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E- Area Low-Level Waste Facility Multitiered Groundwater and Intruder Radionuclide Screening

Solid Waste Management (SWM) operates the E- Area Low-Level Waste Facility (ELLWF) where low level on-site and off-site solid waste streams are buried. The facility has been in operation since late 1994 and is currently projected to remain in operation until 2065. This facility can accommodate a broad range of waste forms resulting from the six different types of disposal unit (DU) options (i.e., varying degrees of engineered barriers → trenches to concrete vaults). This facility is currently operating under a Performance Assessment (PA)issued back in 2008, along with several subsequent supporting Special Analyses (SA).

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Special Analyses for the Hanford Integrated Disposal Facility Performance Assessment - 20102

In 2014, the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of River Protection and its contractors began to develop a performance assessment for the near-surface disposal of low-level and mixed low-level waste at the Hanford Site's Integrated Disposal Facility (IDF). The IDF is a doubly-lined landfill that was constructed between 2004 and 2006 to be the disposal facility for the vitrified low-activity waste that will be produced at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP). IDF is also expected to receive solid secondary waste produced at the WTP and other solid wastes from site activities. The IDF has been in a preoperational state awaiting authorization from DOE and a RCRA permit modification from the State of Washington Department of Ecology to receive waste. Both the Disposal Authorization Statement and permit modification require a performance assessment demonstrating that the system of engineered and natural features will limit releases of radionuclides and hazardous chemicals from the IDF and be protective of human health and the environment. The simulated duration is 10,000 years. Based on the analyses presented in the 2017 Integrated Disposal Facility Performance Assessment, DOE issued a conditional Operating Disposal Authorization Statement for the IDF in June 2018. The long-term performance of the IDF to be protective of human health and the environment was evaluated under the requirements of DOE Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management. Computer simulations were performed to evaluate whether or not the IDF would comply with DOE requirements. In the time that has passed since the performance assessment was approved by DOE, new information has been discovered that had not been considered in the performance assessment. Since this new information has not been evaluated, the potential impact of the changes have not been taken into consideration in DoE's disposal authorization. DOE and its contractors follow a change control process to screen and, when necessary, evaluate new information that could potentially impact the conclusions of the completed performance assessment. This paper will describe the change control process and provide two examples of evaluations performed following the change control process. The first example evaluates a new waste form for liquid secondary waste that was not evaluated in the performance assessment. In the performance assessment, liquid secondary waste was assumed to be solidified with grout. A new recommendation to dispose of the liquid secondary waste after drying it to a powder was evaluated. The second example evaluates inventory implications from changes to the flow sheet that estimates the feed composition to the low-activity waste vitrification facility. The changes result in higher strontium concentrations in the vitrified waste stream. (authors)

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A Systematic Evidence Based Performance Approach to Regulation of Nuclear Sites in England and Wales - 20058

The Environment Agency for England has developed a systematic evidence-based approach to pursue our strategic environmental objectives for the regulation of nuclear sites. We use an annual evidence review process to ensure effective and efficient targeting of limited resources to achieve those objectives. Over the last 8 years, we have been developing and refining this approach to ensure risk-based and value driven regulation. The approach comprises nuclear site and nuclear sector review processes known as Site Environment Review (SER) and Nuclear Environment Review (NER). This approach complements our regulation of nuclear site permit holders under the Environmental Permitting Regulations (EPR). We deliver our regulation of nuclear sites in England and Wales alongside the Office for Nuclear Regulation. The SER process involves the lead regulator for each nuclear site assessing the permit holder's environmental performance across 14 themes, set within the context of the site's main activities and associated waste disposals. Our themes include environmental leadership, resources and climate change, radioactive waste management, facility management and decommissioning, groundwater, and environmental radiological protection. We use evidence from site inspections and working within our subject matter groups to grade current and predicted future environmental performance. We are particularly interested in sustainability and the application of Best Available Techniques (BAT) to prevent the creation, and minimise the disposal, of radioactive wastes. We use risk analysis (strengths, weaknesses, threats and opportunities) to examine performance against our strategic environmental objectives, which are set out, in our 5-year Nuclear Delivery Plan (NDP). The output supports the targeting of our resources at each nuclear site. We consult the relevant permit holders on the SER priorities and use their feedback to refine our plans. We expect all permit holders to take account of our priorities when considering their own programmes of work, objectives and plans. The NER process brings together what we learn and achieve through regulation across the sector. It provides input to planning priorities, supported by qualitative and semi-quantitative evidence. It covers the 28 nuclear sites in England and Wales and spans the same 14 environmental themes. During the process we collate, compile and summarise evidence from the SERs and other sources such as inspection reports and evidence from our other nuclear work programmes. The output is the NER annual report. This provides a snapshot of the status of the nuclear sector and gives insights to enable us to regulate more efficiently and effectively. It also takes account of cross-cutting issues and risks such as changes in international standards, domestic policy, regulatory framework, domestic standards and guidance, learning from experience such as incidents, events and good practice, and innovation, research and development. It provides graphics that illustrate the grading of environmental performance for the nuclear sector across the fourteen environmental themes. This analysis allows benchmarking of nuclear site's environmental performance and the visualisation provides a convenient comparison of performance across themes, sites, and over time. We use this intelligence to inform our investment in training and development of our staff, and our cross-cutting engagement on strategic issues with government, the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) and other corporate organisations. Adopting this approach can provide benefits with organisational reputation, stakeholder participation and ensuring value from the public investment. This paper describes the history of the SER/NER process, a selection of outputs from the process and ideas for improvement. The paper will be of interest to other regulators and organisations across the world that are interested in supporting continuous improvement. (authors)

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NEVADA NATIONAL SECURITY SITE 2021 WASTE MANAGEMENT MONITORING REPORT AREA 3 AND AREA 5 RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT SITES

Environmental monitoring data are collected at and around the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) within the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). This report summarizes the 2021 environmental data to provide an overall evaluation of RWMS performance and to support environmental compliance and performance assessment (PA) activities.

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Industrial Energy Assessment Training Effectiveness Evaluation: An Eye-Tracking Study

It is essential to understand the effectiveness of any training program so it can be improved accordingly. Various studies have applied standard metrics for the evaluation of visual behavior to recognize the areas of interest that attract individuals’ attention as there is a high correlation between attentional behavior and where one is focusing on. However, through reviewing the literature, we believe that studies that applied eye-tracking technologies for training purposes are still limited, especially in the industrial energy assessment training field. In this paper, the effectiveness of industrial energy assessment training was quantitatively evaluated by measuring the attentional allocation of trainees using eye-tracking technology. Moreover, this study identifies the areas that require more focus based on evaluating the performance of subjects after receiving the training. Additionally, this research was conducted in a controlled environment to remove the distractions that may be caused by environmental factors to only concentrate on variables that influence the learning behavior of subjects. The experiment results showed that after receiving the training, the subjects’ performance in energy assessment was significantly improved in two areas: production, and recycling and waste management, and the designed training program enhanced the knowledge of participants in identifying energy-saving opportunities to the knowledge level of experienced participants.

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Past Approaches for Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level, and Transuranic Waste Disposal in the United States—Part 1: Safety Criteria and Treatment of Uncertainty

The United States (US), with its 50-year experience in developing deep geologic disposal for transuranic waste, spent nuclear fuel (SNF), and high-level radioactive waste (HLW), has much to share with other countries. Yet, other countries are better able to translate the US experience and corresponding policy decisions into solutions sensible for their country when they understand the compliance requirements in US laws and regulations. This paper presents past approaches in the generic and site-specific standards of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and implementing regulations of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) using the framework provided by (1) key questions of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, and (2) international consensus standards. Both the 1985 EPA generic standards, as updated in 1993 and applied at the operating Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in southern New Mexico for transuranic waste from atomic energy defense activities, and the EPA 2008 site-specific standards and implementing regulations, as applied at the proposed Yucca Mountain repository in southern Nevada for SNF and HLW, adopt the strategy of using quantitative, probabilistic analysis to assess performance and compliance.

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Monitoring Plan for the Idaho National Laboratory Remote Handled Low Level Waste Disposal Facility

This monitoring plan for Idaho National Laboratory’s Remote-Handled Low Level Waste Disposal Facility was developed to meet the requirements for monitoring low-level waste disposal facilities according to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1, “Radioactive Waste Management,” and the guidance provided in the associated technical standard “Disposal Authorization Statement and Tank Closure Documentation” (DOE-STD-5002-2017). The purpose of this monitoring plan is to document a monitoring strategy that includes (1) compliance monitoring activities to demonstrate compliance with regulatory standards/limits and (2) performance monitoring to build confidence the facility is performing as demonstrated in the facility performance assessment (PA) (DOE-ID 2018a), composite analysis (CA) (DOE ID 2012), and CA addendum (DOE-ID 2018b). The de minimus impact to the aquifer predicted by the PA suggests that aquifer compliance monitoring should be augmented with performance monitoring of the drainage course materials and sedimentary interbeds in the vadose zone beneath the facility to provide a more effective means of identifying performance deviations. The monitoring approach delineated in this document was informed by the systems evaluation of natural and engineered facility features presented in the PA, an assessment of aquifer baseline conditions (INL 2017d), the dose analysis conducted in support of the PA and CA, and monitoring data collected during the first four years of facility operations (baseline monitoring phase) (INL 2023b). This plan provides monitoring locations, sampling frequencies, and sampling methods; recommendations for data evaluation; and a description of the monitoring plan implementation. Collected data will be used to demonstrate facility compliance and to identify conditions that are not consistent with the key assumptions made by the PA and CA.

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Annual Summary Report (FY 2025) Performance Assessment for the Integrated Disposal Facility

The purpose of this Annual Summary Report (ASR) for fiscal year (FY) 2025 is to evaluate the continued adequacy of the Integrated Disposal Facility (IDF) Performance Assessment (PA) and Disposal Authorization Statement (DAS). This report consolidates relevant monitoring data, modeling analyses, and regulatory reviews to demonstrate a reasonable expectation that the PA objectives and performance measures will be met, as required under DOE O 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management. The ASR follows the guidance in DOE-STD-5002-2017, Disposal Authorization Statement and Tank Closure Documentation, which provides a framework for maintaining the validity of the DAS through periodic assessment of facility performance and compliance with waste disposal requirements.

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Scenario development for safety assessment in deep geologic disposal of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel: A review

Radiation and radioactive substances result in the production of radioactive wastes which require safe management and disposal to avoid risks to human health and the environment. To ensure permanent safe disposal, the performance of a deep geological repository for radioactive waste is assessed against internationally agreed risk-based standards. Assessing postclosure safety of the future system's evolution includes screening of features, events, and processes (FEPs) relevant to the situation, their subsequent development into scenarios, and finally the development and execution of safety assessment (SA) models. Global FEP catalogs describe important natural and man-made repository system features and identify events and processes that may affect these features into the future. By combining FEPs, many of which are uncertain, different possible future system evolution scenarios are derived. Repository licensing should consider both the reference or “base” evolution as well as alternative futures that may lead to radiation release, pollution, or exposures. Scenarios are used to derive and consider both base and alternative evolutions, often through production of scenario-specific SA models and the recombination of their results into an assessment of the risk of harm. Furthermore, while the FEP-based scenario development process outlined here has evolved somewhat since its development in the 1980s, the fundamental ideas remain unchanged. A spectrum of common approaches is given here (e.g., bottom–up vs. top–down scenario development, probabilistic vs. bounding handling of uncertainty), related to how individual numerical models for possible futures are converted into a determination as to whether the system is safe (i.e., how aleatoric uncertainty and scenarios are integrated through bounding or Monte Carlo approaches).

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FY2020 Savannah River Site Composite Analysis Annual Summary Review

This document provides the Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1 and its manual, Radioactive Waste Management (DOE 2021a, 2021b) required Annual Review for the Savannah River Site (SRS) Composite Analysis (CA). Progress made to-date toward addressing the secondary issue from the LFRG review of the 2010 SRS CA has focused primarily upon inventory estimate improvements. Inventory impacts dose in a linear fashion and reduces the uncertainty with the CA conclusions. Maintenance items are addressed, as funding allows, based on the relative risk associated with meeting the performance objectives. Currently, there is minimal risk in exceeding the DOE 100 mrem/yr CA primary dose limit or the DOE 30 mrem/yr dose constraint (administrative limit). Proposed activities, discoveries, new information and changes potentially affecting the 2010 SRS CA are documented in this and earlier Annual Summary reports, and a consolidated list of changes since the 2010 CA is documented in this report. The impact to the CA of changes arising from updated performance assessment (PA) baselines [i.e., Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF), E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility (ELLWF), and F & H Tank Farm (FTF & HTF) closures] is expected to be minor for the following reasons: The primary contributors to the SRS CA dose impact at the Upper Three Runs (UTR) point of assessment (POA) are the H-Canyon and Mixed Waste Management Facility (MWMF), contributing 68% and 9%, respectively, to the dose impact at that POA. The combined contribution to the UTR dose impact from all PA’s (SDF, ELLWF, FTF and HTF) is ~2% of this total. The 2010 SRS CA model validation performed indicates that the CA projected dose, while generally conservative, provides a reasonable representation of the maximum annual doses. Doses evaluated are well below the SRS established 15 mrem/yr administrative limit (Crapse et al. 2011). Based on the assessment presented within this annual review and collective engineering judgement, the conclusions of the 2010 SRS CA remain valid and there is reasonable assurance that SRS will meet the performance objectives delineated in DOE Manual 435.1-1. The 2010 SRS CA should be updated to incorporate PA changes, proposed changes to inventories and sources and model improvements accumulated since the 2010 CA. The timing will be dependent on the completion of the ongoing E-Area PA revision.

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E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility Multitiered Groundwater and Intruder Radionuclide Screening

Solid Waste Management (SWM) operates the E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility (ELLWF) where low level on-site and off-site solid waste streams are buried. The facility has been in operation since late 1994 and is currently projected to remain in operation until 2065. This facility can accommodate a broad range of waste forms resulting from the six different types of disposal unit (DU) options (i.e., varying degrees of engineered barriers → trenches to concrete vaults). This facility is currently operating under a Performance Assessment (PA) issued back in 2008 (WSRC 2008), along with several subsequent supporting Special Analyses (SAs). The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) developed the prior PAs and SAs and was tasked to update the facility’s upcoming PA, most likely to be issued during FY2023. For operating the E-Area facility, a Consolidated Waste Tracking System (CWTS) is actively employed by waste generators where every radionuclide entering the facility, to be buried in one of its many DUs1, must be either directly or indirectly tracked. Since there are many radionuclides in existence (>3,000), the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), specially ICRP Publication 107, has provided guidance on the subset of radionuclides requiring further assessment in landfills such as the ELLWF. The ICRP 107 publication provides critical radiological information on 1,252 radionuclides consisting of 97 elements. This database, along with the current dose coefficients that have been developed for these radionuclides in DOE-STD-1196-2011 (DOE 2011), is the critical starting point for developing a consistent inventory limit system.

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Sensitivity analysis of generic deep geologic repository with focus on spatial heterogeneity induced by stochastic fracture network generation

Geologic Disposal Safety Assessment Framework is a state-of-the-art simulation software toolkit for probabilistic post-closure performance assessment of systems for deep geologic disposal of nuclear waste developed by the United States Department of Energy. This paper presents a generic reference case and shows how it is being used to develop and demonstrate performance assessment methods within the Geologic Disposal Safety Assessment Framework that mitigate some of the challenges posed by high uncertainty and limited computational resources. Variance-based global sensitivity analysis is applied to assess the effects of spatial heterogeneity using graph-based summary measures for scalar and time-varying quantities of interest. Behavior of the system with respect to spatial heterogeneity is further investigated using ratios of water fluxes. This analysis shows that spatial heterogeneity is a dominant uncertainty in predictions of repository performance which can be identified in global sensitivity analysis using proxy variables derived from graph descriptions of discrete fracture networks. New quantities of interest defined using water fluxes proved useful for better understanding overall system behavior.

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Improbability of Post-Closure Criticality in Array of Transuranic Waste Containers after Compaction by Salt Creep at Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

Based on the rationale presented, post-closure nuclear criticality is improbable when room closure compacts containers disposing transuranic (TRU) waste emplaced at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), an operating repository in bedded salt in southeastern New Mexico. As described in the original WIPP certification, a qualitative estimate of the probability of post-closure criticality in TRU waste produced from atomic energy defense activities has been low either because remote-handled TRU waste canisters are neutronically isolated by the bedded salt or because the low fissile mass in an array of contact-handled TRU waste drums cannot be compacted sufficiently by room closure from salt creep. These situations are still valid for the majority of TRU waste that is disposed at WIPP without any disposal constraints, as updated herein. This report also qualitatively evaluates the probability of criticality after disposal of TRU waste in pipe overpack containers (POC) where every POC in a shipment may have the maximum 200 fissile gram equivalent of 239Pu content. The probability of criticality for a disposal room filled with POCs is estimated during four representative phases of repository evolution: (1) a large salt block falls onto POCs in the first 20 years, (2) salt creep closes a disposal room in the first 1000 years without brine seepage and subsequent gas generation, which permits maximum compaction, (3) some brine seepage occurs into the closed room, which initiates consumption of the fiberboard (cellulose) impact absorber in the POC in the second 1000 years, and (4) full brine inundation of a room and consumption of all fiberboard thereafter. Salt-block fall in the first phase does not greatly disrupt three tiers of POCs. The compacted spacing of POCs in the later three repository conditions is calculated through high-fidelity, geomechanical modeling. Criticality evaluation of compacted 200-g 239 Pu spheres at the compacted spacing shows that neither 12-inch nor 6-inch POCs are critical after the first 1000 years, the second 1000 years, or thereafter as the sea of reflector material changes to represent the three repository conditions. Specifically, fiberboard and iron isolates 239 Pu while dry, and brine reduces the reactivity when a room is partially and fully inundated. Because POC behavior bounds behavior of other standard TRU waste containers, post-closure criticality caused by room closure compacting containers is omitted in the performance assessments for the 2019 and 2026 WIPP compliance re-certification applications to the US Environmental Protection Agency.

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129 I and 99 Tc Distribution Coefficients of Subsurface Sediments Collected from the Proposed Site of the Environmental Manage Disposal Facility

Performance Assessment calculations are presently underway to evaluate the Environmental Management Disposal Facility (EMDF), a proposed new low-level radioactive waste (LLW) disposal facility on the U.S. Department of Energy’s Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR). Among the large number of input parameters needed for such calculations, are distribution coefficients (K d values; radionuclide concentration solid:liquid ratio) that provide a measure of the tendency of radionuclides to bind to sediments. The objective of this study was to measure K d values of two radionuclides that may pose a disproportionately large amount of risk, 129 I and 99 Tc. The average I K d value for the 10 geological materials recovered from the proposed EMDF site was 52.3 mL/g and ranged from 2.7 to 140.9 mL/g. These values were consistent, but somewhat larger than previous measurements made with ORR sediments and were about an order of magnitude greater than those used in previous EMDF PA calculations. The median Tc K d value was 807.2 mL/g, much greater than previously reported using ORR geological materials. Five of the ten tested geological materials sorbed large quantities of Tc, suggesting that the weakly sorbing Tc(VII) species had been reduced to the very strongly binding and sparingly soluble Tc(IV) species. The five strongly sorbing sediment had apparent solubility values of approximately <10 -8 mol/L. Based on sediment properties and general ORR geological considerations, it was proposed that much of the I and Tc sorption could be attributed to the low pH (average pH = 4.94), low redox status, and/or the elevated levels of iron oxides, manganese oxides, and natural organic matter. An implication of this study is that the areas of the EMDF subsurface environment may have natural properties for attenuating I and Tc movement, thereby potentially reducing risk posed by burial of LLW at this site.

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Corrosion of Steel During Long-Term Exposure to Evolving Cementitious Environments

SRS is proceeding with closure of the H-Area Tank Farm (HTF) and F-Area Tank Farm (FTF). Closure consists of removing the bulk waste, heel removal, and filling the tank with tailored grout formulations. The long-term performance of the concrete and steel materials of construction and the closure grout is an important consideration for Performance Assessment (PA) of closed tanks in FTF and HTF. Over PA timeframes of hundreds, thousands, to tens of thousands of years, the chemical and physical properties of the concrete and steel materials will slowly degrade due to environmental exposure and material aging. In the interim these materials will provide a barrier to the leaching of radionuclides into the soil. Savannah River Remediation (SRR) is updating relevant portions of these analysis inputs to support an imminent revision to the HTF PA and a future update to the FTF PA. This analysis provides an update to the previous PA inputs for steel corrosion. The Central Scenario for the PA analysis includes three postulated modeling cases: 1) Realistic Case, 2) Compliance Case, and 3) Pessimistic Case. This analysis also included a Fast Flow Path Case. This latter case considered the circumstance where the initial condition of the concrete was a completely degraded state and that grout shrinkage exposed the steel to the soil environment immediately. In effect, the steel was unprotected by the concrete and grout. The cases have various degrees of conservatism considered. Chemical, physical and tank configuration parameters were investigated to understand their effects on the predicted time to release of the contaminants. The assessment reviewed the initial tank and steel configuration, service life degradation of the steel, and potential corrosion mechanisms associated with degradation of the concrete materials.

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Criticality Consideration for Geologic Disposal of DOE-Owned Spent Nuclear Fuels - 20255

Decisions must be made relative to packaging spent nuclear fuel (SNF) for storage, transportation, and eventual disposal. This paper evaluates potential criticality-related loading and packaging considerations for Department of Energy (DOE)-owned SNF that could be impacted favorably or unfavorably by disposal uncertainties and proposes approaches to minimize such impacts. Using Al-Based SNF as an example and drawing on analyses performed in support of the Yucca Mountain Repository License Application (LA), this paper explores the role of natural barriers, engineered barriers, and waste form characteristics relative to reducing the potential for postclosure criticality. Several parameters important to postclosure criticality are considered in order to determine which are useful discriminators to support packaging decisions. Using these parameters, a qualitative assessment is performed relative to three options for managing DOE-owned SNFs. (authors)

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129 I, 99 Tc, And U Distribution Coefficients of Subsurface Sediments Collected from the Proposed Site of the Environmental Management Disposal Facility

Performance Assessment calculations were completed in 2020 to evaluate the Environmental Management Disposal Facility (EMDF), a proposed new low-level radioactive waste (LLW) disposal facility on the U.S. Department of Energy’s Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR). Among the large number of input parameters needed for such calculations, are distribution coefficients (K d values; radionuclide concentration solid:liquid ratio) that provide a measure of the tendency of radionuclides to bind to sediments. The objective of this study was to measure K d values of three radionuclides that may pose a disproportionately large amount of risk, U, 129 I and 99 Tc. The average I K d value for the 14 geological materials recovered from the proposed EMDF site was 37.8 mL/g and ranged from -1.8 to 140.9 mL/g. These values were consistent, but somewhat larger than previous measurements made with ORR sediments and were about an order of magnitude greater than those used in previous EMDF PA calculations. The median Tc K d value was 365.7 mL/g, much greater than previously reported using ORR geological materials. Five of the 14 tested geological materials sorbed large quantities of Tc, suggesting that the weakly sorbing Tc(VII) species had been reduced to the sparingly soluble Tc(IV) species. The five strongly sorbing sediments had apparent Tc solubility values of approximately <10 -8 mol/L. The median U K d value was 5,726 mL/g. All of the tested geological materials had large K d values, ranging from 625 to >10,208 mL/g. Among the sediment samples that exhibited strong U binding, the apparent solubility value was approximately <10 -9 mol/L. Based on sediment properties and general ORR geological considerations, it was proposed that much of the I and Tc retention could be attributed to the site materials exhibiting low pH (average pH = 4.94), low redox status, and/or the elevated levels of iron oxides, manganese oxides, and natural organic matter. Similarly, the extremely high U binding measured in these sediments may also be attributed to the low conditions of carbonates, which can complex and therefore solubilize uranyl in these tests due to the low pH, and also the relatively high concentrations of iron and organic coatings on these samples. An implication of this study is that the areas of the EMDF subsurface environment may have natural properties for attenuating I, Tc, and U movement, and potentially other radionuclides, thereby possibly reducing risk posed by burial of LLW at this site. This document is a revision of SRNL-STI-2021-00404, Revision 0 that includes new data describing U K d values and new I and Tc K d values for four Nolichucky sediments. These new results were integrated into the data presented in the original document.

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129 I, 99 Tc, and U Distribution Coefficients of Subsurface Sediments Collected from the Proposed Site of the Environmental Management Disposal Facility

Performance Assessment calculations were completed in 2020 to evaluate the Environmental Management Disposal Facility (EMDF), a proposed new low-level radioactive waste (LLW) disposal facility on the U.S. Department of Energy’s Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR). Among the large number of input parameters needed for such calculations, are distribution coefficients (K d values; radionuclide concentration solid: liquid ratio) that provide a measure of the tendency of radionuclides to bind to sediments. The objective of this study was to measure K d values of three radionuclides that may pose a disproportionately large amount of risk, U, iodine-129 ( 129 I) and technetium-99 ( 99 Tc). The average 129 I K d value for the 14 geological materials recovered from the proposed EMDF site was 37.8 mL/g and ranged from 0.45 to 140.9 mL/g. These values were consistent, but somewhat larger than previous measurements made with ORR sediments and were about an order of magnitude greater than those used in previous EMDF PA calculations. The median 99 Tc K d value was 365.7 mL/g, much greater than previously reported using ORR geological materials. Five of the 14 tested geological materials sorbed large quantities of 99 Tc, suggesting that the weakly sorbing 99 Tc(VII) species had been reduced to the sparingly soluble 99 Tc(IV) species. The five strongly sorbing sediments had apparent 99 Tc solubility values of approximately <10 -8 mol/L. The median U K d value was 5,726 mL/g. All of the tested geological materials had large K d values, ranging from 625 to >10,208 mL/g. Among the sediment samples that exhibited strong U binding, the apparent solubility value was approximately <10 -9 mol/L. Based on sediment properties and general ORR geological considerations, it was proposed that much of the 129 I and 99 Tc retention could be attributed to the site materials exhibiting low pH (average pH = 4.94), and/or the elevated levels of iron oxides, manganese oxides, and natural organic matter. Similarly, the extremely high U binding measured in these sediments may also be attributed to the low conditions of carbonates, which can complex and therefore solubilize uranyl in these tests due to the low pH, and also the relatively high concentrations of iron and organic coatings on these samples. An implication of this study is that the areas of the EMDF subsurface environment may have natural properties for attenuating 129 I, 99 Tc, and U movement, and potentially other radionuclides, thereby possibly reducing risk posed by burial of LLW at this site.

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