal conditions throughout all vehicle mission flight phases, including precipitating safing actions and crew aborts. This presents a large and complex system engineering challenge, which is being addressed in part by focusing on the specific subsystems involved in the handling of off-nominal mission and fault tolerance with response management. Using traditional model based system and software engineering design principles from the Unified Modeling Language (UML) and Systems Modeling Language (SysML), the Mission and Fault Management (M&FM) algorithms for the vehicle are crafted and vetted in specialized Integrated Development Teams (IDTs) composed of multiple development disciplines such as Systems Engineering (SE), Flight Software (FSW), Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) and the major subsystems and vehicle elements such as Main Propulsion Systems (MPS), boosters, avionics, Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC), Thrust Vector Control (TVC), and liquid engines. These model based algorithms and their development lifecycle from inception through Flight Software certification are an important focus of this development effort to further insure reliable detection and response to off-nominal vehicle states during all phases of vehicle operation from pre-launch through end of flight. NASA formed a dedicated M&FM team for addressing fault management early in the development lifecycle for the SLS initiative. As part of the development of the M&FM capabilities, this team has developed a dedicated testbed that integrates specific M&FM algorithms, specialized nominal and off-nominal test cases, and vendor-supplied physics-based launch vehicle subsystem models. Additionally, the team has developed processes for implementing and validating these algorithms for concept validation and risk reduction for the SLS program. The flexibility of the Vehicle Management End-to-end Testbed (VMET) enables thorough testing of the M&FM algorithms by providing configurable suites of both nominal and off-nominal test cases to validate the developed algorithms utilizing actual subsystem models such as MPS. The intent of VMET is to validate the M&FM algorithms and substantiate them with performance baselines for each of the target vehicle subsystems in an independent platform exterior to the flight software development infrastructure and its related testing entities. In any software development process there is inherent risk in the interpretation and implementation of concepts into software through requirements and test cases into flight software compounded with potential human errors throughout the development lifecycle. Risk reduction is addressed by the M&FM analysis group working with other organizations such as S&MA, Structures and Environments, GNC, Orion, the Crew Office, Flight Operations, and Ground Operations by assessing performance of the M&FM algorithms in terms of their ability to reduce Loss of Mission and Loss of Crew probabilities. In addition, through state machine and diagnostic modeling, analysis efforts investigate a broader suite of failure effects and associated detection and responses that can be tested in VMET to ensure that failures can be detected, and confirm that responses do not create additional risks or cause undesired states through interactive dynamic effects with other algorithms and systems. VMET further contributes to risk reduction by prototyping and exercising the M&FM algorithms early in their implementation and without any inherent hindrances such as meeting FSW processor scheduling constraints due to their target platform - ARINC 653 partitioned OS, resource limitations, and other factors related to integration with other subsystems not directly involved with M&FM such as telemetry packing and processing. The baseline plan for use of VMET encompasses testing the original M&FM algorithms coded in the same C++ language and state machine architectural concepts as that used by Flight Software. This enables the development of performance standards and test cases to characterize the M&FM algorithms and sets a benchmark from which to measure the effectiveness of M&FM algorithms performance in the FSW development and test processes.

Trevino, Luis↗

A Vehicle Management End-to-End Testing and Analysis Platform for Validation of Mission and Fault Management Algorithms to Reduce Risk for NASAs Space Launch System

The engineering development of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) new Space Launch System (SLS) requires cross discipline teams with extensive knowledge of launch vehicle subsystems, information theory, and autonomous algorithms dealing with all operations from pre-launch through on orbit operations. The nominal and off-nominal characteristics of SLS's elements and subsystems must be understood and matched with the autonomous algorithm monitoring and mitigation capabilities for accurate control and response to abnormal conditions throughout all vehicle mission flight phases, including precipitating safing actions and crew aborts. This presents a large and complex systems engineering challenge, which is being addressed in part by focusing on the specific subsystems involved in the handling of off-nominal mission and fault tolerance with response management. Using traditional model-based system and software engineering design principles from the Unified Modeling Language (UML) and Systems Modeling Language (SysML), the Mission and Fault Management (M&FM) algorithms for the vehicle are crafted and vetted in Integrated Development Teams (IDTs) composed of multiple development disciplines such as Systems Engineering (SE), Flight Software (FSW), Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) and the major subsystems and vehicle elements such as Main Propulsion Systems (MPS), boosters, avionics, Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC), Thrust Vector Control (TVC), and liquid engines. These model-based algorithms and their development lifecycle from inception through FSW certification are an important focus of SLS's development effort to further ensure reliable detection and response to off-nominal vehicle states during all phases of vehicle operation from pre-launch through end of flight. To test and validate these M&FM algorithms a dedicated test-bed was developed for full Vehicle Management End-to-End Testing (VMET). For addressing fault management (FM) early in the development lifecycle for the SLS program, NASA formed the M&FM team as part of the Integrated Systems Health Management and Automation Branch under the Spacecraft Vehicle Systems Department at the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). To support the development of the FM algorithms, the VMET developed by the M&FM team provides the ability to integrate the algorithms, perform test cases, and integrate vendor-supplied physics-based launch vehicle (LV) subsystem models. Additionally, the team has developed processes for implementing and validating the M&FM algorithms for concept validation and risk reduction. The flexibility of the VMET capabilities enables thorough testing of the M&FM algorithms by providing configurable suites of both nominal and off-nominal test cases to validate the developed algorithms utilizing actual subsystem models such as MPS, GNC, and others. One of the principal functions of VMET is to validate the M&FM algorithms and substantiate them with performance baselines for each of the target vehicle subsystems in an independent platform exterior to the flight software test and validation processes. In any software development process there is inherent risk in the interpretation and implementation of concepts from requirements and test cases into flight software compounded with potential human errors throughout the development and regression testing lifecycle. Risk reduction is addressed by the M&FM group but in particular by the Analysis Team working with other organizations such as S&MA, Structures and Environments, GNC, Orion, Crew Office, Flight Operations, and Ground Operations by assessing performance of the M&FM algorithms in terms of their ability to reduce Loss of Mission (LOM) and Loss of Crew (LOC) probabilities. In addition, through state machine and diagnostic modeling, analysis efforts investigate a broader suite of failure effects and associated detection and responses to be tested in VMET to ensure reliable failure detection, and confirm responses do not create additional risks or cause undesired states through interactive dynamic effects with other algorithms and systems. VMET further contributes to risk reduction by prototyping and exercising the M&FM algorithms early in their implementation and without any inherent hindrances such as meeting FSW processor scheduling constraints due to their target platform - the ARINC 6535-partitioned Operating System, resource limitations, and other factors related to integration with other subsystems not directly involved with M&FM such as telemetry packing and processing. The baseline plan for use of VMET encompasses testing the original M&FM algorithms coded in the same C++ language and state machine architectural concepts as that used by FSW. This enables the development of performance standards and test cases to characterize the M&FM algorithms and sets a benchmark from which to measure their effectiveness and performance in the exterior FSW development and test processes. This paper is outlined in a systematic fashion analogous to a lifecycle process flow for engineering development of algorithms into software and testing. Section I describes the NASA SLS M&FM context, presenting the current infrastructure, leading principles, methods, and participants. Section II defines the testing philosophy of the M&FM algorithms as related to VMET followed by section III, which presents the modeling methods of the algorithms to be tested and validated in VMET. Its details are then further presented in section IV followed by Section V presenting integration, test status, and state analysis. Finally, section VI addresses the summary and forward directions followed by the appendices presenting relevant information on terminology and documentation.

Trevino, Luis↗

A Vehicle Management End-to-End Testing and Analysis Platform for Validation of Mission and Fault Management Algorithms to Reduce Risk for NASA's Space Launch System

The development of the Space Launch System (SLS) launch vehicle requires cross discipline teams with extensive knowledge of launch vehicle subsystems, information theory, and autonomous algorithms dealing with all operations from pre-launch through on orbit operations. The characteristics of these systems must be matched with the autonomous algorithm monitoring and mitigation capabilities for accurate control and response to abnormal conditions throughout all vehicle mission flight phases, including precipitating safing actions and crew aborts. This presents a large complex systems engineering challenge being addressed in part by focusing on the specific subsystems handling of off-nominal mission and fault tolerance. Using traditional model based system and software engineering design principles from the Unified Modeling Language (UML), the Mission and Fault Management (M&FM) algorithms are crafted and vetted in specialized Integrated Development Teams composed of multiple development disciplines. NASA also has formed an M&FM team for addressing fault management early in the development lifecycle. This team has developed a dedicated Vehicle Management End-to-End Testbed (VMET) that integrates specific M&FM algorithms, specialized nominal and off-nominal test cases, and vendor-supplied physics-based launch vehicle subsystem models. The flexibility of VMET enables thorough testing of the M&FM algorithms by providing configurable suites of both nominal and off-nominal test cases to validate the algorithms utilizing actual subsystem models. The intent is to validate the algorithms and substantiate them with performance baselines for each of the vehicle subsystems in an independent platform exterior to flight software test processes. In any software development process there is inherent risk in the interpretation and implementation of concepts into software through requirements and test processes. Risk reduction is addressed by working with other organizations such as S&MA, Structures and Environments, GNC, Orion, the Crew Office, Flight Operations, and Ground Operations by assessing performance of the M&FM algorithms in terms of their ability to reduce Loss of Mission and Loss of Crew probabilities. In addition, through state machine and diagnostic modeling, analysis efforts investigate a broader suite of failure effects and detection and responses that can be tested in VMET and confirm that responses do not create additional risks or cause undesired states through interactive dynamic effects with other algorithms and systems. VMET further contributes to risk reduction by prototyping and exercising the M&FM algorithms early in their implementation and without any inherent hindrances such as meeting FSW processor scheduling constraints due to their target platform - ARINC 653 partitioned OS, resource limitations, and other factors related to integration with other subsystems not directly involved with M&FM. The plan for VMET encompasses testing the original M&FM algorithms coded in the same C++ language and state machine architectural concepts as that used by Flight Software. This enables the development of performance standards and test cases to characterize the M&FM algorithms and sets a benchmark from which to measure the effectiveness of M&FM algorithms performance in the FSW development and test processes. This paper is outlined in a systematic fashion analogous to a lifecycle process flow for engineering development of algorithms into software and testing. Section I describes the NASA SLS M&FM context, presenting the current infrastructure, leading principles, methods, and participants. Section II defines the testing philosophy of the M&FM algorithms as related to VMET followed by section III, which presents the modeling methods of the algorithms to be tested and validated in VMET. Its details are then further presented in section IV followed by Section V presenting integration, test status, and state analysis. Finally, section VI addresses the summary and forward directions followed by the appendices presenting relevant information on terminology and documentation.

Trevino, Luis↗

STS-47 Mission Overview

Flight Director Milt Heflin gives an overview of the goals of the Space Shuttle Endeavour. He describes the crew, the role of the orbiter, the planned experiments, and the timeline of activities on board. Mission Manager Aubray King introduces the Spacelab-J mission. He discusses the planned experiments and Japanese involvement in development. Heflin and King then take questions from the press.

Source record↗

Integrating Planning, Diagnosis and Execution for Vehicle Systems Management

We describe a prototype Vehicle System Manager (VSM) for NASA’s Gateway, a human-capable spacecraft that will also be capable of autonomous operations. The VSM consists of an execution system, planner, and fault management system, integrated via an over-arching mission management compo- nent. We describe the VSM architecture and each of its com- ponents. We describe a series of use cases, centered on a spacecraft propulsive operation that can fail at different times, for different reasons, and how the VSM detects and responds to these failures. We show the VSM is capable of detecting faults and loss of capability, and subsequently replanning, in the presence of each failure scenario.

Planning↗

Trustworthy Autonomy for Gateway Vehicle System Manager

The Vehicle System Manager (VSM) is the highest-level software control system in the Gateway hierarchical Autonomous System Management Architecture. The VSM provides four function categories: Mission Management and Timeline Execution, Resource Management, Fault Management, Vehicle Control and Operation. VSM provides various levels of automation ranging from fully autonomous operations with no flight crew and minimal ground monitoring to advisory automation when Gateway is crewed and has full ground monitoring. Trustworthiness is achieved via verified specification, comprehensive development verification, and real-time verification using assume-guarantee contracts. Development verification includes semantic verification of the data model via peer review and testing and assume-guarantee contracts implemented using the PlusCal/TLA+ environment. VSM also uses runtime assume-guarantee contracts, implemented in R2U2 via a runtime monitor that feeds the necessary telemetry data to R2U2 and which receives and responds to the R2U2 verdict stream. The full lifecycle verification approach and use of assume-guarantee contracts provides increased trustworthiness to VSM. Preliminary results provide encouragement that VSM can be both autonomous and trustworthy.

Assume-guarantee contracts↗

Thermal Protection System Imagery Inspection Management System -TIIMS

TIIMS is used during the inspection phases of every mission to provide quick visual feedback, detailed inspection data, and determination to the mission management team. This system consists of a visual Web page interface, an SQL database, and a graphical image generator. These combine to allow a user to ascertain quickly the status of the inspection process, and current determination of any problem zones. The TIIMS system allows inspection engineers to enter their determinations into a database and to link pertinent images and video to those database entries. The database then assigns criteria to each zone and tile, and via query, sends the information to a graphical image generation program. Using the official TIPS database tile positions and sizes, the graphical image generation program creates images of the current status of the orbiter, coloring zones, and tiles based on a predefined key code. These images are then displayed on a Web page using customized JAVA scripts to display the appropriate zone of the orbiter based on the location of the user's cursor. The close-up graphic and database entry for that particular zone can then be seen by selecting the zone. This page contains links into the database to access the images used by the inspection engineer when they make the determination entered into the database. Status for the inspection zones changes as determinations are refined and shown by the appropriate color code.

Goza, Sharon↗

STS-114: Discovery Post MMT Briefing

Wayne Hale, Space Shuttle Deputy Program Manager, is presented in this STS-114 Discovery Post Mission Management Team (MMT) briefing. He begins by talking about obtaining clearance from the Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) material. He then describes the supplies such as eleven water containers and the transfer of 50 additional pounds of Oxygen to the International Space Station. Hale presents a video of a billowed thermal blanket next to the commander's window on the port side of the Space Shuttle Discovery that seems to be of some concern. He answers questions from the news media about the dimensions of this blanket, and the dangers of getting close to this blanket during the Extravehicular Activity (EVA) to repair the gap fillers.

Source record↗

Psychological Support Operations and the ISS One-Year Mission

Since NASA began human presence on the International Space Station (ISS) in November 1998, crews have spent two to seven months onboard. In March 2015 NASA and Russia embarked on a new era of ISS utilization, with two of their crewmembers conducting a one-year mission onboard ISS. The mission has been useful for both research and mission operations to better understand the human, technological, mission management and staffing challenges that may be faced on missions beyond Low Earth Orbit. The work completed during the first 42 ISS missions provided the basis for the pre-flight, in-flight and post-flight work completed by NASA's Space Medicine Operations Division, while our Russian colleagues provided valuable insights from their long-duration mission experiences with missions lasting 10-14 months, which predated the ISS era. Space Medicine's Behavioral Health and Performance Group (BHP) provided pre-flight training, evaluation, and preparation as well as in-flight psychological support for the NASA crewmember. While the BHP team collaboratively planned for this mission with the help of all ISS international partners within the Human Behavior and Performance Working Group to leverage their collective expertise, the US and Russian BHP personnel were responsible for their respective crewmembers. The presentation will summarize the lessons and experience gained within the areas identified by this Working Group as being of primary importance for a one-year mission.

Beven, G.↗

STS-114: Post Launch MMT Briefing

Bill Parsons, Space Shuttle Program Manager, and Wayne Hill, Deputy Manager of the Space Shuttle Program, and Chair of the Mission Management Team talks about the flight day 2 of the Discovery. Bill noted that flight operations are extremely going on well. He also explained an unexpected debris event on a power ramp little ways down where LH2 ramp begins. Before flight and based from technical data, slight modifications were done on the power ramp to ensure safety of return to flight. Bill also noted that STS-114 is a test flight; all data collected and brought back by the crew will be analyzed to ensure that all information needed is sufficient to work on faults and defects and to make appropriate repairs. Wayne discussed on flight safety. He emphasized the need to thoroughly inspect the thermal protection system of the Orbiter to ensure safe entry. Inspection of still photographs from the ISS and the boom sensor system scan are the primary means to understand engineering data in terms of the immediate flight safety. He also reported accomplishments for the day such as survey of the Orbiter boom system, all the wing leading edge, RCC panels and the nose cap, to make sure these are in good shape and working well, and re-emphasized that these are primary methods to clear the thermal protection system of the Orbiter to prove that it is safe to come home on this flight.

Source record↗