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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Fallout Cloud Regimes

The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Energy (DOE), and other organizations maintain operational nuclear explosion and atmospheric dispersion models to provide critical guidance on the expected effects of an accidental or deliberate explosion of a nuclear weapon (in this paper simply referred to as “device”). To be effective, these models must represent, as accurately as possible, the complex interactions of the blast, fire, and residual radiological hazards with the environment and population. One hundred atmospheric nuclear tests that form the basis for many models were conducted at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) (now referred to as the Nevada Nuclear Security Site, NNSS) in a dry desert environment. Other environments should be studied, but have less data available and are beyond the scope of the work presented in this paper. The debris clouds produced by the NTS tests, frequently called “mushroom clouds,” are familiar, with common structural elements such as a buoyant cap connected to a skirt of raised dust at the desert surface by a thin, dirt-filled stem. The film scanning project at LLNL has investigated historical film records of nuclear weapons tests. Here, we summarize findings showing that the mushroom cloud behavior for historic U.S. tests conducted in Nevada, has similar characteristics based on the distance of the device from the ground surface or Height of Burst (HOB), scaled by the energy release, or yield, of the device. This scaled height is referred to as the scaled-height-of-burst (SHOB). The findings discussed below show that mushroom clouds look and behave similarly when detonated at the same SHOB. The amount of residual radiation that is produced by a nuclear detonation is proportional to the yield. But, the amount of that residual radiation that actually becomes local fallout is strongly dependent on the SHOB and the type of surface over which the detonation occurs. In order to develop a more comprehensive model that predicts the fraction of the residual radiation that becomes local fallout, it is convenient to define a series of regimes based on SHOB values in which all detonations that occur within a given regime can be modeled using the same algorithms. The purpose of this paper is to provide a framework for defining different regimes, and, in a qualitative way, a basic understanding of the fundamental characteristics of each of these regimes.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

US Nuclear Testing: Health Consequences and Policy Decisions

With the approval of President Franklin D. Roosevelt to begin the research on a nuclear bomb in 1941 to the last test conducted by the U.S. in 1992, the fifty-year history of the nuclear weapons testing program has been an expansive topic of research. The program's growth is credited to the race to build the first atomic weapon for war. The termination of the Soviet Union and many other factors, including concerns about the adverse health effects of radioactive fallout, influenced the decline of the need for the program. The discovery of the negative health effects caused by low-level radiation and the subsequent studies influenced sitting U.S. presidents in passing policies that significantly impacted the nuclear weapons testing program.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2021

Classified library celebrates two-year anniversary print your own commemorative history posters

Today is the National Security Research Center’s second anniversary. These two years, though, have been eight decades in the making, said NSRC Director Riz Ali. “We opened our doors in 2019, but the Center’s beginnings date back to World War II when J. Robert Oppenheimer created the Lab in Los Alamos to develop the first-ever nuclear weapons,” Ali said. “An important part of opening the Lab included standing up a technical reports library. Since then, we have amassed millions of holdings and today we are one of the top research institutions in the country.” What had long-been a repository of classified archival materials is today a dynamic, vibrant library that outsizes the collections of other similar research libraries around the country. Today, the NSRC houses the Laboratory’s classified nuclear weapons research, data and reports, as well as unclassified historical artifacts – the stories, photos, films and more from the people who have been a part of the Lab from the start.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
DOE OSTI2020

Production of National Nuclear Material Archive Subsamples for High Precision Chemical Analysis

With its historical mission as the focal point for production of uranium components for the NNSA nuclear weapons program, the National Nuclear Materials Archive (NNMA) makes use of Y-12's wide range of uranium materials processing knowledge and onsite materials to identify, collect, and preserve sample materials for nuclear forensics purposes. In 2019, Y-12 took on the responsibility for identifying, subsampling, and shipping a total of 24 NNMA samples to the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) for further forensics analysis. These were highly enriched uranium metal pieces representative of different weapon systems components produced by Y-12 from approximately 1963 to 1993. The purpose was to provide the NNMA program with higher precision analyses of these materials than what is currently available from historical Y-12 production stream data.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Quantitative imaging and automated fuel pin identification for passive gamma emission tomography

Compliance of member States to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is monitored through nuclear safeguards. The Passive Gamma Emission Tomography (PGET) system is a novel instrument developed within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) project JNT 1510, which included the European Commission, Finland, Hungary and Sweden. The PGET is used for the verification of spent nuclear fuel stored in water pools. Advanced image reconstruction techniques are crucial for obtaining high-quality cross-sectional images of the spent-fuel bundle to allow inspectors of the IAEA to monitor nuclear material and promptly identify its diversion. In this work, we have developed a software suite to accurately reconstruct the spent-fuel cross sectional image, automatically identify present fuel rods, and estimate their activity. Unique image reconstruction challenges are posed by the measurement of spent fuel, due to its high activity and the self-attenuation. While the former is mitigated by detector physical collimation, we implemented a linear forward model to model the detector responses to the fuel rods inside the PGET, to account for the latter. The image reconstruction is performed by solving a regularized linear inverse problem using the fast-iterative shrinkage-thresholding algorithm. We have also implemented the traditional filtered back projection (FBP) method based on the inverse Radon transform for comparison and applied both methods to reconstruct images of simulated mockup fuel assemblies. Higher image resolution and fewer reconstruction artifacts were obtained with the inverse-problem approach, with the mean-square-error reduced by 50%, and the structural-similarity improved by 200%. We then used a convolutional neural network (CNN) to automatically identify the bundle type and extract the pin locations from the images; the estimated activity levels finally being compared with the ground truth. The proposed computational methods accurately estimated the activity levels of the present pins, with an associated uncertainty of approximately 5%.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Short video provides broad overview of the Lab’s 80-year history

In celebration of the Lab’s 80th anniversary this month, join National Security Research Center Senior Historian, Alan Carr (NSRCMS), as he provides a six-and-a-half-minute overview of the Lab’s history. The video, co-produced by Brian Clayton (CEA-MP) and Howard Coe (CEA-MP), covers three phases of the Lab’s evolution, from a nuclear weapons laboratory, then a nuclear science laboratory, to its manifestation today as a multidisciplinary laboratory.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Functionalized Magnetic Nanoparticles for Technetium Sequestration from Groundwater

Technetium 99 (Tc) is among the most common environmental contaminants at DOE sites and one of the most common risk drivers in low- and high-level waste disposal sites. The majority of Tc is generated from anthropogenic sources, such as nuclear power plants, global weapons, nuclear storage facilities and medical applications. Through these sources, Tc contamination has been unintentionally introduced in to the environment. The most common chemical form of Tc is Tc(VII)O{sub 4}{sup -}. Due to its high solubility and mobility, Tc can enter the food chain and cause adverse health effects to humans. Currently, ion exchange resins and reduction processes are the most common approaches for Tc immobilization. Although these techniques have shown to be effective, they also possess major drawbacks, such as high cost, low adsorption capacity, and complex creation and maintenance. Therefore, development of more efficient and simple technologies for the remediation of Tc-contaminated systems are needed. Functionalized magnetic nanoparticles have been used to remove organic and inorganic contaminants from water resources. These nanoparticles have attracted extensive attention as an adsorbent material due to their large surface area, high efficiency, low-cost, easy functionalization and separation with a magnet. This study seek to develop functionalized magnetic iron oxide nanoparticles for the efficient removal of Tc and other heavy metal contaminants from water resources under ambient conditions. Objectives: Synthesize magnetic iron oxide nanoparticles and functionalize their surface with Cetyltrimethylammonium Bromide (CTAB) and tetraethyl-orthosilicate (TEOS). Characterize the synthesized nanoparticles using scanning electron microscopy (SEM) coupled with energy dispersive X-ray spectroscopy (EDS), Dynamic Light Scattering (DLS) and Zeta PALS. Perform adsorption studies to evaluate their adsorption behavior and capacity for (a) Technetium using Rhenium (ReO{sub 4}{sup -}) as a surrogate and (b) heavy metals, e.g. Cu{sup 2+}. Conclusions: Magnetic iron oxide nanoparticles were successfully functionalized with CTAB and TEOS. The functionalization of the iron oxide nanoparticles affects their surface charge and their hydrodynamic diameter. The addition of CTAB or TEOS decreased the hydrodynamic diameter of the nanoparticles due to repulsive and steric forces. The SEM micrographs show spherical nanoparticles of different sizes. The EDX analysis shows the presence of iron and oxygen from the iron oxide crystalline structure, and the different constituents of the CTAB and TEOS molecules. Proof-of-concept shows the successful adsorption of rhenium (ReO{sub 4}{sup -}) and copper Cu{sup 2+}) onto CTAB-Fe{sub 2}O{sub 3} and TEOS-Fe{sub 2}O{sub 3} respectively.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

Neutron spectroscopy of plutonium using a handheld detection system

The ability to distinguish multiple forms of plutonium from one another, such as oxide and metal, is paramount in areas of nuclear nonproliferation and international safeguards. In its metal form, plutonium can be readily used in a nuclear weapon, while oxide forms are associated with nuclear reactor fuel. Oxide-based plutonium forms emit neutrons with an energy spectrum that is significantly different from the fission neutrons that are emitted from plutonium metal. Organic scintillation detectors output pulses that are proportional to the neutron energy deposited, and therefore present a means of distinguishing these plutonium forms based on their energy spectra. In this work, metal and oxide forms of plutonium were measured using a handheld detection system based on an organic glass scintillator. Monte Carlo modeling of these experiments was performed to provide insight into the origin of the features in the observed light output spectra. Through analysis of multiple regions of these spectra, in a matter of minutes we were able to unambiguously discriminate oxide and metal plutonium forms from one another and from a plutonium-beryllium neutron source, which was considered for comparison because these sources are commonly used in industrial applications. The ability to discriminate weapons-usable material from nuclear reactor fuel has applications in nuclear treaty verification and safeguards.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

Estimating Potential Tritium and Plutonium Production in North Korea’s Experimental Light Water Reactor

Our work explores North Korea's 100 MW-th Experimental Light Water Reactor (ELWR) and its potential contributions to the country's nuclear weapons program. Built at the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center, the ELWR began operations in October 2023 and represents North Korea's first attempts at a light-water reactor using domestically-enriched, ceramic fuel. Our study examines possible configurations for energy, tritium, and tritium-plutonium co-production. Assuming a single-batch core, the ELWR can be used to annually produce 48-82 grams of tritium, which can supply 2-4 new boosted warheads each year, up to a maximum arsenal of 88-150 warheads total. Concurrent production of tritium and weapon-grade plutonium is also possible but requires reprocessing of spent ceramic fuel. Furthermore, these findings underscore how North Korea's nuclear capabilities may be advanced through the ELWR's dual-use potential.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Examining the potential for detecting simultaneous noble gas and aerosol samples in the international monitoring system radionuclide network

The purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is to establish a legally binding ban on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. The Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization (CTBTO PrepCom) is developing the International Monitoring System (IMS) that includes a global network of 80 stations to monitor for airborne radionuclides upon entry into force of the CTBT. All 80 radionuclide stations will monitor for particulate radionuclides and at least half of the stations will monitor for radioxenon. The airborne radionuclide monitoring is an important verification technology both for the detection of a radionuclide release and in the determination of whether the release event originates from a nuclear explosion as opposed to an industrial use of nuclear materials. Nuclear power plants and many medical isotope production facilities release radioxenon into the atmosphere. Low levels of a few particulate isotopes, such as iodine, may also be released. Detections of multiple isotopes are useful for screening the radionuclide samples for relevance to the Treaty. This paper examines the anticipated joint detections in the IMS of noble gas and particulate isotopes from underground nuclear explosions where breaches in the underground containment vents from low levels to up to 1% of the radionuclide inventory of the resulting fission products to the atmosphere. Detection probabilities are based on 844 simulated release events spaced out at 17 release locations and one year in time. Six different release (venting) scenarios, including two fractionated scenarios, were analyzed. When ranked by detection probability, 11 particulate isotopes and one noble gas isotope ( 133 Xe) appear in the top 20 isotopes for all six release scenarios. Using the 11 particulate isotopes and the one noble gas isotope, the IMS has nearly the same detection probability as when 45 particulate and 4 noble gas isotopes are used. Thus, a limited list of relevant radionuclides may be sufficient for treaty verification purposes. The probability that at least one particulate and at least one radioxenon isotope would be detected in the IMS from the release events ranged from 0.15 to 0.86 depending on the release scenario.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2024

Impacts of future nuclear power generation on the international monitoring system

Many countries are considering nuclear power as a means of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and the IAEA (IAEA, 2022) has forecasted nuclear power growth rates up to 224% of the 2021 level by 2050. Nuclear power plants release trace quantities of radioxenon, an inert gas that is also monitored under international agreements as a signature of nuclear weapons tests. To better understand how nuclear energy growth (and resulting Xe emissions) could affect this global nonproliferation architecture, we modeled daily releases of radioxenon isotopes used for nuclear explosion detection in the International Monitoring System (IMS) that is part of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty: 131m Xe, 133 Xe, 133m Xe, and 135 Xe to examine the change in the number of radioxenon detections as compared to the 2021 detection levels. If a 40-station IMS network is used, the detections of 133 Xe in 2050 would range from 82% for the low-power scenario to 195% for the high-power scenario, compared to the detections in 2021. If an 80-station IMS network is used, the detections of 133 Xe in 2050 would range from 83% of the 2021 detection rate for the low-power scenario to 209% for the high-power scenario. Essentially no detections of 131m Xe and 133m Xe are expected. The high growth scenario could lead to a six-fold increase in 135 Xe detections, but the total number of detections is still small (on the order of 1 detection per day in the entire network).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Technical Basis for the International Export of Handheld Spectroscopy Detectors

The international export of handheld spectroscopy detectors by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to partner states will provide state regulatory authorities and nuclear material owners a way to improve accountancy for accidental gains of nuclear material, including the provision of reports to the IAEA, in order to meet their safeguards agreements. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreements for non-nuclear weapons states requires accountancy for all nuclear material. As defined in Article XX of the IAEA statute, nuclear material includes source materials: "uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature," and special fissionable material: "plutonium-239; uranium-233; uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233". For IAEA Member States to meet their requirements under comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSA), safeguards are to be applied on "all source or special fissionable material," which "includes all nuclear material subject to IAEA safeguards". Therefore, accidental gains and losses of nuclear material must be reported to the IAEA. An accidental gain occurs when a state unexpectedly adds nuclear material to their inventory by various means such as seizing smuggled material or the discovery of legacy items previously unaccounted for. The material type and quantity must be added to the State's inventory by updating domestic records and then communicated to the IAEA.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2022

Operational and Mission Highlights: A Monthly Summary of Top Achievements October 2022

On Sept. 26, Director Thom Mason signed the Laboratory’s annual assessment of four of the weapons systems in our nation’s nuclear stockpile: the B61 family of bombs and the W76, the W78 and the W88 warheads. Addressed to the secretary of energy, the secretary of defense and the chair of the Nuclear Weapons Council, this letter informs the president of the United States of our confidence that the stockpile remains safe, secure, and effective now and into the future as a result of our dedicated sustainment and modernization efforts.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

FY23 Laboratory Directed Research & Development Annual Report

At Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), we put science to work to protect the environment and address nuclear security challenges. Through our transformative science and technology efforts, SRNL provides solutions to the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) for the safe cleanup of environmental legacy resulting from nuclear weapons development and government-sponsored nuclear energy research. SRNL also supports DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) as it maintains the nation’s nuclear stockpile and reduces the threat of nuclear proliferation around the world. Investments through SRNL’s Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) program drive exploratory research foundational to advancements in mission critical technologies for EM, NNSA and other offices of DOE. Our LDRD program also provides meaningful development opportunities for the people central to innovation. Seven Laboratory Director’s Postdoctoral Research Fellows were supported by LDRD during fiscal year 2023. These named postdoctoral fellows are driving SRNL’s scientific and technical core competencies forward through their dedication to research and advancement of technologies. The LDRD program supports established researchers to explore new concepts, while fueling opportunities for the next generation of scientists to join the SRNL workforce, contributing to the global scientific community through scientific publications. Enjoy reading this Annual Report which summarizes the innovative science and engineering contributions of SRNL staff supported by the LDRD Program. Dr. Vahid Majid

Majidi, Vahid↗
DOE OSTI2020

Verification of Arms Control Treaties with Resonance Phenomena

Nuclear disarmament treaties remain insufficient to neutralize the existential threat of the nuclear weapons. Technologies are necessary for verifying the authenticity of the nuclear warheads undergoing dismantlement before counting them toward a treaty partner’s obligation. Here we present a review of concepts involving isotope-specific resonance processes, Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence (NRF) [1] and Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis (NRTA) [2, 3], used to authenticate a warhead’s fissile components by comparing them to a previously authenticated template. All information is encrypted in the physical domain by the addition of an encrypting filter to the target, leading to measurements with an outcome similar to an equation with two unknowns. Using Monte Carlo simulations and experiments we show that the measurements readily detect hoaxing attempt, while no vital isotopic or geometric information about the weapon is released. These nuclear techniques can be used to dramatically increase the reach and trustworthiness of future nuclear disarmament treaties.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2023

Finding of Effect, And Mitigation Documentation for Building 23-620, Mercury, Area 23, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) plans to demolish Building 23-620 in the town of Mercury (Nevada State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource No. B15283), which is on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada (see Figure 1). The purpose of the undertaking is related to the modernization of Mercury for future mission needs. The NNSA/NFO will implement this undertaking in accordance with the Programmatic Agreement between the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer Regarding Modernization and Operational Maintenance of the Nevada National Security Site, at Mercury in Nye County, Nevada, hereafter referred to as the Mercury PA. Building 23-620 was built in 1968 as office space for the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL), who worked on the design and engineering of nuclear weapons. In the 1990s, it became a maintenance facility for Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Company (REECo), and eventually, it became the Real Estate Services building in 2004. The town of Mercury and the immediate surrounding area have been formally determined eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (National Register, NRHP) as the Mercury Historic District (MHD, SHPO Resource No. D230) under Criteria A and C for its importance in supporting nuclear testing and scientific research from 1951 through 1992. Building 23-620 was identified as a contributing element to the MHD in a 2018 architectural survey of the district (Reno et al.) and recorded on a Nevada Architectural Resource Assessment (ARA) form (Reno et al. 2017). Building 23-620 was also identified in Appendix C of the Mercury PA as a Category I contributing element, indicating that it might be individually eligible for the NRHP. It is a historic property for the purposes of compliance with Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) and subject to the stipulations of the Mercury PA. Mitigation Report: The purpose of this letter report is to submit documentation related to the mitigation of the demolition of Building 23-620 (Nevada State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource No. B15283) in the Mercury Historic District (MHD, SHPO Resource No. D230). This submission is intended to comply with the stipulations in the Programmatic Agreement between the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer Regarding Modernization and Operational Maintenance of the Nevada National Security Site, at Mercury in Nye County, Nevada, hereafter referred to as the Mercury PA.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗