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NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA’s Efforts to Pursue Commercial Communications Services for Missions in Near Space

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Space Communications and Navigation (SCaN) Program enables high speed, robust, secure, and cost-effective space communications and navigation services to current and future science and exploration missions. Consistent with National Space Policy, NASA is seeking commercial services for all its future near-Earth requirements by incorporating additional direct to Earth (DTE) providers and introducing commercial satellite relay communications (SATCOM) vendors as NASA’s Tracking and Data Relay Satellites (TDRS) begin to decline. Through the progression of these efforts, SCaN is also integrating commercial services in the cislunar domain. The overarching objective is to satisfy the demands from the mission community – both in terms of capacity and capability – in a robust, reliable, and cost-effective way, leveraging the strong and growing commercial space sector. For near earth space relay, six SATCOM vendors were awarded Funded Space Act Agreements in June of 2022 to demonstrate the ability to serve near-Earth missions with space-based communication relay services. All six vendors are working through their committed milestones with end-to-end service demonstrations tacking place throughout the mid-2020’s. The failure of TDRS Flight-9 (F9) in late 2022 prompted an increased tempo of mission engagement to identify driving user needs that commercial SATCOM can meet in the near-term. NASA has set a course to accelerate a decision to terminate offering TDRS services to new missions and is developing a plan to execute validation and risk reduction efforts with early adopter “pathfinder” missions, paving the way to operational services. As the Artemis Program matures and builds on the successful Artemis I flight in November-December of 2022, the definition of the supporting communications and navigation architecture has further been refined. Although NASA government assets will continue to play a key role in provision of services, such as through the Deep Space Network, SCaN is pursuing commercial services offerings to expand ground network capability and implement lunar relay services. In February of 2023, SCaN released solicitation for services that include DTE services to missions near-Earth and in cislunar space, as well as lunar relay services. Further, SCaN is seeking opportunities to integrate commercial capability into lunar surface communications infrastructure. NASA is also advocating for standards that promote interoperability and strategic technology investments in the commercial sector. This paper addresses the recent progress and future plans in the near-Earth space and lunar regimes, discusses the unified approach for industry engagement, and highlights both the common and unique challenges of commercialization efforts in the two regimes.

commercial services↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA's Efforts to Commercialize Communications Services for Mission in Near-Earth Space

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Space Communications and Navigation (SCaN)Program enables high speed, robust, secure and cost-effective space communications and navigation services to current and future science and exploration missions. Consistent with National Space Policy, NASA is pursuing the use of demonstrated commercial services for all its future near-Earth requirements through a flexible, multi-provider approach that minimizes risks to the user missions and ensures costs to user missions are reasonable. Progress toward this goal is advancing in multiple key areas including direct to Earth (DTE), space-based relay, technology investments, required spectrum regulatory changes and mission engagement and infusion. The transition to commercial DTE services is already underway, with a target for transition by 2024. The primary functions to execute SCaN’s DTE strategy include increasing commercial service allocations by leveraging current commercial network providers and enabling seamless onboarding of additional providers into the network. Furthermore, moving away from government DTE services will allow operational costs to be optimized. A more gradual approach is planned for the transition to commercial space-based relay services to allow for demonstration and operationalization of commercial services for future users by 2030. In June of 2022, six American SATCOM vendors were awarded a combined $278.5 million through Funded Space Act Agreements (FSAAs) for the first cycle of demonstration and validation activities. The end-to-end service capabilities being targeted are based on existing NASA mission operational needs. Accordingly, each company has proposed a technical approach to lower costs, increase flexibility, and improve performance for a broad range of missions. Successful user mission transition to commercial services, both DTE and space-based relay, are dependent on the technologies and capabilities that address gaps in commercial capability. NASA is investing in technology development and pursuing a new strategic approach to the creation or adoption of space communications standards to move the agency toward a commercial paradigm. Wideband and multi-lingual user terminals are being developed to bridge differences in industry services. Building on ground demonstrations completed in 2021, the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab (APL) will be flight testing a multi-lingual wideband terminal (payload) and demonstrating connectivity to both government and commercial relay services. NASA holds a leadership role in multiple civil space standards bodies and international coordination groups to ensure that standards supporting interoperability are developed with defined functions, interfaces, and performance. However, to successfully meet commercialization objectives, NASA seeks to collaborate with industry, and as applicable adopt or adapt to commercially defined standards. As such, NASA joined the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) as an official member in 2021 to advocate for the inclusion of space missions as a unique user segment in future 5G non-terrestrial networks, and to better understand the scope of 3GPP releases and implications for space users. Further, engagement in Spectrum regulatory bodies is being undertaken to augment existing space-Earth and inter-satellite frequency allocations available for both government and commercial space systems. This paper addresses the recent progress toward NASA’s commercial space communications transition objectives and how key challenges are being navigated.

Gregory W Heckler↗
NASA NTRS2008

Certifying Auto-Generated Flight Code

Model-based design and automated code generation are being used increasingly at NASA. Many NASA projects now use MathWorks Simulink and Real-Time Workshop for at least some of their modeling and code development. However, there are substantial obstacles to more widespread adoption of code generators in safety-critical domains. Since code generators are typically not qualified, there is no guarantee that their output is correct, and consequently the generated code still needs to be fully tested and certified. Moreover, the regeneration of code can require complete recertification, which offsets many of the advantages of using a generator. Indeed, manual review of autocode can be more challenging than for hand-written code. Since the direct V&V of code generators is too laborious and complicated due to their complex (and often proprietary) nature, we have developed a generator plug-in to support the certification of the auto-generated code. Specifically, the AutoCert tool supports certification by formally verifying that the generated code is free of different safety violations, by constructing an independently verifiable certificate, and by explaining its analysis in a textual form suitable for code reviews. The generated documentation also contains substantial tracing information, allowing users to trace between model, code, documentation, and V&V artifacts. This enables missions to obtain assurance about the safety and reliability of the code without excessive manual V&V effort and, as a consequence, eases the acceptance of code generators in safety-critical contexts. The generation of explicit certificates and textual reports is particularly well-suited to supporting independent V&V. The primary contribution of this approach is the combination of human-friendly documentation with formal analysis. The key technical idea is to exploit the idiomatic nature of auto-generated code in order to automatically infer logical annotations. The annotation inference algorithm itself is generic, and parametrized with respect to a library of coding patterns that depend on the safety policies and the code generator. The patterns characterize the notions of definitions and uses that are specific to the given safety property. For example, for initialization safety, definitions correspond to variable initializations while uses are statements which read a variable, whereas for array bounds safety, definitions are the array declarations, while uses are statements which access an array variable. The inferred annotations are thus highly dependent on the actual program and the properties being proven. The annotations, themselves, need not be trusted, but are crucial to obtain the automatic formal verification of the safety properties without requiring access to the internals of the code generator. The approach has been applied to both in-house and commercial code generators, but is independent of the particular generator used. It is currently being adapted to flight code generated using MathWorks Real-Time Workshop, an automatic code generator that translates from Simulink/Stateflow models into embedded C code.

Denney, Ewen↗
NASA NTRS2019

Trends in Human Spaceflight: Failure Tolerance, High Reliability and Correlated Failure History

In a half century of human spaceflight, NASA has continuously refined agency safety and reliability requirements in response to mission demands, critical failures, and technology development. Early spacecraft, including Mercury, Gemini and Apollo vehicles, were highly reliant on dissimilar redundancy and demonstrated test margins. Later programs, such as the reusable Space Transportation System (STS) and International Space Station (ISS), introduced probabilistic studies and isolated two-failure tolerance to improve robustness at the expense of added complexity. More recently, the Orion Multi-Program Crew Vehicle (MPCV) program adopted universal single-failure tolerance with two categorical exceptions; Zero-Failure Tolerant (0FT) and Design for Minimum Risk (DFMR) hardware. Failure tolerance variances are defined and managed in accordance with agency human-rating requirements, and require concurrence from program Technical Authorities (TA) as well as the MPCV Safety and Mission Assurance Safety and Engineering Review Panel (MSERP). To understand and reaffirm standards applied to Apollo, Space Shuttle and Orion vehicles, Orion and Deep Space Gateway Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) representatives conducted accelerated research to compare unique safety and reliability criteria against ground and flight anomalies, based on information contained in post-mission reports and the Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) database. In some cases, high-profile failures and narrow escapes have reinforced decisions to maintain or adapt safety requirements. In others, empirical trends have highlighted the need for vigilance and innovative safety guidelines. Given the inability to achieve absolute compliance with evolving safety and reliability requirements, the team conducted a targeted review of DFMR and 0FT propulsion elements within the framework of changing system design, inspection, materials and process developments to formulate conclusions on technological maturity, failure density, and net changes in safety risk. Based on the aggregate performance of high-reliability and failure-tolerant systems, the authors have attempted to establish best practices and guidelines to inform future program decisions. On a somewhat cautionary note, this study is not intended to direct a universal set of requirements for future missions based on prior lessons learned. Spacecraft safety is a multi-variable problem, and attempts to mitigate past failures will not guarantee future success. However, this assessment offers a retrospective review of policy changes, implementation and effectiveness. In the future, NASA, European Space Agency (ESA) and industry partners may benefit from a more robust correlation between requirements and performance, as space-faring nations work toward more challenging, complex and long-duration commercial and deep-space ventures.

Green, Carrie↗
NASA NTRS2020

Architecture and Information Requirements to Assess and Predict Flight Safety Risks During Highly Autonomous Urban Flight Operations

As aviation adopts new and increasingly complex operational paradigms, vehicle types, and technologies to broaden airspace capability and efficiency, maintaining a safe system will require recognition and timely mitigation of new safety issues as they emerge and before significant consequences occur. A shift toward a more predictive risk mitigation capability becomes critical to meet this challenge. In-time safety assurance comprises monitoring, assessment, and mitigation functions that proactively reduce risk in complex operational environments where the interplay of hazards may not be known (and therefore not accounted for) during design. These functions can also help to understand and predict emergent effects caused by the increased use of automation or autonomous functions that may exhibit unexpected non-deterministic behaviors. The envisioned monitoring and assessment functions can look for precursors, anomalies, and trends (PATs) by applying model-based and data-driven methods. Outputs would then drive downstream mitigation(s) if needed to reduce risk. These mitigations may be accomplished using traditional design revision processes or via operational (and sometimes automated) mechanisms. The latter refers to the ‘in-time’ aspect of the system concept. This report comprises architecture and information requirements and considerations toward enabling such a capability within the domain of low altitude highly autonomous urban flight operations. This domain may span, for example, public-use surveillance missions flown by small unmanned aircraft (e.g., infrastructure inspection, facility management, emergency response, law enforcement, and/or security) to transportation missions flown by larger aircraft that may carry passengers or deliver products. Caveat: Any stated requirements in this report should be considered initial requirements that are intended to drive research and development (R&D). These initial requirements are likely to evolve based on R&D findings, refinement of operational concepts, industry advances, and new industry or regulatory policies or standards related to safety assurance.

Young, Steven↗