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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2003

Assessment and Control of Spacecraft Charging Risks on the International Space Station

Electrical interactions between the F2 region ionospheric plasma and the 160V photovoltaic (PV) electrical power system on the International Space Station (ISS) can produce floating potentials (FP) on the ISS conducting structure of greater magnitude than are usually observed on spacecraft in low-Earth orbit. Flight through the geomagnetic field also causes magnetic induction charging of ISS conducting structure. Charging processes resulting from interaction of ISS with auroral electrons may also contribute to charging albeit rarely. The magnitude and frequency of occurrence of possibly hazardous charging events depends on the ISS assembly stage (six more 160V PV arrays will be added to ISS), ISS flight configuration, ISS position (latitude and longitude), and the natural variability in the ionospheric flight environment. At present, ISS is equipped with two plasma contactors designed to control ISS FP to within 40 volts of the ambient F2 plasma. The negative-polarity grounding scheme utilized in the ISS 160V power system leads, naturally, to negative values of ISS FP. A negative ISS structural FP leads to application of electrostatic fields across the dielectrics that separate conducting structure from the ambient F2 plasma, thereby enabling dielectric breakdown and arcing. Degradation of some thermal control coatings and noise in electrical systems can result. Continued review and evaluation of the putative charging hazards, as required by the ISS Program Office, revealed that ISS charging could produce a risk of electric shock to the ISS crew during extra vehicular activity. ISS charging risks are being evaluated in ongoing ISS charging measurements and analysis campaigns. The results of ISS charging measurements are combined with a recently developed detailed model of the ISS charging process and an extensive analysis of historical ionospheric variability data, to assess ISS charging risks using Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) methods. The PRA analysis (estimated frequency of occurrence and severity of the charging hazards) are then used to select the hazard control strategy that provides the best overall safety and mission success environment for ISS and the ISS crew. This paper presents: 1) a summary of ISS spacecraft charging analysis, measurements, observations made to date, 2) plans for future ISS spacecraft charging measurement campaigns, and 3) a detailed discussion of the PRA strategy used to assess ISS spacecraft charging risks and select charging hazard control strategies

Koontz, Steve↗
NASA NTRS2010

Structural Health Monitoring Analysis for the Orbiter Wing Leading Edge

This viewgraph presentation reviews Structural Health Monitoring Analysis for the Orbiter Wing Leading Edge. The Wing Leading Edge Impact Detection System (WLE IDS) and the Impact Analysis Process are also described to monitor WLE debris threats. The contents include: 1) Risk Management via SHM; 2) Hardware Overview; 3) Instrumentation; 4) Sensor Configuration; 5) Debris Hazard Monitoring; 6) Ascent Response Summary; 7) Response Signal; 8) Distribution of Flight Indications; 9) Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA); 10) Model Correlation; 11) Impact Tests; 12) Wing Leading Edge Modeling; 13) Ascent Debris PRA Results; and 14) MM/OD PRA Results.

Yap, Keng C.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Applications of the International Space Station Probabilistic Risk Assessment Model

Recently the International Space Station (ISS) has incorporated more Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs) in the decision making process for significant issues. Future PRAs will have major impact to ISS and future spacecraft development and operations. These PRAs will have their foundation in the current complete ISS PRA model and the current PRA trade studies that are being analyzed as requested by ISS Program stakeholders. ISS PRAs have recently helped in the decision making process for determining reliability requirements for future NASA spacecraft and commercial spacecraft, making crew rescue decisions, as well as making operational requirements for ISS orbital orientation, planning Extravehicular activities (EVAs) and robotic operations. This paper will describe some applications of the ISS PRA model and how they impacted the final decision. This paper will discuss future analysis topics such as life extension, requirements of new commercial vehicles visiting ISS.

Grant, Warren↗
NASA NTRS2014

Exit Presentation Fall 2013

Our current International Space Station Probabilistic Risk Assessment (ISS PRA) model assumes all collisions between a visiting vehicle (VV) and the ISS result in worst case loss of the ISS crew and the vehicle (LOCV). Drawing results from the Mir-Progress collision, we know this assumption is inaccurate because that collision did not lead to LOCV. Therefore the PRA team is conducting a study to determine the likelihood of LOCV when a collision occurs between a VV and the ISS. Kinetic energy is calculated and converted to pounds of TNT for the moving VVs when they collide with the ISS. Different scenarios are evaluated to obtain collision related data such as translational kinetic energy and rotational kinetic energy. These calculated data are integrated into the results from the expert elicitation performed on the Mir- Progress collision. As a result of this study, the PRA model will now calculate the probability of a VV collision with ISS, the probability that collision will result in Loss of Soyuz Crew (LOC) or Loss of ISS Crew and Vehicle (LOCV).

Yang, Qi Rong↗
NASA NTRS2015

Dynamic Modeling of Ascent Abort Scenarios for Crewed Launches

For the last 30 years, the United States' human space program has been focused on low Earth orbit exploration and operations with the Space Shuttle and International Space Station programs. After over 40 years, the U.S. is again working to return humans beyond Earth orbit. To do so, NASA is developing a new launch vehicle and spacecraft to provide this capability. The launch vehicle is referred to as the Space Launch System (SLS) and the spacecraft is called Orion. The new launch system is being developed with an abort system that will enable the crew to escape launch failures that would otherwise be catastrophic as well as probabilistic design requirements set for probability of loss of crew (LOC) and loss of mission (LOM). In order to optimize the risk associated with designing this new launch system, as well as verifying the associated requirements, NASA has developed a comprehensive Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of the integrated ascent phase of the mission that includes the launch vehicle, spacecraft and ground launch facilities. Given the dynamic nature of rocket launches and the potential for things to go wrong, developing a PRA to assess the risk can be a very challenging effort. Prior to launch and after the crew has boarded the spacecraft, the risk exposure time can be on the order of three hours. During this time, events may initiate from either the spacecraft, the launch vehicle, or the ground systems, thus requiring an emergency egress from the spacecraft to a safe ground location or a pad abort via the spacecraft's launch abort system. Following launch, again either the spacecraft or the launch vehicle can initiate the need for the crew to abort the mission and return home. Obviously, there are thousands of scenarios whose outcome depends on when the abort is initiated during ascent and how the abort is performed. This includes modeling the risk associated with explosions and benign system failures that require aborting a spacecraft under very dynamic conditions, particularly in the lower atmosphere, and returning the crew home safely. This paper will provide an overview of the PRA model that has been developed of this new launch system, including some of the challenges that are associated with this effort.

Bigler, Mark↗
NASA NTRS2011

Reliability Analysis and Standardization of Spacecraft Command Generation Processes

center dot In order to reduce commanding errors that are caused by humans, we create an approach and corresponding artifacts for standardizing the command generation process and conducting risk management during the design and assurance of such processes. center dot The literature review conducted during the standardization process revealed that very few atomic level human activities are associated with even a broad set of missions. center dot Applicable human reliability metrics for performing these atomic level tasks are available. center dot The process for building a "Periodic Table" of Command and Control Functions as well as Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) models is demonstrated. center dot The PRA models are executed using data from human reliability data banks. center dot The Periodic Table is related to the PRA models via Fault Links.

human errors.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Estimating Orion Heat Shield Failure Due To Ablator Cracking During The EFT-1 Mission

The Orion EFT-1 heatshield suffered from two major certification challenges: First, the mechanical properties used in design were not evident in the flight hardware and second, the flight article itself cracked during fabrication. The combination of these events motivated the Orion Program to pursue an engineering-level Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) as part of heatshield certification rationale. The PRA provided loss of Mission (LOM) likelihoods considering the probability of a crack occurring during the mission and the likelihood of subsequent structure over-temperature. The methods and input data for the PRA are presented along with a discussion of the test data used to anchor the results. The Orion program accepted an EFT-1 Loss of Vehicle (LOV) risk of 1-in-160,000 due to in-mission Avcoat cracking based on the results of this analysis. Conservatisms in the result, along with future considerations for Exploration Missions (EM) are also addressed.

Avcoat↗
NASA NTRS2018

Synthesizing a New Launch Vehicle Failure Probability Based on Historical Flight Data

New launch vehicles have historically had significantly higher failure rates in early flights than what has been predicted using Probabilistic Risk Assessment - PRA. This is because PRAs typically model a mature vehicle where a significant portion of the early failure probability contributors have been eliminated due to testing and improvements after actual field operation. To capture a more accurate early flight failure probability estimate, this paper develops a method that estimates ascent failure probability starting with the first flight based on historical launch vehicle records. With new launch vehicles being developed, such as the Space Launch System - SLS, a PRA model must be extended to cover early flight failure probability contributions that are either not covered in the mature-vehicle PRA or are underestimated. These failure probability contributions include design errors, quality control deficiencies, installation errors, and environmental impacts. There are also failure dependencies due to systemic errors that still exist due to limited entire-system testing.

Cross, Robert B.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Comparative Analysis of Static and Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment

Implementation of risk-informed design allows the design team to thoroughly explore the risks of a system while iterating the operations concept, design, and requirements until the system meets mission objects and is achievable within constraints. To arrive at a space system design that is likely to meet all constraints placed upon mass, cost, performance and risk, the system requirements must be understood and traded against each other as early as the conceptual design phase. Depending on the project phase and the goals of the risk analysis, various PRA methodologies could be used to produce quantitative risk estimates to enable such a process. In order to better understand the applicability, advantages, and limitations of various PRA methodologies, a comparative analysis of three bottom-up, component-based PRA approaches was performed. The three methods examined are a traditional static fault tree, a fault tree hybrid, and a dynamic Monte Carlo simulation. Each approach was used to assess a generic reaction control system (RCS) thruster pod and mission. The methods are assessed in terms of the process of modeling a system, the actionable information produced for the design team, and the overall fidelity of the quantitative risk evaluation generated. The paper also discusses the applicability of each methodology to the different phases of system development.

Probablistic↗
NASA NTRS2020

Using Bayesian Estimation to Quantify the Risks of Spaceflight

Complex PRA is the best method and current gold standard, as it allows us to reflect changes (improvements) in individual spacecraft system risks over time. Yet, Bayesian methods – using simple inputs – allowed us to get estimates that are in line with high-complexity PRA. Here Bayesian estimation acts as a “gut check” on PRA (supposing a “reasonable” prior is used). Frequentist calculations can overestimate P(failure), especially when total number of trials are few (e.g., after Challenger). In general, Bayesian probability estimation can be used in any risk assessment situation to integrate what we think we know ahead of time with what we observe over time.

Reynolds, Robert J.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Challenger tragedy was caused by an Apollo mistake, terminating risk analysis

NASA’s view of risk changed between early Apollo and the Space Shuttle. Risk was a known serious problem at the beginning of Apollo and the risk estimates were disturbingly high. To avoid public concern, risk analysis was discontinued. Risk analysis was avoided in Shuttle, leading to an unnecessarily risky design. The immediate cause of the Challenger tragedy was the mistaken decision to launch in cold weather. The fundamental cause was the high risk of the Shuttle design. Before Challenger, management thought and testified that the probability of an accident was 1 in 100,000. After Challenger, Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) found a roughly 1 in 100 chance of a Shuttle failure. The recent Orion design uses the safer Apollo approach, with a hardened capsule, launch abort escape, and the crew placed above the rocket tanks and engines. During Apollo it was estimated that, “assuming all elements from propulsion to rendezvous and life support were done as well or better than ever before, that 30 astronauts would be lost before 3 were returned safely to the Earth.” The chance of astronaut survival was only 10%. After the Apollo 1 tragedy, the awareness of risk led to an intense focus on achieving safety. “The only possible explanation for the astonishing success – no losses in space and on time – was that every participant at every level in every area far exceeded the norm of human capabilities.” During Apollo, a NASA PRA found that the chance of success was “less than 5 percent.” The NASA Administrator felt that “the numbers could do irreparable harm,” and discontinued numerical risk assessment. This led to decreasing understanding of risk. The head of Apollo reliability and safety decided, “Statistics don’t count for anything,” and that risk is reduced by “attention taken in design.” The great and initially unexpected success of Apollo appeared to validate the neglect of PRA. Continuing to neglect the mathematical estimation of risk led Shuttle into a high risk design that produced tragic results. The initial design of the Shuttle emphasized increasing capability and reducing cost without analysis or even mention of risk. A retired NASA official stated, “some NASA people began to confuse desire with reality. … One result was to assess risk in terms of what was thought acceptable without regard for verifying the assessment. … Note that under such circumstances real risk management is shut out.” Not computing risk led to removing launch abort, removing crew escape, selecting less reliable Solid Rocket Boosters, placing the crew compartment next to the rocket boosters, and accepting more stressed shielding tile designs. Accepting these specific risks directly caused the shuttle disasters. The Challenger tragedy is frequently taught as a case of management failure. The focus is on the Challenger launch decision hours before, which is a dramatic example of bad management. However, the true cause of the Challenger disaster occurred decades earlier in the Apollo era. When the easily predictable failures occurred, failure investigations focused on how they might have been avoided. The Shuttle was cancelled after the space station was completed because of its high risk. The ultimate cause of the Shuttle tragedies was the choice by the Apollo-era NASA administrator to avoid a negative public reaction to realistic risk analysis.

Harry W. Jones↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Accounting for Point Estimate Uncertainty in Space Systems Reliability and Risk Analysis

Understanding and accounting for uncertainty in risk analysis is a critical step in the management and communication of risk in engineered systems. The component and system-level analysis to determine the probability of a negative outcome and its consequence is often quantified by a point estimate. Many Program and Enterprise decisions involving technical concerns and issues rely on reliability engineering activities to produce quantified risk analysis to inform the decision making process. At NASA, it is common to use a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) to inform the overall risk to Loss of Mission or Loss of Crew that involves integration across all spacecraft subsystem fault trees to produce an overall probability of mission failure. The point estimate is an estimate of this overall probability and is an immediate result of a fault tree model. It is the result of a model where the probability of each event is taken to be equal to its mean. The value provides an approximation of the overall mean without running any uncertainty calculations (e.g., no sampling). Using only the point estimate can lead to a false sense of precision and the point estimate may not match the resulting mean when uncertainty is taken into consideration. This paper will explore five conditions that can cause the PRA model mean to diverge from the point estimate and will provide engineers and managers insight into the importance of understanding uncertainty in the elements of PRA models.

Paul J Collier↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Sensorimotor Application of Proposed Methods to Combine the Effects of Multiple Countermeasures for PRisM

Risk associated with human systems is challenging to quantify but is critical for the mission planning and decision making required to enable future Lunar and Martian missions. To address this gap, the Crew Health and Performance-Probabilistic Risk Assessment (CHP-PRA) project is developing an integrated computational model for CHP mission risk. Much like how MEDPRAT is designed to allow medical resource trades informed by medical risk, CHP-PRA will enable analogous trades in human system risks across multiple CHP functions and capabilities. Human performance is one component of the risk intended to be captured by CHP-PRA through the Performance Risk Model (PRisM). The sensorimotor risk area provides a good frame of reference for investigating the structure of a performance model because most tasks that astronauts are expected to perform require input from the sensory system and/or movement/motor control. Additionally, sensorimotor countermeasures are an area of particular concern for NASA’s Human Research Program because of the increased sensorimotor risk associated with surface operations in Lunar and Martian missions. Thus, a tool that can quickly compare risk reductions of potential countermeasures would be beneficial in guiding research and development of effective countermeasures. In this proof of concept, we present a systematic way to combine multiple performance data sets for humans subjected to different countermeasures such that we can predict the countermeasure(s) that optimize astronaut performance on relevant tasks. PRisM assumes that both the tests that are used to measure countermeasure effectiveness (input data) and the tasks we use to represent astronaut performance, can be broken down and represented as a function/vector of the human systems required to perform that test/task. Through mathematical combination, test data are used to predict performance on astronaut tasks that use similar systems. We propose that when combining countermeasures evaluated using the same test, that only one value should be used to represent their combined effectiveness. We start our analysis with the assumption that two countermeasures together will perform better than each countermeasure individually. Our initial implementation of this framework compares various space motion sickness countermeasures and the most up to date analysis will be demonstrated at the IWS.

Caroline R Austin↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

In-Depth Modeling and Simulation Analysis of Artemis Missions Using the Impact Probabilistic Risk Assessment Tool

BACKGROUND The Artemis campaign is a Moon exploration program with a series of six planned missions, five of which will be crewed. These five crewed missions will contain a single mission segment (space flight), or multiple mission segments involving space flight (Orion), lunar landing (LTV) and/or space habitat (Gateway). Each crewed segment faces the risk of unique medical conditions, necessitating medical sets/kits tailored to those specificities. To support and enable a data-driven and evidence-based decision-making process through out a mission’s life cycle, a software tool called IMPACT was developed. Using probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methodologies, IMPACT (Informing Mission Planning via Analysis of Complex Tradespaces) is a novel tool built for analyzing the possibility of encountering complex medical risks during space flight, and for identifying the medical resources and capabilities needed to treat those potential at-risk medical conditions. IMPACT achieves this by performing hundreds of thousands of Monte Carlo simulations of missions to build aggregate pictures of medical risk. During an extended simulation modeling phase, IMPACT generated analytical results for medical risks, and the medical resources and capabilities to address those risks, for every segment of every crewed Artemis mission. This presentation will highlight the reliability, consistency and validity of IMPACT’s computational modeling techniques and will showcase the library of analytical outcomes generated for the Artemis missions. OVERVIEW During the early stages of IMPACT’s design, architecture and technical requirements collection, “scenarios” (use cases) - achievement goals required for acceptance testing, were identified by stakeholders. IMPACT successfully completed the scenario testing requirements and undertook an extensive operational run phase utilizing a wide range of input combinations with a goal of delivering a cohesive, trustworthy, reliable, vast, and diverse body of evidence. The intent of these modeling runs was to validate consistency in output, ensure solidity of executable operations and to streamline processes by identifying areas requiring efficiency improvements. Using the many missions of Artemis, IMPACT ran variations of operational runs to assess the output for acceptable, as well as unusual characteristics. This rigorous long-term “shakedown” analysis was implemented to help build a collective body of evidence to aid in securing a high level of confidence, reliability, and validity in the output, whether from the applicational components of IMPACT, or the entirety of the operational process. ANTICIPATED ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION This presentation will discuss the various categories of input criteria; the comparisons in the application of these input criteria to various Artemis missions; the preparation and collection of the body of evidence, and reliability of the computational modeling techniques. This paper serves as an initial analytical overview of IMPACT’s probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) medical risk outputs covering Artemis missions and is not intended to be deemed the official medical response for the Artemis campaign.

Crew Composition↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Performance Risk Model (PRisM) Proof-of-Concept: An Operational Decision Support Tool to Predict Crew Performance in Space from Available Performance Tests

The Crew Health and Performance-Probabilistic Risk Assessment (CHP-PRA) team at NASA Glenn Research Center has developed a range of tools to evaluate astronaut health during spaceflight and to optimize the medical set required for missions. Among these, the Performance Risk Model (PRisM) represents a novel advancement, extending CHP-PRA’s focus beyond medical systems into the domain of human performance. Such tool could be pivotal in optimizing astronaut capabilities during space travel, thereby enhancing overall mission success. PRisM leverages data from well-established performance assessments conducted during previous crewed space missions and Earth analogs to strategically predict outcomes for planned tasks, even when direct performance testing has not been conducted for those specific tasks. To evaluate performance, PRisM references the various metrics outlined in NASA-STD-3001 and employs a methodology to integrate different performance scales. This framework analyzes the contribution of various human system task categories (HSTCs) to task execution and compares these contributions to the HSTCs’ involvement in other known tests. The model further employs a Monte Carlo simulation to sample performance scores from their distribution in operationally relevant tests such as those in Mulavara et al. (2018) and, by leveraging similarities in HSTC involvement, transfers this knowledge to actual mission tasks, such as those outlined in the "Human Exploration of Mars: Preliminary List of Crew Tasks”. The current PRisM proof-of-concept includes analyses of the impact of exercise and specific medications on astronauts’ performance, with provisions to incorporate additional countermeasures as data becomes available. Furthermore, the tool is customizable to include any system necessary to fully encompass the domain of human systems and can be adapted to evaluate performance for any spaceflight activities as requested by operational stakeholders. PRisM has the potential to assist the Human Research Program in exploring the capabilities trade space for optimized crew performance.

performance modeling↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Performance Risk Model Validation with Operationally Relevant Tasks

Human Research Program aims to develop methods to support astronauts’ health and productivity during spaceflight. The Crew Health and Performance Probabilistic Risk Assessment (CHP-PRA) team uses powerful computational methods to predict mission risk in both domains: medical and performance. Here, we show how CHP-PRA uses the Performance Risk Model (PRisM) to quantify the performance risk and show an application of the model on operationally relevant tasks. There are various metrics adopted across performance researchers that PRisM can accommodate. For data analysis, interpretation, and integration, we use a method of unifying data from multiple sources by converting each to a single metric. We consult subject matter experts prior to integrating the converted data into PRisM. The method we use is inspired by the Cooper-Harper rating scale [1]. Using this unified metric, we can easily combine data from various tests and lab groups. We explain our conversion method in detail and show how it pertains to the process of testing and validation of PRisM on operational tasks. We conducted an initial validation in collaboration with the Behavioral Health and Performance (BHP) lab. We test PRisM using data on their operationally relevant task ROBoT-r, a track-and-capture task for grappling incoming resupply vehicles [2]. Several other labs at NASA Johnson Space Center worked together to design 7 Functional Task Tests (FTTs) in pursuit of simulating the tasks required after landing on a planetary surface and after return to Earth [3]. Here we use the results from both ROBoT-r and the 7 FTTs and compare their experiment data to PRisM’s computational output to demonstrate how PRisM can support operations by predicting crew performance on future missions.

performance modeling↗
NASA NTRS1974

Effects of positive acceleration /+Gz/ on renal function and plasma renin in normal man

The effects of positive radial centrifugation (+Gz) on plasma resin activity (PRA) and renal function were assessed in 15 normal male subjects under carefully controlled conditions of Na, K, and water intake. Twenty minutes of +2.0 Gz resulted in significant decreases in the mean rate of sodium excretion and creatine clearance and in a doubling of PRA in seven sodium-depleted subjects (10 meq Na intake). In eight sodium-replete subjects (200 mq Na intake), 30 min of +2.0 Gz was also associated with a decrease in the mean rate of sodium excretion. As a consequence of a concurrent decrease in creatine clearance, the fractional excretion of sodium during centrifugation did not differ from control, suggesting that the changes in Na excretion were mediated primarily by renal hemodynamic factors, although enhanced renal tubular sodium reabsorption may also have played a role.

Epstein, M.↗
NASA NTRS1977

Planetary radio astronomy receiver

The planetary radio astronomy (PRA) experiment on the Voyager spacecraft will measure the amplitude, spectrum, time variations, and polarization of radio emissions over a frequency range of 1.2 kHz to 40.5 MHz with the aid of the PRA receiver (PRAR) and two 10-m orthogonal monopoles. Sensitivity and dynamic range will allow observation of a wide range of Jovian emissions from near earth to encounter. This paper describes the system elements, including the preamp/attenuator/calibrator, the LF polarization discriminator, the four LF-IF amplifier stages, the HF polarization discriminator, the translation LO, the log-IF and detector, the frequency synthesizer, the data processor, control system, power supply, and antennas.

Lang, G. J.↗